THE 2006/2007 BIANNUAL ARMY RESERVE HISTORICAL SUMMARY

OFFICE OF ARMY RESERVE HISTORY
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND
FORT McPHERSON, GEORGIA
THE 2006/2007 BIANNUAL
ARMY RESERVE
HISTORICAL SUMMARY
(RCS CSHIS-6 (R4))

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Editor

Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia
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DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen Soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (US Army Institute of Heraldry.)

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United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)
FOREWORD

This volume represents the fifth historical summary for the United States Army Reserve (USAR). It traces the component's significant events and developments during the calendar years 2006 through 2007. The narrative is based on primary sources, oral history interviews, and facts contained in various command and staff agency historical reports, all located in the United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection. The author selected significant source documents intending to interpret the interplay of those forces and policies that have shaped the Army Reserve and to provide a historical perspective in support of the reserve component's mission – ensuring the wartime readiness of those forces assigned. As a permanent historical reference, this publication is the thirteenth in a series of volumes containing the institutional memory of the Army Reserve, serving as a guide for current and future operations.

The history was developed through the professional assistance of subordinate command historians, staff agency historical liaison officers and the individual action officers, the subject experts on the various complex programs within the Army Reserve. A listing of the historians and liaison officers follows the foreword, while the individual contributions of the action officers are cited in the footnotes. The research historian in the Office of Army Reserve History, Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, drafted the entire history. Mr. William Choate, who recently retired as a computer specialist from the Army Reserve G-7 office, provided invaluable technical assistance. In addition, appreciation is extended to Ms. Dolly Warrick of the G-2/G-6 who coordinated the printing of the manuscript.

The Biannual Army Reserve Historical Summary provides a record of the component's performance during the previous two years for the purposes of adding historical perspective to the
decision-making process, and orienting new personnel on the force’s mission, recent activities, accomplishments and issues. Thus, I am certain that all members of the Army Reserve will find this volume an interesting, useful addition to their professional libraries.

Fort McPherson
Atlanta, Georgia
August 2008
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Chief Army Reserve
Commanding General, US Army Reserve Command
25 May 2006-Present
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Narrative Overview

2006 to 2007:

Transitioning the Army Reserve from a Strategic to an Operational Force

ARMY STRONG
Our nation - this generation - will lift the dark threat of violence from our people and our future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts, by our courage. We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.

President George W. Bush

Background

2007 marked the sixth year of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) beginning with the 11 September 2001 attacks by terrorists on the homeland. Actually the threat predates the 9/11 attacks as seen in Osama bin Laden’s determination voiced in 1998 whereby killing Americans was “an individual duty of every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”

Recent American foreign policy has concentrated, as President Bush stated in the 2006 National Security Strategy, on “fighting and winning the war on terrorism and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair. . . .” This latest National Security Strategy was released on 16 March 2006, four years after the 2002 edition. Cold War historian, John Lewis Gaddis, called the 2002 National Security Strategy “the most important formulation of grand strategy in over half a century.” It officially set forth the reformulation and posture of America’s foreign policy, including preemption to handle rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction: the “Bush Doctrine.”

The 2006 National Security Strategy took, like Bush’s predecessors, a more multilateral approach. A joint effort was needed to combat the enemies of freedom. It rested on two main “pillars”: advancing “freedom, justice and human dignity” and taking the lead of democratic nations in overcoming today’s challenges facing all democracies.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates seemed to agree with that approach. Perchance, he opined, “the most important component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.” Victory then will be measured in how well the county molds the “behavior of friends,
adversaries and most importantly, the people in between” rather than “imposing one’s will on another.”

The 2006 National Security Strategy addressed a number of issues. Those included: championing aspirations for human dignity; strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against the US and its allies; working with others to defuse regional conflicts; preventing the nation’s enemies from threatening us and our allies and friends with weapons of mass destruction; igniting a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expanding the circle of development by opening societies and building infrastructures of democracy; developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; engaging opportunities and confronting the challenges of globalization and transforming the nation’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

That last issue was a direct reference to, among other security institutions, the Department of Defense and its efforts to combat terrorism. The Department of Defense was transforming to meet four types of asymmetric threats recognized in the National Security Strategy and in the 2005 National Defense Strategy: traditional (conventional armed forces); irregular (state and non-state agents using methods such as terrorism and insurgency); catastrophic (weapons of mass destruction, pandemic disasters); and disruptive (use of technologies such as biotechnology to counter US safety measures). Sustaining transformation was the way ahead.

Addressing transformation, Secretary of the Army Dr. Francis Harvey wrote, “We cannot be satisfied with the status quo.” The National Security Strategy made “this need very clearly: The unparalleled strength of the U.S. armed forces and their forward presence have maintained the peace of the world’s most strategically vital regions. However, the threats and enemies we must confront have changed, and so must our forces. Therefore, he concluded,” we must transform as quickly as possible.”
Transformation was part of the Department of Defense’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. According to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, “The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reflects a process of change that has gathered momentum since the release of its predecessor QDR in 2001. Now in the fifth year of this global war, the ideas and proposals in this document are provided as a roadmap for change, leading to victory.”

It validated the strategic direction of the Army Plan.

The “strategic foundation” of the QDR was the National Defense Strategy which included its national military strategic requirements. The National Defense Strategy buttressed the National Security Strategy. It called for the armed forces “to be able to conduct joint, multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum of conflict.” That spectrum extended from accenting “stability and civil support operations” and unconventional warfare to accenting “major combat operations,” concentrating on the more traditional offensive and defensive operations. That National Defense Strategy mirrored the veracity of the current strategic milieu. Army doctrine, which furthered its transformation and its approach to preparing Soldiers in the post 9/11 world, was in line with the change. The change permeated throughout the manning, training, educating and equipping of the Army’s force.

The strategy, as referred to above, called for the continued transformation of the Department of Defense to confront the challenges of the twenty-first century. The 2006 QDR offered a “new direction for accelerating” the department’s transformation to “focus more on the needs of Combatant Commanders and to develop portfolios of joint capabilities rather than individual stove-piped programs.” This was driven by today’s “complex strategic environment” of the “long war.” This atmosphere was more demanding and put pressure on the Department of Defense’s all volunteer, Total Force. “The Total Force of active and reserve military, civilian, and contractor personnel must continue to develop the best mix of
people equipped with the right skills needed by the Combatant Commanders.”

In reaching that mix, the total force must be reconfigured. In addition to other actions, the reserve component, according to the QDR, “must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more accessible and more readily deployable than today.” The reserve component must no longer serve as a “strategic reserve,” (relevant to the major combat operations of the Cold War) but not to today’s global war on terrorism. The Army Plan called for this basic change in direction.

According to Gates, the Army must strike a balance in the contest to maintain its “edge in conventional warfare while retaining lessons learned from “low-intensity” conflicts.” “One of the principal challenges the Army faces,” Gates stated, “is to regain its traditional edge at fighting conventional wars while retaining what it has learned and relearned about unconventional wars, the ones most likely to be fought in the years ahead. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.” The linear battlefield no longer exists.

Army Chief of Staff General George Casey used the term “out of balance” to describe the situation. The focus on fighting this unconventional war makes it difficult to have forces ready for “other potential contingencies.” The operational tempo of the war and its demand for Soldiers is more than the readily available supply. This is straining the force to include Soldiers, families, and their support systems (e.g., health care, education and equipment), “which are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time. . . .Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.” “Our Reserve Components are performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced.” Even if the Army grows by 74,000 Soldiers across the three Army components, as Bush has supported, it will take years he said to “restore a force that is capable of meeting the full range of military challenges.” Casey had
four strategic imperatives, as explained later, to help remedy this state of affairs: sustain the force, prepare the force, reset the force, and transform the force.\(^{18}\) The Army Reserve mirrored them.

Casey recognized the need to “adapt our Reserve Components from a paradigm of a strategic reserve only mobilized in National emergencies, to an operational reserve, employed on a cyclical basis to add depth to the active force. This,” he continued, “has been happening for the last six years and will be required in a future of persistent conflict.”\(^{19}\) He defined persistent conflict as “protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.”\(^{20}\)

Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, chief, Army Reserve, recognized like Casey, a change in the paradigm for the Army Reserve:

…we’re a federal operational force. The old Army Reserve was a strategic force and we advertised it as such, one weekend a month, two weeks in the summertime. That all changed after 9/11 -we’re now an operational force. Our nation is involved with the global war on terrorism on an enduring basis. To support that need we have to be an operational force. We have to be much more active and ready on a regular basis in supporting the war.\(^{21}\)

As an operational reserve, Soldiers must revamp their mentality from that of the Cold War to today’s long war. Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized “non-stop” since those attacks of 9/11.”\(^{22}\) Indeed, as of 31 December 2007, 183,553 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized, thousands more than once.\(^{23}\) As of 28 January 2008, there were 127,000 Soldiers in Iraq; 5,300 were from the Army Reserve.\(^ {24}\) Twenty-four thousand nine hundred thirteen (24,913) warrior-citizens from communities around the nation were serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and in eighteen other countries.\(^ {25}\) Today’s Army Reserve Soldiers know mobilization is a probability not a possibility.\(^ {26}\) They must be, as Lieutenant General James Helmly, then chief, Army Reserve said,”poised
and available for active service, as if they knew the hour and day they would be called.”

Who are these warrior-citizens? They come from across the country as doctors, policemen, firefighters, construction workers, civil affair specialists, truck drivers, teachers, welders, nurses and every other walk of life—bringing their civilian acquired skills with them. “Our Soldiers,” wrote Stultz, “bring value-added skills from their civilian employment and experiences. We will continue to leverage civilian skills to compliment our military capabilities.”

These warrior-citizens are “black (22 percent); white (60 percent); Hispanic (12 percent); Asian and Pacific Islanders (4 percent). Seventy-seven percent are men; 23 percent are women. They are young (46 percent are aged 17-29) and they are mature (46 percent are aged 30-49). They wear the uniform as enlisted Soldiers (81 percent), officers (18 percent) and warrant officers (1 percent).”

Of the number mobilized at any one time, some 10,000 are stationed in the country, for example, as drill sergeants at Fort Benning, doctors and nurses at Walter Reed, in garrison support units running installations at Fort Carson or Fort Hood, at mobilization stations like Fort McCoy or Fort Dix, and serving in the US Northern Command. “We,” said Stultz, “are engaged around the world as a force. The reserve components have so much capability that the (active) Army relies on.”

For example, the Army Reserve provided 100 percent of chemical brigades, internment brigades, judge advocate general units, medical groups, railway units, training and exercise divisions, and water supply battalions. It provided more than two thirds of transportation groups, motor battalions, chemical battalions, hospitals, medical brigades, theater signal commands, and military history units. Nearly half of the petroleum battalions and groups, adjutant general units, transportation commands, terminal battalions, and public affairs units resided in the Army Reserve. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Stultz remarked: “. . . with the amount of combat support and combat
service support that resides in the Army Reserve, this nation cannot go to war without us.”

As the reliance on the Army Reserve increased, it continued like the active Army to transform while at war. “We all need,” said Stultz, “to understand that transformation is not an end-state. It is a continuous process and cultural mindset. When we talk about transformation, we develop initiatives and implement decisions that improve our capacity to effectively deliver capabilities to the nation.” Stultz intended to maintain the momentum of the Army Reserve’s transformation, essential to the force’s readiness and relevance as a federal force supporting the National Security Strategy.
At 6 percent of the Army’s budget, the Army Reserve provides a cost-effective force multiplier to meet the Army’s need for specialized capabilities.

Figure 1: Army Reserve Contribution to the Force
Force Restructuring

As noted earlier, Army transformation was one of Casey’s strategic imperatives, which included “adapting the reserve components to a period of persistent conflict.” Stultz believed that transformation for the Army Reserve equated to the “most dramatic changes to Army Reserve structure, training and readiness since World War II.”

With that in mind the Army Reserve continued in 2006 and 2007 to restructure its units into a more flexible, adaptable, deployable force with more streamlined command and control. This created a more functionally aligned force, one of the Army Reserve’s own transformation imperatives. Molding and setting the Army Reserve force structure was one of Stultz’s “most important objectives.”

Furthering the transformation of the force meant the Army Reserve was divesting itself of force structure in excess of its authorized end strength and “reinvesting non-deployable headquarters and institutional Army structure and resources into deployable war fighting units.” The Army Reserve continued to convert the deployable forces into 58 modular brigade-sized formations. The reorganized units were modified to provide increased combat support and combat service support to the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force Packages, as discussed later. In fiscal year 2006 alone the Army Reserve transformed 78 units with 5,076 spaces of non-deploying structure to deployable organizations. The Army Reserve was changing the Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) accounts from 20,500 to 12,000. The additional spaces will be converted to operational force structure.

The Army Reserve will move toward increasing the operating force by over 16,000 deployable spaces between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013 by reducing and rebalancing force structure from training and
support organizations to deployable modular operational units. In 2007, three hundred and eighty-six organizations activated or converted to a new modular structure. As Stultz said, “The Army Reserve continues to improve force structure to meet current challenges, while we better prepare for the demands of future operations.”

Stultz stated that these command and control restructuring and reorganizing measures equated to “more . . . streamlined and efficient deployable commands. . . .” In his view the Army Reserve was “already on track to yield larger numbers of operational forces as a result of converting legacy spaces from the 20th-century Army Reserve.” Army Reserve Force Programs’ issuance of 51 activation orders, 85 inactivation orders, 709 reassignment orders, 359 reorganization orders and 46 re-designation orders in just a six month period evidenced the magnitude of the changes.

One step toward restructuring the Army Reserve was repositioning the Army Reserve’s structure, per Stultz’s intent, from its “Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA)-type organizations into . . . [a] Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) deployable force. In so doing the AR will increase MTOE structure from approximately 128,500 to 145,000 positions.” This will take some time to effect a more “expeditionary” force. These changes were in line with Decision Point 57 to the Army Campaign Plan, which addressed the overall reduction of tables of distribution and allowances structure in an effort to convert it to operational force structure.

Accordingly the Army Reserve was moving its structure from its TDA organizations and placing it under operational and functional (O&F) commands. These commands now provide “training and readiness oversight functions for their subordinate units.”

Today’s O&F commands included the Military Intelligence Readiness Command. This command, created provisionally in July 2003, was responsible for the “ongoing intelligence requirements of the U.S. Army, combatant commands, combat support agencies, and other services by
providing trained and ready Soldiers, mission-tailored teams and units, and state-of-the-art intelligence production and training facilities.”

15 September 2007 marked the activation of the 11th Aviation Command at Fort Knox, Kentucky, another O&F command. Aviation command and control was transferred from the 244th Aviation Brigade to the 11th Aviation Command to execute modular aviation unit conversion. Activation of the 11th was significant as it symbolized the growth and importance of aviation to the Army Reserve. The 11th will oversee the transformation of every aviation unit in the Army Reserve. The 88th Regional Readiness Command will continue to provide support as needed to aviation units until 30 September 2008. The command supplied “air traffic services, airfield management, aero medical evacuation, combat aviation brigade reinforcement, theater aviation support and coordination of aviation staging and onward movement in order to support corps, Army or joint operations in theater.” When deployed, the headquarters will operate as a theater aviation command.

Army Reserve aviation has been a significant force multiplier in GWOT. Elements of Army Reserve aviation have been forward deployed in the Southwest Asia area of responsibility since Operation Desert Spring in 1999. Every rotation of Operation Iraqi Freedom has involved Soldiers from Army Reserve aviation. In fact the Department of the Army in 2007 tasked the Army Reserve to provide ten C-12 aircraft with crews in the Department of Defense’s “Take Back the Roads” operation.

Multiple rotations of Operation Enduring Freedom have involved aviation Soldiers to include relief efforts in Pakistan after the earthquake in 2005. Army Reserve aviation not only provided highly qualified and trained Soldiers for overseas deployment but also provided critical aviation support for disasters at home such as hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Another O&F command was the Army Reserve Medical Command (AR MEDCOM), which was established on 16 October 2005. AR MEDCOM will remain as a command and control headquarters for all TDA medical
units. The 3rd and 807th Medical Deployment Support Commands will have command and control of MTOE medical units. The 3rd and 807th will be direct reporting units to the USARC.57

In another realignment action, effective 1 October 2006, the Department of the Army realigned command and control of the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) “and all Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units and Soldiers from the US Army Special Operations Command to” the USARC.58 This was a Quadrennial Defense Review decision.59 Over 96 percent of civil affairs forces were in the Army and 93 percent of those were in the Army Reserve. Over 63 percent of the Army’s psychological operations units were in the Army Reserve. This will support the Army Reserve’s plans to create and sustain trained and ready civil affairs and psychological operations forces.60 Between 2008 and 2011, Army Reserve civil affairs spaces were expected to grow by some 900 spaces and psychological spaces to about 1,230 spaces. The tactical civil affairs capability will grow from 64 to 112 tactical companies. This will increase support to the conventional force and to the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF) packaging,61 to be discussed later.

The command’s critical worldwide mission was to train, equip, validate and prepare civil affairs and psychological operations forces to support regional combatant commanders, US ambassadors, country teams, joint task forces and other agencies as directed. According to the commander’s vision, “Our efforts must contribute to an expanded and improved Reserve component readiness capability that will provide Responsive, Deployable, Agile, Versatile, and Sustainable Combat Ready forces across the entire spectrum of likely operations.”62

At the transfer ceremony Helmly emphasized the significance of modernization: “I think we have to streamline and flatten our command and control structure to push more resources into the operational pool.” This action reduced the number of coordinating headquarters, thereby
increasing the given unit’s effectiveness. It also provided better direct
care for Soldiers and their families attached to the units.63

Two other O&F commands were the 311th and 335th Theater Signal
Commands (TSC). Their mission was “to provide communications
support in the theater of operations to the Army Service Component
Commander, Army Forces (ARFOR), joint and coalition forces. They
provide command and control of all assigned and attached signal units;
formulate and implement signal support plans, policies and procedures.”64

Under transformation the 311th became Pacific Command’s theater
signal command and had full responsibility for the Pacific LandWarNet,
the strategic and tactical network for all installations and deployed forces
in the region.65 According to the commander, “Our systems and Soldiers
have worked superbly during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom. I am very pleased with how our network came
together and continues to serve the war fighter.”66

Another two existing O&F commands were the 412th and 416th
Engineer Commands. They conducted “theater-level engineer operations
in support of assigned theater commanders. These units participate in
joint and combined regional contingency operations. They also support
continental U.S.-based engineer requirements as directed.”67 Like other
commands, transformation will be compounded as each command’s
structure changes in the midst of meeting its global missions. “Our
exceptional Soldiers,” stated the commander, “and civilian employees,
supported by well-prepared Families and understanding employers, are
ready for the task.”68

The 200th Theater Military Police Command was another O&F
command. The command’s force design update received approval on 13
December 2006. Activation of the command was a direct result of lessons
learned from tactics, techniques, and procedures during Operation Iraq
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Properly structured the 200th
Military Police Command possesses the appropriate mix of reserve
component and active component Soldiers to simultaneously support
GWOT, major combat operations, and small scale contingencies. The integration of both reserve and active Soldiers ensured seamless and rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operation and enhanced readiness through the establishment of a mutually supporting training relationship.\textsuperscript{69} The command provided “command and control for the execution, planning, supervision, coordination and integration of MP [Military Police] combat support and Internment/Resettlement brigades and other military police units engaged in theater-level Army, joint and multinational military police operations in support of the Army/Combatant Commander’s priorities.”\textsuperscript{70} Like other restructuring actions, the activation of the 200th Military Police Command supported Army Reserve command and control transformation, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), and the Army Campaign Plan.\textsuperscript{71}

The 377th Theater Sustainment Command, another O&F command, was the lead integrator of USAR sustainment forces.\textsuperscript{72} It “provides command and control of all assigned, attached and operational control (OPCON) units. The command provides sustainment planning guidance and support to forces in an area of operation. This will become the largest command in the Army Reserve. Assigned under the 377th will be five general office expeditionary sustainment commands (ESC). The ESCs are a critical component to the Army Reserve’s theater sustainment role, designed to forward deploy in an austere theater and provide combat service assets and services.”\textsuperscript{73}

“Five expeditionary sustainment commands,” said Stultz, “were programmed to be converted to O&F commands and activated by the end of FY 08. The 143rd at Orlando, Fla.,\textsuperscript{74} and the 311th at Coraopolis, Pa., have already been converted to O&F commands.” Future conversions included the 103rd, 310th, and the 311th.

“The 316th ECS [Expeditionary Support Command]—which went from zero to Iraq in nine months as it stood up in September 2006 and deployed in June of . . .[2007]—is now the primary logistical support
command in theater.” As Stultz explained, “It overseas 20,000 Soldiers who sustain U.S. forces, coalition partner forces, and Iraqi forces in theater with products that range from bullets to beans, from fuel to maintenance parts.”

A Legal Command was provisionally established effective 26 May 2006. In directing its establishment Helmy stated that the concept was to “provide a single agency responsible for the readiness and mobilization of the Army Reserve legal services personnel. The 99th Regional Readiness Command . . . [was] to provide stationing and administrative support to establish the . . . [Legal Command] in a temporary location near the National Capital Region.” A force design update was to “design the LRC [Legal Readiness Command] and redesign the Army Reserve MTOE legal structure.” As of 5 February 2008 the force design update was in the staffing stage. The command was programmed to assume command and control of 23 units and 1,440 authorizations.

In other transformation developments, under Decision Point 74 to the Army Campaign Plan approved on 26 February 2006, the Army Reserve’s “six Divisions (Institutional Training) will realign under three new [two star] training commands: 80th Training Command (The Army School System), the 108th Training Command (Initial Entry Training), and the 84th Training Command (Leader Readiness). The various brigades within the current…[Divisions [Institutional Training] will be reorganized by specialty and realigned under a general officer training headquarters.”

On 9 March 2007 USARC’s deputy commanding general, Major General Alan Bell, decided to accelerate institutional training transformation by approving a course of action that gave the 80th operational control of the 95th, 100th, and 104th TASS (The Army School System) brigades and battalions on 1 October 2007 and transferred all division (Institutional Training) (IET) brigades and battalions to the 108th Training Command (IET) on 1 October 2007 conditioned upon the establishment of a two year carrier status for Decision Point 74 phase II
units. The Army Reserve G-7 developed a fragmentary order (FRAGO) in coordination with the 80th and the 108th to outline the responsibilities of all parties. On 27 July 2007 the approved FRAGO was sent to the USARC major subordinate commands.80

Other transformation actions concerned the training support divisions (TSD). “The five current Army Reserve TSD headquarters and their subordinate units will re-align under several new headquarters including Army Reserve (AR) TSD East; AR TSD West, 75th Battle Command Training Division (BCTD), 78th Operations Group and the 91st Operations Group.”81

“In September 2006 four newly-created Regional Readiness Sustainment Commands (RRSC)82 [as of 1 October 2007 known as regional support commands (RSCs) to better align them with their mission requirements]83 entered carrier status within the Army Reserve.” They (in accordance with BRAC) will in a phased schedule replace the ten “Regional Readiness Command (RRC) headquarters in providing base operations support to Army Reserve units in their respective regions. The new commands, designated as the 63rd, 81st, 88th and 99th…[RSCs] will provide personnel, information and resource management, facilities and equipment support to the AR units in their geographic area. The new… RSCs will be fully operational no later than FY 08. The former RRC missions of command and control, and training and readiness oversight are shifting to the O&F commands.”84 They are scheduled to be disestablished on 16 September 2008.85 Regional personnel service centers were scheduled to be located at the RSCs in fiscal year 2008.86 The personnel model developed in 2006 for the RSCs called for 217 civilian requirements and 37 AGR requirements for a total of 2554 full time support requirements.87

Fort McCoy, Wisconsin will be the home of the 88th; Moffett Field, California for the 63rd; Fort Dix, New Jersey for the 99th; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina for the 81st.88
Figure 2: Current Regional Readiness Commands
Other transformation actions affected for example, Army Reserve bands, health service battalions, garrison support units, reassignment of command readiness teams, reassignment of emergency preparedness liaison officers, reorganization of the Army Reserve Pacific, and reorganization of the Crisis and Emergency Management Unit. Another action occurring in 2007 was the inactivation of the 65th Regional Readiness Command.

Perhaps one of the most important restructuring actions was the Secretary of the Army’s 16 October 2006 letter making the USARC a direct reporting unit (DRU) to the Army chief of staff. This was in accordance with Decision Point 58 to the Army Campaign Plan and efforts to more effectively administer and support operating forces.

As part of The Grow the Army Program, the Army Reserve’s end strength will increase to 206,000 by 2013. The program, reported Stultz, “will result in a total of seven expeditionary sustainment commands, nine
sustainment brigades, and three combat support brigades (maneuver enhancement) as well as growth in other combat support and combat service support organizations. Units that will be added by 2013 include transportation, engineering, chemical, signal, military police, quartermaster, and maintenance. Building the right force is crucial for success. The result of transforming our force will be an increase in ready, deployable assets to support the Long War.”

The Transient, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account target was set at 12,000 spaces. The Army Reserve will reduce the Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) spaces from the current 5,500 to 4,000 total spaces by fiscal year 2010. The reserve will convert, restructure approximately 16,000 spaces of TDA and TTHS between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2013 and will apply the 1,000 additional spaces in fiscal year 2113 to operating force units. These new units will have combat support and combat service support capabilities applicable to total Army analysis (TAA), GWOT rotation and homeland defense requirements. According to Stultz, “That’s going to take several years to get there, but again as we go along this continuum of transforming the Reserve, we’re building more capability.”

ARFORGEN

One critical aspect and enabler of Army Reserve transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational and expeditionary force was ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation). This Army-wide model or roadmap supported expeditionary deployment of forces on a rotational basis. As stated in the implementation plan (Annex F to the Army Campaign Plan), “ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time, resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commanders requirements. ARFORGEN was an Army process that applies to all components across the operating and generating force. The Army will continue to adapt and
improve ARFORGEN over time to generate ready forces to meet operational requirements more effectively and efficiently.”101 Full implementation of ARFORGEN was affected by increased operational demands and the need, as Casey pointed out, to rebalance active component/reserve component capabilities, part of his transformation strategic imperative.102

Under ARFORGEN, units progress through a series of “pools” or stages with ever increasing readiness over time. The end result was available, trained cohesive units ready for operational deployment. It provided predictable resources of units and Soldiers.103 According to Major Paul Nichols with the USARC G-7, “In layman terms, ARFORGEN training follows a “crawl-walk-run” method building from an individual to a fully trained unit available to deploy and conduct a theater mission. . . .”104

There were three force pools or phases of unit capabilities and readiness through which units rotate. Units entered the “Reset/Train force pool” upon redeploying from extended operations or finishing their planned deployment window in the Available force pool. There were no readiness expectations as units were not prepared to execute major combat operations. However, units can be required to supply defense support to civil authorities among which were homeland defense and security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and consequence management operations. Priority was given in this pool first to Soldier and family re-integration and second to home station recovery. Units carried out recovery, reconstitution, equipment reset and recapitalization actions, received and stabilized new Soldiers and effected institutional training support plans and change of command property accountability. Once reset (necessary actions preparing units for future deployment, rebuilding readiness) was accomplished, the unit progressed to collective and individual training on the mission essential task list (METL) providing the unit was not earmarked to deploy earlier than expected and received a mission essential task list tailored to the area of operation. Once theater or core METL readiness and training requirements/capabilities were met
after a collective training event, the unit progressed to the “Ready force pool.”

Units in the Ready force pool can be sourced for full-spectrum operations. If necessary they can be mobilized. Units may be obligated to meet operational requirements. Units deployed from this pool comprise the Army’s ability to surge. Collective training continued as the units increased their theater or core METL readiness. Reserve component units designated for deployment can be mobilized in this pool to complete post-mobilization training and preparation for deployment. When commanders determined units have reached specified theater or core METL capability they moved to the “Available force pool.”

Units in the Available pool were at the highest state of training and readiness and the first to be considered for sourcing operational requirements. Active component units were primed to deploy. Reserve component units were ready for alert, mobilization, required post-mobilization training, validation and deployment. The goal was to have a predictable, ready force of units and Soldiers prepared for operational deployment.105

“What our Soldiers,” Stultz, remarked before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, “tell me they want is predictability in their lives.”106 When fully implemented ARFORGEN will fulfill that desire.107 It also provided predictability to those employing Army Reserve Soldiers.108

In 2005 about 75 percent of the Army Reserve’s mobilized units were from the ARFORGEN model.109 In 2007, 80 percent of Army Reserve forces, including the 58 modular combat support/combat service support services brigades and 8 civil affairs brigades were aligned into ARFORGEN.110
Army Reserve Expeditionary Force

The basis for Army Reserve support to contingencies was the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). AREF was a management process to integrate with ARFORGEN and the framework for sourcing operational requirements. The G-7, Colonel Less Carroll, explained that “AREF is just the way we organize the units to support ARFORGEN; to rotate.”

The AREF used a five-year cyclic approach to manage Army Reserve force readiness. AREF applied Army rotational force doctrine to decisions concerning training, equipping, education, and leader development. The AREF in concert with ARFORGEN altered “the way the Army Reserve generated and prepared trained, ready forces to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.” It was flexible to meet the volatile demands of twenty-first century war fighting.

The AREF was based on ten operational packages with planned available one year deployment periods. Units were assigned to one of the packages. Under partial mobilization authority, two operational packages move into the Available pool annually beginning 1 October of each fiscal year. Assigning each unit to an AREF package also determined its five year ARFORGEN cycle and when and how much each unit will be resourced in the next five years of the ARFORGEN cycle. Resourcing was progressive from the beginning to the end of the ARFORGEN cycle. The master list of units was updated periodically. Updating the AREF list ensured that all Army Reserve units that were previously not included in ARFORGEN were included and units that were previously included, but no longer in the force structure, were eliminated from the AREF master list in support of ARFORGEN.

Each package consisted of units which moved through a progressive readiness cycle. The units that were low density or unique were evenly packaged across the packages. Each packaged unit spent two years in the Reset/Train pool, two years in the Ready pool as Ready one and Ready
two, and one year in the Available pool. While package changes could be made in accordance with adopted USARC procedures and directives, they should be kept at a minimum to avoid disrupting the established ARFORGEN cycle of the majority of units.\textsuperscript{117}

The latest rules came in a memorandum from USARC’s Deputy Commanding General Alan Bell dated 18 December 2007. He addressed the criteria and guidance to be used to ensure equal distribution of like MTOE/TDA, same SRC, and unit capability in AREF packaging.\textsuperscript{118}

In the first year of AREF Soldiers concentrated on training, professional schools, and qualification courses. In the second and third years, units began to come together as they trained at company and higher levels. In the fourth year, units were engaged in complicated collective training spanning from squad and section level to detachment and platoon level. By the fifth year Soldiers were fully trained and became available for missions. The Army Reserve Soldier like his active Army counterpart must be at a continuous state of readiness: ready to deploy to defend the homeland and to thwart aggression beyond our shores. This strategy, then, was built upon having trained combat support and combat service support units and Soldiers on hand at any time.\textsuperscript{119}

In 2004 the Army Reserve began using the AREF to ascertain the preparation and resourcing of units for deployment. In 2005 some 75 percent of the mobilized units came from AREF packages 1 and 2.\textsuperscript{120} That number was fifty-three percent and seventy-eight percent for 2006 and 2007, respectively.\textsuperscript{121}
### ARFORGEN

**AREF Package Five Year Cycles**

Figure 4: AREF Package Five Year Cycles, FY 08-FY 12

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26
**ARFORGEN**

**Five Year Cycle**

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Figure 5: Five Year Cycle/Projection of Packages
AREF in coordination with ARFORGEN was, indeed, the very foundation of the Army Reserve’s ability to support present and future contingencies. Its planned readiness-based packages provided more concentrated and proficient support to units about to deploy. These packages can be called to duty as warranted. According to Stultz, “The result will be recurring periods of available, trained, ready and cohesive Army Reserve units that are prepared for operational deployments.”

**Rebalance**

According to Casey, “We must continue to rebalance the Army’s ‘capabilities by converting less necessary skills to those in high demand, and by shifting much-needed reserve forces into the active component.’” As noted earlier, this was part of Casey’s transformation strategic imperative. Army Reserve units in greatest demand were engineer, military police, military intelligence, Special Forces, chemical, civil affairs, and psychological operations units. Most of these resided in the Army Reserve. In fact according to the 2007 Army Posture Statement, the Army Reserve had 88 “unique skill sets.” The Army Reserve had over 90 percent of the Army’s civil affairs capability and over 50 percent of its medical capability. Rebalancing involved identifying for restructuring and rebalancing some 100,000 active Army, National Guard and Army Reserve positions. According to the 2006 Army Posture Statement, in 2005 the Army met its goal to “adjust” over 26,000 positions. It was on target to complete the rebalancing of the 100,000 positions by 2011. In fact by 2006 the Army reportedly had accomplished over half of this rebalancing. This was a continuing effort. As the 2006 Army Posture Statement recognized, “We must achieve a proper balance of capabilities and skills among our active and reserve forces and continue to build high-quality units to increase capability and ease the strain on our deployed Soldiers.”
The constant deployment of the Army Reserve has, in fact, put a strain on certain military occupational specialties [MOSs] concentrated in the Army Reserve. As a result, Soldiers in these and other “short-handed” military occupational specialties are being redeployed. This conflicted with the Department of Defense’s twelve month mobilization policy for Army Reserve Soldiers, as discussed below, and with ARFORGEN/AREF which called for four to five years dwell time for every one year deployed. Consequently, according to Lieutenant Colonel Susan Lefever, chief of current operations for the Army Reserve G-1, “The Army Reserve at this time is not capable of performing that [the ARFORGEN/AREF model]... We are deploying people in a lot less time than one to four. We need more people in the force as a whole, so we don’t have to redeploy people.”129

Lieutenant Colonel Gary Kayser, chief of the Institutional Training Division for the Army Reserve G-7, agreed that the demand from theater makes it difficult to reach the AREF goal. “The operational situation dictates what the Army needs and when it needs it. . . .We don’t always have the luxury of saying, ‘We have 20 percent of our force carved out into five year chunks.’ The operational need drives us.”

This is particularly true as the Army Reserve has become an operational force. Lieutenant Colonel Mark Cogburn, chief of the G-1 Strategic Communications Division, declared that the severest strain has been in transportation Soldiers leading to their most frequent deployment and redeployment. Shortages occurred in numerous military occupational specialties, including two transportation military occupational specialties. Among the other career fields in high demand were civil affairs, military police, quartermaster and personnel service support. A case in point was motor transport operators. As Mr. Jim Ferguson, chief of the G-1 Systems and Analysis Division, stated, “We’re short 1,561. . . .The real issue is since 9/11 we’ve mobilized just short of 6,000 of those same 88Mikes.”130
In an effort to address and correct this situation, Cogburn explained that the Army Reserve offered “targeted incentives for new Soldiers and re-enlisting Soldiers.” We base that on where they fall in the ARFORGEN cycle.\footnote{131} Some of those incentives for initial enlistment included up to $20,000 for a six year term under the “non prior service” enlistment bonus. Major Anne Bailey, who was in charge of the G-1 Army Reserve Incentives Program, explained “We… have the quick ship payment [for non prior service] that if they agree to ship within a certain amount of time they can get a quick ship bonus because we want to try to fill our nearest training seats first….There’s the Army Civilian Acquired Skills Program that if a person is enlisting and say. . . their civilian job is [a] truck driver, we can bring them in as a 88Mike and they don’t have to go to advanced individual training…. [They] qualify that much quicker.” For prior service there were, among others, the officer/warrant officer accession bonus and the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) reenlistment bonus.\footnote{132}

Mr. Ferguson noted by using the Recruit Quota Management System (REQUEST), recruiters knew which jobs were in most demand and could attempt to fill those jobs with Soldiers enlisting in the Army Reserve.\footnote{133} As Bailey explained, “It is an automated system that the counselors out in the field that are getting Soldiers the jobs. . . . They punch up in their system and it finds where the units are vacant, where they have a slot to fill. . . . On our end we prioritize which ones are priority fill based on where they fall in the ARFORGEN cycle. With that we are able to filter people towards the units that we need the most fill in soonest.” Cogburn added, “The highest priority is the units that are mobilizing the soonest. . . .”\footnote{134}

Cogburn explained that in the event the need for certain military occupational specialties can not be met, the Army Reserve “will tap into other units and retrain Soldiers into that job.” This was known as cross-leveling. An attempt was made to cross-level groups (e.g., squads, platoons) of Soldiers rather than individuals from various units, which the Army Reserve tried to avoid. Those Soldiers then undergo training and reclassification into high demand military occupational specialties. “We
are committed to support any requirements the Army gives us. . . . We then have to manage internally very carefully to ensure we can support and sustain the force for the long term.”

**Mobilization**

As the Army Reserve transitioned to an operational and expeditionary force and as the active Army continued to rely more heavily on the reserve in an era of persistent conflict, it became clear that some mobilization policies needed to change.

On 14 December 2006, then Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker told the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve that these policies were “not right.” Schoomaker said access to the reserve component was “critical to readiness. . . We need to reframe our mobilization policies and practices [which were] written 50 years ago.” They may have worked for a conscripted force and a strategic reserve but not for today’s operational reserve. At that time many Army Reserve Soldiers had been mobilized for active duty between fifteen and eighteen months. He said the Army went to a sixteen month model to get twelve months boots on the ground (the actual time in theater) due to the Cold War practice of having Soldiers and units re-certified as ready after they arrived at the mobilization station. This made some 90,000 National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers available out of more than 520,000. The deployment cycle in GWOT was running four to five times that of the Cold War, making it “unprecedented.” This increased the burden on the active Army. Cross-leveling, as discussed elsewhere, was being used to fully man units with qualified Soldiers. The commission’s chairman, Major General (retired) Arnold Punaro stated that 62 percent of Army Reserve Soldiers were being cross-leveled to a deploying unit. Schoomaker called this “evil.” He explained: “Military necessity dictates that we deploy organized, trained, equipped, cohesive units; and you don’t do that by ‘pick-up’ teams.”
While there were other mobilization policy changes, such as the ability to involuntarily re-mobilize Army Reserve Soldiers, a major one came in a memorandum dated 19 January 2007 from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. He announced new mobilization guidance on utilization of the total force. In it he stated that the Defense Department had been “assessing a number of options on how best to support global military operational needs.” A question arose about whether or not the Department of Defense had “the right policies to govern” how the total force was being used. Based on that assessment the Department of Defense issued several changes to its policies: (1) Involuntary mobilization for members of the reserve forces was to be for a “maximum one year at any one time. At service discretion, this period may exclude individual skill training required for deployment, and post-mobilization leave;” (2) “Mobilization of ground combat, combat support and combat services support will be managed on a unit basis [which] . . . will allow greater cohesion and predictability in how these Reserve units train and deploy.” Only Gates could make exceptions. (3) “The planning objective for involuntary mobilization of Guard/Reserve units. . . [was to] remain a one year mobilization to five years demobilized ratio,” but in light of the high operational tempo some high demand units, such as military police, civil affairs and engineers, as noted above, would be “remobilized sooner than this standard.” These exceptions were to be temporary. The goal was the 1:5 ratio as set forth in ARFORGEN. The active Army was to remain at the 1:2 ratio. Force structure should be planned with that in mind. Like the active Army, Army Reserve forces were being asked “to do more in this time of national need.” (4) A new program was created to “compensate or incentivize individuals in both the active and Reserve” called upon “to mobilize or deploy early or often, or to extend beyond the established rotation policy goals.” (5) Units and commands were to review administration of the hardship waiver program “to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstances facing military families of deployed service members.” (6) Stop Loss (when a Soldier is
not released from duty] use was to be “minimized” across the total force. Plans to effect these changes were due to Gates by 28 February 2007. “The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness … [was to] update existing guidance on Reserve mobilization to reflect these principles.”

On 15 May 2007 Under Secretary of Defense David Chu issued a memorandum implementing Gates’ directive. It was titled Revised Mobilization/Demobilization Personnel and Pay Policy for Reserve Component Members Ordered to Active Duty in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks-Section. Among the subjects included was continued partial mobilization authority, which among other features, stated that units or personnel with mobilization orders published on or after 19 January 2007 were not to exceed twelve months at any one time, “except at Service discretion this period may exclude individual skill training required for deployment or post-mobilization leave. However, such orders may be amended to extend the period of mobilization with approval by the Secretary of Defense, or designee. Such orders may be amended to reduce the period of mobilization with the approval of the Secretary concerned.”

Other subjects included in the memorandum were: (1) twenty-four month consecutive limit vice twenty-four month cumulative (rescinding the previous policy of limiting involuntary mobilizations to twenty-four cumulative months); (2) primarily managing mobilization of the ready reserve on a unit basis; (3) authorization of involuntary remobilizations; (4) extensions; (5) unit mobilizations; (6) remobilization considerations; (7) 400 day mobilizations; (8) mobilization for training; (9) voluntary Contingency Operations-Active Duty for Operational Support (CO-ADOS) tours; (10) exemptions under demobilization; (11) unit focus after demobilization; (12) stop loss; (13) manning shortages; (14) retired or retainer pay, and (15) post mobilization training.\textsuperscript{138} Soldiers with less than twelve months individual dwell time as of the unit’s mobilization date were not to be involuntarily deployed. However, Soldiers falling into
this category could “volunteer to remobilize and deploy with their unit.” One of the main aspects or results from this directive was twelve month deployments with increased boots on the ground. It recognized as a “planning objective” the one year mobilized to five year demobilization ratio.

Another benefit from the new policy came in deploying units in tact rather than depending on volunteers or cross-leveling; a practice that impaired readiness and unit cohesion. According to Carroll, “We are trying as best we can not to fill deploying units with individual replacements [or] with individual cross-levels.” For example, he explained, “say a company that’s supposed to have a hundred and seventy Soldiers in it, if they (sic) are missing fifty of those Soldiers and we have to provide them fifty Soldiers, we try not to do that with fifty individuals. We try, he continued, ”to structure what we give them into a platoon or a section or a team, or something that we pull that complete structure out of another unit., a donor unit, and plug it into the unit that’s going.” . . .”We try to do what we call unit plugs and that maintains . . . cohesion.” The “whole structure” is sent as a “separate unit to go with that parent unit, the original unit that’s being mobilized.” This practice “helps in family support back home. . . .” for the structured unit and in taking better care of the attached Soldiers and their families during and after deployment.

But there were times when cross-leveling was unavoidable in order to meet the needs of theater commanders. For example, as mentioned above, this may be needed to fill high demand military occupational specialties or, as Carroll stated, to fill a “non-structured” mission or “special requirement.” The proactive and predictive/anticipated push replacement system was used to cross-level, that is transfer, Soldiers from the Army Reserve commands to the USARC Augmentation Unit (UAU). The UAU then processed each Soldier’s mobilization order. Since June 2005 the UAU had mobilized 671 Soldiers using this program.

These changes and programs affecting reserve component mobilization were of vital assistance in sustaining the “high levels of strategic demand
for Army forces, and to better manage stress across the force” and promote execution of the National Defense Strategy by today’s Army, including the operational Army Reserve.145

Training

“[P]reparing forces to succeed in the current conflict,” was one of Casey’s imperatives. One aspect of that was training Soldiers.146 “We will, he said, “continue to provide tough, demanding training at home stations and in our combat training centers to give our Soldiers and their leaders the confidence they need to succeed. . . .”147

The cornerstone of training for the Army Reserve was the Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS). ARTS was based on the “train-alert-deploy” strategy of the new world order and the operational Army Reserve. “Successful implementation of . . . ARTS,” Stultz stated, “is critical to remain ready and relevant in expeditionary force rotation requirements. We have to be capable of conducting training prior to being alerted that has traditionally been done post-mobilization.”148

ARTS was based on AREF in the context of ARFORGEN. The cyclic readiness model simultaneously provided priorities for resources, managed readiness levels, and afforded predictable training and deployment time frames for Soldiers, as well as the families, employers and communities that supported them. Soldiers moved through a series of cumulative and progressively complex training events. This management model recognized that training must be planned, continuous and executed on a progressive scale. ARTS, then, was the visionary strategic way ahead providing the framework to create and sustain a trained, ready Army Reserve.149

Under the “fully matured” ARFORGEN, in the Reset/Train pool units will reconstitute and train on their basic mission-essential task list (METL). Soldiers will complete, as needed, professional education and individual skill-related training. Meanwhile units perform collective training at the squad-to-company level in local areas and functional
exercises. The pool ends with a warrior exercise, “a multifunctional, multi-echelon event that improves unit proficiency.” The ARFORGEN standard was to exit Reset/Train at T2 readiness level and be prepared for a combat training center level training event during the Ready phase. These exercises simulated in theater mobilization, deployment, and employment. Lessons learned from GWOT enhanced realistic training. In June 2005 at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 90th Regional Readiness Command executed the first warrior exercise which trained over 3,500 Soldiers.

An example of individual Soldier training was the ten-week Exercise Pacific Survivor conducted in August 2006 at Fort Hunter Liggett, California. It was designed to provide each Soldier with the opportunity to participate in a training environment focused on individual combat skills and knowledge. The four training categories were weapons ranges (qualification and familiarization), convoy operations training, selected warrior training tasks (e.g., first aid, land navigation, hand grenade course), and classroom instruction covering law of land warfare and cultural awareness training. The latter became one of the most popular training events for Soldiers who had been deployed for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and for those soon to deploy.

One example of the Reset/Train-2 phase of ARFORGEN was Exercise Quartermaster Liquid Logistics for water purification, water production, and petroleum, oil and lubricants units. There were other exercise opportunities for military police, transportation, maintenance and medical units.

An example of the annual medical based training was Golden Medic, the Army Reserve’s largest annual medical command and control exercise. It culminated the training year’s individual and small unit collective training events. Soldiers set up and managed an improvised medical complex with equipment found in an American hospital. Soldiers learned how to respond to medical situations on a battlefield such as evacuating casualties to a theater hospital.
In fiscal year 2006 the Army Reserve conducted eight-day Exercise Patriot Warrior and Exercise River Warrior. For example, in June 2006 the 88th Regional Readiness Command executed Patriot Warrior at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. Twenty-three of the units participating were ARFORGEN Reset/Train-3 (R/T 3) units. This warrior exercise provided year three units with an external evaluation of training and readiness for entry into the ready pool. During the field exercise, Soldiers trained collectively at platoon level and concentrated on improving company level readiness. It provided a realistic battle-focused environment incorporating all the battle operating systems and components/services on the battlefield to enhance battle drill training and sustain technical proficiency.155

In June 2006 the 11th Military Police Brigade executed Patriot Justice 2006 at Fort McCoy. The purpose of the exercise was to provide mission-based training to Army Reserve military police Soldiers, officers, units and support military occupational specialties with theater specific individual and collective METL training. The exercise prepared forces to deploy to any geographical combatant command on order or to perform missions in the homeland supporting civil authorities.156

In July 2006 the 89th Regional Readiness Command planned and executed a river warrior exercise at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. The command’s mission was to improve unit collective training in a tactical environment and prepare ARFORGEN R/T-3 units for validation and entry into the Ready pool. There was heavy use of engineer units together with boat units engaged in executing a shore-to-shore bridging operation.157

In the fourth year Ready phase of ARFORGEN, training concentrated on “collective war fighting skills and theater specific mission tasks.”158 Based upon the Secretary of Defense’s 19 January 2007 memorandum, Stultz directed the minimization of post-mobilization training by training Soldiers and units in the ARFORGEN ready phase during pre-mobilization when possible at home station or local training area and also
at regional training centers. \textsuperscript{159} “'We’re still kind of in a bridging period of doing that,’” Stultz stated, “'because it takes some time for us to set up the training structure and resources we need to shift [training] left of the mobilization date.’” For instance, one of the combat support hospital units spent 68 days at the mobilization station compared to one which spent 27 days at the mobilization station. The reduced time at the mobilization station equated to more boots on the ground. That also meant less rotation of Soldiers in and out of theater. \textsuperscript{160}

First Army, together with the Army Reserve and Forces Command (FORSCOM), identified 130 of 160 tasks trained during post-mobilization that would migrate to pre-mobilization training for the reduction of pre- and post-mobilization training (RPMT) for deployment expeditionary force (DEF)-sourced Army Reserve units in the Ready phase of ARFORGEN. \textsuperscript{161}

Partners in minimizing post-mobilization training were the regional training centers (RTCs) aimed at learning individual tasks. These centers will have the training infrastructure and support personnel to conduct theater specified individual required training (TSIRT) and Army warrior training when not available at a unit’s Army Reserve center or home station/local training areas. The first of four centers was at Fort Hunter Liggett (RTC-West) made possible by establishing a task force using components of an initial entry battalion from the 108\textsuperscript{th} Training Command for instructors and augmented with elements from the Small Arms Readiness Group and observe controller/trainer teams from the 104\textsuperscript{th} Training Command. The other regional training centers will be at Fort Dix (RTC-Central), Fort McCoy (RTC-Central), and a yet to be determined site. \textsuperscript{162} According to the USARC G-7s Major Nichols, “RTC is the final catch-all ensuring individual tasks are accomplished prior to units and Soldiers being mobilized in the execution of the train-alert-deploy construct.” \textsuperscript{163}

Referring to the minimizing of post-mobilization training occasioned by the regional training centers, Carroll said, “Instead of spending three
months, which was the average at the mobilization station, now we’re down to forty days as an average.” Some units were spending less than thirty days at the stations including completing administrative requirements. “So, we’re getting ten and a half to eleven months of boots on the ground.”

Another contributing factor to less time at the mobilization station was being able to “notify a unit that they (sic) are going to go to the theater” sooner so that the unit can begin training earlier. The unit then must be stabilized; the Soldiers being trained are the same Soldiers that will deploy. The battle roster must be set. Also First Army was recognizing and certifying the Army Reserve’s pre-mobilization training which reduced the requirement for more training at the mobilization station.164

Before progressing to ARFORGEN’s Available pool (what Carroll called the “favorable” year),165 Soldiers had to complete a combat training center event or equivalent event and had to certify their combat skills.166 An example was Operation Platinum Wrench. Operation Platinum Wrench was a USARC G-4/G-7 maintenance initiative to integrate USAR maintenance into the Army sustainment maintenance capability and to provide fully trained, ready and relevant USAR direct support (DS), general support (GS), and collection and classification (C&C) maintenance structure.167

Another example of ARFORGEN Ready phase training was Operation Sand Castle which simulated engineer operations in a desert environment and implemented anti-terrorism force protection measures.168

The Army Reserve planned to establish several combat support training centers (CSTCs) at locations across the country in a further attempt to conduct more pre-mobilization training and increase boots on the ground.169 A CSTC rotation involved “collective training in a live, virtual and constructive training environment leveraging technology to stimulate and simulate training at various unit levels.” 170 The aim was to “teach and match the most realistic situations Soldiers may encounter during deployment.171 Explaining CSTC, Carroll said, “It’s a venue where we
can do big exercises, like Pacific Warrior, where we bring in a lot of units for an annual training for two weeks... We’ve got a lot of moving parts and they learn how to operate in a theater... So, the CSTC is designed to be a national training center, an NTC-like place... That would be kind of the last thing they do before they go to the theater, before they mobilize.”

The CSTC training came in Ready two year of ARFORGEN.172 Training based on lessons learned from GWOT included the counter improvised explosive device (CIED) train-the-trainer course,173 convoy training to meet the operational demands of this unconventional war,174 and mobile training teams (MTT).175

The Army Reserve along with other coalition partners played a vital role in training Iraqi security forces.176 One program involved mobile training teams which developed and implemented a program of instruction to train Afghan National Army noncommissioned officers.177

**Equipment**

Another one of Casey’s strategic imperatives was resetting the Army to be ready for future conflicts. That included equipment. Casey noted: “Since 2003 equipment has been used at rates at over five times [expected] and it has been used in harsh, demanding desert and mountainous environments.”178 Equipment must be fixed, replaced and upgraded.179 In 2007 alone, 4,139 pieces of Army Reserve equipment were overhauled.180

Equipment needs have changed as the battlefield has changed. According to Stultz, “When our force was a strategic reserve, our combat support units were considered theater-level units that operated in the rear. They didn’t need night-vision gear or 50-caliber machine guns. Well, the ‘rear’ doesn’t exist anymore, and on today’s asymmetric battlefield, our Soldiers must be equipped and fully prepared for attacks and ambushes because the front line is everywhere in this war.”181

The Army Reserve endeavored to fulfill ARFORGEN requirements while balancing equipment and logistics constraints. That required having
the right equipment available in the right place at the right time and having adequate resources. The train-alert-deploy strategy under ARFORGEN and the twelve month mobilization policy required higher levels of equipment use to meet training and readiness objectives for an operational Army Reserve.

Largely in response to ARFORGEN, AREF and the Army Reserve training strategy the Army Reserve has developed a new equipment and training strategy, which replaced the ARLOG XXI (Army Reserve Logistics for the Twenty-First Century) program. The new strategy included maintaining equipment at four main areas: individual training sites, home station, collective training sites and strategic deployment sites. Go-to-war equipment will be positioned at the various sites to provide training to Soldiers as they go through ARFORGEN/AREF. In the new strategy, units will move to the equipment located at the training sites instead of moving equipment to the units. Creating these centrally located sites will foster efficient resourcing and maintenance of equipment. In 2007 over 6,700 pieces of equipment were moved to the sites. Over 2,000 pieces of equipment were moved to support the Army Reserve training strategy at Fort Hunter Liggett.

Individual equipment like night vision goggles will continue to be positioned at home stations to provide effective training and to “support homeland defense requirements.” “Some of the equipment will be consolidated in individual training sites” where Soldiers focused and qualified on individual, “job-related skills.”

At the strategic deployment sites major end item equipment will be inspected and assembled into unit sets and then placed in controlled humidity storage. By this time units have progressed through AREF individual and collective training and have been validated for deployment and are in the available pool—set to deploy. The equipment will be shipped directly to theater.

As the Army Reserve continued to restructure the force, the USARC issued guidance and clarification concerning how area maintenance
support activities and equipment concentration sites were to set their work priorities once the regional support commands (RSCs) have BASOPS responsibilities. The deployment expeditionary force (DEF) in year five of ARFORGEN had top priority. These were units sourced against a future requirement, had been alerted for mobilization, or were currently mobilized. The next priority in year five was the contingency expeditionary force (CEF) which included, among others, equipment needed for homeland defense or disaster response. The G-4 met all logistics mobilization requirements for 190 DEF and CEF units through innovative and intensive management of resources and logistics readiness.

To meet the equipment needs of mobilizing units, the G-4 worked to resolve in just one six month period over 2,500 items required for mobilizing units, fixed all equipment shortages for deployment expeditionary force units, and coordinated with FORSCOM for equipment not in the Army Reserve inventory. The G-4 coordinated with FORSCOM, First Army and Third US Army/Coalition Forces Land Component Command for sourcing Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom rotation units. Regional readiness commands filled shortages with major Class VII equipment excess from inactivating and non-deploying units. Any remaining shortages were forwarded to the USARC for assistance. According to the G-4, no units have been deployed without their mission essential equipment.

The G-4 conducted analyses of units to identify the best units logistically to be sourced with equipment for the deployment expeditionary force. It implemented new procedures to gather required logistical fix-it plans from the regional readiness commands and operational and functional commands for their units on the deployment expeditionary force list. The G-4 served as the focal point for the accountability and tracking of Army Reserve equipment remaining as stay behind equipment and later transferred to property books as theater provided equipment. It developed and tracked the unit equipment on hand,
requisitioning, and lateral transfer status ensuring activating and converting units accomplished the necessary tasks required to implement force structure action.

At home, the G-4 coordinated with the USARC’s G-3, Homeland Defense, to conduct a logistical analysis of units selected for homeland defense operations.\textsuperscript{194}

The G-4 Depot Maintenance Program was the Army Reserve’s strategic maintenance sustainment base and was the only source of fully reconditioned/overhauled weapons systems and equipment replenishment or redistribution used to fill equipment readiness needs.\textsuperscript{195} The total funding for the fiscal year 2007 program was $129.173 million. Late in that fiscal year $15.2 million was reprogrammed from under-executed, lower priority programs into the Depot Maintenance Program, resulting in a $144.373 million execution rate for the fiscal year. According to Stultz, 4,139 pieces of equipment were overhauled as part of the program.\textsuperscript{196} In fiscal year 2006 the G-4 inducted 5,337 major end items and 30,725 items for calibration into depot maintenance.\textsuperscript{197} More then 45,000 pieces of Army Reserve equipment were scheduled to be inducted into the Depot Maintenance Overhaul/Rebuild Program in fiscal year 2008. As of 31 December 2007, the Army Reserve had obligated $64 million (49 percent) of its fiscal year Depot Maintenance Program.\textsuperscript{198}

Looking to the future, the G-4 participated in the development of the Global Service Support-Army system and the Single Army Logistics Enterprise Program. The G-4 began fielding the Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced system.\textsuperscript{199}

While there were successes in logistics and equipment as noted above, including the fielding of over 17,000 pieces of equipment in 2007,\textsuperscript{200} there remained challenges to logistically transforming and sustaining the Army Reserve as an operational force. As of early 2008, the reserve had 66 percent of its required wartime equipment. That meant the availability of some equipment lagged behind its need. Less than 33 percent of night vision devices and sights were on hand. Of the line haul tractors available
over 50 percent were the older A1 models with less power and towing capacity. Individual force protection items were at less than 50 percent fill. The five ton fleet was modular force compatible, but was primarily the aged M900 series vehicles. There were problems with non-modular force compatible equipment, such as the 2.5 ton truck. There was a need to build and renovate facilities to support modernized equipment.\footnote{201}

The expanded training requirements necessary to support the train-alert-deploy strategy under ARFORGEN and the new twelve month mobilization policy required higher levels of equipment use to meet training and readiness objectives for an operational Army Reserve. More full time support, tools, repair parts and, consumables were needed to meet requirements of additional equipment and the higher training tempo.\footnote{202}

In congressional testimony, Stultz pointed out the challenge of training on modern equipment when he stated, “I’ve got almost 3,500 of the old M-35 deuce-and-a-halves, the old trucks that we used back in Vietnam. Those are not the trucks we need to train on for our Soldiers, because that’s not the truck they’ll operate in theater.” Added to this problem is the shortage of equipment to train on. We’re going to operate up-armored Humvees when we get into theater. Out of 1,000 or so that I’m authorized, right now I’ve got 23, because all of them are in theater.”\footnote{203}

On the positive side, and in addition to major accomplishments detailed above, the reserve received the resources needed to reset units.\footnote{204} In fiscal year 2007, 228 units completed reset. The backlog of units processing through the program was reduced.\footnote{205} Carroll applauded the G-4s attempt to get the right equipment for training and funding to upgrade old equipment. He noted that the Army Reserve was no longer getting “what’s left over. . . .Units are getting plenty of equipment to train [on], but it is a definite juggling act by the G-4 to make that happen.”\footnote{206} According to Stultz, “the Army Reserve is projected to receive about $5.6 billion in the next six years to buy new equipment for current and future Army Reserve units. Funding from supplementals has been extremely
important in filling shortages and replacing the non-deployable equipment.”

Recruitment and Retention of the Force

The continuing, persistent Global War on Terrorism and its high operational tempo challenged the Army Reserve to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of quality Soldiers to meet immediate personnel requirements. This was part of Casey’s strategic imperative of sustaining the force. “Our warriors,” he stated, “are our ultimate asymmetric advantage, the one thing that no enemy can duplicate now or in the future and we need to keep them with us.” Sustaining the force meant “transforming quality recruits into Soldiers who are physically tough, mentally adaptive and live the Warrior Ethos. These Warriors are our ultimate asymmetric advantage.-the one thing that cannot be matched by our adversaries-now or in the future.” “Recruiting,” said Stultz, “in this period of protracted war is one of the greatest challenges in the history of the all-volunteer force. . . .”

The US Army Recruiting Command stated the goal for Army Reserve Soldiers recruited in fiscal year 2005 was 22,175. Yet only 19,400 were recruited. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) noted that in 2006 the National Guard and the Reserve “experienced a turnaround in recruiting…approaching their goals for the number of accessions.” According to the Recruiting Command, in fiscal year 2006 the goal was 25,500; the actual number successfully recruited was 25,378. In 2007, 39,055 Soldiers were recruited. Stultz said the recruiting goals for fiscal year 2007 were met “for the first time since 2004.”

As a recruiting incentive, on 15 May 2007 Stultz signed a memorandum concerning implementation guidance for a twenty-four month deployment stabilization period for Soldiers from the active component and IRR transferring to the Army Reserve. “Effectively immediately,” wrote Stultz, “the Army Reserve will begin offering a mobilization deferment from involuntary mobilization for a period of 24 months. The role of the
Army Reserve Soldier has become increasingly demanding as we have moved from a strategic to an operational force. Offering a deferment from involuntary mobilization for 24 months will provide predictability for Families and allow adequate transitioning time for Soldiers.” Active component Soldiers transferring directly into a TPU were granted the twenty-four month stabilization period. “RC Soldiers who transfer from the IRR [Irregular Ready Reserve] and are returning to a TPU [Troop Program Unit] of the Selected Reserve (SELRES), and who have completed their prior SELRES obligation,” Stultz explained, “will be authorized the 24-month stabilization period. Additionally, the 24-month stabilization period will also be authorized to IRR Soldiers whose last period of service was on active duty or active service incurred by mobilization orders.” The policy did not apply to TPU Soldiers reenlisting for another term in the Army Reserve.216

As noted above, there were several incentives the Army Reserve used to recruit Soldiers, especially those in high demand military occupational specialties. On 1 July 2007, the Army Reserve began another recruiting initiative, the Army Reserve Recruiting Assistance Program (AR-RAP).217 The Army Reserve G-1 was the proponent of the program and had oversight of it.218

This was a civilian contracted program which rewarded Army Reserve Soldiers who served on a voluntary basis as recruiting assistants. The recruiting assistants acted as liaisons between the prospective recruit, the Army Reserve recruiter, and leadership from the assigned unit. When announcing the program, Stultz said, “Soldiers, you can earn $2,000, while helping the Army Reserve fill its ranks.”219 He was referring to the financial incentives of up to $2,000 Soldiers can receive for each recruit. In essence each Soldier can be a recruiter.220 As of 2 April 2008, there were 23,237 active recruiting assistants resulting in 4,613 nominations and 715 accessions.221

As far as retention was concerned, in 2005 the Army exceeded its retention goals in all three components.222 The Army Reserve closed out
fiscal year 2006 at 103 percent of its retention mission, with 18,243 Soldiers reenlisting. The goal was to retain 17,712 Soldiers. According to Stultz, “In 2007, we exceeded our re-enlistment goal for first-term Soldiers by 155 percent—the highest rate in a decade—and careerist-re-enlistments finished at 103 percent. To re-enlist at a time of war is a powerful commitment. It says a great deal about our noncommissioned officers and our Army.” Stultz set the retention rate in fiscal year 2007 at 19,727. The Army 2006 Posture Statement recorded that the retention rate for the Army Reserve in fiscal year 2003 was 13,749; 16,330 in fiscal year 2004; and 16,485 in fiscal year 2005.

Retention was in part due to increased incentives for reenlistment, “among the highest of the decade,” as distinct from recruiting incentives. In 2006 the reserve spent a total of nearly $174 million on reenlistment bonuses for drilling Soldiers and between $3 and $12 million annually in the 2000-2004 time frame.

Particular retention initiatives included, for example, the secretary of defense-authorized command responsibility pay bonuses for officers serving in positions of special responsibility. The number of officers eligible for bonuses was capped within each officer grade. Another retention initiative was ARFORGEN designated unit pay. This program was included in the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act. It afforded payment for non-obligated Soldiers in key critical skills and units such as those Soldiers belonging to ARFORGEN units earmarked for deployment and who make a service commitment. This may lower the need to cross-level Soldiers by raising more volunteers and keeping Soldiers in high priority units. Another retention incentive was the critical skills retention bonus designed for Soldiers in high priority units.

According to studies the CBO examined “factors that service members cite as negatively affecting their intention to stay in the military [were]: stress associated with high workload and long work hours while deployed, uncertainties surrounding deployment dates, short-notice deployments,
and insufficient downtime between deployments.” Another reason was family separation.\textsuperscript{230}

The Army Reserve faced several challenges in sustaining the force and meeting its authorized end strength of 205,000. Prior to fiscal year 2005, the Army Reserve gained more Soldiers from the active component and National Guard than it lost. From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2006 the trend reversed for both components and the Army Reserve lost more Soldiers than it gained from the active Army and National Guard. In fiscal year 2007 the Army Reserve lost 9,500 Soldiers to the active component and National Guard vice a gain of only 4,300. One out of four losses was a transfer to the active Army or National Guard.\textsuperscript{231} “According to Stultz, “The biggest challenge I’ve got right now in maintaining my force structure is competing with the active Army. The Army is out trying to grow their end strength and they’re trying to recruit the same Soldiers that we’re trying to recruit into the Reserve, and so we’re competing with each other.”\textsuperscript{232}
Figure 6: Active Army Losses and Gains
Figure 7: National Guard Losses and Gains
The G-1 reported the end strength for fiscal year 2007 to be 189,014 which was 15,986 below the congressionally directed end strength objective of 205,000.233

The Selected Reserve (SELRES) strength for fiscal year 2007 was slightly lower than that for fiscal year 2006 but still higher than fiscal year 2005 (189,005). The main reason for the fluctuations in strength was the Troop Program Unit component of the SELRES. The decrease in SELRES strength in fiscal year 2007 was due to TPU commissioned officer losses, mainly due to an increase in retirements. Commissioned officer strength decreased 420 over the course of fiscal year 2007. TPU enlisted and warrant officer strength, along with AGR end strength, increased in fiscal year 2007. AGR strength ended the year at 15,608 above the end strength objective of 15,416 and was a 1.9 percent increase in overall from the beginning strength of 15,608. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) continued to “ramp down” to end 2007 at 4,302, a loss of 179.

**Full Time Support**

Full time support personnel included AGR Soldiers, DA civilians, and military technicians. Full time support personnel served in diverse positions throughout the Army Reserve. Operations personnel, for example, planned the training to move Soldiers through ARFORGEN. Human resources personnel directed the life cycle management of unit personnel to make certain the right Soldier was in the “right place at the right time.” They also coordinated with unit training personnel to ensure personnel were scheduled for and attended military schooling for “career competency, progression, and enhancement.”234

In fiscal year 2005, the DoD average full time support manning level was 21 percent of end strength. The total for the Army Reserve was 11.3 percent, the lowest of all reserve components within the Department of Defense.235 The end state for current growth in full time support will result in AGR authorizations that are 76 percent of requirements and

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technician authorizations that are 69 percent of validated requirements. The current level of full time support was insufficient to support an operational Army Reserve. The OPTEMPO and the new twelve month mobilization policy has necessitated a reexamination of full time support requirements and resourcing. Additional full time support requirements were needed to ensure the Army Reserve can meet the readiness demands of ARFORGEN.236

On 24 February 2006, Major General Stultz, then the USARC deputy commanding general, signed a memorandum directing the use of AGR personnel to augment rotational support of worldwide operations in order to mitigate current and future operation shortfalls. The intent was to use the AGR force in the table of distribution and allowances headquarters organizations to fill personnel shortfalls in units designated to mobilize and/or deploy in support of worldwide operations. Each command/organization was to provide up to 20 percent of assigned AGR personnel annually to meet the requirements. The selection program was to be centralized at AR G-1 and the USARC’s Full Time Support Directorate (FTSD). The intent of the FTSD selection program was to ensure that the program was fair and equitable to all headquarters, USARC AGR Soldiers and their directorates or special staffs.237 Transformation of the AGR force into one that matched the current OPTEMPO took on increased significance in 2007.238

As the Army Reserve migrates into implementation of ARFORGEN it will be necessary to revise AGR management business practices.239 It was the CAR’s intent “to modernize the [Army Reserve] AGR program into a professionally competent force of trained, experienced leaders in our core competencies who by virtue of serving with our operating formations help us grow AR leaders and improve readiness.”240
Well-Being of Soldiers

Taking care of Soldiers and their families was a key objective of the Army Campaign Plan. Casey stressed its importance as part of his strategic imperative on sustaining the force.241 In his testimony on 26 September 2007 before the House Armed Services Committee, he remarked:

We recognize the strain on Families, and we are aware that Families play an important role in maintaining the readiness of our all-volunteer force. We will therefore ensure that their quality of life is commensurate with their quality of service. We will also ensure that our Wounded Warriors are cared for and reintegrated into the Army and society and we will never forget our moral obligation to the spouses, children and Families who have lost their Soldier since September 11th.242

He further stated when addressing the need to reset units: “. . . we must also revitalize our Soldiers and Families by providing them time and opportunity to recover in order to reverse the cumulative effects of sustained high operational tempo.”243 In short, the well-being of families was critical to the well-being and readiness of Soldiers.244

This extended to the Army Reserve. According to Stultz, “We must understand that we’re asking more of our Soldiers today, and we must ensure that the quality of life our Soldiers and their families enjoy matches the quality of service they give the nation.”245 “We need to rededicate ourselves to acknowledge the sacrifice and commitment of families and employers. . . .Our military is an all volunteer force that needs a stronger connection with ‘home town America and our ‘Army Reserve Communities’ are critical nodes in that support network.”246

An indication of the CAR’s emphasis on Soldier and family welfare was the Well-Being Advisory Council which provided strategic oversight of the well-being process. It was directly responsible to the CAR. The council represented not only Soldiers and families but also civilians, retirees and veterans.247
In the area of fostering family support, the Army Reserve established a Child and Youth Services (CYS) Directorate to provide services supporting the readiness and well-being of families. According to CYS program manager Pamela McBride, “Providing community-based activities for the children of deployed Soldiers is a key priority. We have heard from Soldiers that the well-being of their children is one of their top concerns.” One example of services was the Army Reserve Teen Panel which was established to allow teens an opportunity to develop effective strategies, as well as, implement solutions for issues facing military youth. 

Enrichment Camps and Operation Purple Camps for eight-to-fourteen year-olds fostered interaction and understanding between children “while learning,” said Stultz, “about the unique factors associated with being an Army Reserve family member.”

One of several programs available was Operation Child Care. This was a nationwide initiative to provide short term respite and reunion child care for children of Soldiers returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom for their two-week rest and recuperation leave period.

In 2007, the Army Reserve conducted 165 strong bond marriage enrichment programs for 8,500 Soldiers and family members to enhance family and community relationships and reintegration efforts following deployment. 2007 marked the inauguration of the first Army Reserve enrichment camps attended by 100 children of Army Reserve Soldiers. These were just a few of the programs and services available to Soldiers and their families. The G-1 fully supported these programs.

Providing adequate, continuous health care was vital to the well-being of Soldiers. Multiple deployments were causing trouble with the Army’s TRICARE coverage. Providing continuous health care was of concern, for example, in treating post traumatic stress syndrome and traumatic brain injuries that may take months to surface and was complicated when the Soldier moved out of the TRICARE system. The goal was to provide seamless health care. “What I can’t do,” said Stultz, “is expect a family
to switch health care every time the Soldier gets off active duty. We’ve got to figure out a way to say that families are going to have continuous care.”\textsuperscript{254} A more holistic approach was needed. Among the available health care benefits was one affecting Soldiers on active duty service for thirty consecutive days after which they and their families were entitled to comprehensive health care coverage. As of 1 October 2007, Selected Reserve (SELRES) Soldiers became eligible for TRICARE health coverage.\textsuperscript{255}

Another development in the health care arena was passage in 2007 of the Wounded Warrior Assistance Act, a part of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. It provided better care and benefits for wounded Soldiers and their families and helped the transition of new veterans to civilian life. In particular, section 114 authorized reserve component Soldiers the option of using medical care treatment facilities closest to home rather than closest to the base from which the Soldier deployed.\textsuperscript{256}

In 2006 the Post Deployment Health Reassessment Program (PDHRA) began. The program provided education, screening, assessment and an opportunity to access information for a variety of questions and concerns Soldiers may have after returning from deployment. The program enabled Soldiers to address their deployment-related health concerns with a health care professional. By completing a questionnaire during the three to six month time period after returning from deployment, Soldiers had a chance to report mental and physical health concerns that had occurred or worsened since their return home. This “cooling off” period allowed Soldiers to reintegrate into their daily lives and then determine the affects of their deployment. This program applied to all Army Reserve Soldiers following their return from deployment to a combat zone after 10 March 2005. “While this was the focus of the program,” wrote Stultz in September 2006 to previously mobilized Soldiers, “PDHRA is available to all Soldiers who have returned from deployments or mobilization since September 11, 2001. . . The Army Reserve greatly values your dedicated
service to our Nation. Additionally, the Army Reserve values your health and welfare...”  

Another example of the commitment to the well-being of Soldiers was the Army Reserve Warrior and Family Assistance Center. Stultz directed support to Army Reserve “wounded warriors” -- those Soldiers (warriors in transition) requiring medical care resulting from military service and others requesting information on existing services. The center, established in October 2007, was the proponent. It was configured to report directly to the chief of staff, enable subordinate commands to render direct support to Soldiers, and ensure an accurate and timely relay of information through the Army Reserve chain of command and the families of Soldiers in need. The center’s slogan, “Soldiers first, Families always,” epitomized its mission and purpose.

The center’s staff had as their most immediate mission to contact Army Reserve Soldiers who were assigned to warrior transition units (designed to improve support to those Soldiers and approved by the Department of the Army in October 2007), community-based health care organizations, and Veterans Administration poly-trauma centers. The center assigned a reserve Soldier to serve as a caseworker for each wounded Soldier.

In addition to medical issues, the center provided assistance on a variety of other issues, such as, finance, education, housing, administrative and pastoral concerns. In essence, the Warrior and Family Assistance Center provided “responsive, flexible, and adaptable support to the Warfighter, their Families and units.”

In the realm of educational benefits, the Army Reserve Voluntary Education Services Program was of particular importance to the CAR. This was a DoD-mandated commanders’ program promoting “lifelong opportunities for Selected Reserve Soldiers through voluntary education services that enhance recruiting, retention and readiness of Army Reserve Soldiers.” Some major educational programs included the Montgomery GI Bill, the Reserve Educational Assistance Program, and the Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript System.
To honor those Soldiers who have been deployed and come home, the Army Reserve began the Welcome Home Warrior Citizen Award Program in 2004. This program ensured those Soldiers returning from deployments were recognized publicly for their service. The award took place within 90 days of a Soldier’s demobilization. More than 70,000 awards have been made since the program’s inception; 62,359 of them during formal welcome home ceremonies. This program contributed to the retention of Soldiers, thereby increasing unit readiness.  

Other Soldier well-being programs included specific policy changes effected by the CAR to improve personnel management of officers; implementation of four regional personnel service centers to support the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force model; and improved base operations support.  

Personnel policy changes included accelerated reserve component mandatory captain promotion boards. Promotable first lieutenants in the Selected Reserve who reached their maximum promotion eligibility date were not required to transfer to the IRR to be promoted or to delay/decline their promotion. There were several policy changes affecting Troop Program Unit enlisted promotions. Changes occurred to Army Reserve enlisted personnel management policies, retention of dual status military technicians, extension of the mandatory removal date maximum age policy from age 60 to 62 and administrative leave.  

The operational Army Reserve presented new challenges to employer-employee relationships. To assist efforts in promoting good employer-employer relations, in 2005 the Army Reserve established the Army Reserve Employer Relations (ARER) Program. This was a Department-of-Defense-mandated program. The program was intended to build positive and enduring relationships with employers of Army Reserve Soldiers in order to enhance readiness and retention and preserve the strength of the Army Reserve. The program sustained readiness and strength by providing a variety of programs and assistance venues to
Soldiers and their civilian employers. The programs included employer recognition and awards, mediation and intervention services, employer and community outreach, and training and assistance in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act. These programs assisted commanders and supervisors in managing a shared workforce.273 “Our Soldiers,” wrote Stultz, “bring leadership, commitment, character, and skills that will make a difference to their employer’s bottom line. It is mutual support between Soldiers, families and employers, and the Military Services that makes the Warrior-Citizen a Critical Capability of the nation.”274 Unfortunately small business owners were not covered by the act.

In March 2007, Stultz established a general officer steering committee to “rethink and develop innovative operations for employer outreach and benefits.”275

The G-1’s Casualty Affairs Program, in addition to other tasks, continued to manage deaths, injuries and illnesses of Soldiers and retained statistics for the Army Reserve-wide program. The USARC continued to hold memorial services for those killed in action.276 As of 11 April 2008, 108 Soldiers had been killed in action and another fifty in non-battle deaths for a total of 158.277 (See Appendix A) The G-1 managed the Army Reserve Military Funeral Honors Program.278

**Domestic Operations/Support**

Providing federal first response capabilities for domestic operations was one of Stultz’s primary intentions. “. . . the Army Reserve has capabilities the nation needs to respond to domestic natural disasters and federal capacity in the event of a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] attack on the homeland.”279 As a case in point, in 2005 the Army Reserve sent two truck companies and five CH-47 helicopters and their Soldiers to hurricane Katrina relief efforts and ten CH 47s to aid victims of hurricane Rita’s devastation. Army Reserve aviators transported over 2,100 people
and more than 5,200 tons of cargo. The Army Reserve provided two military history detachments to document the operations.\textsuperscript{280}

As part of the general plans in preparation for the 2006 hurricane season, the Army Reserve coordinated efforts with regional readiness commands and units in fifteen states. In March 2006, the Army Reserve created regional and state hurricane task forces to prepare equipment and Soldiers for hurricane support operations. The Army Reserve positioned over 1,996 pieces of equipment along the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast.\textsuperscript{281} Testifying before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Stultz said, “The Army Reserve’s ability to position capabilities, without regard to state borders, and provide neighborhood-based support directly to our communities, states, and federal agencies ensures our commitment to our homeland endures, even as we continue to support operations throughout the world.”\textsuperscript{282}

In preparation for the 2007 hurricane season, in April 2007 the Department of the Army directed specific equipment actions to mitigate Army National Guard shortages within the states of Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and US Territories Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.\textsuperscript{283}

On 22 October 2007, The Combat Support Training Center – Camp Parks and Fort Hunter Liggett, California, received a request to deploy firefighters and equipment in support of the southern California wildfires. Through mutual aid agreements with the California Office of Emergency Services, Camp Parks and Fort Hunter Liggett sent eight firefighters and three pieces of equipment to support various wildfires in the area.\textsuperscript{284}

\textbf{Homeland Defense}

Defending the homeland was one example of the Army Reserve’s participation in joint, combined and interagency operations. The reserve worked for example with the US Northern Command, US Joint Forces Command and US Army North. Twenty-six chemical companies with
specialized equipment were on the ready to execute mass causality decontamination and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) hazardous materials (HAZMAT). The reserve offered support to the 20th Support Command in its efforts to thwart CBRN. The reserve supported the Special Operations Command in countering terrorism.  

First US Army requested assistance to train and validate the training for the 704th Chemical Company prior to its deployment for OIF. The 392nd Chemical Company provided HAZMAT operations training.  

Sometimes similar support extended to operations overseas. On 20 January 2007, the G-3 Homeland Defense Division conducted a site visit to the 392nd Chemical Company in Iraq to review and assess HAZMAT detection and sampling capabilities in theater. A recommendation stemming from this visit was that the Army Reserve and First Army combine interests and identify 392nd Chemical Company Army Reserve Soldiers willing to volunteer for tours of duty to provide pre-mobilization training to the next Army Reserve chemical units in the Operation Iraqi Freedom HAZMAT rotation.  

**Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)**

Base Realignment and Closure 2005 allowed the Army Reserve to “reshape its force and command, control and management headquarters, improving readiness while realizing significant cost reductions.” The BRAC recommendations for the Department of Defense were announced on 15 May 2005 and became law on 8 November 2005.

Among the changes wrought by BRAC were reforming command and control, as discussed above; lowering overhead expenditures; and stationing Army Reserve Soldiers in modern facilities. BRAC will help redesign many Cold War facilities, which do not support today’s operational Army Reserve. Under BRAC the Army Reserve will close or realign 176 facilities and move into 125 new armed forces reserve centers.
shared with at least one other reserve component, thereby supporting joint relationships and facility use. These actions were at a higher percentage rate than any other service. They will eradicate surplus centers and further the transformation of Army Reserve command and control. These centers will be equipped with distance learning and video teleconferencing resources, fitness centers, family readiness centers and improved maintenance and equipment storage facilities. These actions were orchestrated with the Army Reserve’s endeavor to redesign its structure and grow “war fighting forces.”

The Army Reserve has made significant strides in executing BRAC. This included: planning for the establishment of the four regional support commands, synchronizing military construction activities with deployment operations and Army Reserve force structure updates, synchronizing 125 Army Reserve BRAC projects worth over $3.1 billion; awarding 15 projects worth $383.6 million in 2006 and 2007 and establishing the Base Transition Coordinators (BTC) Program and 12 BTCs regionally focused to facilitate BRAC property disposals, key to closing the 176 Army Reserve centers.

In 2007 the Army Reserve initiated twenty-three BRAC and military construction projects to build fourteen armed forces reserve centers, five centers, and four training support projects.

Business Transformation

Another facet of transformation concerned business processes. The USARC Business Transformation Office was established at the USARC in April 2006. According to the deputy director, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Kemp, it resulted from the secretary of the Army’s mandate that Lean Six Sigma would be used in the Army as a means of garnering cost savings that the Army was in dire need of based on the current operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq.” Lean Six Sigma was a combination of two business process programs which were already in use by civilian corporations. Lean focused on “eliminating waste and inefficiency. . .
while Six Sigma concentrated on effectiveness and “trying to decrease variations” in the process. “. . . We want to make sure,” Kemp explained, “that our business processes are as tight as they can be with as little rework or wasted effort or energy as possible; eliminate all non-value added to a process and at the same time ensure that we maintain the same level of quality every time.”

In late 2006 and early 2007 the office began deploying Lean Six Sigma “methodology” to the field with full deployment expected by 2010. Transformation in force structure complicated the deployment. The office deployed Lean Six Sigma first to five commands: the 335th Signal Command (Theater), 377th Theater Support Command, 84th Army Reserve Readiness Training Center, 80th Training Command [TASS] and the 416th Engineer Command. The office has begun the second “wave” of deployment.

Lean Six Sigma projects may not always result in cost savings. “As profits are to corporations,” Kemp stated, “so readiness is to the Army.” Money saved might be “reinvested in other areas, specifically the war fight.” Some examples of projects included: improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the contracting process at the USARC; reducing the number of Soldiers who were non-participants (e.g. do not attend battle assemblies) resulting in saving millions of dollars; increasing boots on the ground for combat hospitals; and reducing vendor pay penalties. Some twenty projects were completed in 2007.291

**Financial Management**

The operational Army Reserve must have the financial resources to support the force. The Army Reserve’s Director of Resource Management (DRM) provided overall financial management. In particular its mission was to provide timely and credible financial management information, guidance, products, and services, and foster stewardship and accountability in support of Army Reserve mission accomplishment. The
DRM served as the appropriation sponsor for the Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA), the Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR), and Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR) funds. The DRM was the Army Reserve’s principal staff officer for overall management of fiscal resources. The office oversaw Army Reserve budgeting and execution, and prepared, justified, and defended the Army Reserve budget. The DRM, which included the Program, Analysis, and Evaluation Division, worked to justify requirements, garner resources for the program objective memorandum (POM), and protect and defend those resources in deliberations with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and briefings to members of Congress.

The DRM developed the fiscal year 2008 President’s Budget (PB) and submitted it to Congress. The Army Reserve experienced some growth over PB 2007 for both appropriations. RPA was $3,405.7 million in February fiscal year 2007, which took congressional reductions of $435.0 million in fiscal year 2007: $20.9 million budget for cost avoidance; $66.5 million unexpended balances from prior years; and $347.6 million basic allowance for housing. RPA also received an increase of $87.8 million for Title IX (additional provision to HR 3222 for cost related to GWOT) and $72.5 million to restore the fiscal year 2007 program memorandum decision reduction of 5,000 in end strength.

OMAR started off with a PB07 of $2,299.2 million in February fiscal year 2007 which took a congressional reduction of $341.3 million: $23 million for cost avoidance; $18.7 million for unexpended balances from prior years; $215.9 million for facilities sustainment, restoration and maintenance (FSRM) quality of life; and $83.7 million in other reductions. OMAR received a decrease in general provisions of $1.4 million for travel and transportation of persons and $6.6 million in economic assumptions. OMAR received an increase of $211.6 million in Title IX funding. OMAR received a reprogramming action of $3 million for border security.

Additional obligation authority was restored under the continuing resolution authority (CRA), 2007 for basic allowance for housing (BAH)
of $321.6 million to be executed with RPA funds and $202.3 million to FSRM (Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization) to be executed with the OMAR funds.

The Army Reserve received the fiscal year 2007 main supplemental in the late third quarter after a year-long building process. The Army Reserve received $147.2 million in RPA and $74.0 million in OMAR appropriations. Accordingly, the DRM continued to track and report contingency operation costs to the Army. 292

Fiscal year 2008 congressional marks were received in November 2007. House Resolution 3222 (2008 Department of Defense Appropriations Act) appropriated $3,684.6M million for RPA, $2,510 million for OMAR, and $148 million for MCAR. The fiscal year 2008 RPA congressional marks consisted of $50 million: $10 million from cost avoidance; $19 million from unexpended balances from prior years; $30 million from under execution of authorized end strength and $8.9 million from authorized basic pay increase. OMAR congressional marks consisted of $17.3 million for congressional adds and earmarks and $15.3 million for historical under execution. OMAR received a decrease in general provisions of $12.5 million for general provisions for contract efficiencies and economic assumptions.

The fiscal year 2009 budget estimate submission was submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in August 2007; the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request was submitted to OSD in October 2007. The fiscal year 2009 supplemental request was $245.3 million for RPA and $232.5 million for OMAR.

Fiscal year 2007 was a successful year end closeout for the Army Reserve by obligating 99.9 percent for the OMAR, RPA, and MCAR appropriations. The Army Reserve received the fiscal year 2007 supplemental in late third quarter for $235 million in RPA and $286.2 million OMAR. The comptroller tracked and reported contingency operation costs to the Army during this period. Both appropriations experienced some growth over PB08.
For the fiscal year 2008 budget, the Comptroller Division received the funding guidance in December 2007 and planned accordingly. The OMAR and RPA appropriations continued to operate under a CRA until 15 November 2007 when the fiscal year 2008 budget was approved. However, the MCAR appropriation continued to be funded under the CRA until the end of December 2007. The fiscal year 2008 supplemental request increased based on the secretary of defense’s policy change to reduce mobilization time by increasing pre-mobilization training requirements. The fiscal year supplemental had not passed before 31 December 2007. The Army Reserve continued operations by cash flowing end of calendar year requirements. Additional funding will be needed in fiscal year 2009 to support the pre-mobilization training mission.

Summary

In 2006 and 2007 the Army Reserve, like the active Army and the National Guard, continued to fight the “Long War.” The Army Reserve’s warrior-citizens were in a constant state of alert, facing foes extending beyond traditional borders as non-state terrorists. Asymmetric warfare replaced the traditional linear battlefield. In the midst of this volatile, unstable era, the Army Reserve continued to undergo an extensive restructuring/ transformation of its force to better meet and successfully confront in partnership with coalition forces, as envisioned in the 2006 National Security Strategy, the challenges of this new world order. No longer could the Army Reserve serve as a strategic reserve. As envisioned in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Army Reserve has become an operational force in full partnership with the Army. The two weeks in the summer and one weekend a month have been replaced with inevitable mobilization and deployment. The weekend warrior was an anachronism. Today’s Army Reserve Soldiers must be in a constant state of readiness. Consequently they must be fully trained and equipped. AREF in concert with ARFORGEN was the tool to accomplishing that. This cyclic system
provided predictability to Soldiers, their families and employers. It promoted the well-being of all.

In 2006 and 2007, then, the Army Reserve was fulfilling its vision for the 21st century of a community-based federal operational force of skill-rich warrior citizens providing complementary capabilities for joint expeditionary and domestic operations. The operational Army Reserve, like the active Army, will continue to pursue the key imperatives of transforming, sustaining, preparing and resetting the 21st century force. “The nation has called,” said Stultz, “so we’ve answered the call, and we’re going to continue to answer the call.”
APPENDIX A

Causality Report
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Location of Death</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06-Apr-08</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Stuart A. Wolfer</td>
<td>84 CMD, 104th Regt, 11th Bn, Boise, ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06-Apr-08</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>Stephen K. Scott</td>
<td>HRC - St Louis</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-Mar-08</td>
<td>North of Abu Ghurayb, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Keith M. Maupin</td>
<td>88 RRC, 724th TC Co, Bartonville, IL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Mar-08</td>
<td>Talil, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Dustin C. Jackson</td>
<td>89 RRC, 103d ESC, 350th AG Co, Grand Prairie, TX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Nov-07</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>John J. Tobiasen</td>
<td>377 TSC, 847th AG Bn, Fort Snelling, MN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-Oct-07</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Lillian L. Clamens</td>
<td>143 ESC, 834th AG Co, Miami, FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>05-Oct-07</td>
<td>Basaj, Iraq</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Rachel L. Huga</td>
<td>88 RRC, 303d MP Co, Jackson, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Aug-07</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>James S. Collins, Jr</td>
<td>88 RRC, 303d MP Co, Jackson, MI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Aug-07</td>
<td>Kuzulaikhel, Afghanistan</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Charles B.</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 345th PO Co, Dallas, TX</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Jun-07</td>
<td>Kirkuk, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Farid El Azzouzi</td>
<td>HRC - St Louis</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-May-07</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Shoemaker</td>
<td>108th DIV(I), 2d Bde, Det 7, Garner, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>03-May-07</td>
<td>Ar Ramadi, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Coby G. Schwabe</td>
<td>70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, Hayden Lake, ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03-May-07</td>
<td>Ar Ramadi, Iraq</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Kelly B. Grothe</td>
<td>70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, Hayden Lake, ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Apr-07</td>
<td>Fallujah, Iraq</td>
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<td>Joshua A. Schmit</td>
<td>HRC - St Louis</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Brandon L. Wallace</td>
<td>HRC - St Louis</td>
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<tr>
<td>08-Feb-07</td>
<td>Kirkham, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>James J. Holcomb</td>
<td>70 RRC, 321st EN Bn, Boise, ID</td>
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<tr>
<td>08-Feb-07</td>
<td>Kirkham, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Ross A. Clevenger</td>
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<tr>
<td>08-Feb-07</td>
<td>Karmah, Iraq</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Raymond M. Werner</td>
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<tr>
<td>31-Jan-07</td>
<td>Balad, Iraq (after injuries from Ar Ramadi, Iraq)</td>
<td>CPL</td>
<td>Stephen D. Shannon</td>
<td>88 RRC, 397th EN Bn, Wausau, WI</td>
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<td>26-Jan-07</td>
<td>Sof Duoix, Iraq</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Alan R. Johnson</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 402d CA Bn, Yokohama, NY</td>
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<td>20-Jan-07</td>
<td>Karmah, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Mertideth L. Howard</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 351st CA CMD, 354th CA Bde, Portland, OR</td>
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<tr>
<td>05-Jan-07</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Michael L. Mundell</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 351st CA CMD, Mountainview, CA</td>
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<tr>
<td>01-Jan-07</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Thomas E. Vandling</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 303d PO Co, Oakdale, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-Oct-06</td>
<td>Yafi, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Ronald L. Paulsen</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 414th CA Bn, Utica, NC</td>
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<tr>
<td>23-Sep-06</td>
<td>Hor Al Bosh, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Carlos MN Dominguez</td>
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<td>20-Sep-06</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Robb G. Needham</td>
<td>91st DIV(1S), 1-505th Regt (Log Sp), Fort Lewis, WA</td>
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<td>17-Sep-06</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Adam L. Knox</td>
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<td>08-Sep-06</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>Merideth L. Howard</td>
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<td>Robert J. Paul</td>
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<td>09-Jun-06</td>
<td>Al Diwaniyah, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Benjamin J. Slaven</td>
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<td>Jose M. Velez</td>
<td>77 RRC, 773d TC Co, Fort Totten, NY</td>
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<tr>
<td>15-May-06</td>
<td>LRMC (after MEDEVAC (injuries from Al Hillah, Iraq))</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Shane R. Mahaffee</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 352d CA Cmd, 489th CA Bn, Knoxville, TN</td>
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<td>05-May-06</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
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<td>Carlos N. Saenz</td>
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<td>Nathan J. Vacho</td>
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<td>Anton J. Heid</td>
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<td>13-Feb-06</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Clinton T. Newman</td>
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<td>Myna L. Maravillosa</td>
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<td>Regina C. Reali</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
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<td>Unit Information</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Evan S. Parker</td>
<td>9 RRC, 100th In Br, Honolulu, HI</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kendell K. Frederick</td>
<td>88 RRC, 983d En Br, Monclova, OH</td>
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<tr>
<td>20-Sep-05</td>
<td>Landstuhl/GE (after MEDEVAC</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Lawrence E. Morrison</td>
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<td>30-Aug-05</td>
<td>Al Iskandariyah, Iraq</td>
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<td>Gregory J. Fester</td>
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<td>Joseph C. Nune</td>
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<td>11-Aug-05</td>
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<td>Heseltone</td>
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<tr>
<td>05-Aug-05</td>
<td>Tal Afar, Iraq</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Robert V. Derenda</td>
<td>98 DIV(II), 1st Bde, 1/417, Pennsauken, NJ</td>
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<tr>
<td>02-Aug-05</td>
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<td>James D. McNaughton</td>
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<td>28-Jun-05</td>
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<td>Frank F. Yee</td>
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<td>Robert F. Atzola, Jr.</td>
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<td>31-May-05</td>
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<td>Miguel A. Ramos</td>
<td>95 RRC, 807th Sig Co, Puerto Nuevo, PR</td>
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<td>20-May-05</td>
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<td>Brad A. Wentz</td>
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<td>22-Apr-05</td>
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<td>Gavin J. Colburn</td>
<td>88 RRC, 542d TC Co, Kingsbury, IN</td>
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<td>04-Apr-05</td>
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<td>Christopher W. Dill</td>
<td>98 DIV(II), 3rd Bde, 2/390, Det 4, Webster, NY</td>
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<td>21-Dec-04</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Paul D. Karpowich</td>
<td>98 DIV(IT), 1st CA CMD, 1/417, Pennsauken, NJ</td>
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<td>13-Nov-04</td>
<td>Camp Victory, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Catalin D. Dima</td>
<td>77 RRC, 411th In Br, New Windsor, NY</td>
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<td>Fallujah, Iraq</td>
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<td>Todd R. Connel</td>
<td>84 DIV(I), 1st Bde, 1/339th MI, Fort Benning, CA</td>
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<td>08-Nov-04</td>
<td>Baghdad, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Bryan L. Freeman</td>
<td>98 DIV(I), 2nd Bde, 2/390, Det 4, Fort Benning, CA</td>
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<td>13-Oct-04</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Mark P. Phelan</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 350th CA CMD, 416th CA Br, Norristown, PA</td>
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<td>13-Oct-04</td>
<td>Mosul, Iraq</td>
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<td>Charles R. Soltes, Jr.</td>
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<td>Richard L. Morgan, Jr.</td>
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<td>30-Sep-04</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Lauro G. DeLeon, Jr.</td>
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<td>06-Sep-04</td>
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<td>PFC</td>
<td>Devin J. Greilla</td>
<td>88 RRC, 760th TC Co, Mansfield, OH</td>
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<td>06-Sep-04</td>
<td>Ira Hassan, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Brandon M. Read</td>
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<td>17-Jul-04</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>David A. Hartman</td>
<td>88 RRC, 461st TC Co, Battle Creek, MI</td>
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<td>01-Jul-04</td>
<td>WRAMC (after MEDEVAC</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Stephen G. Martin</td>
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<td>88 RRC, 330th MC Co, Sheboygan, WI</td>
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<td>16-Jun-04</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Arthur S. Mastro, Jr.</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Jun-04</td>
<td>Bagram, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Jeremy M. Dimaranan</td>
<td>89 RRC, 302d TC Co, Fort Eustis, VA</td>
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<td>09-Jun-04</td>
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<td>81 RRC, 391st In Br, Greenville, SC</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Taq, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Melvin Y. Mora</td>
<td>89 RRC, 249th CS Co, St. Louis, MO</td>
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<td>29-May-04</td>
<td>Qalat, Afghanistan</td>
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<td>USACAPOC, 7 PSTOPS, 320th PO Co, Portland, OR</td>
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<td>14-May-04</td>
<td>Bagram, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Lawrence A. Roukey</td>
<td>98 DIV(IV), 1st Bde, 2/390, Det 4, Leavenston, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Apr-04</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Eiller C. Krause</td>
<td>88 RRC, 724th TC Co, Bartonville, IL</td>
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<td>09-Apr-04</td>
<td>Route Cardinal, Iraq</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Gregory R. Goodrich</td>
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<td>-------</td>
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<td>10-Mar-04</td>
<td>BaQubah, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Bert E. Hoyer</td>
<td>88 RRC, 652d En Co, Ellsworth, WI</td>
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<tr>
<td>16-Feb-04</td>
<td>BaQubah, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Nichole M. Frye</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 353d CA CMD, 415th CA Bn, Kalamazoo, MI</td>
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<td>05-Jan-04</td>
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<td>Luke P. Frist</td>
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<td>25-Dec-03</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
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<td>15-Nov-03</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Kelly M. L. Boior</td>
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<td>09-Nov-03</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Nicholas A. Tomko</td>
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<td>20-Sep-03</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>David T. Friedrich</td>
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<td>29-Aug-03</td>
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<td>96 RRC, 244th En Bn, Boulder, CO</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Gregory A. Belanger</td>
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<td>Eric R. Hull</td>
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<td>Jonathan M. Cheatham</td>
<td>90 RRC, 486th En Bn, N. Little Rock, AR</td>
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<td>21-Jul-03</td>
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<td>Mark A. Bibby</td>
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<td>Ramon Keyes-Torres</td>
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<td>SFC</td>
<td>Dan H. Gabrielson</td>
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</table>

Total: 90 USARC + 18 HRC – ST. Louis = 108 ARMY RESERVE, OPERATIONS REEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM

TOTAL by Operation: 97 OIF, 11 OEF
### DECEASED (NON-BATTLE DEATHS) – NBD

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<th>Rank</th>
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<th>Unit</th>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Michael R. Sturdivant</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 431st CA BN, North Little Rock, AR</td>
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<td>28-Oct-07</td>
<td>Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Thomas L. Bruner</td>
<td>100 DIV (I), 2 Bde (IET), Owensboro, KY</td>
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<tr>
<td>29-Sep-07</td>
<td>Diwaniyah, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Chirasak Vidhyarkorn</td>
<td>HRC - St. Louis</td>
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<tr>
<td>14-Jun-07</td>
<td>Talil, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Dustin R. Brisky</td>
<td>90 RRC, 952D EN Co, Paris, TX</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-Mar-07</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Douglas C. Stone</td>
<td>108 DIV (I), 1 Bde, Det 6, Spartanburg, SC</td>
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<tr>
<td>28-Jan-07</td>
<td>LSA Adder, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Carla J. Stewart</td>
<td>83 RRC, 25th TC Co, El Monte, CA</td>
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<tr>
<td>13-Nov-06</td>
<td>Kaiserslautern, Germany</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Peter E. Winston</td>
<td>143 TRANSCOM (Fwd), Orlando, FL</td>
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<tr>
<td>03-Jun-06</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>Darren Harmon</td>
<td>MIRC, 203d MI Bn, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD</td>
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<tr>
<td>07-Jan-06</td>
<td>Umm Qasar, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Robert T. Johnson</td>
<td>81 RRC, 805th MP Co, Raleigh, NC</td>
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<td>07-Jan-06</td>
<td>Zamar Mountain, Iraq</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Stuart M. Anderson</td>
<td>89 RRC, 3rd COSCOM, Des Moines, IA</td>
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<tr>
<td>07-Jan-06</td>
<td>Umm Qasar, Iraq</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Nathan R. Field</td>
<td>89 RRC, 414th MP Bn, Joplin, MO</td>
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<tr>
<td>05-Nov-05</td>
<td>Talil, Iraq</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Thomas A. Wren</td>
<td>82 DIV (FWD), HQ, Richmond, VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-Oct-05</td>
<td>Ali Al Saleem, Kuwait</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Benjamin D. E. Hoeffner</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 324th PO Co, Aurora, CO</td>
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<td>Christopher L. Monroe</td>
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<td>(after MEDEVAC)</td>
<td>SGT</td>
<td>Larry W. Pankey, Jr.</td>
<td>81 RRC, 46th En Bn, Greenwood, MS</td>
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<td>27-Jul-05</td>
<td>Al Taqqaddum, Iraq</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Benjamin D. Jansky</td>
<td>88 RRC, 98th En Bn, Middletown, OH</td>
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<td>19-Jul-05</td>
<td>Camp Arifjan, Kuwait</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Jeffrey J. Farrow</td>
<td>77 RRC, 148th CS Co, Fort Totten, NY</td>
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<td>29-May-05</td>
<td>Doha, Qatar</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Albert E. Smart</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 3rd CA CMD, 321st CA Bde, Fort Bragg, NC</td>
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<td>06-Apr-05</td>
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<td>MAJ</td>
<td>David S. Connolly</td>
<td>94 RRC, 117th USA Trans 784, Brockton, MA</td>
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<td>08-Feb-05</td>
<td>Kandahar, Afghanistan</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Richard M. Crane</td>
<td>89 RRC, 325th M Co, Independence, MO</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Tina S. Time</td>
<td>63 RRC, 208th TC Co, Tucson, AZ</td>
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<td>Kenton, OH (after MEDEVAC)</td>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Ote J. McVey</td>
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<td>03-Oct-04</td>
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<td>SSG</td>
<td>James L. Pettitaway</td>
<td>99 RRC, 223rd TC Co, Norristown, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Aug-04</td>
<td>Fallujah, Iraq</td>
<td>PFC</td>
<td>Luis A. Perez</td>
<td>99 RRC, 223rd TC Co, Norristown, PA</td>
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<tr>
<td>25-Aug-04</td>
<td>Tikrit, Iraq</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Charles L. Neely</td>
<td>88 RRC, 454th TC Co, Columbus, OH</td>
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<tr>
<td>24-Aug-04</td>
<td>Fallujah, Iraq</td>
<td>SSG</td>
<td>Donald N. Davis</td>
<td>88 RRC, 69th TC Co, Zanesville, OH</td>
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<td>12-Jul-04</td>
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<td>Juan M. Torres</td>
<td>99 RRC, 453rd TC Co, Houston, TX</td>
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<td>04-Jul-04</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Julie R. Hickey</td>
<td>USACAPOC, 352d CA CMD, 412th CA Bn, Ft Bragg, NC</td>
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Total: 48 USARC + 2 HRC – ST. LOUIS = 50 ARMY RESERVE OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM/IRAQI FREEDOM
Total by Operation: 38 OIF, 12 OEF

Total All Deaths in Theater = 138 USARC + 20 HRC – ST. LOUIS = 158

Total All deaths by Operation = KIA OIF/97 OEF/11 Total/108  NBD: OIF/38, OEF 12, Total/50 All Deaths in Theater; OIF/135, OEF/23, Total 158

No changes since the last report dated 18 Apr 08.

MISSING - CAPTURED

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<td>SGT</td>
<td>Altaie, Ahmed K</td>
<td>HRC - St. Louis</td>
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APPENDIX B

Silver Star Recipients
Specialist Jeremy Church of the 724th Transportation Company was the first Army Reserve Soldier to earn the Silver Star in Iraq after driving the convoy commander’s vehicle through a four mile kill zone and rendering assistance to fellow Soldiers under an ambush from Iraqi insurgents in Balad, on April 9, 2004.

Sergeant James Witkowski of the 729th Transportation Company received the Silver Star posthumously after shielding other Soldiers in his company from a grenade while conducting a combat logistics mission near Ashraf on 26 October 2005.²

Staff Sergeant Jason Fetty with the Joint Provisional Reconstruction Team of the 364th Civil Affairs Brigade was the first Army Reserve Soldier to earn the Silver Star in Afghanistan after battling with a suicide bomber’s attack at the opening of an emergency room at the Khost Hospital on 20 February 2007.³
APPENDIX C

Selective Chronology of Army Reserve History

1908  Medical Reserve Corps was established.


1917-1919  89,500 officers from the Officers Reserve Corps participated in World War I. One third were medical doctors. 80,000 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps served. 15,000 were in medical units.

1920s  Funding limited training to Reserve officers to two weeks every three to four years.

1930s  More than 30,000 Army Reserve officers helped to manage 2,700 Civilian Conservation Corps camps.

1940-1945  More than 200,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps participated in World War II. Army Reserve officers provided 29 percent of the Army’s officers. Between 1941 and 1945 the Army mobilized 26 Reserve-designated infantry divisions.

1950  More than 240,000 members of the Organized Reserve Corps were called to active duty for the Korean War.
1961 More than 60,000 Army Reserve Soldiers were called to active duty for the Berlin Crisis.

1968-1969 Vietnam resulted in a small reserve mobilization of 42 Army Reserve units with some 5,000 Army Reserve Soldiers. Thirty-five units actually sent 3,500 Soldiers to Vietnam.

1973 The all volunteer force was implemented. Army Reserve Soldiers received more responsibilities and resources.

1983 After the U.S. rescue operation, volunteers from Army Reserve civil affairs units deployed to Grenada to help rebuild the infrastructure.

1989 After the U.S. invasion of Panama, Army Reserve civil affairs and military police units helped to restore order.

1990-1991 During the Persian Gulf War, more than 84,000 Army Reserve Soldiers provided combat support and combat service support to the Army. Of that number, more than 40,000 deployed to Southwest Asia, among them 20,000 members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

1992 Army Reserve Soldiers provided postal, logistical and other assistance to support the U.S. relief efforts in Somalia.

1995-1996 The Army Reserve helped to restore democracy in Haiti by providing more than 70 percent of all reserve component support.

1995-present In 1995, 70 percent (16,000) of the Army’s peacekeeping force in Bosnia was Army Reserve Soldiers. Operations are ongoing.

1998 Army Reserve platoons from the 310th Chemical Company mobilized for duty in Southwest Asia.
1999  The Army Reserve sent units to Central America in support of New Horizons ‘99, the relief effort for Hurricane Mitch.

2000-present  Army Reserve units supported NATO forces in Kosovo. Operations were ongoing.

2001-present  For Operation Noble Eagle, the Army Reserve became a major partner with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and with state and local agencies in defending the American homeland against terrorist attacks. The Army Reserve provided resources and training to first responder organizations throughout the nation.

2003-present  For Operation Iraqi Freedom, Army Reserve Soldiers participated in the thousands in the advance to Baghdad and in the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.

2005  Army Reserve Soldiers helped in post Hurricanes Katrina and Rita recovery operations and in Pakistan following an earthquake.

2005-2006  The Army Reserve’s only remaining ground combat unit served in Iraq. The 100th Battalion, 442nd Infantry, deployed there as part of the 29th Separate Infantry Brigade, Hawaii Army National Guard.

2007  The Army Reserve has mobilized more than 183,000 Soldiers for the Global War on Terrorism. Army Reserve Soldiers helped to extinguish the California wildfires.
APPENDIX D

General Officer Commands,
Direct Reporting Activities,
Installations
General Officer Commands

1 MSC
Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico
(USARC)

2d Medical Brigade
San Pablo, CA
(63d RRC)

3d Medical Command
Forest Park, GA
(USARC)

Army Reserve Medical Command
Pinellas Park, FL
(USARC)

3d Transportation Agency (Movement Control) (TAMC)
Anniston, AL
(143d TRANSCOM)

7th ARCOM
Schwetzingen, Germany
(OCAR/HQ USAREUR)

8th Medical Brigade
Staten Island, NY
(77th RRC)

HQ, 9th RRC
Fort Shafter Flats, Honolulu, HI

11th Aviation Command
Fort Knox, KY
(USARC)
21st Theater Support Command (CONUS)
Indianapolis, IN
(88th RRC)

63d RRC
Moffett Field, CA
Los Alamitos, CA
(USARC)

70th RRC
Seattle, WA
(USARC)

75th Training Support Division
Houston, TX
(USARC)

77th RRC
Flushing, NY
(USARC)

78th Training Support Division
Edison, NJ
(USARC)

80th Training Command
Richmond, VA
(USARC)

81st RRC
Birmingham, AL
(USARC)

81st RRSC
Fort Jackson, SC
(USARC)
84th Training Command (Leader Readiness)
Fort McCoy, WI
(USARC)

88th RRC
Fort Snelling, MN
(USARC)

88th RSG
Indianapolis, IN
(88th RRC)

89th Regional Readiness Sustainment Command
Fort McCoy, WI
(USARC)

89th RRC
Wichita, KS
(USARC)

90th RRC
North Little Rock, AR
(USARC)

91st Training Support Division
Dublin, CA
(USARC)

94th RRC
Devens, MA
(USARC)

95th Division (Institutional Training)
Oklahoma City, OK
(USARC)

96th RRC
Salt Lake City, UT
(USARC)

82
98th Division (Institutional Training)
Rochester, NY
(USARC)

99th RRC
Coraopolis, PA
(USARC)

99th RRSC
Fort Dix, NJ
(USARC)

100th Division (Institutional Training)
Louisville, KY
(USARC)

103d Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)
Des Moines, IA
(89th RRC)

104th Division (Leader Training)
Vancouver, WA
(USARC)

108th Division (Institutional Training)
Charlotte, NC
(USARC)

143d Transportation Command (Expeditionary)
Orlando, FL
(USARC)

206th RSG
Indianapolis, IN
(88th RRC)

220th Military Police Brigade
Gaithersburg, MD
(99th RRC)
300th Military Police Command (EPW)
Inkster, MI
(88th RRC)

310th Support Command (Expeditionary)
(88th RRC)

311th Support Command (Expeditionary)
Los Angeles, CA
(USARC)

311th Theater Signal Command
Fort Shafter, HI
(USARC)

330th Medical Brigade
Fort Sheridan, IL
(88th RRC)

332d Medical Brigade
Nashville, TN
(81st RRC)

335th Theater Signal Command (TSC)
East Point, GA
(USARC)

359th Tactical Theater Signal Brigade
Fort Gordon, GA
(335th SC (T))

377th Theater Sustainment Command
Belle Chasse, LA
(USARC)

411th Engineer Brigade
New Windsor, NY
(77th RRC)
412th Engineer Command
Vicksburg, MS
(USARCC)

415th Chemical Brigade
Pelzer, SC
(335 SC (T))

416th Engineer Command
Darien, IL
(USARCC)

420th Engineer Brigade
Bryan, TX
(90th RRC)

800th Military Police Brigade
Uniondale, NY
(77th RRC)

804th Medical Brigade
Devens, MA
(94th RRC)

807th Medical Command
Seagoville, TX
(90th RRC)

2290th U.S. Army Hospital
Washington, DC
(99th RRC)

Military Intelligence Readiness Command
Fort Belvoir, VA
Regional Support Group-East
Birmingham, AL
(USARCC)
Regional Support Group-West
Arlington Heights, IL
(USARC)

US Army Reserve Readiness Command
Fort Jackson, SC
(USARC)

US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command
Fort Bragg, NC

**Direct Reporting Activities**

USAR Element, USCENTCOM
McDill AFB, FL
(USARC)

USAR Element, USSOCOM
McDill AFB, FL
(USARC)

USAR Element USSOUTHCOM
Miami, FL

**Major Installions**

USAG-Fort McCoy
Fort McCoy, WI
(USARC)

USAG-Fort Buchanan
Puerto Rico
(USARC)

USAG-Fort Dix
Fort Dix, NJ
(USARC)
USAG-CSTC Fort Hunter Liggett
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA
(Fort McCoy)
APPENDIX E

FY2006 Total Force Composition

*Includes active-duty operational support Soldiers from the reserve component.
# APPENDIX F

## Strength of the Army Reserve
### 1946-2007

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<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Paid Drill (TPU)</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total Ready Reserve</th>
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92
## APPENDIX G

### Army Reserve Appropriations

#### 1970-2007

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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2,664</td>
<td>1,749</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>4,580</td>
<td>86,099</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>5,347</td>
<td>122,268</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>2,036</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>5,483</td>
<td>141,551</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3,514.2</td>
<td>2,450.6</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>6,096.8</td>
<td>221.124.2</td>
<td>2.76</td>
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1997 to 2005: All amounts include base funding/appropriate supplemental funding.
# APPENDIX H

## US Army Recruiting Command

### Mission and Accessions 1990-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Active Army</th>
<th>Army Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Accessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>88,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>78,241</td>
<td>78,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>77,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>76,900</td>
<td>77,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>68,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>62,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>73,400</td>
<td>73,528</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>82,000</td>
<td>82,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>72,550</td>
<td>71,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>74,500</td>
<td>68,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>75,800</td>
<td>75,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>79,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>73,800</td>
<td>74,132</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>77,000</td>
<td>77,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>73,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>80,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>26,500 (^{14})</td>
</tr>
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# APPENDIX I

## Army Reserve Accessions for FY 2007
### As Compared to Other Reserve Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Accessions</th>
<th>Goal</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>66,652</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>35,734</td>
<td>35,505</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Reserve</td>
<td>10,627</td>
<td>10,602</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Reserve</td>
<td>7,959</td>
<td>7,256</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
<td>9,975</td>
<td>10,690</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Reserve</td>
<td>7,110</td>
<td>6,834</td>
<td>104&lt;sup&gt;16&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
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</table>
APPENDIX J

Army Reserve Attrition Rates
2000-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Actual Percentage</th>
<th>Percentage Relative To Ceiling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>102.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>86.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attrition Ceiling</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>Not applicable†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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