The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New York City

OFFICE OF ARMY RESERVE HISTORY

HEADQUARTERS
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The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New York City

311th Military History Detachment

Major Robert Bensburg
Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner
Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner

Contributions by Sergeant William Miller
90th Military History Detachment

Editors
Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker
MG David T. Zabecki
Ms. Deborah Foster-King

Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
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Upper left:
On a dark blue disk, the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed United States Army Reserve in gold. The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty. The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (U.S. Army Institute of Heraldry.)

Upper right:
The Statue of Liberty shoulder sleeve insignia was originally approved for the 77th Division on 23 October 1918. It was officially announced on 31 May 1922. On 22 April 1968 it was authorized for the 77th U.S. Army Reserve Command. The insignia was reassigned on 16 April 1996 for the 77th Regional Support Command, the command of the 311th Military History Detachment and of most Army Reservists in the New York City metropolitan area.
On 11 September 2001, unimaginable horror came to our country as terrorists turned airliners filled with innocent people into lethal weapons. As one terrible blow after another hit in New York City, at the Pentagon and in Pennsylvania, ordinary Americans -- citizens and citizen-soldiers -- responded heroically to these extraordinary events.

We in the Army Reserve are particularly proud of our own who displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness on 11 September, whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, regardless of personal safety concerns, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue and recovery activities.

We especially remember those we lost on 11 September. There were the five citizen-soldiers of the 77th Regional Support Command (RSC) who were members of the Fire Department of New York. They, along with hundreds of their comrades, died saving the lives of thousands of others at the World Trade Center. There was the 77th RSC Judge Advocate General officer, also at work in his civilian job, who died in Tower Two of the World Trade Center. There was the retired colonel, a security chief for an investment company in Tower Two, who got all but six of his firm's 2,700 employees out safely and then lost his life when he went back to find those still missing. And there were the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) colonel and the retired AGR colonel who were at their appointed place of duty in the Pentagon at the time that place of duty became the point of impact.

These are the names of those we should never forget, our first casualties in the war on terrorism:

- Warrant Officer 1 Ronald P. Bucca, fire marshal, Fire Department of New York (FDNY), killed during rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.
- Staff Sergeant Frederick J. Ill, captain, FDNY, killed during rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.
- Retired Colonel Ronald F. Golinski, Department of Army Civilian, killed while on duty at the Pentagon.
- Captain Michael D. Mullan, fireman, FDNY, killed during rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.
- Lieutenant Colonel William H. Pohlmann, lawyer, working on the 91st floor of Tower Two, killed at the World Trade Center.
- Sergeant Shawn Powell, fireman, FDNY, killed during rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.
- Retired Colonel Rick Rescorla, director of security for Morgan Stanley in Tower Two killed while helping others escape at the World Trade Center.
• Colonel David M. Scales, AGR officer, killed while on duty at the Pentagon.
• Captain Mark P. Whitford, fireman, FDNY, killed during rescue efforts at the World Trade Center.

These were not our only heroes on 11 September, nor did the Army Reserve's response end after the initial attacks. It was only beginning. Army Reservists on site in the Pentagon and New York City took immediate action to help the injured, to try to reach other survivors, and to assist other rescue workers.

Even as rescue workers fought the flames, the Army Reserve response grew, all across America, with crisis action teams standing up and in full operation in every major Army Reserve command headquarters within hours. Military Police units quickly took up station at key facilities.

In New York City, the 77th RSC reacted swiftly to the disaster, quickly appropriating and delivering hundreds of support items in short order to assist in the disaster recovery effort.

Equally quick to respond and critical to the rescue and recovery operation were the Army Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers in the New York City area. They arrived on the scene immediately to facilitate support requests from civilian agencies as quickly and effectively as possible.

Thousands of trained and ready Army Reserve men and women came forward, first as volunteers and then in response to the partial mobilization ordered by the president on 14 September, just three days after the attacks.

Among the first soldiers to move out and begin operations was the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. Seventy-two hours after the call went out for volunteers from the 311th, they had deployed to the Pentagon and were searching through debris for the remains of victims. By the time the unit was mobilized a week later, it had already been "at war" for a week.

Two of our Military History Detachments have worked hard to capture the events of 11 September and the weeks that followed from the perspective of the Army Reserve. The 311th Military History Detachment from Fort Totten, N.Y., commanded by Major Robert Bensburg, and the 90th Military History Detachment from San Antonio, Texas, commanded by Captain Suzanne Summers, were called up soon after 11 September. The 311th was assigned to cover the New York City story and the 90th covered the Washington, D.C., area.

The soldiers of these two small detachments gathered information and material, documented what had taken place and conducted numerous oral history interviews with participants. In doing their mission, they had to go into the damaged section of the Pentagon and also look out over what is now known as Ground Zero in New York City. They interviewed survivors of the Pentagon attack and others who had performed the grim task of recovering those who had not survived. They talked with heroes and those who supported the heroes.

The monographs they have produced provide a flavor of what it was like on the scene at one of the greatest days of tragedy in American history, told mostly from the points of view of
those who were there. A day of tragedy to be sure, but also a day when the best of America came through loud and clear. What you will read is the first chapter in the story of the Army Reserve's role in the global war on terrorism, the beginning of what was and continues to be a decisive and extraordinarily rapid response to a national crisis. This is the start to a story that will not end until the United States achieves the inevitable victory over the terrorists.

The Army Reserve was on the front lines of this war when it began on 11 September. We will be there at the finish, too.

Thomas J. Plewes
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Chief, Army Reserve
21 May 2002
The 311th Military History Detachment wishes to acknowledge assistance in the completion of this work from various individuals. From the 77th Regional Support Command (RSC), we extend our appreciation to Major General Richard Colt, commander; Mr. Gary DiLallo, command executive officer; Mr. Michael Scotto; Lieutenant Colonel Lee Cunningham; Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink, Major Bernd Zoller; and Mr. Chester Marcus. Appreciation is also extended to Colonel Gerard McEnerney, regional emergency preparedness liaison officer, Federal Emergency Management Agency, New York City; Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Mestler, Individual Ready Reserve; and Mr. Richard Prager, ironworker, Local 40, New York City.

We also wish to thank the following for their logistical, administrative, and financial support: (1) from the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, Colonel Mitchell Bisaner, Colonel Randy Pullen, Mr. Albert Schilf, Lieutenant Colonels Stephen Ackman, John Bianci, Lawrence Collins, Ronald Dykstra, and Charles Hash, the OCAR Computer Support Staff, and the OCAR Public Affairs Office; (2) from the Office of Army Reserve History at the USARC, Dr. Lee Harford, Dr. Kathryn Coker, and Ms. Deborah Foster-King; Mr. Steven Farmer, Mr. David Moyer, Ms. Ovetta Robinson, and Major Mark Young; (3) Mr. Jack Sand from the Defense Finance and Accounting Office; and (4) Mr. Robert Cole and Mr. Joseph Logan from Fort Dix, New Jersey.

We also wish to express our gratitude to Major General George Garrett and his staff from the 42nd Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard, for their hospitality during the first three months of our mobilization and the 126th Military History Detachment, Massachusetts National Guard. Finally, we are indebted to the interviewees who so willingly shared their experiences and response to the tragedy at the World Trade Center. We realize that by the time this edition is published, many people may have had a change in rank, status or affiliation. We have made a concerted effort to list these individuals accurately at the time of this publication.
Army Athlete Holds World Trade Center Flag at Olympics

Eight U.S. Olympians, including women's biathlete and Vermont Army National Guard Sergeant Kristina Sabasteanski (second from right), hold a U.S. flag during the national anthem at the 2002 Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Salt Lake City on 8 February 2002. The tattered flag was found in the rubble of New York's World Trade Center following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Sergeant Sabasteanski is a member of the Army's World Class Athlete Program.  (Photo by Petty Officer First Preston Keres, U.S. Navy)
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INTRODUCTION

At 8:46 a.m. Eastern Standard Time\(^1\) on 11 September 2001 (also known as 9-11), a hijacked civilian airliner “traveling as fast as 586 miles an hour”\(^2\) crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center\(^3\) (the second tallest building in the United States) in New York City. At 9:02 a.m. a second airplane flew into the South Tower of the World Trade Center. These planes contained two of four groups of suicidal terrorists –nineteen individuals – who commandeered four commercial airliners – three from American and one from United. The result of these impacts caused the buildings to catch on fire. With the intense heat, the steel girders buckled, eventually causing the two towers to collapse. The South Tower collapsed first at 9:59 a.m., approximately fifty-seven minutes after impact. The North Tower collapsed at 10:28 a.m., approximately one hour and forty-two minutes after being hit. The terrorists flew these aircraft into a major American financial institution, thereby causing loss of life and destruction of property. In addition to the World Trade Center (also referred to as the Twin Towers), the terrorists targeted and attacked the Pentagon, headquarters for the Department of Defense. The fourth aircraft crashed into a field in rural Pennsylvania near Pittsburgh, thus missing its intended target, thanks to a heroic attempt by the passengers who prevented the hijackers from carrying out their intended deadly mission. (Local officials at that site brought the bodies and wreckage from the plane to the Pennsylvania National Guard Armory at Somerset, where the bodies were identified and eventually sent to the victims’ families.\(^4\) The federal government speculated that other aircraft hijackings were planned for that day. At 9:40 a.m., the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) halted all flight operations at U.S. airports with instructions for aircraft to land and for all further flights to cease.\(^5\) This action may have prevented other terrorist attacks that day.

As of 31 May 2002, New York City officials tallied the death toll from the Twin Towers at 2,823 people from about eighty countries, though only 1,102 victims were identified.\(^6\) The

\(^1\) All times in this manuscript will be noted in Eastern Standard Time, unless otherwise specified.


\(^3\) The World Trade Center complex was completed in 1972. It had cost $400 million, contained 400 million pounds of steel, 1.5 billion pounds of concrete, and each tower was 110 stories high, used by about 50,000 workers on an average workday, and sat on sixteen acres. “Wonders of the World Databank: accessed online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/building/wonder/structure/world_trade.htm, 25 April 2002.


\(^5\) Ibid., p. 1.

death toll from those on board the two planes that crashed into the World Trade Center stood at 152. Due to the collapse of the World Trade Center towers and the high heat generated by burning jet fuel that disintegrated bodily remains at the former World Trade Center site, hundreds of bodies will never be recovered. Therefore, the city issued numerous death certificates without bodies. The search for victims’ remains at the World Trade Center site lasted until 31 May 2002. On that day, recovery workers walked alongside an empty stretcher, which represented the remains not found. Workers extended every effort to recover remains and sifted through the World Trade Center debris at least three times. Another 189 people died at the Pentagon, including sixty-four passengers from the plane that hit it, while forty-four people died at the Pennsylvania crash site. These attacks on 11 September resulted in the second highest death toll from an act of war against the United States on its soil since the battle of Antietam during the Civil War. The casualties sustained on 11 September 2001 also exceeded those suffered on 7 December 1941, when Japanese warplanes attacked U.S. forces at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and killed 2,390 Americans. Thus 7 December and 11 September have the following in common: they are dates that initiated American involvement in two wars – World War II and the War on Terrorism.

As a sign of respect for the victims of 11 September, the president ordered all flags on federal buildings, at military installations, aboard naval ships, and in the District of Columbia, to be flown at half-staff. He extended this order until sunset on 22 September 2001.

PART I: BACKGROUND NARRATIVE
The Federal Response

President George W. Bush was in Florida at the time of the attacks. Due to the unstable situation and on advice from the U.S. Secret Service, he took a circuitous route back to Washington. After the president assessed the situation and upon advice from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (who was in the Pentagon when the plane hit it), he signed an executive order for a partial mobilization of reserve components. This order resulted in a call to active duty for up to 50,000 military reservists. President Bush called upon the state governors to activate their National Guard (under Title 32) to provide additional security at airports, rail terminals, power plants, and other sensitive sites in their respective states. Consequently, soldiers carrying M-16 A-2 rifles or Beretta M-9 pistols became a common site at the nation's airports. The role of reserve forces was vital for America's national military strategy because reservists provide the bulk of combat service and combat service support functions for the active component. The 1.3 million men and women serving in the seven reserve forces made up nearly one half of the Armed Forces and were an integral part of our nation's military.

The Defense Department coined Operation NOBLE EAGLE as the official name for U.S. military operations in support of homeland defense and civil support to federal, state, and local agencies in the United States. Its overseas counterpart, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, was the name associated with the war on terrorism outside the United States. As of December 2001, the Defense Department had called to duty for either operation almost 10,000 Army Reservists; by March 2002, more than 12,000 Army Reservists were involved. Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief of the Army Reserve, said:

This Army Reserve will render all support asked of us by the National Command Authority. The men and women of the Army Reserve will do all that the Nation expects of us in this national crisis. As citizens and soldiers, we could do nothing less.

In his holiday message to the troops in December 2001, he summed up the Army Reserve response to 11 September:

They [Army Reservists] came quickly, more quickly than ever before, conducting hasty mobilizations or mobilizing on the go. Arriving at their places of duty, they immediately started their missions: force protection and security at installations and facilities, intelligence and investigation support, training and training validation, headquarters augmentation and historical documentation, logistics and

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transportation operations. Whatever the National Command Authority needed the Army Reserve to do, we did it.11

Before President Bush called up the Army Reserve for Operation NOBLE EAGLE or ENDURING FREEDOM a week after the attacks, some soldiers were already involved in post 11 September activities. The 77th Regional Support Command (RSC), Fort Totten, Queens, New York, served as the U.S. Army Reserve’s major command within the state of New York, and was the higher headquarters for more than 100 units spread out over two other states, as well. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the 77th Regional Support Command headquarters staff directed the Operations Section to establish an emergency operations center staffed with full-time personnel and Army Reserve troop program unit members – some of whom showed up the same day – who communicated with higher and subordinate commands and orchestrated assistance to New York City and government agencies. Brigadier General Richard Colt (promoted to major general in February 2002), commanding general of the 77th Regional Support Command, created the 77th’s command mission statement, along with its intent and guidance. Major Bernd Zoller, an Active Guard Reserve (full-time Army Reservist) mobilization and operations officer, coined the name, Operation LIBERTY CRISIS hours after the terrorist attacks on 11 September, which referred to the 77th Regional Support Command’s hasty response in setting up an emergency operations center and offering assistance to the city of New York. The name also referred to a past 77th training exercise.12

Colonel Philip Spies, senior liaison officer for the 77th Regional Support Command, summed up the 77th Regional Support Command’s Army Reserve response by saying that the command was “able to step up and give the city just about anything they wanted. . . .The challenge was knowing where to get it to. . . .Anybody who asked us for any support, we basically provided it and provided it very quickly.”13

Eye Witness Accounts

Army Reserve soldiers were among the first on the scene of the World Trade Center destruction. Two Active Guard Reserve 77th Regional Support Command soldiers from the Caven Point Army Reserve Center in Jersey City, New Jersey – Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard and Specialist Alex Brown of the 920th Transportation Company – became heroes on that fateful day. The two soldiers, who lived at Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York, were driving to work on the Brooklyn Bridge, which provided a spectacular but horrific view of the World Trade Center on fire from the first airplane strike. After seeing the World Trade Center in smoke, the two soldiers crossed the Brooklyn Bridge and parked their car on Chambers Street,

12 Email correspondence between Major Bernd Zoller and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, January 2002.
just two blocks from the World Trade Center complex. Then they began to assist local police personnel by directing civilians from the impact area. They arrived at the World Trade Center plaza area before the second plane hit the South Tower.¹⁴

Sergeant First Class Bernard first directed the injured to an area that New York City emergency medical services personnel had established as a triage area in the World Trade Center Plaza. At this point, the two friends became separated when Sergeant First Class Bernard went inside the North Tower to help evacuate people coming down the escalator from the first floor. Specialist Brown remained outside at the triage area and assisted the injured there.¹⁵

When the South Tower collapsed at 9:59 a.m., Sergeant First Class Bernard was standing in the lobby of the North Tower. Debris from the South Tower entered forcefully into the lobby area where he stood. The ensuing smoke and dust made it extremely difficult to see and breathe. He tried to escape the debris that was coming into the North Tower, so he and a group of others reached a bank archway made of marble that provided shelter. At this point he thought he was going to die. Miraculously, the pocket of steel and stone protected him and the others from the crushing force of the debris that was coming in. The only light this small group possessed came from a fireman’s helmet. They successfully ventured out of the lobby area by holding on to each other, thereby forming a human chain. Upon exiting the doorway of the bank and slowly emerging into the plaza area, Sergeant First Class Bernard was shocked to see bodies and crushed cars. Bruised and battered, covered in ash from head to toe and choking on dust, he struggled to safety and finally made it to a more stable area.¹⁶

Within minutes of leaving the building, he witnessed the sickening sight of the North Tower collapsing at 10:28 a.m. The collapsing building formed a giant mushroom cloud similar to that caused by the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. He had to literally run for his life in order to escape the falling debris. The smoke and dust of the collapsed buildings turned day into night. Scared, exhausted, and desiring to see his family, he reached the Manhattan Bridge, which connected with Brooklyn. He was at first hesitant to cross it, perhaps in shock, but he decided to go ahead. Upon reaching the safety of Brooklyn, Sergeant First Class Bernard, covered in soot, walked into an Armed Forces recruiting office. One of the recruiters there took Sergeant First Class Bernard to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Brooklyn where he was checked in and treated for his injuries. A few hours later, he was greatly relieved to see that Specialist Brown

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¹⁴ Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 7 November 2001, pp. 1-3; Specialist Alex Brown, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 7 November 2001; and Telephone and email correspondence between Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard and Major Robert Bensburg, “Bernard and Brown Input,” 7-15 June 2002.
¹⁵ Telephone and email correspondence between Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard and Major Robert Bensburg, 7-15 June 2002.
¹⁶ Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 7 November 2001, pp. 4-9 and Telephone and email correspondence between Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard and Major Robert Bensburg, “Bernard and Brown Input,” 7-15 June 2002.
was also brought there, slightly injured, but otherwise in good health.\(^\text{17}\) (Sergeant First Class Bernard believed he was the first patient from the World Trade Center attacks who was treated at the Veterans Hospital.) The staff checked his head, legs, arms, breathing and eyes, and they gave him painkillers. He went home that same day.\(^\text{18}\)

After Specialist Alex Brown arrived at the World Trade Center Plaza, he directed the people exiting the towers. He also made his way to a triage area, where the injured were being treated by emergency medical personnel. The injuries he helped treat included head wounds, burns from the fire, exhaustion, anxiety attacks, and immense bleeding from fallen glass and debris. When the second plane hit the South Tower, Specialist Brown was located approximately between the two towers. He did not realize the explosion he heard was from a second aircraft. He heard an explosion and thought it was from the fire and fuel from the original aircraft strike.\(^\text{19}\)

After he treated the injured for several minutes, he glanced up to see that the South Tower was starting to tilt. He described what happened next:

All I could do was grab the first couple of people I saw close to me and yell out, 'Run, run, the building is coming down!' Most people just looked up and froze. I don’t know if they were in shock or what. The debris started hitting the ground with rock and glass hitting everyone, to include myself. I took one quick glance back, but all I saw was rocks hitting people and a thick cloud of black smoke. It was like a big mushroom cloud following me up the street. I turned and ran as fast as I could, but not fast enough. A couple of seconds after that, the smoke had caught up to the running crowd and we were engulfed in it.\(^\text{20}\)

He told the others to put something over their mouths and to hold each other’s hands in order not to be separated by the blinding smoke. The smoke was so thick at this point that he could not even see his hands in front of his own face. People were going into shock. “About ten to twenty minutes later, we were down further from the towers. The smoke was still there, but we


\(^\text{18}\) Telephone and email correspondence between Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard and Major Robert Bensburg, 7-15 June 2002.


could see a little better. Everyone was covered from head to toe in soot,” Specialist Brown said. After escaping imminent death, he aided authorities with triage near Chambers and Broadway streets, and also assisted in setting up roadblocks and keeping people out of the area.

Specialist Brown stayed near Chambers Street helping police and firefighters with whatever they needed. He inquired about his supervisor, Sergeant First Class Bernard, whom he had lost track of while helping in the triage area. After he stayed in the area for several hours, Specialist Brown called his unit about 3:00 or 3:30 that afternoon and was told that Sergeant First Class Bernard was all right and at the Veterans Administration Hospital. The unit told Specialist Brown to get out of the area and go to the hospital to be checked. He arrived at the hospital where he was reunited with Sergeant First Class Bernard. Specialist Brown was treated for head, back, and knee injuries from the falling debris. He stayed overnight due to exhaustion and smoke inhalation and was released the next day. He attributes his survival to divine intervention.

Another Army Reservist from the 77th Regional Support Command also witnessed first hand the first plane flying into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Captain Tom Sullivan worked as Brigadier General Colt’s aide as an Army Reservist and as a civilian worked at Fiduciary Trust on the ninety-fifth floor of the South Tower. His wife was expecting twins in February 2002. On the morning of 11 September, he glanced out the window and saw a huge plane fly into the North Tower. After he felt his own building tremble from the plane hitting the other tower, Captain Sullivan decided it was time to evacuate. On his way down the stairs, he helped others along the way. By the time he reached the sixty-fifth floor approximately twenty minutes later, the building shook violently; the second plane had just hit the upper floors of the South Tower. Because he knew that something just hit his building, he expedited his descent, which took almost an hour to reach the ground floor. Upon exiting the building, Captain Sullivan and the others fled for their lives as the South Tower began to fall. As he walked across the Brooklyn Bridge to safety, he turned around and witnessed the crumbling of the North Tower. His company lost eighty-seven out of approximately 500 employees, including his boss and friend, Anthony Ventura. He did not have a chance to call his wife for nearly two hours to tell her he was okay. This disaster left such a deep emotional scar on Captain Sullivan that he vowed to always be there for the family of one of his co-workers who died. To say that this was a day that Captain Sullivan and his fellow workers will never forget would be an understatement. Captain Sullivan described his experiences on popular television shows such as Good Morning America and Eye on America with Dan Rather.

22 Ibid.
23 Article, Mr. Bruce Hill, "Aide-de-Camp Lucky to be Alive," Liberty Torch, 15, no. 2, (December 2001): p. 7; Captain Tom Sullivan, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 5 January 2002; and Email correspondence between Captain Tom Sullivan and Major Robert Bensburg, 6 August 2002.
A third Army Reservist from the 77th Regional Support Command also witnessed the disaster at the World Trade Center. Lieutenant Colonel Seth Gahr, an Army Reserve provost marshal, was one of three soldiers selected by Army Times who earned that publication’s honorable mention as a candidate for Soldier of the Year for 2002. As excerpted from the Army Times:

While performing his civilian duties as a patrolman with the New York City Police Department, Lieutenant Colonel Gahr saved lives and recovered bodies at the site where the World Trade Center Towers once stood. As a member of the New York Emergency Medical Squad, he was instrumental in rescuing police [officers], fire [fighters], and other victims trapped in the hot debris and smoky rubble. As one of the first police officers on the scene, he began to escort people away from the area. He then risked his own life by further assisting in the rescue and recovery operations. He tunneled through areas that continued to burn and rappelled into chasms where jagged metal and broken concrete loomed overhead, threatening to collapse. His valiant efforts and demeanor in such a horrific environment drew upon both his civilian and military experience and training, epitomizing the value and strength of the reserve component.24

Lieutenant Colonel Gahr, Captain Sullivan, Sergeant First Class Bernard, and Specialist Brown were by no means the only Army Reservists from the 77th Regional Support Command or other commands who witnessed the attacks on 11 September; nor were they the only ones who assisted innocent bystanders, city and federal agencies in the aftermath of the attack. They merely represented a small fraction of Army Reserve involvement. Many other Army Reservists volunteered their time and efforts on 11 September and in the days following. Some of their stories are included in the abridged interviews following this background narrative.

77th Regional Support Command Casualties

The 77th Regional Support Command lost six soldiers on 11 September who were working at their civilian jobs. All but one, Lieutenant Colonel William Pohlmann who was an attorney, were firefighters who died while trying to save others. The Department of the Army awarded a Legion of Merit for Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann and Soldiers’ Medals for the firefighters.25 The fallen soldiers were:

25 Email correspondence between Mr. Thomas Kane and Major Robert Bensburg, “Casualty Chapter 3rd Revision,” 17 July 2002.
Lieutenant Colonel William Pohlmann, who had twenty-seven years of military service, worked in his civilian job as an attorney for the New York State Department of Taxation, which had an office at the World Trade Center. He was also a volunteer firefighter and engine company president with the Ardsley Volunteer Fire Department in New York. He enlisted in the Army in 1968 where he first served as a cook while going to law school. Upon graduation, he received a direct commission as a major. He volunteered for overseas duty in Panama and Germany, in addition to serving in a variety of legal assignments in the continental United States. At Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann’s funeral, Colonel (P) William Terpeluk, deputy commander of the 77th Regional Support Command, was the senior officer from the 77th Regional Support Command. Brigadier General James Cullen, former commander of the 4th Judge Advocate General (JAG) and former judge advocate general officer for the 77th Army Reserve Command, presented the American flag to the next of kin at the memorial service on 22 September at Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Hartsdale, New York. Colonel Thomas Hollenhorst, commander of the 4th Legal Support Organization, presented the Legion of Merit medal to Lieutenant Colonel Pohlmann’s wife.26

Captain Michael Mullan was a New York City firefighter for Ladder 12. He had fifteen years of military service and was a member of the Army Nurse Corps with the 344th Combat Support Hospital. That day Captain Mullan was conducting rescue operations at the Marriott Hotel which stood between the two Twin Towers. He had reached the nineteenth floor of the hotel and was assisting victims to lower floors when the first of the towers fell, blowing out windows and doors of the hotel and knocking firefighters down the stairwells. Word immediately went out to evacuate the building. Captain Mullan started to exit, when on his way down he received a "Mayday" distress call from two other firefighters on floors above him. Instead of evacuating immediately, he courageously volunteered to get them. Soon after, the second tower fell and tore off most of the face of the Marriott, exposing the stairwell to the outside. Captain Mullan was one of four firefighters from Ladder 12 who did not escape. Shortly after that, the rest of the building collapsed.27 His body was later recovered. He entered military service in 1986 where he trained to be a medic. Prior to his untimely death, Captain Mullan was recently promoted to his current rank. He received airborne training, held a military

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26 Telephone correspondence between Master Sergeant Robert Pignatelli and Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 28 June 2002.
occupational specialty of x-ray technologist, and later trained as a nurse. The funeral Mass was held on 20 October 2001 at Our Lady of the Blessed Sacrament Roman Catholic Church, Bayside, Queens. The burial was at Calvary Cemetery, Woodside, Queens. Brigadier General Bill Bester, chief of the U.S. Army Nurse Corps, Washington, D.C., attended Captain Mullan’s funeral. Brigadier General Robert Kasulke, commander of the 8th Medical Brigade, presented the Soldiers’ Medal to the family, while Brigadier General Colt represented the 77th Regional Support Command and presented the American flag to the next of kin.28

Captain Mark Whitford, who had eight years of military service, worked as a chauffer for Manhattan’s Engine Company 23. It was his duty to remain in the truck while the other firefighters went into the towers, but this time he went with his team into the burning South Tower. His family held a memorial service on 4 October 2001 at Saint Mary’s Church, Washingtonville, New York. Recovery workers at ground zero found his remains on 5 April 2002, and the family held a Mass and burial on 9 April at Saint Mary’s. Major General Colt presented the American flag to the next of kin.29

Warrant Officer 1 Ronald Bucca, who had twenty-nine years of military service, was assigned as a fire marshal to the Manhattan Command. Incidentally, Chief Bucca’s brother, Major Alfred Bucca, worked as a maintenance officer with the 301st Area Support Group, Fort Totten, and noted that his brother was the first fire marshal killed in the line of duty with the Fire Department of New York.30 Chief Bucca’s family held a funeral service and burial on 10 November 2001. The funeral was held at Concordia College Sommer Center for Worship and the Performing Arts, Bronxville, New York. The burial was at Gate of Heaven Cemetery in Hawthorne, New York. Mr. Gary DiLallo, the 77th Regional Support Command's command executive officer and then a recent member of the Individual Ready Reserve, attended the funeral in his Army Reserve rank of brigadier general, and presented the American flag to the next of kin.31

Staff Sergeant Frederick Ill, who had sixteen years of military service, was a fire captain with Ladder 2 of Manhattan. He gained fame in 1999 for helping to save the life of a forty-six-year-old father of three, who was pushed onto the tracks of an oncoming subway train. Staff Sergeant Ill had saved many people – a few even from subway tracks – and knew normally that rescuers should wait for confirmation that the 600 volts of power running through the train tracks

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28 Ibid., pp. 5-7, and Telephone correspondence between Master Sergeant Robert Pignatelli and Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 28 June 2002.
30 Major Alfred Bucca, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 30 January 2002.
31 Telephone and email correspondence between Master Sergeant Robert Pignatelli and Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 28 June 2002.
had been shut off. However, the victim’s legs were severed, and he was losing blood fast and could die within minutes. So Staff Sergeant Ill risked his own life by jumping down onto the tracks, pulling the man from underneath the subway cars, strapping him to a backboard, and carrying him to safety and medical care. For his efforts, he received the Al DeFlumere Medal of Valor, awarded to citizens demonstrating unusual heroism and courage in risking their lives while attempting to save the lives of others. As an Army Reservist, Staff Sergeant Ill traveled to Central America to build schools and churches. His body was found following the 11 September attacks; he was laid to rest on 9 October 2001. His Mass was held at Saint Margaret’s Roman Catholic Church in Pearl River, New York, his hometown. Former President Bill Clinton, who had met Staff Sergeant Ill, attended the Mass. Brigadier General Colt presented the American flag to the next of kin.  

Sergeant Shawn Powell, who had thirteen years of military service, was a firefighter assigned to Engine Company 207 in Brooklyn. Sergeant Powell served four years on active duty with the Army before joining the Army Reserve. He completed the combat medic course and emergency medical technician course, and was serving as a medical assistant at the 4220th U.S. Army Hospital. His memorial service was held on 10 November 2001 at the Corner Store Baptist Church, located in the Bedford Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, where he lived. Brigadier General Colt presented the American flag to the next of kin. The 77th Regional Support Command's representation – to include senior officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted – was immense at all the wakes, funerals, and memorials of the five Army Reserve firefighters and one attorney who died at the World Trade Center. In fact, nearly one year before the 11 September attacks, the 77th Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel had established a funeral honor detail team that consisted of rotating Army Reserve soldiers on active duty for special work, who performed honors at many funerals of Army soldiers to include 77th members from the New York City area. The detail, led by Master Sergeant Robert Pignatelli, performed funeral honors for all six Army Reservists who perished on 11 September. The team received much praise for its professionalism and sensitivity. 

Another Army Reservist perished on 11 September at the World Trade Center. Retired Colonel Cyril Richard “Rick” Rescorla, who worked at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and had retired from the Army in 1989, died while trying to evacuate employees from the World Trade Center. He was a Vietnam veteran whose actions as a platoon leader in the battle at Landing Zone Xray in 1965 were documented in the book, *We Were Soldiers Once…and Young*. Colonel

34 Master Sergeant Robert Pignatelli, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 9 January 2001.
Rescorla retired from a non-77th Regional Support Command unit. One of his last Army Reserve assignments was as a commander, 2nd Battalion, 337th Mechanized Infantry, 1st Brigade, 85th Training Division in Chicago. Colonel Emil Philibosian, commander of the 1079th Garrison Support Unit, attended the memorial. Colonel Rescorla’s wife received the New Jersey Vietnam Service Medal for her husband.

It is worth noting that the highest ranking uniformed officer in the Fire Department of New York, Chief Peter Ganci, also perished that day. Though not an Army Reservist – he once was a paratrooper for the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division – he was the brother of a 77th Regional Support Command soldier, 1179th Deployment Support Brigade commander Colonel Daniel Ganci. As a side note, when Colonel Ganci received command of the 1179th on 3 November 2001 from Colonel John Levasseur, the Fire Department of New York honored him and his brother at the conclusion of the change of command ceremony by spraying red, white, and blue-colored water into the New York Harbor by fire boat. Brigadier General Louis Roach, deputy commander for mobilization, attended and represented the Military Management Traffic Command. Also, Brigadier General Colt spoke about the attacks on the World Trade Center and the loss of Chief Ganci. In late October 2001, soldiers from the 1179th mobilized for up to two years under Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Part of the unit’s mobilized mission was to transport supplies and equipment among military installations. Soldiers of the 1179th also deployed overseas in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.35

The 77th Regional Support Command’s Immediate Response

After 11 September 2001, the 77th Regional Support Command provided comfort and support to the populace in the New York City area. At the time of the attacks, Mr. DiLallo and some other full-time personnel were attending a training class, when Sergeant First Class Yvette Lee, his administrative sergeant, interrupted to tell him an airplane had just crashed into the World Trade Center. He left the class and returned to his office to watch on Cable News Network (CNN) the events unfold at the World Trade Center. He was in his office when the second plane hit the other World Trade Center tower. He walked to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations area, where about twenty-five other people from various staff sections were watching CNN. After the Pentagon crash, which was within an hour from the first attack in New York, Mr. DiLallo decided to activate the Emergency Operations Center.36 The Emergency Operations Center was a large room with computer terminals, telephone lines, and work stations that were


36 Mr. Gary DiLallo, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 February 2002, pp. 3-4, 6-7, and Email correspondence between Mr. Gary DiLallo and Major Robert Bensburg, 14 August 2002.
set up in one of the office rooms in the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Section. This room was used for everyday operations, and was converted to an emergency operation center when the need arose. Mr. DiLallo directed Mr. Brian Seliga, staff operations officer and also an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, to activate the Emergency Operations Center. Active Guard Reserve and Army civilians from all staff sections also helped set up and operate the center. Some key full-time personnel from various staff sections who operated the center in those first hours to include Mr. Seliga were: Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cochrane, Lieutenant Colonel Al Kose, and Major Bernd Zoller, all from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; Mr. Anthony Filosa and Mr. Peter Bianchi from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller; Mr. Robert Neglia and Major Douglas Gradwohl from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics; Chief Warrant Officer 4 Paul Silverman and Ms. Terry Gibbons from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel; Major Paul Casazza and Captain Lisandro Murphy of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer; and Colonel Philip Spies, senior liaison officer.37 Mr. DiLallo also helped Major Zoller clear out nonessential personnel in the Emergency Operations Center, who had been watching the morning’s news unfold on the big-screen television.38 Mr. DiLallo directed personnel to secure the building, to start getting water and provisions, and to increase the security presence at the front gate to the post. He sent nonessential employees home. He also met with a small group of city fire department officials, who shared work space at Fort Totten. The Fire Department of New York and 77th Regional Support Command staff agreed that the post needed force protection. Both organizations kept in touch as the identities of 11 September casualties were discovered and revealed to the fire department and next of kin.39

Though the 77th’s Emergency Operations Center fell under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Section for management purposes, every other staff section employed representatives in the center, who managed the telephones and any requests that dealt with their particular section’s responsibilities. For example, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer Section needed to keep abreast of the operational status of 77th Army Reserve buildings because various local and federal government agencies were requesting to use them as rest, storage, or operations centers. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) used the Kilmer Army Reserve Center in Edison, New Jersey, as storage and office space for workers until they found a facility closer to ground zero. The Fire Department of New York and the New York City Police Department used Fort Totten’s storage facilities. The Secret Service, the New Jersey State Police, and other agencies used the Caven Point Center in Jersey City, New Jersey. In the first forty-eight hours following the 11 September attacks, the engineers received other non-engineer types of requests,

37 Ibid., p. 4; Telephone correspondence between Mr. Gary DiLallo, Major Virginia Rea, and Major Robert Bensburg, 8 August 2002; Email correspondence between Mr. Gary DiLallo and Major Robert Bensburg, 14 August 2002; and Email correspondence between Captain Lisandro Murphy, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson, and Major Robert Bensburg, 12 August 2002.
38 Mr. Gary DiLallo, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 February 2002, p. 12.
39 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
such as medical and logistical, since the Emergency Operations Center had not yet established a systematic switchboard. Calls came randomly into telephones staffed by all sections.\textsuperscript{40}

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics staff provided additional help in several ways. Mr. Anthony Filosa, logistics management specialist, provided financial and supply assistance to units and staff. Mr. Thaddeus Staniszewski, supervisory equipment specialist, ensured Army materiel support activity and equipment concentration sites were available to assist units, and that these assets were on standby. Mr. Larry Gonsalves and Mr. Richard Greenberg arranged to feed more than 100 personnel on Fort Totten during the increased staffing that occurred after 11 September. Ms. Arlene Walker, logistics management specialist, ensured the government services fleet vehicles were accessible for tasks and arranged any transportation actions. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Richard Valentine, Active Guard Reserve staff maintenance technician, worked maintenance issues presented by units. Staff Sergeant William Olson, Active Guard Reserve stock control noncommissioned officer, worked equipment transfers and loan actions. Major Gradwohl, Active Guard Reserve plans and operations officer, set up the logistics computer system in the Emergency Operations Center, managed all message traffic pertaining to logistics, and analyzed data and prepared reports. Mr. William Robertson, logistics management specialist, was at the Fort Dix Emergency Operations Center providing logistical support back to Fort Totten.\textsuperscript{41}

While the 77th Regional Support Command was establishing its Emergency Operations Center, it directed its major subordinate commands to do the same. At 9:21 a.m., the 77th ordered the subordinate commands to stand up emergency operations centers. These emergency operations centers operated twenty-four hours a day for at least several days after the attacks. These major subordinate commands included: 411th Engineer Brigade, 301st Area Support Group, 800th Military Police Brigade, 455th Chemical Brigade, 4th and 7th Legal Support Organizations, 8th Medical Brigade, 1079th Garrison Support Unit, and the 1179th Deployment Support Brigade.\textsuperscript{42}

One such command, the 455th Chemical Brigade based at Fort Dix, New Jersey, responded to Operation LIBERTY CRISIS by establishing an emergency operations center at the SSG Jonah E. Kelley, U.S. Army Reserve Center, Fort Dix, New Jersey. The brigade posted guards at key locations, and took other actions for increasing security under the THREATCON levels being directed from higher headquarters. Two subordinate units, the 411th and 357th Chemical Companies, had previously scheduled training on domestic response casualty

\textsuperscript{40} Email correspondence among Captain Lisandro Murphy, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson, and Major Robert Bensburg, 12 August 2002.

\textsuperscript{41} Email correspondence between Mr. Robert Neglia and Major Robert Bensburg, 12 August 2002.

\textsuperscript{42} Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Trent Andrews, et. al., “Stand Up of 77th RSC EOC,” MMLF 1, #012, 11 September 2001.
decontamination during this time, and it was determined that these units could be available for use, if the situation arose.\textsuperscript{43}

Another unit, the 4th Legal Support Organization, Bronx, New York, established its own Emergency Operations Center. Personnel staffed the unit phones around the clock. Also the unit identified and informed the 77th of soldiers who were available to provide immediate help in any capacity. The unit also asked if the 77th would organize a blood drive, since soldiers indicated that they would like to donate. The unit extended this offer to the 77th Regional Support Command, state, federal, and city agencies.\textsuperscript{44}

Major Zoller supervised the Emergency Operations Center at the 77th until Colonel Matthew Cacciatore, deputy chief of staff for operations and drilling Army Reservist, arrived later that morning. While the 77th Regional Support Command staff was setting up the Emergency Operations Center, its commander, Brigadier General Colt, formulated the 77th’s command mission statement, as well as his intent and guidance in response to the terrorist attacks. Brigadier General Colt thought he remembered arriving at Fort Totten from his civilian job at around 10:30 a.m. on 11 September. He held a staff meeting with representatives from all the sections and conveyed his mission and intent for his staff to distribute throughout the command.\textsuperscript{45}

Some full-time staff initially manned the Emergency Operations Center. Within a few hours, drilling Army Reservists voluntarily came in to augment the full-time staff. Eventually, the 77th put these soldiers on drill or annual training pay status. Prior training and previous mobilization exercises helped prepare the command to quickly respond and organize the initial effort. Emergency Operations Center personnel logged in all tasks and email communication, which amounted to 860 messages.\textsuperscript{46}

Many full-time and Army Reserve soldiers worked long hours in the 77th Regional Support Command's Emergency Operation Center. Sergeant First Class Gregory Carpenter, Active Guard Reserve operations noncommissioned officer, estimated that the Emergency Operations Center staffed approximately 126 people, or about twenty-six people per shift, working there at some time during the first two weeks. Sergeant First Class Everett Butcher, an Active Guard Reserve administrative specialist, put in long hours in the Emergency Operations Center receiving calls. Sergeant Butcher also visited ground zero frequently for several months.

\textsuperscript{43} Fax, Colonel Joseph Leonelli to EOC 77th RSC, “Emergency Operations Center (EOC) SITREP-Operation Liberty Crisis,” MMLF 5, #276, 15 September 2001.
\textsuperscript{44} Email, Ms. Sandra Rolon to Sergeant First Class Charles Pursel, et. al., “4th LSO EOC,” MMLF 1 #71, 12 September 2001
\textsuperscript{45} Email correspondence between Major Bernd Zoller and Major Robert Bensburg, “77th 9-11 Response,” 17 June 2002.
\textsuperscript{46} Telephone conversation between Sergeant First Class Charles Pursel and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 10 January 2002.
after the attacks to help recover bodies, and he worked with other agencies, such as FEMA.\footnote{47} Sergeant First Class Charles Pursel, Active Guard Reserve administrative specialist, organized all telephonic and email communications that came into or went out of the center.\footnote{48}

At 11:53 a.m. on 11 September, Mr. Joseph Beck, operations training officer and Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, placed personnel on additional duty assignments and then on formal orders for the duration of the emergency. At 5:18 p.m., Mr. Beck directed subordinate units to document accountability of support, such as material, equipment, and/or manpower, to ensure reimbursement from the requesting organization. He also directed units to follow the U.S. Army Reserve Command’s (USARC) guidelines for spending funds for emergency operations. Under the guidance of Brigadier General Colt and Mr. DiLallo, each unit placed an appropriate number of personnel on orders in order to handle any arising situation. Mr. Beck further stated that units were to continue to prepare updated rosters, and that staff members needed to keep running the Emergency Operations Center.\footnote{49}

On the morning of 12 September, Colonel Cacciatore ordered the Emergency Operations Center to operate as a “battle staff” to provide support and security. Battle staff was defined as a staff formed to plan operations and direct forces in response to contingencies and crises, develop courses of action, and execute the commander’s directives.\footnote{50} The 77th command group designated Major Virginia Rea, an Active Guard Reserve training officer, as the battle staff officer in charge, while Major Zoller assumed the roles of operations officer for intelligence and mobilizations, and coordinator of command briefings. Master Sergeant Jack Mutter, Active Guard Reserve soldier, was the noncommissioned officer in charge, while another Active Guard Reserve soldier, Sergeant First Class Gordon Bullard of the Training Section, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, assisted the operations and battle-staff personnel. Sergeant First Class Carpenter also worked as the noncommissioned officer in charge of intelligence and readiness operations.\footnote{51}

One of the battle staff operation’s responsibilities was to oversee communications throughout the command with the USARC, the FEMA, the FBI, New York State and New York City emergency operations centers, and New York City Police and the Fire Department of New York.

\footnote{47} Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Lieutenant David Van Cleve et. al., "Duty Status for Personnel," MMLF 1, #76, 12 September 2001 and Sergeant First Class Everett Butcher, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, pp. 3-5.
\footnote{48} Telephone conversation between Sergeant First Class Charles Pursel and Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 10 January 2002.
\footnote{49} Email, Joseph Beck to Trent Andrews et. al., “RE: Duty Status for Personnel” MMLF 1, #0023, 11 September 2001; Email, Joseph Beck to Joseph Beck, et. al., “Operational Funding Costs and Accounting,” MMLF 1, #0035, 11 September 2001; and Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve, et. al., “Duty Status for Personnel,” MMLF 1, #76, 12 September 2001.
York. Additionally, the battle staff operations staff was responsible for “immediate response” – life or death – requests for support within the city, security of emergency operations within the command, and for providing updates for the command briefings that took place several times a day.  

The Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations' troop program unit staff, augmented Majors Rea and Zoller. Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve, division chief for mobilizations, happened to be at the Ernie Pyle Reserve Center on 11 September on annual training orders. Colonel Thomas Butler, assistant deputy chief of staff, operations, reported on 12 September for duty. Lieutenant Colonel Kirk Lamb, division chief, deputy chief of staff, operations for readiness, reported within days of the attack. The entire troop program unit noncommissioned officer staff also reported to assist with emergency operations staffing and provided twenty-four hour shift coverage.

At 12:14 p.m. on 12 September, Major Zoller emailed subordinate units to identify communications traffic that pertained to supporting New York City recovery efforts under Operation LIBERTY CRISIS. He informed all sections that the 77th's mission and the commanding general's intent and guidance, as directed by the USARC headquarters, was to provide all types of support to any requesting government agency, monitor all equipment issued, conduct missions supporting the relief efforts, monitor personnel status, ensure that safety procedures were being followed, and to ensure all subordinate units continued to submit situation reports.

On the same day, under guidance from the commanding general and Colonel Cacciatore, Mr. Beck directed all commands to provide equipment, material, or manpower support. Under the guidance of Brigadier General Colt and Mr. DiLallo, each unit placed an appropriate number of personnel on orders in order to handle any arising situation. Mr. Beck further stated that units were to continue to prepare updated rosters, and that staff members needed to keep running the Emergency Operations Center.

Also on 12 September, Mr. Beck assumed his lieutenant colonel position, troop program unit role as division chief, deputy chief of staff, operations training, and provided the essential advice regarding the continued conduct of individual and unit training, as well as military school attendance. He advised all 77th Regional Support Command units that they were to continue with their training for the remainder of 2001. However, commanders had flexibility to make adjustments to training and missions depending upon how the emergency situation developed. He also told subordinate commanders to monitor the number of additional annual training days performed, and that soldiers were not to be denied their fourteen days of annual training. The

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., and Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve, et. al., “Duty Status for Personnel,” MMLF 1, #76, 12 September 2001.
command emphasized that because of Army regulations, soldiers could not work more than twenty-nine annual training days, including travel. Lieutenant Colonel Beck assisted the Emergency Operations Center by researching the security issues and questions of supervisory staff administrators and commanders and advising them and Colonel Cacciatore accordingly.56

At Fort Totten, Emergency Operations Center personnel logged in all requests for equipment and routed them to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, led by Army Reserve Colonel John Skoll. Mr. Robert Neglia was the full time supervisory logistics management specialist, and as an Army Reservist was a chief warrant officer 4 in logistics.57 Chief Warrant Officer 4 William Iannone, Active Guard Reserve, also worked in the logistics office and provided support for equipment requests. They established 100 percent accountability for all items provided to Army Reserve or National Guard units, the New York City Police Department and the Fire Department of New York, FEMA, or any other agency. Logisticians documented on hand receipts for all equipment loaned, which followed procedures outlined in Army regulations regarding accountability. They arranged to send the supplies to Pier 40 on the Hudson River between 42nd and 46th Streets in Manhattan.58 New York City officials set up their Emergency Operations Center at Pier 92 on the Hudson River between 54th and 56th Streets in Manhattan.

The 77th Tasked Colonel Skoll to work three days as a liaison officer among the FEMA emergency preparedness liaison officers, the active duty Army, and the 78th Division headquarters in Edison, New Jersey. Colonel Skoll informed the 77th of the FEMA activity that occurred during those first three days after the attacks. He then returned to Fort Totten to assist in the 77th’s logistical support for recovery operations. He described the major concern that faced the logistics section at the 77th, which was who can receive what and how much. Colonel Skoll commented:

I completed the tasks required for me as DCSLOG [Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics], and we provided manpower to the EOC [Emergency Operations Center], which was running seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, and all the log[istics] and supply activities for the World Trade Center activities at that time . . . . I stayed here ten days.59

57 Colonel John Skoll, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 2 February 2002.
58 Chief Warrant Officer 4 William Iannone, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 2 February 2002, pp. 2-3.
59 Colonel John Skoll, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 2 February 2002, pp. 2-3.
Mr. Neglia elaborated on the logistical issues the 77th faced immediately after the terrorist attacks:

> When you go into an emergency situation, [you] basically review all our assets on hand as to [the] . . . mission-capable status of assets...we have and the availability of our personnel . . . identify where all our personnel are, whether on leave status. This includes our personnel out in the field. Within an hour, we are in the Emergency Operations Center. We also had all information as to availability to all water containers, refrigerator units, mortuary units, [and] any types of cots, canvases, anything that may be needed in support of the operation. We started to receive requests from various agencies because FEMA was not on board. And based on the direction of the commander, if it pertains to the life and well being of individuals and to our soldiers, we will support them. At that time, we started to identify our operational assets, which we had in our concentration sites and used in the EOC . . . .

> Mr. Neglia further explained that the 77th’s Logistics Section assisted in identifying the various subordinate units to haul loaned equipment to different locations in New York City. Jacobi Hospital in the Bronx, the FBI, Staten Island, and Randall’s Island were among some locations. The 77th loaned about $100,000 in tents to the National Guard. It also loaned protective masks and x-ray machines. Details on equipment loaned and associated costs will be covered below.

**The 77th Regional Support Command’s Logistical Support**

The 77th Regional Support Command responded quickly and honored all reasonable requests for assistance from civilian and military agencies in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civilian Authorities*. The New York Medical Examiner’s Office, in perhaps what was the first request for assistance, asked for thirty-two medium sized general-purpose tents in order to set up a temporary morgue. The 301st Area Support Group, commanded by Colonel John Wohrle, was a major subordinate command of the 77th Regional Support Command. It owned the tents and loaned them out. Due to health regulations, the 77th did not expect these tents to be returned.

Some 301st soldiers who were instrumental in assisting the command after 11 September included: Lieutenant Colonel James Gross, who led the Emergency Operations Center with assistance from Lieutenant Colonels Veronica Baddine and Melody Thomas, and Major Andrew

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60 Colonel John Skoll, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 2 February 2002, pp. 2-3.  
61 Ibid., p. 4.  
Burns, an Active Guard Reserve operations and plans officer at the 301st, Major John Cummings and Specialist Mark Lans, troop program unit members, were also part of the initial team that responded on 11 September. The 301st and several of its subordinate units assisted the city in other ways, as described below.

A subordinate unit of the 301st, the 140th Quartermaster Company, Fort Totten, provided fourteen soldiers and a portable bath unit, light set, four large tents, and a 4,000-pound piece of material-handling equipment to the New York City Medical Examiner’s Office at Jacobi Hospital. The 77th gave the unit the mission of providing temporary morgue space and aiding the medical examiner in identifying victims of the World Trade Center attacks. Unit members arrived at Jacobi Hospital on the evening of 11 September. Captain Bill Martin and First Lieutenant Matthew Goldman of the 140th were the officers in charge of this mission. However, the 140th Quartermaster did not receive any casualties at its temporary morgue at Jacobi Hospital. Other area morgues closer to downtown Manhattan handled the anticipated casualties. Chaplain (Captain) William Heisterman, of the 77th Regional Support Command Chaplain’s Office offered solace and prayer daily to the soldiers at the Jacobi Hospital mission. During his visit to New York on 16 September 2001, Lieutenant General Plewes, together with Brigadier General Colt, visited 140th Quartermaster soldiers at that hospital. The 140th also provided a generator unit to the Fire Department of New York.

The 695th Combat Support Battalion, Fort Tilden, New York – subordinate to the 301st – donated five tables and delivered a “refer” [refrigerated] van to Jacobi Hospital for food storage only for the 140th Quartermaster Company. Lieutenant Colonel Chester Wernicki, commander of the 695th Combat Support Battalion, and his staff directed much of the activities of the subordinate logistical units. The 146th Quartermaster Company, Fort Totten – subordinate to the 301st – donated two floodlights to the Fire Department of New York, as well as a forklift and five-ton tractor to the New York Medical examiner.

The 695th also helped the FBI when it placed a request to the 77th for the following equipment:

- 20 chairs
- 20 field desks
- portable kitchen
- electric generators
- extension cords
- fresh-water containers
- garbage cans
- flood lights
- 20 sleeping cots
- 20 blankets
- 20 fresh water canteens
- mess gear (for portable kitchen)
- 20 ponchos
- portable showers
- vehicles to transport this equipment

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64 Sergeants John Sloan and John Kim and First Sergeant Edward Allen, interviews with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 10 February 2002, pp. 3-7.
The FBI used this equipment to support the personnel working in the reconstruction of the two airplanes and the investigative efforts. The 77th Regional Support Command also tasked the 695th to provide maintenance support to the California Urban Search and Rescue Team by repairing tires on a trailer. The National Urban Search and Research Response System, established under the authority of the FEMA in 1989, structured emergency services personnel into disaster-response task forces. In a related tasking, the 695th provided four personnel to another urban search and rescue team, the Nebraska Task Force, by transporting banded stacks of lumber in two five-ton trucks to the disaster site of the former World Trade Center.

The 77th Regional Support Command also tasked the 301st Area Support Group to provide generators, portable flood lights, garbage cans, portable water containers, and twenty each of the following items: cots, blankets, ponchos, and canteens. These were for the FEMA response team rescue effort. A 12 September mission sent them to pick up 150 cases of Army field rations called “Meals Ready to Eat” from Fort Dix, New Jersey, for transport to Fort Totten. On 17 September, the New York Police Department needed weapons’ repair and cleaning assistance. The 301st supported the city police department by providing a repair and cleaning space in a dust-free environment at Pier 90.

The 301st Area Support Group and its subordinates were not the only 77th Regional Support Command units to help the city of New York. Medical units also helped. For instance, other support to Jacobi Hospital came from the 344th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Totten – subordinate to the 8th Medical Brigade. The unit provided the medical examiner with a modular field kitchen, a mobile kitchen tent, and a 400-gallon water trailer. The 344th also sent 100 cots to the Lutheran Medical Center in Brooklyn. The 300th Medical Detachment in Rocky Point, New York – also subordinate to the 8th – supplied the Medical Examiner's office with three dental x-ray kits.

Engineer and military police units helped the city as well. The 411th Engineer Brigade in New Windsor, New York, and another major subordinate command, provided ten medium-size tents to the New York Army National Guard at Randall's Island, located opposite the Harlem section of New York on the East River. (The original plan called for the New York Air National Guard from Stewart Air Force Base in Newburgh, New York, to send personnel for the equipment, but they did not show.) Therefore, a subordinate unit of the 411th – the 854th

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70 Email, Major Bernd Zoller to 77th RSC, "T0010-Generator Support for FEMA Response Teams," MMLF 4, #233, 12 September 2001, p. 2.
Engineer Battalion, Kingston, New York – delivered the tents to their destination. The 854th also provided heavy hauling support to the Air National Guard in New Windsor. The unit transported heavy engineer equipment to ground zero and helped in maintenance and recovery, among other tasks. The 77th Regional Support Command also tasked the 411th to provide transportation for the Red Cross in the city. In another mission, the 306th Engineer Company in Amityville, New York – subordinate to the 411th – transported food, water, and clothing from local charities to New York City rescue and recovery workers.

On 13 September, the 77th Regional Support Command assigned the 340th Military Police Company in Jamaica, New York, which was subordinate to the 800th Military Police Brigade, to escort another vehicle from the 4220th U.S. Army Hospital in Rocky Point that was transporting dental x-ray equipment to the New York University Medical Center in Manhattan. The medical center had set up a temporary morgue site. Another subordinate unit – the 300th Medical Company, also of Rocky Point and subordinate to the 8th Medical Brigade – supplied the three dental x-ray kits. Staff Sergeant Lance Bryer and Sergeant Christopher Arroyo, both 340th soldiers, assisted with this escorting mission. They helped unload and set up the equipment. During that time, they witnessed the “many visual horrors of the attack.” Staff Sergeant Bryer spoke of what he saw that day:

As myself and Sergeant Arroyo were escorting the dental equipment to NYU [New York University], we had no idea of what we would see. As we arrived, the first thing we saw was the many refrigerated trailers located in front of the hospital. I was told they were there to hold the remains of the victims until they could begin the identification process. As we began to unload the gear, the main ambulance garage was set up as a mass triage table with people [police or medical personnel] sitting across from each other [with] bags of body parts being distributed. I remember one body that I saw was mangled so bad that there was no head, and the body looked as if it was a lump of flesh. The only way I could have recognized it as human was from the arm, which was the only body part that was identifiable. Another room . . . contained burnt charred bones in a plexi-glass box. Another body on a gurney was also mangled very badly to the point that the skull was split in half and the remnants of the jaw line [was] exposed without any recognizable flesh on the skull. Another was a young woman. . . . The majority of her body was intact but she had pieces of flesh missing from her, and numerous bodies in body bags on gurneys that I didn’t want to wait around and see what

74 Email, Paul Casazza to Mr. Trent Andrews, et. al, “77th RSC EOC Tasker T0028,” MMLF 3 #195, 14 September 2002.
was inside. One thing is sure – myself and Sergeant Arroyo will be the first ones to volunteer to fight terrorism. 76

Other major subordinate commands and their units assisted the city following 11 September. The 1179th Deployment Support Brigade issued seventy-eight protective masks to the New York Police Department. 77 The U.S. Coast Guard received sixty-five cots and sleeping bags from the 436th Transportation Battalion of Staten Island and subordinate to the 1179th. The 436th delivered the cots and bags to Fort Wadsworth, also on Staten Island. The 77th Regional Support Command gave 100 cots and one portable floodlight to the U.S. Coast Guard facility at Fort Totten. Since this facility borders on a large body of water, Long Island Sound, the Coast Guard provided roving patrols for additional security. 78 The 320th Chemical Company, Jamaica, subordinate to the 455th Chemical Brigade, sent FEMA one each of a sleeping bag, a wet-weather parka, and a pair of wet-weather trousers. 79

On 25 September, Mr. Neglia and Major Gradwohl decided to visit Randall's Island after they did not receive replies from several telephone messages they left with the New York Army National Guard regarding the loaned tents. When they arrived on the island, they discovered that the National Guard had left. Subsequent investigation revealed that the National Guard’s 53rd Troop Command, which borrowed ten tents (using four to store bodies), sent them to the Arthur Kill Landfill, Staten Island, to be used as temporary mortuaries. A National Guard officer told them that FEMA would reimburse the 77th for the tents. As of August 2002, the National Guard still had not returned nor reimbursed the 77th for the tents. 80

Meanwhile, on 30 September 2001, as subordinate units accomplished their missions, the 77th Regional Support Command's headquarters staff issued an order to plan for the retrieval of loaned equipment to the various government agencies. This included equipment loaned to the FBI's command post at Brooklyn's Floyd Bennett Field, trucks that aided in the urban search and rescue teams, tents at Pier 40, and equipment and space loaned to the New York City Police and Fire Department of New York. The 77th Regional Support Command's Logistics Section estimated the total dollar value of equipment loaned to the different government agencies and

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78 Email, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cochrane to EOC 77th RSC, ”MP Support,” MMLF 11, # 486, 19 September 2001.
80 Email, Mr. Robert Neglia to Mr. Gary DiLallo, ”10 GP Medium Tents TASK #T0030,” MMLF 13, #629, 26 September 2001 and Telephone correspondence among Mr. Gary DiLallo, Mr. Robert Neglia and Major Robert Bensburg, 8 August 2002.
hospitals at $363,306. The recovery of unreturned equipment was ongoing. The estimated dollar value of the unreturned items was $63,462.81

77th Regional Support Command Public Affairs, 
Finance and Personnel Staff Sections

Soon after 11 September, the USARC headquarters sent further guidance on the importance of operations security regarding public affairs. They referred the field to Army Regulation 530-1, Operations Security, for proper guidance, which cautioned units, soldiers, civilians, and contractors about the type of information to be released to the news media. For instance, the 77th Regional Support Command could not divulge information on unit strength, operational capabilities, deployment intentions, and all types of speculation. To ensure media procedures were consistent, the USARC Public Affairs Office forwarded the Public Affairs Guidance (PAG), which originated from Headquarters, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Public Affairs. On the evening of 11 September, the USARC Public Affairs Office was still directing its regional support commands’ public affairs officers to maintain a “passive” stance – that is, to respond only to specific queries from the media and to volunteer nothing more. They were also told not to acknowledge the presence or absence of any THREATCON level.

The 77th Active Guard Reserve public affairs officer position was vacant on 11 September. The full time public affairs civilian, Mr. Chester Marcus, who was a master sergeant for a subordinate Army Reserve unit in Lodi, New Jersey, reported to his unit because bridges and tunnels going to and from Manhattan were closed except to fire, police, and some military personnel. Therefore, the 77th Regional Support Command’s Public Affairs Office was short staffed on 11 September and needed a qualified public affairs senior representative. Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink, an Army Reservist and commander of the 361st Press Camp Headquarters, a direct reporting unit to the 77th Regional Support Command, reported to the command. He lived in Queens and was already on orders preparing for his unit’s deployment to the Bright Star exercise in Egypt on 7 October.

Lieutenant Colonel Fink quickly coordinated support to the public affairs effort which focused on the Army Reserve’s role in the recovery effort and subsequent mobilization activities. He explained the first public affairs activities on 11 September:

When I arrived, one plane had already struck the one tower. . . . While I was in the office here, the second plane struck. . . . We realized that eventually the 77th

82 Email, Lieutenant Colonel Boyd Collings to USARLINK@ns1.OCAR.ARMY.PENTAGON.MIL, et. al., “Latest USAR PAG—1030 hours, 4 October 2001,” MMLF 16, #697.
would be involved in some way. . . . New York being the media capital of the world, I anticipated a lot of activity from the media. . . . I wrote a draft response to query which is sort of like a press release or news release. After I organized the Public Affairs Office and set up a query book. . . . I started receiving public affairs guidance from the USARC, which was coming down from OCAR [Office of the Chief, Army Reserve] and the DA [Department of the Army], as well as DOD [Department of Defense]. As we got the public affairs guidance, we placed that in this book, and we maintained that book and updated it.

Other members of the 361st Press Camp Headquarters volunteered for public affairs duty. Staff Sergeant Timothy Barnes, who was called into the unit and arrived around 2 p.m. on 11 September, served with Lieutenant Colonel Fink for more than three weeks. Members of the 361st fielded media queries, arranged interviews, and helped the 77th Regional Support Command’s commanding general with his public affairs needs during the crisis. Lieutenant Colonel Fink also served as public affairs officer for Lieutenant General Plewes during his visit to New York City.\(^\text{84}\)

Following 11 September, some 77th Regional Support Command personnel had to balance their Army Reserve and civilian jobs. Mr. Marcus was one such individual who tried to perform his Army Reserve and civilian jobs at the same time. As a civilian and as mentioned above, Mr. Marcus was a public affairs officer at the 77th Regional Support Command’s Public Affairs Office. As an Army Reservist, he was a master sergeant for the 10th Battalion, 4th Brigade, 98th Training Division. His services were also needed there as acting sergeant major. Therefore, for a few days following 11 September, Mr. Marcus worked at his reserve center while keeping abreast of public affairs events back at the 77th. He explained:

I was able to still support the public affairs mission in my civilian capacity by use of e-mail and land-line phone. I was responsible for responding to queries from television and cable news services. From those initial contacts, the 77th responded to over fifty-four television news queries and had numerous news and feature news stories aired in the first two weeks following the attack.\(^\text{85}\)

The financing of soldiers and civilians for additional duty following 11 September was a concern for the 77th Regional Support Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller. Mr. Peter Bianchi, resource management officer and retired lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, explained the budgeting process during the first hours after 11 September:

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\(^{84}\) Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 March 2002, p. 3 and Email correspondence between Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink and Major Robert Bensburg, 6 August 2002.

\(^{85}\) Email correspondence between Mr. Chet Marcus and Major Robert Bensburg, “LODI Update 911,” 8 June 2002.
I had instructed my personnel to provide me with the current financial balances for both reserve pay, Army and . . . operations and maintenance . . . funding requirements that may have been needed. Primarily, the first few hours I was basically in a listening mode trying to react to either logistical requirements or operational requirements. It became apparent very early that we would require a number of personnel to be called to active duty immediately . . . . We instructed the DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations] that all they would have to do is query our subordinate units as to the name and social security number of an individual, and that we would take care of all administrative work within the [comptroller]. I would say within the first ninety-six hours to the first seven days we had a round-the-clock orders processing operations. There was always someone here [who] could process an order. As far as civilian personnel, we took stock of what our overtime balances were for the balance of the fiscal year and at that point, as we were getting into the operations twenty-four, forty-eight hours . . . we started receiving frag [mented] messages from the USARC DCSCOMPT [Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller] as to certain . . . accounting processing codes to be used so we could collect the data.86

Mr. Bianchi explained that the 77th Regional Support Command’s Comptroller’s Section had been given “carte blanche” from the USARC’s Comptroller and Operations directorates to spend as much money as it needed for the 11 September effort. From 11 to 30 September 2001, the 77th employed 1,324 soldiers at a cost of about $1.3 million. By the same token, the section faced its normal year-end close out to balance the prior fiscal year’s budget, which was more difficult than usual since it also had to fund a sudden increase of Army Reservists on orders.87

Security, Force Protection, and Threat Conditions

The federal government took swift action to impede other possible terrorist attacks by implementing certain security measures. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shut down all New York City area airports at 9:17 a.m. on 11 September, fourteen minutes after the second plane hit the World Trade Center. As mentioned earlier, at 9:40 a.m. the FAA halted all flights at U.S. airports – the first time in U.S. history that air traffic nationwide was halted.88

The National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, acting on orders from the secretary of defense, directed its subordinate commands on U.S. military installations to implement THREATCON Delta on the morning of 11 September. The Military Command Center was an entity responsible for collecting and managing information related to a crisis or

86 Mr. Peter Bianchi, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 27 March 2002, p. 3.
87 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
threat against the United States. The U.S. Joint Forces Command – one of nine unified combatant commands – directed this force protection posture to subordinate commands at 11:30 a.m. on 11 September through a secure Internet system called the Global Command and Control System.  

With the nation reeling from the shock of the terrorist attacks, the Department of the Army prepared for terrorist attacks against Army installations, including Army Reserve centers, by implementing the directives set forth from higher headquarters for THREATCON Delta. The Department of Defense established the progressive THREATCON levels of security for the Armed Forces prior to 11 September, so that the services had guidelines to follow in case of a perceived or real threat to their personnel or facilities. The levels ranged from THREATCON Normal, the lowest, to THREATCON Delta, the highest. Each one specified certain security measures that an installation should take. On or about 11 September, the Army was in the process of changing the name from “threat condition” to “terrorist force protection condition,” or TFPCON, which was a change in name only. It took a few days for subordinate units to realize and implement the name change. Local area commanders did have, however, the authority to implement higher threat condition levels depending on the local area situation. The events of 11 September resulted in a significant increase in security in anticipation of possible terrorist actions. The Army Reserve operated from 1,198 facilities and more than 4,000 buildings that

90 Major General Craig Bambrough, interview by Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002, p. 2, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th Military History Detachment), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.  
91 Ibid; Email correspondence among Majors David Phillips, Mario Beckles and Major Robert Bensburg, 20 June 2002; Email, Watch Team (FORSOM) to Sergeant First Class Michael Jungers et. al., “THREATCON Status Board,” MMLF 1 #38, 11 September 2001; and Email correspondence between Master Sergeant Fred Buyarski and Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, “Threatcon Name Change,” 17 April 2002.
92 Email, Major Andrew Burns to First Lieutenant Erik Johnson, et. al., “THREATCON Levels,” MMLF 2 #90, 11 September 2001. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 525-13, Appendix F-1, laid out the following levels of security:
1. THREATCON Normal—as the name indicates, this level applies when there is no discernible threat of possible terrorist activity. Under these conditions, only a routine security posture designed to defeat the criminal threat is warranted.
2. THREATCON Alpha—applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or installations and the nature of the threat is unpredictable. Some vehicles may be searched.
3. THREATCON Bravo—applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Most vehicles are searched.
4. THREATCON Charlie—applies when an incident occurs or intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist activity against personnel or facilities is imminent. All vehicles are searched.
5. THREATCON Delta—implementation applies in the immediate area or intelligence indicates that some form of terrorist action against personnel or facilities is imminent.
needed to upgrade their security to a level rarely seen before in the continental United States. While each Army Reserve center already had security plans in place, new problems or situations arose, and commanders frequently altered their plans, such as what took place at the 77th Regional Support Command on 11 September.93

Major General Craig Bambrough, deputy commanding general at the USARC and deputy commanding general for Army Reserve affairs at Forces Command (FORSCOM), expressed his views on threat conditions:

I can’t remember the Army ever going to Delta, at least not in my career. For the USARC, this involved getting guards, barriers, and other force-protection measures. The Army’s focus has always been outward. We’ve always been concerned about a threat outside the country.94

Army Reserve commanding generals of regional support commands shared their views on the threat and security conditions. Major General William Kiefer, commanding general of the 94th Regional Support Command, headquartered in Fort Devens, Massachusetts, recalled that “with the events of September 11th, we immediately mobilized to put together an emergency operations center at our headquarters and went about developing force protection measures for all our Army Reserve centers in New England.”95

The regional support commands reacted to the Army’s call for additional protection of military installations as well as they could, but it was not easy or quick. For several decades, the Army Reserve tried to increase the public’s awareness of its existence and roles and did so by building reserve centers in the middle of civilian communities. Unfortunately, the close community locations made it difficult to defend these structures from possible terrorist attacks. Major General Robert Ostenberg, commanding general of the 63rd Regional Support Command, Los Alamitos, California, said:

Certainly, we did lockdown and cleared anybody that came into the buildings, but if you are working in THREATCON Charlie, it goes way beyond, and you have the capability to do that [lockdown and clearing out]. In the Army Reserve,

93 Major Mark Brooks, interview by Sergeant William Miller, tape recording with transcript, 11 January 2002, p. 6 and 77th RSC Pamphlet 190-1, THREATCON Research Material (Hereafter referred to as TCRM) #5, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th Military History Detachment), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.
94 Major General Craig Bambrough, interview with Captain Suzanne Summer, 10 January 2002, p. 2, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th Military History Detachment), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.
95 Major General William Kiefer, interview by Sergeant William Miller, tape recording, 27 March 2002, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th Military History Detachment), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.
because of the 70s and 80s, when we wanted to be a community based organization and source, we moved away from the security that we could have implemented had it been prior to that when we were on posts and not off.96

Major General Karol Kennedy, commanding general of the 99th Regional Support Command, Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, commented on the increased security and the challenges it presented:

We had to implement lockdown procedures. The only thing we could do was create physical barriers with the existing locks. In most places, fences were not around all the facilities, but any fences that did exist were locked. We have many facilities that are on military installations, and that was helpful. We also have facilities [that] are shared, sometimes with other military components that were using different levels of security measures [which] resulted in some conflict. One such case, [we were] sharing it with the Marine Corps, who had put their reservists under arms, and we had not done that at that particular location.97

Army Reserve installations needed barriers to isolate centers, limit access, and thereby meet force protection measures. Installation commanders rushed to use concrete barriers and chain link fencing, but until those materials arrived they made do with resources on hand, and went so far as to include using engineer tape to block off areas with an unarmed guard standing watch.98 The active duty Army designed its military installations with security as a primary concern. In contrast, the Army Reserve worked among the community. These differences became apparent as the Army went to higher THREATCON levels. The terrorist attacks forced the Army Reserve to look inward as well as outward.

On 11 September at 9:59 a.m., the 77th Regional Support Command’s Emergency Operations Center personnel directed subordinate units to go to THREATCON Bravo, which


included a search of all vehicles entering the post. At 10:22 a.m., the Department of the Army’s Operations Center at the Pentagon raised the THREATCON level to Delta, and the USARC distributed that information to its units. Then at 10:50 a.m., the 77th increased the threat level to THREATCON Delta – the most severe – which warned of imminent terrorist attacks. Before the actual email traffic was received, the 77th received verbal communications that the threat condition levels would be increasing, so it directed its subordinate commands to implement THREATCON Delta. Consequently, the military police at Fort Totten’s gate allowed access only to personnel assigned to that installation after checking their identification cards. Military police also searched all vehicles entering Fort Totten for explosives. They opened hoods and used mirrors to scrutinize even the undercarriage of vehicles. Major Gradwohl procured the mirrors.

At 1:24 p.m. on 11 September, Major Andrew Burns, an Active Guard Reserve soldier working as the operations officer at the 301st Area Support Group, sent through email the actual threat condition level descriptions from the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Regulation 525-13, Appendix F. He did this because units were seeking guidance about what each threat condition level entailed. Quoting from this regulation, the THREATCON Delta level requirements also encompassed all the previous provisions of lesser THREATCON levels. Described below was one of the provisions within THREATCON Charlie, addressed by Major Burns, which created a situation that the Army Reserve was trying to address at the time:

Issue weapons to all law enforcement personnel, security guards, and guard force personnel, if not already accomplished. Ensure that all personnel have been briefed to include augmentation personnel, if not already accomplished. Ensure that all personnel have been briefed concerning policies governing the use of force/rules of engagement, particularly criteria for use of deadly force. Ensure that ammunition is available for immediate issue [for those personnel not already issued ammunition] and that supervisory personnel are familiar with policies governing issuance of ammunition.

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99 Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Mr. Joseph Beck, et. al., “Stand Up of 77th RSC EOC,” MMLF 1, #12, 11 September 2001.
However, at 3:55 p.m. on 11 September, Brigadier General John Yingling, the USARC chief of staff, sent out an order to all subordinate commands not to issue firearms and ammunition to personnel on guard details, excluding military police. This contradicted THREATCON Delta’s requirement to arm all guards. The USARC issued the order while waiting for further guidance from higher headquarters – Forces Command – because it was concerned about accidental shootings involving soldiers without proper training. The USARC referred to Army Regulation 190-14, *The Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties* because this regulation required all guards to be trained in the use of force and to be qualified to fire with their assigned weapons. The USARC directed the Army Reserve installations to use unarmed soldiers or military police to protect the installations. The email directive about “no ammo [ammunition] and no firearms” that was sent earlier was again sent at 4:05 p.m. to ensure that subordinate units received it and complied with its directive. The USARC did not provide the intent or meaning behind this order to the 77th, which led to some confusion.\(^{104}\)

Major Zoller noticed the contradiction between THREATCON Delta requirements and the USARC’s orders immediately and asked for clarification at 4:07 p.m. on 11 September. Due to its concerns over safety, the USARC insisted that only contracted security officers or military police stand guard with issued firearms and ammunition. Some soldiers at the 77th disagreed with this decision because they wanted to protect their units in the field by employing roving patrols around the reserve center. However, the 77th complied with the USARC’s modification of the THREATCON Delta requirement and continued on with its security posture. As Brigadier General Colt said, “We can agree to disagree, but cannot agree to not support.” With the exception of the non-military police guards not being armed, the Ernie Pyle Reserve Center at Fort Totten met the security standards for THREATCON Delta in about four hours. As mentioned above, the 77th was not the only regional support command to experience security challenges. Commands across the country were trying to achieve force protection levels that proved difficult to meet.\(^{105}\)

On 12 September at 1:55 p.m., the USARC directed to its subordinate commands that the THREATCON level be reduced to THREATCON Charlie by noon that day. The local area


commanders had the discretion to post armed guards. The 77th Regional Support Command made the discretionary decision to remain at THREATCON Delta. As Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve, 77th operations officer, explained to the 77th Emergency Operations Center and subordinate commands:

Per the deputy commander [Colonel (P) William Terpeluk], 77th Regional Support Command units were to remain at Threat Condition Delta due to their proximity to the New York City metropolitan area. The carrying of weapons is not authorized without the permission of the commanding general of the 77th Regional Support Command. If circumstances warranted, and only after receiving permission to carry weapons, the 77th Regional Support Command's rules of engagement for force protection, dated 11 September 2001, will be strictly followed. Units not under the direct command of the 77th will follow guidance issued by their respective headquarters.

Even though New York City, which leased Fort Totten for use by its police and fire departments, provided armed contracted guards, the 77th called up some of the military police under its command to augment the security guards and to protect other reserve centers. Soldiers from the 800th Military Police Brigade of Uniondale, New York, commanded by Brigadier General Paul Hill, started showing up at their reserve center on the afternoon of 11 September and arrived at Fort Totten later that night. These military police personnel worked without ammunition that day because their reserve centers lacked security to store ammunition. In order to keep both weapons and ammunition, a reserve center needed secure housing that kept the weapons and ammunition separated. The military police rectified their situation by going to Fort Dix the next day and drawing limited ammunition to supply the gate guards. In the days after 11 September, the 800th secured a significant amount of ammunition that allowed them to arm the roving patrols as well.

For the first couple of days after the attack, the 77th Regional Support Command did not allow commercial trucks on Fort Totten. On 13 September, the following guidelines were issued regarding the handling of commercial vehicles:

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107 Email, Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve to EOC 77th RSC, et. al., “Clarification of THREATCON for 77th RSC Units,” MMLF 3, #152, 13 September 2001.

1. Check driver's identification and invoice  
2. Contact the addressees by telephone or by runner if they expected a delivery  
3. Inspect trucks in the same manner as cars  
4. Escort vehicle to destination and back to exit  
5. Deny entry of all trucks that cannot be verified ¹⁰⁹

In addition to using armed military police personnel, the personnel at Fort Totten employed several other methods to enhance the installation’s protection. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cochrane, Army Reserve acting provost marshal and also a management analyst for the Force Development Section as a civilian, used his prior experience as a military policeman, identifying Fort Totten’s weak points and making an assessment of its security needs. Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane and Alan Ecke, a member of the 77th's Engineer Section and a colonel in the Army Reserve at the 800th Military Police Brigade as the unit's deputy commander, determined how many guards Fort Totten needed. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane became the 77th’s acting provost marshal because the current provost marshal, Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Seth Gahr, a New York City policeman, was heavily involved with the World Trade Center rescue and recovery operations. Furthermore, the 77th Regional Support Command instituted a 100 percent identification check, searched vehicles, locked its buildings, and placed trucks and trailers across the installation’s single entrance in order to prevent easy access.¹¹⁰

Security issues continued into October 2001. The 77th’s Provost Marshal’s Office ordered additional equipment to reinforce security at Fort Totten’s main gate, though several weeks passed before the requested materials arrived. During the week of 22 October 2001, the 301st Area Support Group delivered and installed ten truckloads of “jersey barrier” (concrete barriers) to the gate of Fort Totten to aid in security.¹¹¹

In October, the 800th Military Police Brigade headquarters in Uniondale provided security support, not only at its own facility and Fort Totten, but also to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York.¹¹² West Point requested security for the four remaining

¹¹¹ Memorandum, John Arnim to Commander, 301st ASG, “Tasking Letter 011019-01,” MMLF 19, #824, 19 October 2001; Email, Philip Haynie to EOC 77th RSC, “Barrier Delivery,” MMLF 19 #820, 19 October 2001; and Email, Major Andrew Burns to Philip Haynie, et. al., “RE: Barrier Delivery,” MMLF 19, #826, 22 October 2001.
¹¹² Email, Staff Sergeant Faasoasaogatumua Viena to Sergeant First Class Rafael Almanzar, "800th MP Tasking," MMLF 17, #756, 11 October 2001.
home football games, which resulted in sixty military policemen from the 800th being detailed.\textsuperscript{113}

Some of the 800th Military Police Brigade soldiers worked in different areas of law enforcement, such as municipal police officers, correction officers, or probation officers in their civilian occupations. This enabled them to practice their craft both in the military and in civilian life.\textsuperscript{114} The 800th Military Police Brigade and its subordinate units continued manning the gates at different posts and performing other related missions for several months.

With security a major concern in the weeks following the 11 September attacks, the New York City, New York State, and New Jersey State Police departments set up roadblocks at the entrances and exits to bridges and tunnels. These security point personnel looked for any suspicious vehicles or persons. Law enforcement always considered the possibility that bridges, tunnels, and subways might be key targets for terrorists. Consequently, the city closed the Holland Tunnel and suspended service on the Staten Island Ferry in lower Manhattan for more than a week after 11 September due to their close proximity to the World Trade Center. The city banned trucks from coming into the city, and for a time, enforced a policy banning single occupants in cars from entering the city from 6 to 10 a.m. Bomb scares that were phoned in to Forts Hamilton and Totten proved to be false.\textsuperscript{115}

After 11 September, federal and city government organizations – including the Army Reserve – became more concerned about the possibility of chemical or biological attacks, as well as vehicle thefts. Authorities received reports of attempted and actual thefts of the ingredients to make explosives. City law enforcement officials received reports of missing vehicles, including emergency vehicles and U-Haul trucks, in several states around the country and kept watch for them. An unconfirmed email message sent to the 77th reported that more than thirty trucks from rental companies were stolen. This type of information heightened the need for security precautions regarding vehicles and people.\textsuperscript{116}

Within the boundaries of the 77th Regional Support Command, Verizon, a telecommunications company, reported three of its trucks stolen from the Jersey City area. Additionally, the 77th received incident reports from local law enforcement of unauthorized

\textsuperscript{114}Specialist Albert Ramos, Specialist Wesley Warwick, and Sergeant David Caferella, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 3 November 2001.  
\textsuperscript{115}Email, Mr. Philip Haynie to 77th RSC, “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” MMLF 12, #552, 20 September 2001; SITREP, 1174th Transportation Brigade to Commander, 77th RSC, “Daily SITREP #2,” MMLF 3, #179; and Email, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner to Sergeant William Miller, “Some 9-11 and footnote Questions,” TCRM #9, 22 July 2002.  
persons photographing military installations, including the "pacing off" of buildings, which meant they were identifying exact locations while walking from one point to another.\textsuperscript{117}

Military units seriously considered stolen military uniforms a breach of security. The operations officer of the 695th Combat Support Battalion reported that one of his soldiers had his battle dress uniform stolen from a coin-operated laundry in Brooklyn during the last week in September. The soldier and the officer reported this incident to the local police because they believed that missing uniforms could be used by terrorists to infiltrate military bases or to obtain sensitive information.\textsuperscript{118}

Army Reservists reported a security concern on 11 October 2001 at the Chief Warrant Officer 2 Kerry P. Hein U.S. Army Reserve Center in Shoreham, New York. At 1 p.m. a single-engine white Cessna aircraft with blue side markings approached the reserve center from the southeast with its engine turned off. The plane dropped approximately 50 to 100 feet above the roof, then restarted its engine and sped away, clearing the tree line by less than fifteen feet. This same plane, according to witnesses, was involved in a similar maneuver on 2 October. The Army notified both the police and the FAA.\textsuperscript{119}

Sergeant Mark Snead of the 142nd Transportation Company's Detachment 1, Fort Totten, reported on 15 October 2001 that a soldier observed writing on a wall in a stairway by her apartment that was threatening to the president of the United States. The message said: "Warning to President Bush not to harm Taliban or Afghan people." The soldier also stated that the message had the words, "missile alert," or something to that affect in it, too. She suspected that the message was written because residents of her building were from the Middle East, and they saw her brother, another Army Reservist, coming home from drill in uniform. Sergeant Snead reported this incident to Mr. Philip Haynie, the 77th Regional Support Command's physical security specialist. He advised her to notify the local police.\textsuperscript{120}

Another category of possible terrorism activity occurred in the Washington, D.C. area but could have been applicable anywhere. Middle Eastern males attempted to purchase vehicles identified with Department of Defense decals or stickers from Department of Defense employees. Terrorists in vehicles with such decals could have gained access to any military base, including the Pentagon. In still another incident report, the 77th learned of the theft of a


\textsuperscript{119} Email, 77th RSC EOC 411th ENGR to EOC 77th RSC, "Serious Incident," MMLF 17, #757, 11 October 2001; and Fax, Major Andrew Burns to 77th RSC, "Plane Threat," MMLF 17, #755, 11 October 2001.

\textsuperscript{120} Email, Sergeant Mark Snead to Mr. Philip Haynie, "Sitrep," MMLF 18, #781, 15 October 2001.
vehicle that had Department of Defense decals by a Pakistani mechanic from an automobile repair shop in the Army’s Military District of Washington.\textsuperscript{121}

Other geographic areas had security concerns, which were conveyed to the 77th Regional Support Command's Emergency Operation Center. Individuals in the Salt Lake City, Utah, area tried to ascertain the security layout of the Olympic Village, in preparation for the February 2002 Winter Olympics.\textsuperscript{122} Reports told of individuals trying to impersonate military personnel. On 26 October 2001, the Department of Defense sent warnings to all military installations to be on the lookout for individuals posing as soldiers with false orders. Such individuals might try to penetrate base security.\textsuperscript{123}

Two months after 11 September security concerns continued. On 14 November 2001, the 77th formally requested the mobilization of forty military policemen for anti-terrorism and force protection measures at Fort Totten. The 77th Command Group sent justification for this to the USARC headquarters because Fort Totten was the only military post in the New York City area that did not have full-time force protection. While Fort Totten always had some type of security at the gate, nevertheless, the post considered itself a "soft target" for possible terrorism. The post served as the host to other organizations such as the Coast Guard, New York Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, a veterans association, the Fort Totten Museum, the Bayside Historical Society, as well as reserve units. Fort Totten officials considered Fort Totten a sub post of Fort Hamilton, and therefore required a full compliment of military police personnel. Brigadier General Colt signed this request. Both the USARC and the Military District of Washington denied the request. Therefore, no military police were mobilized for Fort Totten's security.\textsuperscript{124}

Alert Notifications Or “Grazing Herd”

After 11 September, the 77th Regional Support Command and subordinate unit commanders were immediately concerned with attendance and accountability for all soldiers. Commanders tried reaching soldiers by phone to give instructions on what to do if mobilized – also known as a “grazing herd” alert. At 2:17 p.m. on 12 September, Brigadier General Colt directed a grazing herd alert which required units to contact their soldiers for accountability. By 13 September, however, commanders could not contact all soldiers – partly because of existing telephone problems following the attacks or because soldiers had moved and disconnected their numbers. Telephone communication problems persisted in some areas, and those who were in a

\textsuperscript{121} Email, Mr. Philip Haynie to Major Bernd Zoller, et. al., “DOD STICKER REMINDER,” 15 October 2001, MMLF 18, #783.
\textsuperscript{122} Email, Sergeant First Class Scott T. Jones to FORSCOM, "Surveillance and Incident," MMLF 19, #832, 26 October 2001.
\textsuperscript{123} Email, Joint Forces Intelligence Command to all commands, "Crisis Action Support Cell Intelligence Summary," MMLF 19, #834, 26 October 2001.
\textsuperscript{124} Memorandum, Brigadier General Richard Colt to Mr. Anthony Guisti, "Request for Mobilization of Military Police (MP) Personnel," MMLF 20, #860, 14 November 2001 and Telephone correspondence between Mr. Gary DiLallo and Major Robert Bensburg, 8 August 2002.
travel status with airplane tickets had their travel disrupted and could not return to their offices. Soldiers who failed to provide their units with current phone numbers and addresses and those who were in the process of being discharged or retiring presented a significant problem regarding accountability. As time went on, units made better contact with their soldiers. Subordinate units continued to fax and email grazing herd reports for several weeks to their next highest command.  

The current crisis raised the issue of unit readiness with commanders who began examining their own soldier readiness processing, the steps soldiers undergo at their home unit or at a mobilization station to prepare for being mobilized for active duty. Shortly after 11 September, Brigadier General Colt emphasized soldier readiness processing issues and possible unit activations during his Tuesday administrative night conference calls with the major subordinate commands and direct reporting unit commanders. He reiterated to be ready and emphasized that the 77th headquarters staff was prepared to provide help to any unit requesting it. Therefore, in order to prepare for possible unit activations, the 77th Regional Support Command directed all units to review and update their alert rosters and soldier readiness process guidance lists during the October 2001 drill. Commanders wanted to avoid being unable to reach soldiers who had moved, changed, or dropped their telephone numbers, or had experienced a change in their health. Commanders within the 77th Regional Support Command reviewed the alert rosters and identified which soldier readiness process issues required corrective action. These items included: medical records, family care plans, dental and shot records, and current profile status. In the event a unit was called to active duty, then maintaining current records and knowing what to expect during the soldier readiness process expedited soldiers through the mobilization station.

The 77th Regional Support Command’s Communications Security

Disruption of communications, overloaded phone circuits, anthrax and bomb scares, and computer viruses were all a major concern for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management Section headed by Mr. Michael Scotto, the information management officer, who was also a colonel in the Army Reserve. Mr. Scotto’s personnel, to include Lieutenant Colonel Lee Cunningham, automation officer, ensured the protection of all passwords and implemented other security enhancements in the computers used within the command.

125 Email, Lieutenant David Van Cleve to 77th RSC, et. al., “Grazing Herd,” MMLF 2, #96, 12 September 2001; Email, Mr. Joseph Beck to Ricky Romines, et. al., “Taking Care of Soldiers,” MMLF 3 #148, 13 September 2001; and Email, Major David Canoll to EOC 77th RSC, “Grazing Herd Info,” MMLF 3 #164, 13 September 2001.


127 Mr. Michael Scotto, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 1 February 2002, pp. 8-10.
Because of the tremendous increase of email communication during the decade of the 1990s, the 77th Regional Support Command was concerned with security for this mode of communication. Ms. Cordelia Cafferty, the local area network information assurance specialist, sent a reminder shortly after midnight on 11 September that computer viruses may have increased. Therefore, all the USARC attachments, both incoming and outgoing, were blocked for a few days after the attack. Ms. Cafferty was an Army master sergeant in the Individual Ready Reserve. The USARC Operations Section sent additional guidance for sending secured emails to the 77th Regional Support Command. The section suggested that all email users keep the information unclassified and to send classified information via secure channels. On 13 September, Ms. Cafferty announced that units could resume sending attachments. At the same time, FORSCOM directed that all commands place antivirus software in their computers.

Employees of Ciber Corporation based in Hoboken, New Jersey, were instrumental in assisting the 77th Army Reserve Command with network operations. These individuals included: Mr. Gamal Hossack, senior contracting representative; Mr. Errol Deare; Mr. Al Alleyne; Mr. Tony Ogtong; and Mr. Kevin French, who provided twenty-four-hour, seven-days-a-week coverage of the local area network (LAN) operations room. Other individuals in the information management area contributed as well. Mr. Harry Rivera, as administrative services supervisor, was kept busy with mail pick-ups, disseminating information on anthrax and postal security, and arranging for the purchase and installation of a package X-ray scanner. Major Jose Torres, Army Reservist and an administrative services officer, supervised the reserve soldiers who volunteered, helped with mail, ordered the scanner, and supplemented the staff. Mr. Richard Spoley, a staff sergeant from the 99th Regional Support Command, headquartered in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, assisted with improving telecommunications at several of the 77th's Army Reserve centers. Ms. Luz Ruiz, another administrative services team member and a sergeant first class Army Reservist, ensured that commanders had operational laptops, worked on the help desk, and assisted the users in the Emergency Operation Center to get profiled onto the computers in the operations center.

FORSCOM also directed all units associated with Operation NOBLE EAGLE to send email traffic via the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), an encrypted, secure method. Master Sergeant Fred Buyarski, full-time operations noncommissioned officer at the USARC, clarified this by stating that units not in possession of SIPRNET were to communicate via the Global Communication Command System (GCCS). The Global Communication

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129 Email, Sergeant First Class Ronald Polk to Mr. Arthur Lauer, et. al., “MSC SITREP Guidance, MMLF 1, #73, 12 September 2001
130 Email, MS Cordelia Cafferty to Mr. John LaRocca et. al., "Lift of the Band on Email Attachments," MMLF 3, #150, 13 September 2001.
131 Email, Sergeant First Class Ronald Polk to Arthur Lauer, et. al., "MSC SITREP Guidance," MMLF 1, #73, 12 September 2001 and Email correspondence between Mr. Michael Scotto and Major Robert Bensburg, 17 September, 2002.
Command System was a secure method of communication used by the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other commands (including the 77th), that gave them the capability to communicate with each other during a crisis. During the weeks following the attack on the World Trade Center, the system required twenty-four-hour staffing. Mr. Joaquin Rolon, a staff operations specialist, who was also a master sergeant in the Army Reserve in the same section, assisted with this communication system.  

Another key player in communications was Sergeant First Class Carpenter, an operations noncommissioned officer. He managed the SIPRNET system and the STU-3 System, which was a Secure Telephone Unit Generation Three, and the secure faxes that accompanied it.

On 18 October, Ms. Cafferty reported to the principle staff at the 77th that the policy of sending emails that was in place prior to 11 September was to be resumed. All other security measures that existed prior to 11 September, such as personal use of the network, were to continue. A couple of post 11 September procedures were implemented, however. One was to limit use of the secure Internet network to conserve bandwidth – how much volume and speed an Internet connection can handle – and to minimize sending email attachments unless they were for official business.

As with email traffic, the use of cellular phones increased tremendously during the last part of the twentieth-century. This increase was so rapid that the phone companies were forced to add dozens of new area codes around the country. The catastrophe at the World Trade Center resulted in a serious disruption of cellular phone traffic, which increased significantly.

The 77th Regional Support Command's personnel, especially those out of town, were unable to communicate with their offices for a time. For instance, Mr. Chester Marcus was unable to communicate with his office until he reached the Lodi, New Jersey, Alexander Hamilton U.S. Army Reserve Center. He sent an email message to Fort Totten, where he was able to maintain communications with the 77th Regional Support Command. Mr. Marcus was enroute to Fort Totten from his home in New Jersey when the attacks occurred. Because the bridges into the city were temporarily closed, he drove instead to his Army Reserve center in Lodi. Mr. Marcus was one of many Army Reservists who suddenly found that cellular communication was unreliable for a couple of days following the attacks.

The 77th Regional Support Command had a policy prior to 11 September regarding the use of cellular phones in reserve center buildings that was clear and concise. The policy stated that these phones should only be used when there was no other means of voice communication.

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132 Mr. Joaquim Rolon, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, pp. 3-4, 28 November 2001, and Email correspondence between Mr. Michael Scotto and Major Robert Bensburg, 18 September 2002.
133 Sergeant First Class Gregory Carpenter, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 13 December 2001, p. 2.
134 Email, Ms. Cordelia Cafferty to 77th RSC Principle Staff Full Time Support, “011018 Re-send INFOCON Change Alpha,” 18 October 2001, MMLF 19 #815.
135 Mr. Michael Scotto, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 1 February 2002, p. 5.
136 Email, Mr. Chester Marcus to Mr. Charles Jung, "THREATCON B," MMLF 1, #10, 11 September 2001.
and no longer than two minutes in duration, for official calls only, to support mission essential requirements, and for emergencies only. Additionally, users were made aware to ensure that proper communication security procedures were used because an enemy could easily intercept them.137

**Loaned Space**

The importance of this national emergency resulted in a sudden increase in the need for additional office or storage space. Many government offices were destroyed in the Twin Towers. This led several government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels to request and receive permission to use space at neighboring Army Reserve centers. Caven Point U. S. Army Reserve Center, right across the Hudson River from downtown Manhattan, was one such center in which agencies sought space. In addition to being a safe and secure area, Caven Point served as a collection point for civilians relocated from the impact area in New York. New York City officials escorted uninjured civilians from the impact area to await transportation to other destinations in New Jersey. It was also used as a staging location for emergency medical service personnel while awaiting assignments. Its open space was utilized as a landing site for aircraft, which dropped off supplies and equipment for the state police and other agencies.138 The New York City Mayor's Office of Emergency Management used it as a staging area for food and water. The New Jersey State Police requested use or partial use of three buildings: 115A, 204, and 198.139 The U.S. Secret Service requested and received 4,000 square feet of storage space at this reserve center. FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers leased several thousand square feet at a reserve center in Edison, New Jersey.140 The New York City Police Department used it as a staging area for food and water. The reserve centers charged fees for operational costs, such as utilities.141 Fort Totten loaned approximately 1,200 square feet of space to the New York City Police Department.

Storing equipment was not without problems. On 10 October, the 77th Regional Support Command reported a theft of FEMA supplies being stored at building 118 on Fort Totten. An inventory of its supplies by representatives of the Fire Department of New York revealed that several shrink-wrapped pallets were opened and items removed. An investigation of the building reported no means of forced entry. Brigadier General Colt, Mr. Philip Haynie, the FBI, the police, and other key personnel were notified. The items reported missing were the following: shovels, fifty sets of firefighter uniforms, soap, shaving cream, trash cans, toilet brushes, foxhole

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138 Email, Mr. Sean Driskill to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson, "Caven Point USARC," MMLF 1, #34, 11 September 2001.
140 Email, Lieutenant Colonel David Van Cleve to 77th RSC, "Facilities Analysis," MMLF 4, #233, 14 September 2001, p. 1.
141 Email, Major Paul Casazza to Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson et. al., "DCSENG SITREP as of 1000 hrs 16 Sep 01," MMLF 6, #337, 16 September 2001 and Telephone correspondence between Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson and Major Robert Bensburg, 8 August 2002.
covers, and garbage cans. The 77th Regional Support Command concluded that some pilferage took place. To preclude any future problems, the 77th had additional military police personnel monitor this building.142

**Legal Support Organizations**

Army legal support organizations were units that employed lawyers (better known as JAGs or judge advocate generals), along with support personnel. The 77th Regional Support Command had two legal support organizations (LSOs) within its command – the 4th and the 7th. Soon after the attacks, the 4th Legal Support Organization, Bronx, New York, established an Emergency Operations Center by staffing unit phones around the clock. In addition, the 4th provided or was willing to provide the following services to the 77th Regional Support Command, its subordinate commands, direct reporting units, as well as other commands and federal, state, and city agencies:

1. augment the 77th Regional Supports Command’s Staff Judge Advocate Office to provide legal support and operational law guidance
2. provide legal assistance and support at family support centers for those killed or injured
3. augment the Staff Judge Advocate offices of mobilized Army Reserve general officer commands
4. provide legal counseling services to mobilized units and personnel

They offered to send officers to help staff the 77th Regional Support Command's Emergency Operations Center to relieve personnel there as needed or to provide manpower otherwise not available. The 4th volunteered to provide whatever assistance was required, which included blood donations, as well as rescue and recovery efforts.143

The 7th Legal Services Organization in Albany, New York, aided the First Battalion of the 127th Armor, 42nd Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard, Niagara Falls, New York. The commander of the 7th, Colonel James Schultz, Jr., along with Major Paul Barden, received a call for legal assistance from Colonel Maury Janesczko of the New York Army National Guard, to provide training and assistance to an Army National Guard unit that was mobilizing. These two officers made the long trip from the Albany area to western New York State to provide legal support and training to a New York Army National Guard attorney, who was inexperienced in pre-mobilization legal briefings regarding wills and powers of attorney.

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142 Mr. Philip Haynie, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 28 January 2002 pp. 2-4; Telephone correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Patterson and Major Robert Bensburg, 8 August 2002; and Memorandum, Mr. Philip Haynie to 77th Regional Support Command emergency operations center, “Sir FEMA Cache 03,” 10 October 2001.

143 Email, Ms. Sandra Rolon to Sergeant First Class Charles Pursel, et. al., "4th LSO EOC," MMLF 1, #71, 12 September 2001.
They accomplished their mission by preparing eighteen wills, twenty powers of attorney, and answering legal questions. Thus, with less than eleven hours notice, these two Army Reserve officers made themselves available, drove a few hundred miles, and were ready to provide their expertise when it was necessary. \footnote{Email, Colonel James Schultz to EOC 77th RSC, “7th LSO Mission in Support of Mobilization of 1/127 AR USARNG,” MMLF 7, #365, 16 September 2001.}

**The United States Army Reserve Command (USARC)**

Most Army Reserve regional support command commanding generals receive their first lines of guidance and orders from the USARC at Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia. In the case of imminent danger to life, limb or property, a commanding general can make a decision affecting the regional support command without the USARC’s approval. The USARC commands and controls most Army Reserve troop units in the continental United States except psychological operations and civil affairs units, those in the 7th Army Reserve Command, the 9th Regional Support Command, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Individual Mobilization Augmentee programs. \footnote{Internet article, “U.S. Army Reserve Command,” www.globalsecurity.org/agency/army/usarc.htm, 30 April 2002.} Three general officers within the USARC were the first line of command and control for the majority of Army Reserve units. They were: Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, Chief, Army Reserve and the commander of the USARC; Major General Craig Bambrough, deputy commanding general of the USARC and also the deputy commanding general for Army Reserve affairs at Forces Command; and Brigadier General John Yingling, active component chief of staff, USARC. \footnote{Brigadier General John Yingling, interview with Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002, p. 3, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th MHD), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.}

The deputy chief of staff, operations at the USARC was actively involved in the 11 September response and subsequent Army Reserve mobilizations that eventually took place. Within minutes of the second plane hitting the South Tower of the World Trade Center, staff members in the USARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations decided to start up the Emergency Operations Center located in the basement of the USARC building. The deputy chief of staff, operations, upon advisement from the chief of operations, plans and mobilization, made the decision to activate the center. \footnote{Email correspondence among Majors David Phillips, Mario Beckles, and Major Robert Bensburg, “USARC Phillips & Beckles,” 20 June 2002.}

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons, chief of operations, plans and mobilization, explained:

I was sitting down . . . . I’ve got a little TV here in my office, and I keep it on CNN [Cable News Network]. When I heard the first airplane hit the first tower, at first I thought I had it on a movie channel, so I turned around and looked and realized that it was CNN, and I went down to Mr. [Anthony] Guisti’s [assistant

\footnote{Email, Colonel James Schultz to EOC 77th RSC, “7th LSO Mission in Support of Mobilization of 1/127 AR USARNG,” MMLF 7, #365, 16 September 2001.}
deputy chief of staff, operations] office and said, ‘Look, we probably need to start getting things geared up,’ I called the EOC [Emergency Operations Center] and said to start calling people in. I would say within the first two hours we had things fully functional downstairs, even though we didn’t know to what extent we were going to be involved. As soon as the second plane hit – the first one could’ve been an accident, but when we saw the second one, we knew [this] was no accident.148

Lieutenant Colonel Koons explained that three shifts of close to 100 Active Guard Reserve soldiers, who make up the majority of the Army staff at the USARC, worked in the Emergency Operations Center every day until the end of October. Each shift ran twelve hours in the early weeks, and then the staff scaled it back to about eight hours and fewer people, though the key “bridge” and watch officers worked two twelve-hour shifts.149 Representatives, including crisis action team members, from all major staff sections – Logistics, Personnel, Engineer, Comptroller, Chaplain, and Inspector General – worked in the center and represented their section's interests following 11 September. These soldiers – though they may be logisticians or engineers by trade – had to undergo operations exercise training at least three times a year and must have proven that they have a good knowledge of operations functions in order to work in the center. They also must commit to work in the center for six months.150

An independent contracting agency known as “Eagle Group” evaluated the Emergency Operations Center periodically for quality assurance. Eagle Group was based in the USARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. The group was comprised of retired Army colonels and one general officer who had prior extensive operations experience. Periodically, the group facilitated mobilization exercises for the crisis action team members who worked in the USARC Emergency Operations Center. Its civilian staff members also periodically traveled to regional support commands to evaluate their emergency operations centers and make recommendations.151 Ironically, the group visited the 77th Regional Support Command in August 2001 to evaluate its center – less than a month before the 11 September attacks. Mr. DiLallo of the 77th remembered: "They tested our emergency operations procedures – the ability to call up units, test the computers and the redundancy. And the time paid off because soldiers and civilians reacted – didn’t question – reacted. Folks did great."152

148 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 19 March 2002, p. 3.
149 Ibid., pp. 6, 11.
152 Mr. Gary DiLallo, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 February 2002, p. 12.
The USARC frequently worked with its next higher chain of command, FORSCOM, through liaison officers, who were usually Army majors, to bridge any gaps in communication and to relay information between the two commands. Both commands also employed crisis action teams. These teams were the first soldiers to “stand up” during an emergency. These teams worked in the Emergency Operations Centers of FORSCOM and the USARC.153

After receiving higher guidance and orders from FORSCOM, which in turn received orders from the Department of the Army, the USARC decided that all Army Reserve regional support commands and other Army Reserve units would enact Force Condition Delta, the most serious threat level.154 As quoted earlier, Major General Craig Bambrough talked about the first moments following the attacks and the first preparations made at the USARC and the Army as a whole:

The most immediate response came as a result of the Department of the Army going to Force Condition Delta, which meant that they expected Army installations, including Army Reserve centers, to be terrorist targets. The USARC headquarters was not prepared, nor were the hundreds of reserve centers across the country . . . . There was very little information about the nature of the threat or what form it might take. Now we’re inwardly focused [looking within one’s borders for the enemy], worrying about how to protect the [continental United States]. The financial cost of these new security measures was and continues to be extremely high, approximately two million dollars per month. Yet, we have been given no additional funding. We take this money out of hide.155

Within days, between 1,500 to 1,600 Army Reservists in job specialties like military intelligence, police, and general service support functions were called to active duty and mobilized through the USARC for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. By January 2002, that number had risen to about 7,000. By March 2002, that number had risen again to about 8,800.156 One task the Army Reserve did not get was protecting critical infrastructure: bridges, tunnels and airports. That mission went to the Army National Guard.

Besides the new “inward focus” that the USARC was learning to acquire, in other ways the current mobilization of troops was different from the past. Army regulations planned for forty-five days notice to mobilize soldiers deploying overseas. In reality, they must be prepared

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154 Ibid.
155 Major General Craig Bambrough, interview with Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002, p. 2, Operation Noble Eagle Collection (90th MHD), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command.
to go sooner, within days, and sometimes they did.\textsuperscript{157} Lieutenant General Plewes coined the term, “hasty mobilization” when discussing this in his briefings. The USARC staff, working with the Department of the Army, identified the first Army Reserve unit that would be mobilized for Operation NOBLE EAGLE – the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) of Puerto Rico. Within three days, most of that unit was in the Pentagon area and working.\textsuperscript{158} Major Mario Beckles, a budget officer within the USARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, explained how the 311th Quartermaster Company received its activation orders:

The person [who] actually mobilized the 311th Mortuary Affairs . . . was General Plewes. With the disruptions caused at the Pentagon from 11 September, the normal tasking chain was not working as smoothly as normal during the first few days after the attack. Normally, Headquarters, DA [Department of the Army] in conjunction with its MACOMs [major Army commands] mobilizes units. However, once it was determined that the AC [active component] mortuary affairs unit on the ground needed immediate help to accomplish the remains recovery mission, the call came out to the USARC, bypassing FORSCOM. The USARC received an informal tasking request from the CAR [Chief, Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Plewes] that we needed to get the 311th to Washington D.C., ASAP [as soon as possible] to perform a remains recovery mission. Staffed by some patriotic volunteers, the 311th deployed to Washington D.C., on unit annual training orders. Later, after the president implemented his partial mobilization authority, units began to get federally mobilized. Since the Pentagon was still trying to recover from the attacks, General Plewes, while over at the Army Operations Center, recommended the mobilization of the 311th to finish accomplishing the mortuary affairs recovery mission because this mission would require the 311th to remain on site much longer than fourteen days. Based on General Plewes’ word alone, Headquarters, DA mobilized the 311th. This hasty mobilization bypassed the normal process through FORSCOM. However, FORSCOM was kept abreast of this mobilization from the USARC.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} Major General Craig Bambrough, interview with Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002, p. 3, Operation Noble Eagle Collection (90th MHD), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History United States Army Reserve Command.

\textsuperscript{158} Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, interview with Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 29 April 2002, p. 8, Operation Noble Eagle Collection (90th MHD), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History United States Army Reserve Command.

\textsuperscript{159} Major Mario Beckles, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 20 March 2002, p. 16 and Telephone correspondence between Major Mario Beckles and Major Robert Bensburg, 1 August 2002.
One thing that would remain the same for future mobilizations was that Army Reservists would continue to provide the bulk of combat service and combat service support to troops because the current active duty Army force structure relied heavily on the Army Reserve.

The second way Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM were different from past mobilizations was that regional support command commanders were actually calling the USARC and requesting Army Reserve mobilizations themselves. “Normally, mobilization comes from the top down,” Brigadier General John Yingling said. “The CINC [Unified Combatant Command commander in chief] requests a unit, and then [the request] goes down. In many cases now, the request came either through crisis response, much of that the 77th [Regional Support Command] had done.”

The third way the mobilization taking place was different was that following 11 September, Army Reservists were called to active duty under a partial mobilization, rather than a presidential selected reserve call-up. A partial mobilization, which was not used since the Gulf War, allowed the secretary of defense greater flexibility as the situation unfolded. He, working under the president, could call up many more ready reservists for a longer period of time with no geographic limitations. He could call up to a million reservists for up to two consecutive years, and could station them anywhere in the world. The presidential selected reserve call-up, on the other hand, only allowed for 200,000 ready reservists working up to 270 days. In January 2002, the Department of the Army was still examining these call ups and considering a full two-year mobilization of the Army Reserve. If Army Reservists were mobilized to go outside the United States under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the policy was to have the soldiers rotated out of the assignment after six months. If they were mobilized under Operation NOBLE EAGLE, the duration of the assignment could be one year, with a possible extension of an additional year.

During September and October of 2001, information flow was the greatest challenge for the USARC’s Emergency Operations Center staff. They were having difficulty sorting through requests and fielding them to the proper chain of command. According to Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons:

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161 Brigadier General John Yingling, interview with Captain Suzanne Summers, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002, p. 9, Operation Noble Eagle Collection, (90th Military History Detachment), United States Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, United States Army Reserve Command and Email correspondence among Majors David Phillips, Mario Beckles and Major Robert Bensburg, 20 June 2002.
165 Ibid., p. 8.
We were getting requests from outside the United States. Nobody knew where to input the requests to get [them] into the right chain [of command]. We had the RSCs come to us requesting the mobilization of MP [military police] units to support their force protection requirements. We had installations that would go to FORSCOM requesting mobilization of MPs for force protection. We had [units] that went to Department of the Army requesting mobilization of units. Nobody knew exactly where in the system they had to input the requests and be validated. So, that probably was the biggest stress factor that we had was getting the requests into the right channel to make sure [they were] approved all the way up and down the line.166

Once the USARC mobilized Army Reservists in response to 11 September, the soldiers had logistical issues with their equipment. Before a unit leaves home station for its mobilization station, its regional support command should fill its personnel and equipment shortages. Some units were mobilized so quickly (hasty mobilization) that the regional support command could not fill these shortages. If this were the case, the USARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics – specifically the Plans and Operations Branch – would assist in requisitioning whatever was necessary. This branch worked as the conduit between the USARC's Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and its Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics. A key officer who worked these equipment and logistical issues for Army Reservists was Major Kent Jennings, plans and operations officer and also a crisis action team member for the USARC Emergency Operations Center. He explained some initial logistical issues with mobilized soldiers in September 2001:

We had a lot of units nominated to go different places, so we had to look at the readiness posture of all those units. It was a lot of going into the unit status reports looking at on-hand equipment. We call it ‘scrubbing’ the units. There was a lot of work there. NOBLE EAGLE was a different scenario than ENDURING FREEDOM. For NOBLE EAGLE, the basic guide we got was that the units come as they are. Of course, we’re not going to send a unit that’s completely broken. We want to make sure their mission-essential equipment is operational and that they have them on hand.167

Sometimes units did not have all the equipment they needed or were authorized. Sometimes they had wrong or outdated equipment. The USARC’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics assisted the regional support commands to get units their equipment. The first way to get needed equipment to a unit involved “cross leveling,” which meant borrowing equipment

166 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
167 Major Kent Jennings, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 20 March 2002, pp. 4-6.
from one unit and giving it to the mobilizing unit without penalizing the lender to the point where the lender cannot operate.\textsuperscript{168} Logisticians also look at personnel issues to make sure the unit that the Army Reserve is thinking of mobilizing is not short staffed. If it is, then the USARC's Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations may work to fill those personnel shortages through individual ready reservists or individual mobilization augmentees, or they may find another unit to mobilize. Major Jennings asked, “Why fix them for equipment if you can’t fix them for personnel?”\textsuperscript{169}

The second way the USARC tried to get missing equipment to the units was through “plus ups” at the Army installations where units mobilized. The installations either received money beforehand through FORSCOM to buy equipment for the mobilizing units, or the installations paid for equipment upfront and got reimbursed later. According to the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), the installation must buy the equipment for the mobilizing unit if cross leveling does not work.\textsuperscript{170} Once a unit reached its duty station, any equipment issues usually fell to the active component to fix.

There were other logistical challenges for mobilizing units. Because of a hasty mobilization scenario, a unit only had three days to get to its deployment site, bypassing the mobilization-inprocessing installation. This usually meant there was no time to pack up equipment at home station, so the unit left without its equipment, and the equipment came later by freight.\textsuperscript{171} Another problem was that some mobilizing units were not changing their Department of Defense activity codes, also known as DODACs. These codes were used to order and pay for the requisition of equipment. This created financial duress for that unit and the Army Reserve. “That means that you send a unit overseas and they’re still using their peacetime requisitioning process,” Major Jennings said. “The funds are coming out of our pocket – the reserve pocket – when they actually should be billed to the active component. And again, if the DODAC is not changed when they order stuff, it’s coming to home station rather than where it needs to be going.”\textsuperscript{172}

As part of the crisis action team, Major Jennings and his staff of about six also split their time between the Logistics Section and the Emergency Operations Center. They managed twenty-four hour operations in the center until the end of January 2002. Later he worked shorter shifts. Major Jennings thought his job would run indefinitely. He said:

> However fragmented this looks, I think we did a good job in our [mobilization work]. We provided the forces in a timely manner in a condition that they were asked for in the right time and the right place. And that says a lot about our [staff]

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., p. 10.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., pp. 12-13.
that aren’t fully manned to do this and staffed to do this. Who are the primary people who are going to be in charge of mobilizations? Us and the National Guard Bureau.¹⁷³

The Army Reserve’s initial response to 11 September and the subsequent mobilizations of soldiers for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM have put a strain on the Army Reserve budget. The approximate cost of the Army Reserve response from 11 to 19 September 2001 alone was about six million dollars.¹⁷⁴ This figure included the cost of putting soldiers on unit orders or civilians on overtime. Duties of the soldiers included force protection and anti terrorism duty at their reserve centers. This cost also included equipment that regional support commands loaned out, not only in New York and Washington, but nationwide. On the other hand, the USARC did not want to refuse funds to the regional support commands and Army Reserve centers that needed them, especially the 77th Regional Support Command in New York City and the 99th Regional Support Command in Pennsylvania, which had Army Reserve centers in the National Capital Region. Major Mario Beckles, budget officer, USARC Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, explained:¹⁷⁵

In New York I knew all of this [could] fit under what we traditionally call ‘military support to civilian authorities.’ I knew the 77th Regional Support Command was going to have a flood of requests coming in there for personnel, asking for equipment, calling them, or just showing up with a truck to take stuff, asking for whatever assistance they could provide to the civilian authorities. I only worked the money part, but what I did not want the 77th RSC to say – because someone from my headquarters didn’t tell them – was to tell [the people who were asking the 77th for assistance] we don’t have the money; we can’t support you. So I eliminated that big hurdle within two hours of the attack by putting out some initial funding guidance to the field . . . [on how to request money from the USARC and record the costs.]¹⁷⁶

The USARC fulfilled most reasonable monetary requests from the regional support commands following 11 September. Some things, such as masks and tents, have not been

¹⁷³ Ibid., pp. 44-45.
¹⁷⁶ Major Mario Beckles, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 20 March 2002, pp. 5-6.
returned, and the reciprocating agencies who borrowed them, have been or will be billed.\textsuperscript{177} Major Beckles said:

Nowadays, the country and the Army expect the Army Reserve to respond quickly, sometimes within twenty-four hours. The traditional ways we’re doing things don’t work any more, and they’re not coming back. The country expects a whole lot more out of us than what they have in the past. We’ve got to be ready, and we’ve got to have units ready to provide that support . . . when the country needs us. Maybe we helped somebody and we [were] able to provide the support that was needed to help those families or comfort the victims of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon attacks.\textsuperscript{178}

**Reserve Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers**

The Department of Defense, the Army Reserve, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have had a formal working relationship since the mid-1990s. Senior Army Reserve officers and noncommissioned officers frequently worked with FEMA in the wakes of disasters, terrorist attacks, or presidentially declared emergencies. Such was the case after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center. In accordance with the nation’s Federal Response Plan, the plan that defined protocols for federal assistance to victims of a major disaster, twenty-seven federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, worked with FEMA. The twenty-seven agencies worked in twelve emergency response functions- transportation, urban search and rescue, and communications being only a few.\textsuperscript{179} Other Department of Defense agencies established their own protocols in working with FEMA, but the following will address the Army Reserve and FEMA relationship only.

When a government agency needed to request Army Reserve assets – and it did so only as a last resort because of the high cost – it went through a defense coordinating officer, an active duty Army colonel, who coordinated defense assets for the declared emergency.\textsuperscript{180} The only exception to this approval rule happened if the community was faced with a life or death situation or significant loss of property, also known as “immediate response,” then the commanding general of a local Army Reserve command could loan assets without seeking higher approval.\textsuperscript{181}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{177}Ibid., p. 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{178}Ibid., pp. 12, 17-18, 22-23.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Internet article, "introduction to the Basic Plan of the Federal Response Plan." \url{www.fema.gov/rrr/frp/frpintro.shtm}, p. 1, April 1999 and Email correspondence between Colonel Gerard McEnery and Major Robert Bensburg, "Colonel McEnery Input," 4 June 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Email correspondence between Colonel Gerard McEnery and Major Robert Bensburg, "Colonel McEnery Input," 5 June 2002 and Colonel Gerard McEnery, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 5 December 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Colonel Gerard McEnery, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 5 December 2002. p. 9.
\end{itemize}
In the mid 1990s, Army Reserve commands (as they were then called) began streamlining and realigning themselves with geographic FEMA regions and began addressing military support to civilian authorities in the event of certain emergencies. The reorganized commands became known as regional support commands.\textsuperscript{182} An effective working relationship between the Army Reserve regional support commands and FEMA depended upon emergency preparedness liaison officers or EPLOs. The chief EPLOs were Army Reserve colonels. Each employed a staff of commissioned and noncommissioned officers who handled operations, logistics, and communications as they related to Department of Defense activities.\textsuperscript{183}

The idea of inventing an agency like FEMA began from the Congressional Act of 1803, which law historians generally consider to be the first piece of disaster legislation.\textsuperscript{184} This act allowed the federal government to provide help to a New Hampshire town following a fire. Since 1803, dozens, then a handful of individual agencies handled disasters until 1979, when President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order merging many of the separate agencies and responsibilities into a new Federal Emergency Management Agency that answered directly to the president of the United States.\textsuperscript{185}

Specific Army Reserve officers worked as regional EPLOs (REPLOs) at each FEMA region. In addition, there were other officers assigned as state EPLOs who needed to be familiar with city and state emergency managers and Department of Defense assets and be able to assist the defense coordinating officer. The regional EPLO's primary mission was to help FEMA set up one or more regional operation centers prior to and/or during an emergency, to set up a disaster field office, and to perform other duties as assigned by the defense coordinating officer. Regional operation centers consolidated government agencies that served the public in twelve emergency support functions that included transportation, communications, public works, and urban search and rescue.\textsuperscript{186}

The 77th Regional Support Command fell geographically within FEMA’s Region II, encompassing New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Region II’s headquarters was at 26 Federal Plaza in lower Manhattan, near ground zero. During this crisis, Colonel Kevin Connors of Fort Drum, New York, was the defense coordinating officer. The Army Reserve colonels working as EPLO chiefs for Region II during the 11 September response were: Colonel Gerard McEnerney, principal Army REPLO, FEMA Region II, for the New York City metropolitan area; Colonel Michael Santarcangelo, New York State EPLO; and Colonel

\textsuperscript{182} Mr. Peter Garcia, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 13 May 2002, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 2.
\textsuperscript{186} Email correspondence between Colonel McEnerney and Major Robert Bensburg, "Colonel McEnerney Input," 5 June 2002.
Walter Jankowski, New Jersey EPLO. The 77th Regional Support Command asked Colonel David Rockefeller, a former New York state emergency preparedness liaison officer, to fill in on 11 September because Colonel Santarcangelo was out of state that day. Colonel Santarcangelo arrived in Albany soon afterward, where he began work as the state liaison officer. Also, Colonel Harvey Barrison, a Connecticut state liaison officer, worked in lower Manhattan after 11 September. Following 11 September, the FEMA Region II liaison officers assisted in establishing three regional operations centers. Each center functioned for one day, with the third center being used for the remainder of the crisis.\textsuperscript{187}

The 11 September attacks on the United States resulted in the activation of the Federal Emergency Response Plan.\textsuperscript{188} Though the 77th Regional Support Command did not receive any formal FEMA requests for help, it did receive immediate response requests from other government organizations, such as the New York City Police and Fire Department of New York. The command did its best to meet the needs of those organizations.\textsuperscript{189}

The Army Reserve’s emergency preparedness liaison program required a manager to address administrative issues. At the 77th Regional Support Command, Mr. Peter Garcia worked full time as the civil military project officer, and he managed the EPLO program. He also happened to be a master sergeant in the Army Reserve at the 98th Training Division, Bronx. Mr. Garcia’s job was to help the liaison officers have a good working relationship with FEMA. He also worked closely with the New York and New Jersey liaison officers and helped coordinate the activity that took place between FEMA and the 77th Regional Support Command following the 11 September terrorist attacks. Mr. Garcia communicated with the USARC and with First Army on governmental requests for equipment that were coming into the 77th.\textsuperscript{190}

First United States Army was one of two continental armies in the United States. It was a highly specialized team of active Army soldiers, Active Guard Reserve soldiers, and Department of Army civilians. Its purpose was to improve reserve readiness; mobilize, prepare and deploy reservists; and conduct homeland security.\textsuperscript{191} Mr. Garcia explained how his role as EPLO manager began following the 11 September attacks:

We were in a state of confusion. We didn’t know what had taken place, [nor] the extent of what had happened. However, the first thing I knew that needed to be


\textsuperscript{188} Email correspondence between Colonel Gerard McEnerney and Major Robert Bensburg, “Colonel McEnerney Input,” 5 June 2002.

\textsuperscript{189} Mr. Peter Garcia, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 13 May 2002, pp. 7-12.

\textsuperscript{190} ibid., pp. 1-3, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{191} Internet article, "First U.S. Army," at www.first.army.mil(unknown date).
done is I had to get my EPLOs to the site of [the] Federal Emergency Management Agency to begin the coordination of their role, so they [could] assume their role as the [Defense Department] agent.  

Mr. Garcia and the liaison officers evaluated FEMA and other organizations’ requests for help, determined if they were legitimate requests for the 77th, or if they should be fielded to other government organizations. Mr. Garcia contracted the valid requests for equipment and worked out payment plans in the event that FEMA or other organizations did not return the equipment. Mr. Garcia also advised and informed the commanding general and his staff on these issues, and coordinated the loaning process. Though FEMA did not make any formal requests for help or equipment to the 77th, other organizations did. “We received numerous types of requests,” said Mr. Garcia. “We gave equipment, we gave space, and our soldiers were working the issues. We got most of [the equipment] back, but we’re still short a number of pieces.” These resources were loaned out to various organizations: the Fire Department of New York, New York City Police Department, New York Army National Guard, New York City Medical Examiners Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, to name a few. The 77th Regional Support Command loaned more than $363,000 worth of equipment, tents, cots, sleeping bags and masks, as a sample, according to information presented by Mr. John Arnim, staff operations and training officer, 77th Regional Support Command. As an Army Reservist, Mr. Arnim was a command sergeant major for the 411th Engineer Brigade.

On the morning of 11 September, Colonel McEnerney received a phone call from Mr. Gary DiLallo asking him if he had information on the World Trade Center attacks. Colonel McEnerney worked under First Army as an Army Reservist and was assigned to the 77th Regional Support Command for administrative purposes. As a civilian, he worked in Queens at St. John’s University. According to Colonel McEnerney:

[Mr. DiLallo] wanted to know if I had any official information regarding that [World Trade Center attacks and the recovery efforts underway]. So I started to make calls, and the [regional] emergency preparedness liaison officers, which consists of [military members] from all the services, we started to call each other. There were already some difficulties with the cell [phone] systems because of the [north tower] being hit.

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192 Mr. Peter Garcia, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 13 May 2002, p. 3.
193 Ibid., pp. 7-11.
195 Ibid.
Colonel McEnerney managed to reach some liaison officers, but they also did not have any new information. During the first few hours following the attack, information came sporadically and was sometimes inaccurate. Colonel McEnerney kept in contact with the USARC and First Army for guidance during this time. He called back Mr. DiLallo and Mr. Garcia to ask them for a HUMVEE (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) to get to 26 Federal Plaza. He tried to call the FEMA office at 26 Federal Plaza, but could not get through. At the time, all vehicular access roads and bridges were closed going into Manhattan, with the exception of emergency response personnel. The Army Reserve center next to St. John’s University provided a HUMVEE and driver. Colonel McEnerney called Major Nicholas Scopelletti, the assistant New York State emergency preparedness liaison officer, who was already in Manhattan. Major Scopelletti told Colonel McEnerney that 26 Federal Plaza was evacuated.¹⁹⁷

Shortly after 1 p.m. on 11 September, Colonel McEnerney met Major Scopelletti near Stuyvesant High School on West Street, a few blocks from ground zero. The New York City Office of Emergency Management set up an ad-hoc field emergency operations center for city agencies there. At this point, the two officers were the first FEMA representatives there, so they attended a 3 p.m. briefing representing the agency. Immediately after the briefing, they provided a FEMA contact to the city Emergency Operations Center at this location. Lieutenant Colonel John Maul, assistant Army REPLO, who had been at ground zero since the first plane hit, reported to the New York City Police headquarters Emergency Operations Center.¹⁹⁸ Colonel McEnerney explained how he and the other liaison officers began FEMA coordination:

Major Scopelletti . . . was very familiar with the state and city emergency operations, and he was able to make a number of telephonic calls to state authorities, city authorities, and did some significant initial coordination down there. Our jobs as liaison officers is to build these liaisons, so that if something like this happens, you are not explaining who you are, what you do, to the first respondents, that everybody sort of knows the role and that you’re not doing [so many] introductions.¹⁹⁹

After asking different agencies where the alternate FEMA site was, the two officers learned it was in Edison, New Jersey, at a site of an Environmental Protection Agency office. They drove there to help establish the FEMA regional operations center and a Department of Defense presence. Other military liaison officers arrived or they were enroute. By this time, all

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 10.
Army EPLOs for the region were contacted, responded, and were enroute as directed, to include: Colonels McEnerney, Santarcangelo and Jankowski and their assistants. By 12 September, upon FEMA’s directive, Colonel McEnerney and Major Scopelletti helped move the regional operations center to the Joyce Kilmer Army Reserve Center also in Edison. Colonel McEnerney and the other liaison officers soon started fielding phone call inquiries from different organizations. On 13 September, FEMA again decided to move the regional operation center back to 26 Federal Plaza.200

As things calmed somewhat over the next couple of days, FEMA set up a disaster field office made up of the primary federal agencies and a Department of Defense cell. FEMA and the city decided to use one of the west-side piers on the Hudson River in Manhattan, Pier 90, at West Side Drive and 55th Street. Neighboring Pier 92 held the New York City’s Emergency Operations Center. Pier 94 held the victims’ center. Pier 90 operated for the next several months, though skeletal crews stayed at the remaining regional operations centers at FEMA headquarters, 26 Federal Plaza, New York City.201

Colonel McEnerney and other EPLOs staffed the regional operations center at 26 Federal Plaza and the disaster field office and assisted the defense coordinating officer as directed. Part of their job required referring requests to the appropriate government organizations, if they were not appropriate Department of Defense tasks. Defense Department assets were used only as a last resort because they were not always the most appropriate resource and they were most expensive, as mentioned earlier. Often Colonel McEnerney and the emergency preparedness liaison officer team worked long hours – up to sixteen – hours for several days. All this time, Colonel McEnerney stayed in touch with the 77th Regional Support Command and recorded requests for help it had received.202

Sometimes during a disaster or emergency, city governments requested military police to help. Colonel McEnerney and Mr. Garcia advised the 77th commander not to use federal Army Reserve military police to perform civilian police functions in the community. This was illegal, and fell under the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that limits military involvement in civilian law enforcement. Civilian law enforcement usually fell under local police or the Army National Guard.203

On 16 September, Colonel McEnerney escorted Lieutenant General Plewes and Brigadier General Colt, along with their select staff, to tour ground zero, 26 Federal Plaza, and Piers 90 and 92. The general officers also visited a 77th Regional Support Command unit, the 140th Quartermaster Company, which was tasked to provide support to Jacobi Hospital.204

201 Ibid., pp. 17-20.
202 Ibid., pp. 20-22.
203 Ibid., pp.25-26 and fact card from Internet, www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfile/Factcards/PosseComitatus.html.
Colonel McEnerney finished his EPLO duties on 19 September, though a few EPLOs from all branches of the military, continued to assist the defense coordinating officer at the disaster field office until mid-October when the city no longer anticipated the need for Department of Defense assets.  

**Joint Provisional Task Force**

Immediately following 11 September, at least 150 personnel, representing active duty, reserve, and guard from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, Coast Guard, as well as personnel from several states, prior service and retired, volunteered to help at ground zero and elsewhere in New York City in whatever capacity they could. Though most of these soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were not on orders nor specifically authorized by New York state or the federal government to work on active duty in this capacity, they volunteered anyway, many in uniform. They showed up at military and civilian police locations in New York City, and some even went straight to the site of the former World Trade Center. Others went to Chelsea Piers and the Jacob Javits Convention Center. The following section is based on interviews and documents from two United States Army Reserve soldiers who volunteered for duty on 11 September.

One individual who assisted in creating an organized collection of military and civilian volunteers was Army Reservist Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Mestler, a Special Forces officer assigned to the Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida, with duty location in Korea. At the time of 11 September, he was the executive officer as an Individual Mobilization Augmentee. Two months later he entered the Individual Ready Reserve. As a civilian, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler was an attorney.

A little after 8:45 a.m. on 11 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler was shaving at home when his wife called him to the television set. A plane had just crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler was watching TV when a friend of his called. They discussed what was happening when a second plane hit the south tower just after 9 a.m. They both decided this was a terrorist attack, terminated their conversation, and Lieutenant Colonel Mestler got ready to leave for the nearest military installation. He explained:

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It happens that an Army Reserve unit, the 77th Infantry Division Reinforcement Training Unit, whom I had been associated with for about seven years, conduct[s] its drills on Tuesday evenings on the fourth floor of the Park Avenue Armory. So I went on the Internet, communicated a one-way transmission, an email message, to the commander of that unit, Colonel Stuart Brown, that I was at my home in New York City [email actually stated: “Sir, Going to Park Avenue – will have cell phone . . . and computer with me, Gil”]. I departed immediately for the armory, and by that, when I contacted him, I knew he would understand that I meant the 7th Regiment Armory. 209

Lieutenant Colonel Mestler lived in Manhattan and only had to travel twelve blocks to arrive at about 9:40 a.m. on 11 September at the 7th Regiment Armory (which housed some New York Army National Guard units), on Park Avenue at the blocks bounded by 66th Street, 67th Street, and Lexington Avenue. He explained: "I left my home and moved as rapidly as I could to the Park Avenue armory in BDUs [battle-dress uniform]. I took with me load-bearing equipment [LBE], protective mask, rucksack, Kevlar helmet and my [spiral-top] notebook – [and] my personal notebook computer which I use for unclassified military work . . . . 210

When Lieutenant Colonel Mestler arrived at the armory, he looked for the senior ranking New York Army National Guardsman. Only a handful of guardsmen from the 107th Corp Support Group were there at that time. The 107th was only one of several units located at the armory. He reported to the senior officer in charge that day, Lieutenant Colonel Fergal Foley, deputy commander of the 107th. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler introduced himself, gave a brief summary of his military background and pertinent capabilities, and said he was willing and able to help out in any way possible. Lieutenant Colonel Foley agreed that Lieutenant Colonel Mestler should stay and help. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler believed he may have been the first military or civilian volunteer to arrive at this armory. Lieutenant Colonel Foley first asked Lieutenant Colonel Mestler to stand by and wait so they could assess the nationwide situation and respond to what was happening in New York City. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler plugged in his laptop computer and tried to gather information from the Internet on news regarding the attacks. 211

Military and civilian volunteers started reporting into the armory to offer their services to the city. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler asked Lieutenant Colonel Foley and also Major Avery Leider, 107th adjutant, if he could start organizing the volunteers so they would not interfere with the 107th’s work. The 107th was activating its own soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Foley and Major Leider agreed. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler assigned a volunteer, First Lieutenant Lazaro

209 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
210 Ibid., p. 4.
211 Ibid., pp. 4-6.
Fuentes, Army Reservist, to serve as his adjutant. He created a list of these volunteers with their associated skills.212

Across the city, other military volunteers were converging, some to the local armories. Others found themselves going directly to ground zero. The name “Provisional Joint Task Force” and other derivatives of that name were used among military volunteers across the city, though it remains sketchy as to who thought up the name. By the next day, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler coined the name “New York City Provisional Joint Task Force” for the volunteers he helped organize.213

Staff Sergeant Frank Gorglione, a New York Army National Guardsman and a civilian ironworker instructor at a local technical school, asked Lieutenant Colonel Mestler, whom he had known for many years, if ironworkers would be needed at the World Trade Center site. They decided that the steel-cutting equipment that ironworkers use would be needed to help cut the rubble so it could be lifted away. Staff Sergeant Gorglione made a call to the Office of Local 40, Structural Iron Workers. By 2 p.m., over 150 civilian ironworkers arrived at the armory to offer their services. They eventually made it down to ground zero in teams to assist in the search for survivors.214

Lieutenant Colonel Mestler also assisted in setting up an operations center in a 107th conference room. He had his laptop computer and his own dial-up modem for Internet access through America Online, and he used a phone line provided by the unit. He ran more phone lines, while someone donated a printer and paper.215

As noon approached on 11 September, civilian and military volunteers were anxious to get to the World Trade Center site to help in the recovery efforts, but Lieutenant Colonel Mestler knew he had no real authority to dispatch them downtown. He advised them to stay at the armory until they received more information and official word that they could leave. Some chose to leave anyway, so Lieutenant Colonel Mestler told them they should not go further south than North Moore and Greenwich Streets. Some went to the actual “pile” itself and began to dig, while others helped move equipment and rubble. The ironworkers who wanted to go to ground zero needed and requested parking passes and permission papers to gain access to the site. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler drafted parking pass papers on his computer and handed them to the workers.216

Unbeknownst to Lieutenant Colonel Mestler, government agencies were already setting up command posts with limited communication capabilities at Chelsea Piers, the Jacob Javits Convention Center, the Borough of Manhattan Community College, Stuyvesant High School,
and Intermediate School 89 – all in Manhattan. In the first hours after the 11 September attacks, agencies used messengers to communicate with each other. Between the afternoon of 11 September and early on 12 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler received reports that volunteers at ground zero had little or no drinking water. So, he arranged to get drinking water delivered to volunteers at ground zero. By about 10 p.m. on 11 September, the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, United States Army Reserve in Bronx, New York, offered fourteen filled, five-gallon water jugs and transportation to get the water downtown.217

In the evening of 11 September, New York State Governor George Pataki visited the 7th Regiment Armory. Brigadier General Edward Klein, 53rd Troop Command commander, in Valhalla, New York, New York Army National Guard, and his primary staff, briefed the governor. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and several others attended this briefing.218

Around 9 p.m., Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel Peter Pietrowski with the New York Army National Guard, who Lieutenant Colonel Mestler also knew, asked him if he could help obtain some satellite communications equipment so the urban search and rescuers who had assembled downtown could communicate with city fire fighters, police, and emergency agencies. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler tried to find some communications equipment per Lieutenant Colonel Pietrowski’s request and made several phone calls and sent emails to agencies that he was familiar with or that people around him knew, but to no avail.219

At around 6:30 a.m. on 12 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler attended another briefing at the armory. This was when he learned of an assembly point for military volunteers at 340 West Street in an office used by Mr. Michael Bloomberg, who two months later would win election to become mayor of New York City. After the briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler decided to visit 340 West Street to assess the situation.220

As he was getting ready to leave the armory just before 9 a.m., Mr. Harry Brady, identifying himself as the chief, Intelligence Section, U.S. Attorney’s Office and supervisor of a Joint Counter Terrorism Command Post in lower Manhattan, called the armory operations center asking for communications equipment to communicate with combat air patrols over the skies of New York City. Someone else at the armory answered this call and handed the phone to Lieutenant Colonel Mestler, who spoke a few minutes with Mr. Brady, trying to authenticate his identity and clarify what he wanted. Soon after this phone call, Air National Guard pilot Major Michael Wells, who had traveled from Syracuse, New York, along with a Tactical Air Control Party from the 42nd Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard, with four HUMVEES, walked into the armory and offered communication capability services to whoever needed them.

219 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
220 Ibid., pp. 15-17, 26.
Lieutenant Colonel Mestler sent him and his team to Mr. Brady’s “secret” location in lower Manhattan and told him that if he could not help out there to provide point-to-point communications between command centers of the New York City Police Department, the Fire Department of New York, and the New York Army National Guard within the city. Soon after, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and a small staff picked up donated medical supplies from an eastside Manhattan hospital, then drove to the secret command post to assess the situation. They identified themselves with their military identification cards and were admitted into the site. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler found Major Wells, who said he was not gainfully employed. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler suggested he standby to see if he could find another assignment helping with point-to-point communications.221

After visiting Major Wells, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and some military volunteers arrived at 340 West Street and dropped off the medical supplies. He met with some of Mr. Bloomberg’s staff, who offered the Internet, phone access, food, and sleeping space to military volunteers. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler thanked the staff for its generosity. The military volunteers used the office space twenty-four hours a day for several days.222

The list of assembly points for military volunteers during this time included: the Borough of Manhattan Community College, Stuyvesant High School, Intermediate School 89, Jacob Javits Convention Center, Park Avenue Armory, Lexington Avenue Armory, and Chelsea Piers Sports Complex.223

Two or three senior military officers were already working out of the 340 West Street location. One was Army Reserve Colonel Michael Finn of the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade in Riverdale, Maryland, who was in New York City on business when the attacks occurred. He and other military volunteers found themselves assisting with the recovery efforts at the World Trade Center site after the attack. The volunteers eventually found themselves working from the Bloomberg office. When Lieutenant Colonel Mestler arrived, he found Colonel Finn and received a briefing on what had transpired over the last several hours. The two colonels and Commander Mark Hardy, United States Naval Reserve, together began managing three platoons of about sixty volunteers. They had already assigned platoon leaders or would assign more as they volunteered.224

During the three days that Lieutenant Colonel Mestler volunteered for duty in Manhattan, at best estimate, 155 volunteers representing the Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force volunteered to assist in whatever capacity they could. Included in that mix were thirty-eight

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221 Ibid., pp. 27-32.
222 Ibid., pp. 32-33.
223 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
people of unknown military status. By 13 September, the number dwindled to about sixty. Many volunteers got too exhausted and went home.\footnote{Ibid. and Situation report endorsed by Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Mestler, “NYC Provisional Joint Task Force,” 13 September 2001.}

During the afternoon on the twelfth, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler asked one of his captains to draft an operational order, which he revised a couple of times before handing out to military volunteers working under his control. This was forwarded to the 107th Corp Support Group. By late afternoon on the twelfth, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler asked his platoon leaders to assess the situation at ground zero with the military volunteers and to make sure that people were accounted for and working in an organized fashion. Through his platoon leaders, he ordered these volunteers to stay close together and account for each other. Air quality reports started coming in during the afternoon, stating that the air at the World Trade Center site was hazardous. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler, through his platoon leaders, ordered the volunteers not to go further south than Chambers Street, unless they had specific instructions from him to do so. Around 6 p.m., he met with his platoon leaders to talk about the hazards downtown. He employed one of his platoon leaders to again assess the situation at ground zero and to give him a report of what agencies were there.\footnote{Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Mestler, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 22 April 2002, pp. 13-17.}

At 6:30 a.m. on 13 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler proceeded with two of his staff officers to the Park Avenue armory to coordinate activities and to attend a staff meeting. After the meeting, the commander of the 107th Corp Support Group, Colonel Stephen Seiter, called Lieutenant Colonel Mestler into his office, saying that he had received a copy of his operational order. Colonel Seiter was upset because there was no such entity as the “New York City Provisional Joint Task Force,” that Lieutenant Colonel Mestler was not in command of anything, and that, according to higher National Guard authority, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and his military volunteers were to vacate the armories, 340 West Street, and ground zero as soon as possible or they would be arrested by police.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 27-34.}

Lieutenant Colonel Mestler said that he thought he was operating under the blessings of the New York Army National Guard and that it would take some time to gather all the troops together before everyone could vacate in an orderly fashion. Also, he said people downtown were relying on the services and help that the volunteers were providing, and yanking them off the scene abruptly might upset people. Colonel Seiter agreed to a timeline to have the volunteers withdrawn from the area around the World Trade Center site by that evening.\footnote{Ibid., p. 28.}

National Guardsmen were receiving state orders to report to their units to work in the wake of the attacks, so more guardsmen were coming into Manhattan and telling military volunteers to go home. By mid-morning on 13 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler took a cab to 340 West Street and briefed the other officers, telling them to brief these volunteers, to
answer their questions, and to disengage them gradually. If they wanted to continue to volunteer
to work at ground zero, they must wear civilian clothes so they would not be confused with the
National Guardsmen who were pouring into the area.229

The process of disengaging military volunteers took about six hours. Lieutenant Colonel
Mestler held a final formation at about 4 p.m. on 13 September at 340 West Street, whereby he
thanked the volunteers for their work and recorded their names, phone numbers, and other
particulars to have for the record. Also, Mr. Bloomberg and Colonel Pietrowski publicly
thanked the volunteers. Lieutenant Colonel Mestler told the military volunteers to disengage
themselves in groups of twos and threes. About two dozen volunteers did stay and work until
about 8 p.m. that evening. By then the New York City Provisional Joint Task Force had
disbanded.230

On 14 September, Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and some other military personnel,
reported to the 7th Regiment Armory in civilian clothes to process ground zero volunteers and to
solicit donations. At about 3 p.m., Lieutenant Colonel Mestler left the armory after being
informed that the Volunteer Coordination Center – the name given to facilitate the volunteers
arriving at the armory – would be overseen by a National Guard chaplain, and that his services
would no longer be required.231

One military volunteer who fell indirectly under the Joint Provisional Task Force was
Army Reservist Specialist Lawrence Provost. Specialist Provost, a substitute teacher in upstate
New York and a reservist with the 403rd Civil Affairs Battalion, got word of the World Trade
Center attacks as he was preparing to go to class on the morning of 11 September. He arrived at
the school and went into the library to watch television since he still had a few hours before his
assignment began in the early afternoon. As the news unfolded, Specialist Provost felt
compelled to make the drive to Manhattan to help out as a volunteer. He sought and received
permission to do so from his civil affairs reserve unit and the school where he taught.232

By mid-morning on the 11th, Specialist Provost called various New York City Police
Department precincts, trying to connect to people to tell them that he was a reservist and wanted
to help out, and to determine where he should go. Many lines were inoperable or busy. He
finally reached a police officer who said it was fine to come down. His help was needed. By
12:30 p.m., Specialist Provost was back at home collecting personal gear and his Army uniform.
He had no luck catching a train or bus to New York City. Therefore, he drove his car and arrived
in Manhattan around 7 p.m. on 11 September. He was unfamiliar with the city, so he followed
some HUMVEES along the west side of Manhattan. He stopped along the way and asked a
police officer where military people were working. The officer directed him to 340 West Street,

229 Ibid., p. 34.
230 Ibid., p. 34.
231 Ibid.
232 Specialist Lawrence Provost, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 15 February
but when he arrived there were no military inside the building. A few meters away, however, Specialist Provost found some New York Army National Guard military policemen and asked to hitch a ride with them to ground zero or wherever he could help out. This is where he met Colonel Finn, who would meet with Lieutenant Colonel Mestler the following day. The convoy of soldiers drove to Stuyvesant High School.233

Specialist Provost encountered mass confusion there. Several military volunteers, claiming to be squad leaders, shouted contradictory orders. He felt disgruntled and restless. So by the morning of the 12th, he decided to go ahead without orders or guidance to ground zero. He went along with Colonel Finn and a retired soldier. They reached the northern-most part of ground zero and began digging with their bare hands. After a couple of hours, they moved to another site to dig.234

For five days, Specialist Provost worked at ground zero digging, lifting, carrying bodies, and helping out wherever and however he could. He became part of a “bucket brigade” – a group of volunteers who used buckets to carry debris out of an area. Gradually, he obtained a breathing mask, some gloves, and a shovel. He slept nights at the Borough of Manhattan Community College, Chelsea Piers, and once at a private home. Somewhere around Chelsea Piers, he found a shower and donned clean under garments that were donated by private sources. Once he made it to the plaza of the former World Trade Center, he noticed that no American flag was present on any of the flag poles. He asked around about finding one, when a police officer said he had one. Together, with some ironworkers, they managed to hoist the flag up onto a flag pole. This became reason for a ceremony and some prayer, with about a hundred people in attendance.235

Specialist Provost encountered some tension from various individual soldiers of the New York Army National Guard, who after two or three days, began stating they were the only military entity authorized to work in the area. However, other National Guard soldiers, like Sergeant Major Keeler, wished Specialist Provost the best of luck as he continued his actions around ground zero.236

By 16 September, Specialist Provost felt physically worn out from digging and working the bucket brigades every day for four days. He was overcome with grief and had also developed a rash, so he found a Red Cross center near ground zero and went in for rest and treatment. After a couple of hours of contemplation, he left ground zero. He got in his car and drove home to upstate New York.237

Though Lieutenant Colonel Mestler and Specialist Provost never met each other while volunteering during those five days in September, they spoke on the phone in the weeks

233 Ibid., pp. 14-17.
234 Ibid., pp. 13-19.
236 Ibid., pp. 35, 37-38.
following 11 September. Specialist Provost had worked with Colonel Finn, who told him sometime on 12 or 13 September that he was working as part of the Provisional Joint Task Force. So Specialist Provost was familiar with the organization during his volunteer time. The New York Army National Guard became the official military presiding agency in Manhattan for the next several months, while most of the provisional task forces – whether they fell under Lieutenant Colonel Mestler or another senior officer – disbanded by around 16 September.238

**United States Army Corps of Engineers Contingency Response Team**

In response to the 11 September attacks, the United States Army Corps of Engineers Contingency Response Unit activated on 17 September 2001. This Army Reserve engineer unit, which was based out of the Lieber USAR Center in Alexandria, Virginia, consisted of forty field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. These engineers, while being compensated on annual training orders, were ordered to report to the Army Corps of Engineers' headquarters at Fort Hamilton, New York, where they took over emergency operations center operations and converted it into a functioning tactical operations center. This had the dual effect of returning the civilians to their normal assignments, thereby enhancing their assigned functions. Furthermore, their mission was to coordinate the efforts of their North American Defense Command's Continental United States-based districts and its European district in support of operations at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and to maintain accurate communication and information flow with the Corps of Engineers' command and staff channels. These reserve engineers were successful in these endeavors. They mastered situational awareness of subordinate units, the locations and functions of various Corps of Engineers' activities at both attack sites, the Corps' approach to disaster relief with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Corps' information systems in use at both sites. On 8 October, these engineers were mobilized under the authority of Operation NOBLE EAGLE and sent to additional locations including Wiesbaden, Germany. An officer, Major Ernie Edgar, was one activated reservist from the North Atlantic Division to go to ground zero.239 At the request of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Corps of Engineers also sent a small contingent of several civilian engineers (from different states) to lower Manhattan. They stayed at the site for two months providing technical support to New York City and other agencies.240

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240 Mr. Dwayne Poiroux, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 11 November 2001, pp. 2-3.
Other Army Entities

Fort Dix, New Jersey, was one of several Army posts that served as a mobilization station for units activated for Operation NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. Since the mid-1990s, it served as an Army Reserve post. Fort Dix was located in Burlington County, about midway between New York City and Philadelphia, and included nearby McGuire Air Force Base. It provided crisis support after 11 September by supplying billeting and dining facilities to military and emergency response personnel. It also provided an emergency operations center and refueling to the president's helicopter, Marine Corps One, in support of his visit to New York City. Fort Dix also contributed medical and firefighter support and supplied rations to the 77th Regional Support Command. Later, the post obtained fourteen security dogs.241

Another Army entity that contributed to the post 11 September recovery efforts was the Army Reserve's 78th Division – a major command indirectly subordinate to the 77th Regional Support Command. Its headquarters was at Camp Kilmer in Edison, New Jersey. The 78th Division’s mission was to provide command and coordination of military support to the efforts of civil authorities in New York City and the Pentagon. Therefore, it worked with FEMA and Army Reserve preparedness liaison officers. At that time, Major General James Helmly commanded this division. (In May 2002, he succeeded retiring Lieutenant General Plewes to become the new Chief, Army Reserve.) Major General Helmly issued his 11 September response, command mission statement, and guidance by telephone because he was engaged with his full time job as assistant deputy chief of staff, operations at the Personnel Command, headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia.

On 11 September, Mr. Albert Porto, the division’s staff operations and training officer and the division’s operations officer as an Army Reserve colonel, directed his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel William Penny, to activate the Emergency Operations Center. The center had twenty-four-hour, seven days a week staffing coverage. The division also secured its perimeters, activated soldiers, took attendance, and tracked expenditures. As of 18 September, the 78th Division was operating at THREATCON Charlie minus weapons. It improved its security by installing a barbed-wire fence, repairing deficient portions of the existing fence, improving lighting at the front gate, and purchasing ten water-filled plastic barriers. The division loaned FEMA the following computer equipment: a Dell laptop, five Gateway laptops, five Hewlett-Packard 61 printers, and four Hewlett-Packward 1100 printers. The 78th Division also loaned office and storage space to government agencies whose space was destroyed in the 11 September attacks. Mr. Porto designated Captain Philip “Duke” Labasi as the battle staff officer in charge, while Major Gene Olsen assumed the role of operations officer and coordinator of command briefings. Master Sergeant Kevin Blanton was the noncommissioned officer in charge. A total of twenty soldiers manned the Emergency Operations Center.

241 Email, Mr. William Robertson to EOC 77th RSC, "SITREP #4," MMLF 5, #289, 15 September 2001 and Email, Mr. Thomas Collins to USARC, “Operation NOBLE EAGLE/Emergency Support of Recovery Efforts,” MMLF 10, #448, 18 September 2001, p. 2.
Battle update briefs were conducted twice daily. Mr. Porto briefed Major General Helmly daily at 6 p.m. The battle staff’s main responsibility was coordination with First U.S. Army and the division’s defense coordinating elements. The 78th Division mobilized these elements, as well as defense coordinating officers to support efforts in New York City and Washington, D.C. In response to 11 September, the 3rd Brigade handled defense coordinating element support to FEMA Region I, while FEMA Region II redeployed from an exercise in the Caribbean. The 3rd Brigade defense coordinating element initially supported efforts in New York City until a handover of the operation with the 2nd Brigade concluded on 15 September 2001. The 2nd Brigade provided defense coordinating element and officer support to FEMA at the World Trade Center. The 5th Brigade provided the same support to FEMA at the Pentagon.

In addition to providing this support, the 78th Division executed other missions throughout its region of responsibility. These included defense liaison officer and defense liaison element support to the 56th United Nations General Assembly and World Economic Forum in New York City, and the State of the Union Address in Washington, D.C. In the months after 11 September, the 78th Division mobilized hundreds of Army Reservists for Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM.242

Individual U.S. military personnel provided help to New York City, as mentioned earlier, and active duty Army soldiers were some of many who felt compelled to assist the city. One such soldier assigned to an Army Reserve unit was an active duty Army soldier, Sergeant First Class Rafael Gomez of the Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He was attached to the 353rd Civil Affairs Command in the Bronx. He went down to ground zero with another soldier from the 353rd, Sergeant Major Joanna Pittman. When they arrived at ground zero, they were assigned to a welding crew. After several hours at ground zero, they realized that they could be more useful by helping to organize the materials being sent to rescue workers downtown. They organized different types of supplies, such as medical and clothing supplies. They worked out of a Burger King restaurant that was conveniently located near ground zero.243 Sergeant Major Pittman was one of several Army Reserve soldiers who were told to leave by the National Guard after informing her that it was now their operation.244 Another 353rd soldier who spent time at ground zero by helping to remove debris was Captain Brian Goldstein.245

A second active duty soldier who helped authorities at ground zero was Master Sergeant Jose Gordon, senior enlisted advisor at the U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

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243 Mr. Rafael Gomez, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 10 December 2001.
244 Sergeant Major Joanna Pittman, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 7 December 2001.
245 Captain Brian Goldstein, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 6 December 2001.
After the seriousness of what had occurred in lower Manhattan was assessed, FEMA needed people who were able to handle specialized equipment. The owner of a private company mentioned Master Sergeant Gordon’s name because he was a master breacher who could use a specialized torch to get inside structures. After the owner contacted Master Sergeant Gordon, he received permission from his chain of command and received a state police escort to ground zero. His mission there was to train rescue personnel on the use of this torch. His expertise with the master breacher skill made a contribution to rescue operations at ground zero.246

**Army National Guard**

The New York Army National Guard was the primary military organization responding to the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center. Due to the uniqueness of their military mission with the state, Governor George Pataki called them to state active duty within three hours of the attacks. The National Guard coined the term “Joint Task Force 42” – the name it gave to its rescue and recovery operation in New York City. The 42nd Infantry Division was the name of the New York National Guard. Guardsmen provided perimeter security at ground zero, the city's airports, rail terminals, bridges, tunnels, and at other sites deemed sensitive by officials. Their troops came to the city from all over the state on two week rotations. Housing was scattered across the city. The task force headquarters was at the 7th Regiment Armory (Park Avenue Armory), located at 66th and 67th Streets, between Park and Lexington Avenues in Manhattan.

The New Jersey National Guard, which was also part of the 42nd (Rainbow) Division, mobilized more than 1,000 soldiers, airmen, and naval militia personnel in response to the attacks on the World Trade Center. In addition to providing security to the Garden State's three major airports, the 42nd Infantry Division's military police helped the Department of Defense's security force at Fort Dix. Their 50th Brigade, headquartered at Fort Dix, and the 57th Troop Command of Atlantic City, augmented security at the state's two nuclear power stations and the Staten Island landfill. The Atlantic City airport at Pleasantville served as the base for the Air Force’s Air National Guard, 177th Fighter Wing, also of Atlantic City, which flew combat air patrols over New York City in support of the North American Aerospace Command.247

**Summary**

The 77th Regional Support Command and other Army Reserve units responded promptly and efficiently to the attack on America. Emergency operations centers were established, base security was increased, timely responses to requests for equipment were handled, and individual soldiers gave their time to help rescue operations at ground zero and at their reserve centers. The

246 Master Sergeant Jose Gordon, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 17 December 2001.
77th Regional Support Command also had soldiers federally mobilized to support Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM.  

Lieutenant General Plewes complemented the men and women of the 77th Regional Support Command on their timely response in establishing the Emergency Operations Center. In a visit to New York five days after the attack, Lieutenant General Plewes and Brigadier General Colt visited the destruction at ground zero. As part of his tour, Lieutenant General Plewes also visited the 77th’s headquarters and Emergency Operations Center at Fort Totten, New York, and Jacobi Hospital, where soldiers of the 8th Medical Brigade and the 140th Quartermaster Company were assigned. Lieutenant General Plewes praised the Army Reserve's response by stating that "immediately after the attacks, the 77th Regional Support Command and a group of well-trained emergency preparedness liaison officers went into action to support the disaster recovery in New York." Speaking before the U.S. Senate's Subcommittee on Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, Lieutenant General Plewes claimed, "Among the great heroes of that day were Army Reservists," Some of their experiences are captured and preserved in the abridged interviews found in Part II.

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249 Article, Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, "Reserve Soldiers Show Stuff Americans are Made of,” The Post, 76, no. 41, 19 October 2001, p. 2.

Lieutenant Colonel William Pohlmann, civilian attorney who worked at the World Trade Center and Army Reservist with the 4th Legal Support Organization, Bronx, New York.

Captain Mark Whitford, New York City firefighter and Army Reservist with the 331st Military Intelligence Company, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, New York.

Captain Michael Mullen, New York City firefighter and Army Reservist with the 344th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Totten, Queens, New York.

(Photographs courtesy of the Pohlmann, Whitford, and Mullen families)
(Top left) Chief Warrant Officer 1 Ronald Bucca, New York City fire marshall and Army Reservist with the 3413th Military Intelligence Detachment, Bronx.

(Right) Staff Sergeant Frederick Ill, New York City firefighter and Army Reservist with Company A, 854th Engineer Battalion, Bullview, New York.

(Left) Sergeant Shawn Powell, New York City firefighter and Army Reservist with the 4220th U.S. Army Hospital, Shoreham, New York.

(Photographs courtesy of the Bucca, Ill, and Powell families)
(Top) Bronxville, New York, 10 November 2001 – New York City firefighters and family members carry the body of Chief Warrant Officer 1 Ronald Bucca into the Concordia College Sommer Center for Worship, where the family held funeral services.

(Left) Bronxville, New York, 10 November 2001 – Army Reserve Staff Sergeant Pascual Flores (right) of the 1079th Garrison Support Unit, Fort Dix, New Jersey, confers with New York City Fire Department officials before the funeral service for firefighter and Army Reservist Chief Warrant Officer 1 Ronald Bucca. Staff Sergeant Flores worked as part of the military funeral details team sponsored by the 77th RSC. (Photos by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)
Brooklyn, New York, 10 November 2001 – New York City firefighters make their way to funeral services held for Sergeant Shawn Powell at the Corner Stone Baptist Church. (Photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 311th Military History Detachment)

Former Army Soldier Helps Evacuate Workers From World Trade Center

(Above) New York, 11 September 2001 – This is the last known photograph taken of Army Colonel (retired) Cyril “Rick” Rescorla, who uses a bullhorn to direct the evacuation of employees from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, his employer. Colonel Rescorla was posthumously awarded the first New Jersey Vietnam Service Medal. (Photo– Unknown)
Command Honors
Army Reservists Who Died on 11 September

Fort Totten, New York, 5 November 2002 -- This photograph depicts the front of the memorial dedicated to the six 77th Regional Support Command Army Reservists who died at the World Trade Center on 9-11. The 77th RSC held a memorial dedication on 3 November 2002. Key speakers included Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes, chief, Army Reserve; Brigadier General Richard Colt, commander, 77th RSC; and select 77th RSC soldiers. Family members of the victims received a posthumously awarded Soldiers Medal. Lieutenant Colonel William Pohlmann posthumously was awarded a Legion of Merit. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Bruce Hill, 77th Regional Support Command Public Affairs Office)

(Above left) Fort Totten, 3 November 2002 -- Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes commemorates the lives of the six Army Reservists who died on 11 September 2001. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Above right) Fort Totten, 3 November 2002 -- Family members and Army Reservists listen to eulogies of the lives of the six fallen soldiers. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)
Army Reserve Chief Visits Ground Zero

New York, 16 September 2001 – Brigadier General Richard Colt (center) commends New York City firefighters and volunteers on their work following the 9-11 terrorist attacks. *(Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)*

New York, 16 September 2001 – Army Reserve Colonel Gerard McEnerney (left) of the Regional Emergency Liaison Team 2 based in Manhattan, explains to Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes the responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a reservist, Colonel McEnerney worked as a regional emergency preparedness liaison officer – a liaison between FEMA and the Army Reserve. He worked at several FEMA operations centers for a few days following 9-11. *(Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment).*

New York, 16 September 2001 - Specialist Paul Morando, broadcaster with the 361st Press Camp Headquarters, Fort Totten, videotapes the visit by Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General Plewes. *(Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)*

New York, 16 September 2001 – Colonel Gerard McEnerney (right) escorts Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes (left) and Brigadier General Richard Colt (center) through lower Manhattan, stopping sometimes along the way to explain the extent of the devastation and progress being made by local governments. *(Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)*
New Yorkers Create Memorials for 11 September Victims


(Middle right) New York, 16 October 2001 – A photographic memorial of dead and missing World Trade Center victims hangs on a billboard at one of the city’s emergency operations centers near the Hudson River.

(Middle left) New York, 2 November 2001 – New Yorkers create memorials on fences surrounding sensitive or dangerous areas of the World Trade Center site. This particular fence surrounded an area of ground zero banned from the general public. (Photos by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Bottom) New York, 19 October 2001 – This was one of several makeshift work areas near or at ground zero in which patriots wrote words of encouragement to rescue and recovery workers. (Photos by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)
Several Weeks After the Terrorist Attacks . . .

(Top) New York, 19 October 2001 – A small part of the structure of one of the World Trade Center towers stood for more than a month after the terrorist attacks. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Left) New York, 19 October 2001 - New York City firefighters continued to douse out fires that smoldered from the World Trade Center rubble for three-and-a-half months after the attacks. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)
(Top) New York, 19 October 2001 – Recovery workers worked around the clock to clear out the debris from the World Trade Center site. It was not until May 2002 that the site was clean.

(Middle right) New York, 25 October 2001 – Mr. Richard Prager, ironworker from Local 40, New York City, donated these recovery workers’ items to the 311th Military History Detachment to add to its artifact collection.

(Bottom right) Staten Island, New York, 29 December 2001 – An informational sign showing the Fresh Kills Landfill in Staten Island, hangs in an Army Corps of Engineer’s office. The landfill, which had closed, reopened after 9-11 because city workers needed an accessible place to take the World Trade Center debris.

(Middle left) New York, 19 December 2001 – Tools used by the Fire Department of New York lay discarded in a rescue worker's tent near ground zero.

(Bottom left) Staten Island, New York, 29 December 2001 – Refuse from the World Trade Center site sits discarded at the landfill. (Photos by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)
New York, 14 September 2001 – Soldiers of the 1179th Deployment Support Brigade (DSB), Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, volunteered to assist in rescue and recovery operations in lower Manhattan from 14 to 16 September 2001. From left to right: Sergeant First Class Harry Bass, Specialists William Schau and Rosa Arrunategui, Sergeants First Class James Farran, Tino Collura, and Captain Joseph Micelotta. In late October 2001, the 1179th mobilized for up to two years for Operation NOBLE EAGLE. (Photo courtesy of the 1179th DSB)

(Left) New York, 25 October 2001 – Richard Prager, an iron worker with the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 40, New York, worked in lower Manhattan for several months following 9-11. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Right) Brooklyn, New York, 11 September 2001 – Sergeant First Class Michael Bernard, 920th Transportation Company, Jersey City, New Jersey, was on his way to work as an Active Guard Reserve soldier, when he witnessed fire coming from a tower of the World Trade Center. He stopped in Manhattan and helped local police evacuate the area. (Photo courtesy of SFC Bernard)
Army Reservists Help Regionally, Provide Force Protection

(Top left) Bronx, New York, 16 September 2001 -- Captain Martin Williams, 695th Corp Support Battalion, Fort Tilden, N.Y., and First Lieutenant Matthew Goodman, 140th Quartermaster Co., Fort Totten, talk to Lieutenant General Thomas J. Plewes at the Jacobi hospital in the Bronx. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Top right) Fort Dix, New Jersey - A military policeman searches someone’s vehicle before entering post. (Photo courtesy of Master Sergeant Vicki Washington, U.S. Army Reserve Command Public Affairs Office)

(Bottom) Fort Dix, New Jersey – Two civilian contractors lay concrete barriers at the post several days after the 9-11 terrorist attacks. (Photo courtesy of Master Sergeant Vicki Washington, U.S. Army Reserve Command Public Affairs Office)

(Middle left) Fort Totten, New York, 3 November 2001 – Two military policemen guard the front gates at the post. (Photo by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 311th Military History Detachment)
(Top left) New York, 11 November 2001 – President George W. Bush greets firefighters and recovery workers at ground zero in lower Manhattan on Veterans Day. This day marked the two-month anniversary of the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks.

(Top right) New York, 11 November 2001 – Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) autographs the hard hat of a rescue and recovery worker near ground zero. (Photos by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Left) New York, 2 November 2001 -- Governor George Pataki (Rep.) greets Chaplain (Colonel) Jacob Goldstein, 42nd Infantry Division, New York Army National Guard. As a Jewish Rabbi, Chaplain Goldstein may wear a yarmulke while in Army uniform. (Photo by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, 311th Military History Detachment)

(Bottom) New York, 11 November 2001 – New York City Mayor elect Michael Bloomberg greets recovery workers at ground zero. (Photo by Major Robert Bensburg, 311th Military History Detachment)
PART II

EXCERPTS FROM SELECTED ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS
Brigadier General Richard Colt
Chapter 1

Army Reserve Brigadier General Richard Colt, Commanding General, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, Queens, New York

[Brigadier General Colt, who received command of the 77th on 20 June 2001, had thirty-five years of military service. As a civilian he was the director of business operations at Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America in Ossining, New York.]

INTERVIEWER: Sir, can you give us a brief biography of your background?

COLT: I was commissioned in 1967 by ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corp]. I went on active duty in November of 1967, served in the Republic of Vietnam, May of ’68 to May of ’69. When I came off active duty in November 1969, I went into the IRR [Individual Ready Reserve] for approximately nine years. I came back into service in 1978 with the New York Army National Guard, branch transferred to the field artillery, and served in a variety of positions in the field artillery.

[His highest field artillery position was as a battalion commander for the field artillery in the United States Army Reserve.]

I served about three-and-a-half years as the commander. At the conclusion of my tenure as commander, I became the chief of unit training at Headquarters, 77th ARCOM [Army Reserve Command] and then the deputy chief of staff for training at the 77th. I was the DCST [deputy chief of staff, training] during the DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM operation. After that assignment, I was selected to command the 301st Area Support Group, also headquartered at Fort Totten until 1993. Then Major General Francis Terrell, the commander of the 77th ARCOM, asked me to be his chief of staff. I was his chief of staff during the time from the transition from an ARCOM to a regional support command. And then in 1997 . . . I was picked to be the deputy commander of the 94th Regional Support Command [Fort Devens, Massachusetts]. I was promoted in August of ’98 and served with the 94th until March of 2001. I was selected in 2001 to command the 77th, and took command officially on the 20th of June.

INTERVIEWER: On September 11th, 2001, where were you at the beginning of that day?

COLT: I was . . . working my civilian job, when my secretary came in and said, “Dick, a plane just hit one of the towers in the World Trade building.” And I remember I looked out the window, and I said, “No way, not an accident. Somebody just hit that.” So I told her to start canceling my appointments, because I knew I was going to be required down at the command. I was cleaning my desk, making some last-minute phone calls [when] the second [airplane] went in . . . . At that point . . . people were coming down to my office saying, “What’s going on?
What’s going on? What do you know?” And this was before either of the towers had gone down. I called my village police chief. . . . We didn’t have a TV on this floor. . . . I said, “Chief, if I need it, can I get a driver and a car to get me down to my headquarters because I got a funny feeling that things are going to be happening?” He told me that they had just closed the bridges . . . [but] said, “No problem.” I left [work] . . . went home, grabbed some clothes, and toiletries, and went down to the Ossining Village’s police chief’s office . . . . I live right here in Ossining, about six minutes from where we’re sitting, and started this job here about a year ago after retiring from a long career at AT&T. . . . I went to the Ossining police chief, . . . and he had a young police officer drive me from here to Fort Totten in about twenty-six minutes. . . . We got to the Whitestone [Bridge] and got right across that with absolutely no problem.

[The trip from Ossining to Fort Totten was about thirty-three miles. Brigadier General Colt thought he remembered reaching Fort Totten at around 10:30 a.m.]

By that time I walked in . . . . Brigadier General [Gary] DiLallo, who was the former deputy of the 77th and is now a command executive officer, . . . came right down to my office. Colonel [Philip] Spies [senior liaison officer] . . . gave me a fast up brief. . . . As I was coming across the Whitestone [Bridge], we had had the radio on and both towers had fallen. . . . I’d been on the cell phone with [the 77th] trying to get . . . several things I wanted done immediately or that I wanted information on. We had our EOC [Emergency Operations Center] up. The full time staff had done that immediately, and they did it extraordinarily professionally. We were fully functioning with communications with everybody we could reach going up the ladder to USARC [U.S. Army Reserve Command], with our major subordinate commands, giving them directions to establish an EOC. . . . We did not, nor did anybody at the time, know whether this was just one attack with two occurrences or whether there’d be more. . . . You’ll remember the chaos in the city, . . . the uncertainty, . . . the absolute confusion. . . . Headquarters [was] squared away.

[Brigadier General Colt spoke about the emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) arriving quickly to downtown Manhattan. He believed that EPLO Colonel Harvey Barrison was the first Army Reservist to arrive at ground zero, and EPLO Colonel Gerard McEnerney quickly followed. He also mentioned other Army Reservists who were stranded away from the headquarters and could not report to their respective 77th units, such as Colonel Daniel Ganci, commander of the 1179th Deployment Support Brigade, and brother of 11 September fire chief victim Peter Ganci]

When I came in to the headquarters, the EOC was functioning. Communications were established, and the major subordinate commanders were in . . . . Primary staff and special staff had been notified. Everybody was moving in toward [Fort] Totten and toward the headquarters.

[Brigadier General Colt believed then that the 77th had lost soldiers in the World Trade Center, but he had no idea how many. He called the Adjutant General’s Office of New York to offer any assistance possible to the city. He also said that at first he received no guidance from
the Army or Army Reserve because the Pentagon had also been hit and communication flow was disrupted. He did not speak with the top Army Reserve commanders – Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, chief, Army Reserve or Major General Craig Bambrough, deputy commanding general at USARC, and deputy commanding general for Army Reserve affairs at Forces Command (FORSCOM) – until 12 September. Brigadier General Colt offered his help to Colonel (retired) Larry Conners, a battalion chief for the Fire Department of New York, and former 77th operations officer. The 77th staff along with the USARC was obtaining their news primarily from CNN and other newscasts for the first several hours. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was just assessing what occurred in downtown Manhattan.

INTERVIEWER: Do you have any idea when you made the call to the state TAG [The Adjutant General]?

COLT: It was probably . . . close to [10:30 a.m.] . . . . I knew that they [TAG] would be needing help and also knew the capabilities that the Army Reserve . . . and . . . the 77th in particular had within about fifty miles [of] . . . ground zero was significant both in terms of soldiers and in terms of equipment – a medical brigade, an engineer brigade, a military police brigade, a chemical brigade, . . . and a logistics group. . . . We could provide pretty much any kind of immediate life and death support that was needed. . . . We also needed to take into account force protection. . . . We immediately got some military police for the front [gate] of Fort Totten to protect . . . both civilians and AGRs [Active Guard Reserve], . . . fire department personnel, and any other tenants who were on that post at that time. One of the things we did . . . because of the aura of uncertainty that was out there . . . was to release all nonessential people from the headquarters.

[He explained that Mr. DiLallo decided to release nonessential personnel, while mission-critical personnel stayed very late. Some stayed overnight in the reserve center. In the early afternoon of 11 September, Brigadier General Colt held his first formal briefing with all senior staff members present. From then on he conducted briefings twice daily. That continued for at least two months.]

So my role as I saw it was . . . to make the decisions that needed to be made in terms of [what] we are going to support. . . . I was accountable. . . . I wouldn’t put that burden on anybody else. . . . [Another goal was] to work with the staff and be a role model for the staff. If I was there, I expected them [critical staff] to be there . . . . There was not a single moment’s hesitation by anybody on the staff – full time, reserve troop program unit [TPU] folks, civilians – those [who] knew they were needed were there and were there with a vengeance [and] stayed . . . through the crisis phase [of] 11 September and the . . . next couple of weeks.

INTERVIEWER: Was there any planning and anticipated tasks that might be coming from any agencies that might be asking for them?
COLT: Initially, no. And part of the issue was expecting FEMA to come up on line at some point. We knew First Army was going to be moving forward, so we expected to be working closely with them. But neither happened in the time frame [because it] was such a chaotic day [and it took] time for people to get organized. Other than the first responders . . . a lot of our . . . 77th folks who were released as nonessential up here in Fort Totten immediately headed for ground zero and joined bucket brigades and did whatever they needed to do to help their brothers and sisters who were trapped or trying to rescue others. . . .

On the 12th, I got a call about 6:30 in the morning from General Plewes asking how things were going up there. . . . My feedback to him was with all that evolved, we’re doing okay. We were doing whatever was needed to help, whatever we were being asked of. He was very supportive, and I told him that we would keep track and account of our people and of our . . . equipment we were going to be lending out or utilizing . . . .

We had started to get more requests from various agencies for help. And as [with] all things, agencies would tend to work with those whom they know. So besides the fire department, we started getting requests from CID, Criminal Investigative Division, . . . the FBI, and the city Medical Examiner’s Office because . . . we were expecting lots of wounded. That would have filled up a lot of the hospitals. . . . [These agencies were] asking for direct support, everything from helping them get furniture to . . . helping create an evidence collection site, to helping set up a temporary morgue, because we were expecting lots of bodies that we did not get initially because so many were buried and lost in the rubble. . . . People, volunteers, and organizations started to move toward the city. . . . Probably . . . every agency that was ever created . . . within the United States . . . was on the ground or moving toward the ground. We were taking every offer and every request and doing our best to fulfill it because we did not know at that time what the Guard was doing.

By the 12th, we started to get more information about the dead [from the 77th]. . . . We had done a personnel search and went through our records and pulled out everybody who had an occupation as fireman or policeman. . . . We started to get feedback from the fire department who was missing. . . . Within a week . . . [we found] . . . out that five of our soldiers who were firemen had been killed and one of our JAG [judge advocate general] officers had been killed in the collapse of the buildings. . . .

On the 12th . . . we were engaged in some operations, [and] had the great capability to do much more, but we were . . . sensitive to the fact that we were federal troops, and what we could do under the law was limited. As long as it engaged a federal agency or where it was assistance in rescue and recovery, and life and death, we felt real comfortable in doing that mission.

On the 13th, my public affairs folks had arranged an interview for the evening of the 13th with [Alan] Combs and [Sean] Hannity on Fox Cable News. . . . We also had decided that we needed to go downtown . . . to do some liaison work with FEMA and with my EPLOs and to see what . . . we needed . . . or could provide that would assist. On the morning of the 13th, myself,
Brigadier General Paul Hill, who is commander of the 800th MPs [military police] who had been bringing up military police [for] . . . force protection at [Fort] Totten, and some of our other locations, and his Command Sergeant Major Roy Clement, my provost marshal, several military police, my chief of staff, . . . Colonel Ron Linn, and Command Sergeant Major [Harry] Lovell went down to 26 Federal Plaza [in Manhattan] to meet with an active duty soldier named [Colonel Kevin] Conners . . . who was a defense contracting officer assigned there. . . .

[Brigadier General Colt and his staff arrived at 26 Federal Plaza, met with EPLO Colonel (Kevin) Conners, who fell under First Army in a crisis. They gave him a list of 77th personnel and equipment assets and capabilities and told him the 77th would help in any way possible. Communications, including cellular, were still down. Ground zero had been evacuated and there were no lights.]

After that meeting, we walked down toward One Police Plaza. We were going to check in on the New York City Emergency Operations Center, [which] . . . had been in one of the towers that had come down. . . . [We wanted] to just check in with them and to make sure . . . [whether or not] they needed something from us. . . . We now had a contact through Colonel Conners . . . and [they could] request a tasking from him. . . . At that point, too, First Army was establishing [itself] in Edison, [New Jersey], and apparently found out that Edison was kind of remote from downtown Manhattan. . . . [They] thought of moving to the [city] . . . and ultimately found out that they were not going to be needed. . . . So First Army did not play a significant role in the rescue and recovery for New York. . . .

So we did go down to ground zero that day. We had an FBI . . . and an NYPD [New York City Police Department] escort that day. And for the first several days, if you moved around the city, you moved with a police or fire department escort, or you didn’t get to move any place because roads were closed, bridges were closed, traffic was monitored significantly. . . all over the place. You needed to move with somebody who had the authority to move other people out or you didn’t get anywhere. Our liaison and the history of our relationship with both fire departments and police departments had always been exceptionally good. . . . We went and visited the site, came back to Totten later [in the] afternoon, got briefed up on activities that had gone on, were going on, changed, and went down, again escorted . . . to midtown Manhattan for an interview that evening . . . as it turned out, the first interview with any general officer in the Army since 11 September. . . . I was definitely nervous since I did realize that whatever I said was going to be fodder for the media . . . frenzy that was going on and the biggest story of our lives. . . .

General Plewes called me the next morning at about 06:30, which is the 14th, and said that I had done good. . . . So I said, “Do I still have my job?” and he said, “Yes,” and so the conversation went on from there. [I] filled him in on what we were doing. I had started initiating emails to General Bambrough and General Plewes just to give them an update. . . . We were keeping the USARC staff informed. I started to speak with [Brigadier] General [John] Yingling, who is the chief of staff of the United States Army Reserve Command down in Atlanta, who was
extraordinarily helpful and supportive and started making arrangements for General Plewes to come up to the command on that Sunday [16 September]. . . . Friday afternoon my staff kicked me out of my office, [and] said, “Go home for awhile, do some wash, come on back the next morning.” We started to work our long-term, seven-day, twenty-four-hour a day process. . . . [People] were working a minimum of twelve . . . to fourteen hours [per day].

INTERVIEWER: So from September the 11th through the following Sunday, the 16th, you had stayed at the reserve center throughout?

COLT: With the exception of one late afternoon through evening when I got home, changed clothes, and picked up some other uniforms . . . not just me, but the bulk of the staff who came in. We were there twenty-four hours. We were sleeping on couches, on hard floors, on sleeping mats, in chairs. The bulk of the folks stayed because we did not know what was coming. . . . I did not have to ask a single soldier or civilian to stay. . . . By the way, we were getting many . . . calls from people volunteering to come in . . . just saying, “What can we do? Can we come in to make coffee and let somebody else get out on the street?”

Totten became a staging ground for the fire department coming in and then moving out again. . . . Security was needed . . . [due to] significant rumors of this threat and that threat [which] kept bringing emotions up and down. . . . We [also] maintained a pretty high THREATCON [Threat condition level]. . . . So the only people who were on Totten were military and civilian folks associated with the 77th and its operations and essential fire and police folks. . . . We were pretty much into a pattern of two briefings a day, minimum, intelligence briefings, and situation reports, and by that time, I did another interview with Channel 12 . . . on Long Island. . . . In each interview [I said] that I did not know what our country was going to do. That wasn’t important for me right now. . . . My concern was how do we do what we need to do in New York City and to support our city and our state and the governmental agencies here in New York – and the people of New York, as community based soldiers.

On Sunday [16 September] we arranged for General Plewes to come in. He flew into Newark [New Jersey] . . . [and] we picked him up with help from the National Guard. . . . They sent a couple of helicopters . . . to pick him up and [to fly] . . . over . . . ground. zero . . . which was . . . totaled on the ground. . . . [He saw] the magnitude and the extent of the damage, which you can’t see from the ground. . . . You can see it . . . still smoking, still flames just like . . . four days, five days after the incident. We went and picked up General Plewes and flew back to Totten . . . because we could not land helicopters anywhere in the vicinity of ground zero. There were still fears about more structural damage. . . .

I think he had a hard time when he saw the reality of what had happened in New York. [Before] General Plewes [left] . . . [we] first went and visited the 140th [Quartermaster] Company led by a Captain Bill Martin, who had set up . . . a temporary morgue at Jacobi Hospital [Bronx, New York] in conjunction with the New York City Medical Examiner’s Office.
We had a kitchen established up there. Everything was squared away [and]... ready for whatever casualties might occur. ... We had chaplains on call. The ratio of dead to wounded in combat would normally be five, six wounded to one dead. We had [the] ... reverse here – so many more dead and buried and unreachable versus the wounded, who were absorbed primarily by the hospitals downtown. ... We spent some time with them [the 140th soldiers]. General Plewes spoke with every soldier. ... We then drove ... with police escort ... down to ground zero – first to ... Pier 92 – one of the piers that FEMA had set up there. He got the tour of the FEMA operation there and met our EPLOs [emergency preparedness liaison officers] and our SEPLOs [state EPLOs]. ... Colonel McEnerney was the senior guy in charge for the FEMA for the Army Reserve. He briefed General Plewes ... and myself, and introduced us to the members. ...

We went from there to 26 Federal Plaza and got a public health briefing. ... We had respirators. We had our over clothes [because] you could feel ... the air and all the ash all over the place. In just five days they had done a heck of a job cleaning up some of the outlying areas from outside in and ... clearing lanes for more and bigger equipment to come into the site – pulling stuff out so they could get more into the rescue operations. General Plewes got a pretty significant tour. Colonel McEnerney knew his business backwards and forwards. ... Then we moved out from there and then went back up to midtown for him to have an interview with either Mr. Hannity [or] Mr. Combs at the same place I had been four days before that. We did that and then we took him out to Newark [New Jersey] that night. He was staying over and leaving out first thing in the morning. We went back to our headquarters. ... During the course of that time, ... I did interviews with MTV ... another one with Channel 12, then one with WABC and Stacey Sager, who has been a great friend to the 77th and the Army and the Army Reserve.

We went forward from there. ... We had confirmed our losses [six killed]. ... We work very closely with the families of our soldiers who were killed. ... We just had a prayer breakfast this past weekend. ... They died in an act of war. ... We will not forget September 11th here. And then we have to move forward from 9-11 to ... where we are now supporting and deploying soldiers in a war on terrorism around the world and doing that as well and to the same standard and with the same commitment of our soldiers. ...

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned earlier about pulling people in response to this contingency. How was this done? How was this resourced?

COLT: We resourced it probably every possible way you could. I think most of the soldiers who served, particularly senior leaders, would have served without a dime. ... But as we got into significant [taskings] and we were bringing junior soldiers in, we ... knew we would be on duty for awhile. We started using a combination of annual training [AT]. We started using ADSW [active duty for special work] money, which is money for special work, for training and other activities that we would conduct normally as a reserve command. ... We went to USARC and
told them . . . everything that we did. . . . Every decision that we made was communicated to USARC, and the support from USARC was absolutely tremendous. . . . We operated under two basic guidelines – that we would . . . do everything that we could to support the rescue and recovery and . . . it was a matter of life and death. . . . We were working under guidelines . . . that everything . . . we did would be ethical, legal, and moral. . . . We would not cut any deals. . . . We would not do anything shady. . . . We were going to work as professional American military folks. . . .

[A] couple of different things came into play in those considerations. . . . Looking at our annual training plan, not every unit was having every soldier go out to annual training. . . . We were conscious of trying to use as little [as we could], to spread it around so that we did not take it all because we weren’t mobilizing soldiers. . . . We looked at using annual training so we would not disrupt any soldiers more than was necessary. Employers were superbly supportive because we weren’t mobilizing soldiers, but everybody in this . . . metropolitan area stepped up to meet the demands of that crisis. . . . We used soldiers as little as possible . . . except military police. . . .

One area where we used a lot of people and continue to use is our military police support because force protection became a major issue. We have Fort Totten, Fort Dix, the West Point Military Academy, Fort Drum, Fort Hamilton [all within the New York, New Jersey state areas]. Each of these other areas has . . . military policemen deployed. . . . We have been using them in an annual training status to provide force protection. . . . There was going to be a major . . . military police exercise this coming summer. But that was cancelled because military police . . . across the country . . . are being utilized for force protection. . . . I see no major impact on . . . their readiness. The deployments, . . . because they are not all total units, . . . degrade the readiness of the units to do the overall mission. . . . Nevertheless, they are deployments of taking the people that are needed to do a particular mission as opposed to taking a whole unit just for the sake of taking a whole unit. . . . The soldiers who are deployed are doing what they’ve trained to do, [and] come back more ready. . . . I also firmly believe that this whole process that’s been [going] on since 9-11 and emotions generated to those of us in uniform has reinforced the need for us to be ready individually and collectively. . . . That is something I have preached and spoken to and written to, time and time again. . . . This is the time when soldiers . . . [who] wear the uniform . . . step up. This is when people look to us to be the role models. . . . I think the message has been received throughout the 77th. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What were some challenges or concerns that you had and how did you overcome them?

COLT: I think the primary challenge was lack of information. The great thing about the 77th – and I’ve said this at the . . . commanders’ conference for the Army Reserve with my peers from around the country – that I don’t think anybody else, any other command in this country, would
have done anything differently than I. [It] just happened to be New York, but I think every other command in the Army Reserve would’ve stepped up exactly the same way. The challenges [were] lack of information, lack of doctrine. Part of what we get paid for as soldiers is to take whatever information is available and make the best decision we can. . . . try to do the right thing. . . . I don’t want to lose anymore people. So I did not sense that many challenges in terms of the operation, . . . significant challenges. I think keeping our emotional keel steady while we did this, understanding the criticality of the mission, understanding the losses that our city faced [were challenges]. You can always fix things, but you can’t fix people.

INTERVIEWER: What about your major subordinate commands? Did you find that your dealings with your subordinate commands were effective in the execution of their tasks? Were there any concerns there?

COLT: I probably talked to every commander daily of when we should perform. They managed somehow, someway to get in here. I think I mentioned earlier Colonel Ganci. It took us about three days or so to get him home. . . . They all got back. They were all at their posts, all with their units. All had emergency operations centers established, [which] . . . were established concurrently with ours, so that we had that communication. We had plans, if need be, for relocating critical people out of Totten to subordinate headquarters . . . if something else had happened in New York. So the chain of command worked well. Communication worked well, and again, it’s a function of staying at that level of competence and focus[ing] on a continuous basis even when we don’t have a major threat or a major event to have to face. That will make us better even than we are.

INTERVIEWER: Can you evaluate the current training or doctrine to this contingency that was called “Liberty Crisis,” and indicate any positive or negative lessons that can be learned from it?

COLT: Well, there was no doctrine [at] 9-11; 8:46 in the morning. . . . We basically went [toward]. . . protection of life and limb, rescue and recovery, life and death. . . . One of the things this whole process did validate for me . . . is that I think the Army Reserve has a place to play as a higher . . . player than we might normally have been. And I think that applies around the country . . . to our other reserve components [such as] the Coast Guard, which were immediately out there on the harbors and on the docks. . . . We had lots of assets, both in people and in equipment that are absolutely suited to support an event of this magnitude. . . . If we got called to go someplace else in the world to be part of some response to the attack, we could’ve done that. And, in fact, we’ve been doing that through this whole deployment process. . . . I’ve spoke[n] with General Plewes about this, and Major General [William] Collins, who is the former commander of the 77th, [and] who is engaged in a dialog as a retired general officer with the
Army War College and other senior active and reserve component general officers, all of them retired – to talk about what can the Army . . . do in an event like this.

There is no doctrine out there. Regional support commands are coordinated with FEMA regions. . . . I think the center for the federal military side of business and a crisis like this should be the RSC [regional support command] headquarters. We know the area. We’ve got people in the local community. We’ve got facilities all around the state. We’ve got secure communications and . . . most importantly, we’ve got community based soldiers who know their way around our towns, and villages, and cities. I think we should play a bigger role, and I do . . . understand there are [limitations] . . . for federal troops. . . . I spent the last four years through March of 2001 up in New England as the deputy commander of the 94th Regional Support Command. I loved being in New England and I have roots up there. I had a tremendous time with great soldiers. . . . But I looked at 9-11, and I looked at being commander of the 77th, which was a dream fulfilled, and there was absolutely no place in the world I wanted to be on 9-11 [than] as a New York boy commanding New York [soldiers]. . . . I think there has to be a serious look at how does the Army [Reserve] play in catastrophes of this sort. . . . We’ve got the tools and equipment that are much more suitable for digging people out of bombed out buildings – logistics expertise, medical expertise, [and] chemical expertise. . . . We own those competencies in New York. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned the National Guard. How is the relationship with the 77th and the 42nd Infantry Division National Guard command? What took place there?

COLT: I think it’s been mostly neutral for all the years that I’ve been in New York. . . . We compete for the same talent pool within New York. I have spoken recently to the new commander of the Army National Guard in New York, and I have said, “Look, we need to work together better.” . . . The Guard did a great job in New York. They did what they were asked to do, and they did it very well. They did it with great confidence and great soldiers. Our soldiers aren’t any different. . . . I think the integration of assets and resources between the Guard and the Reserve could’ve been better, working together more jointly during this, even if you’re going with logistics support to the Guard. . . . We moved the Air National Guard. We put up tents for [the] Army National Guard. . . . I need to work hard at trying to create a mutually supportive relationship to where both of us . . . can work more effectively together. I don’t think we did that this time. And I think that it’s both to our loss. . . . We could’ve done better. . . . I think that being a civilian as well as a soldier . . . you deal with people you know. If you need to get something done, you go call [someone] that you know, and that personal relationship is always the first step to a successful business relationship. . . . I went to a dinner last week to say goodbye to the outgoing TAG of New Jersey and the new commander of the Army Guard in New York, and I’m going to maintain and build on that. We cover both states. We can support both states. I think we need to work together as soldiers to support the citizens we’re committed [and]
supposed to protect, whatever the calamity is. And I think 9-11 sent the message that it’s not necessarily which component you’re in . . . [but] to get something done when there’s an emergency.\textsuperscript{251}

\textsuperscript{251} Brigadier General Richard Colt, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 7 February 2002.
Chapter 2

Mr. Gary DiLallo, Command Executive Officer, 
77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. DiLallo was also a brigadier general in the Individual Ready Reserve. He began his military career in 1968 as an enlisted Army National Guardsman. After six years, he received a direct commission and served in a variety of staff positions in the Army Reserve and the National Guard before assuming the position in 1977 as deputy commander of the 77th.]

INTERVIEWER: Could you tell us what was transpiring here on the morning of September 11th, 2001?

DILALLO: [Mr. DiLallo, along with several key staff members, was attending a class on how to handle difficult employees, when at about 9 a.m., his administrative sergeant interrupted him in class and told him that an airplane had just hit one of the towers of the World Trade Center.]

First thing I thought it was some pilot off course. I responded upstairs [the command section]. . . . I also grabbed Mr. Brian Seglia of the DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations] . . . as we came in here and we turned the TV on. . . . [It] reported that there was a jetliner that crashed into the World Trade Center. Approximately . . . twenty minutes . . . later, we watched the news here, and we saw a second jetliner crash into the World Trade Center. At that time, I knew it was not any sort of accident. It was purposely, . . . a terrorist attack. I immediately left [the Command Group], went down to the DCSOPS operational room where I came into a group of about twenty-five people watching the TV broadcast. . . . Immediately, I knew that we were under attack.

I immediately cleared the room, and I designated the stand up of the Emergency Operations Center probably within twenty-five minutes of the first plane crash. . . . [I] cleared everybody out, secured the building, told people to start getting water and provisions, and then closed all the entrances to the building. . . . We secured the gate out front, and then I started sending non-essential employees home. I told Brian Seglia he was in charge and to start pulling together troops and cots and blankets – whatever we needed for the disaster. [I] came back to my office, and I called the commander [Brigadier General Richard Colt] and tried to get him down here. The bridges were closed at that time, so we got a police escort to get him down here. And we started doing a mini alert – notifying people that we needed them. Probably within about two hours, maybe three, we got the commander and some of the Command Group in. We got the DCSOPS [operating], and reserv[ists] started filtering in here. And we began our communications with the various police and fire agencies. We did our preparing rations, started setting up food, meal schedules – everything we needed to do to be self sustaining over the next twenty-four or forty-eight hours. Probably within about two hours, the cell of full time civilian
employees turned over a fully operational Emergency Operations Center to the reserve staff that was filtering in, and we began relieving people. [We] couldn’t send them home because there were security concerns. [We] started finding places to put people to sleep and then we began briefing the commander, letting him know what was going on. . . . [We began] answering inquiries [from] the FBI and [from] the Coast Guard and providing whatever service we...[could]. [We also] touched base to our folks at FEMA. [Colonel] Gerard McEnerney was the only federal FEMA person on duty that we could reach out to. . . . He was one of our soldiers [who was] getting an idea of what was going on [and] what type of support we needed.

[We provided] any support that was needed if it was [a] life or death situation. We needed FEMA [tasks], but when people called [and] they needed cots and generators, we gave out whatever was needed. These were our people, our community, so we did what we could to support our community and care for those in need. . . . I think I was here for about eight days before I ever went home. [We handled] briefings, media requests, [and] preparing soldiers for mobilization, for possible world-crisis type of events, . . . a lot of phone calls. . . . Cell phones were totally inoperable during that entire time. It was difficult getting a hold of people. We pretty much relied on the computers. . . . We reached out to our reserve centers [and] told them to secure . . . their facilities. [We] talked to the USARC at times, talked to [Lieutenant General] Thomas Plewes. He called me personally several times asking what was going on, [and] we were giving him updates . . . then pretty much recovery type operations.

[Mr. DiLallo worked with his staff to provide supplies to the city. He specifically mentioned blankets for the morgue at Jacobi Hospital. He mentioned working with the fire and police departments, taking a lot of phone calls and providing security, direction, and guidance. Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes called the 77th within two days to ask how everything was going. Mr. DiLallo said he was also in contact with the USARC Emergency Operations Center soon after the attacks. He said the 77th operations center was fully operational soon after the attacks. During this time, he was also in contact with Colonel McEnerney. Mr. DiLallo was conscious of the fact that he could not lend support to the community unless it fell under the immediate response policy, though the 77th did offer support and waited to do the paperwork later on many requests. The 77th lent out much of what various organizations asked for. The command did so by tasking subordinate units – the 301st Area Support Group being one. However, many soldiers volunteered independently. The 77th put teams of these volunteers together to move vehicles, equipment, tents, generators, desks, tables, cots, blankets, and chairs to various government agencies, such as the Coast Guard in Manhattan. Also, the 301st provided food support to the 77th soldiers who had volunteered.]

INTERVIEWER: Were there any 77th Regional Support Command units called up in response to the World Trade Center attacks?
DILALLO: I believe the 140th Quartermaster Company was . . . called up to provide morgue operations. . . . That was the only unit that I’m aware of that was called up besides this headquarters and a lot of emergency operational cells at each of the MSCs – major subordinate commands. . . . [The 140th was] assigned [to Jacobi Hospital] to provide a sabbatical morgue, a bath, a laundry. . . . I know our chaplain went down there a couple of times to assist with the counseling. . . . [Colonel] Rich Cochrane, . . . our deputy chief of staff for force structure, . . . took over [force protection]. He provided force protection for the next couple of weeks. . . . Our provost marshal, who is Lieutenant Colonel Seth Garr, . . . is a [New York City] emergency service unit police officer [who was] . . . providing rescue operations. . . . A lot of our soldiers who were dual status as police and fire personnel were providing various rescue operations down there. . . .

[Mr. DiLallo mentioned other soldiers and civilians who helped in the crisis. They included: Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink from the 361st Press Camp Headquarters, who provided public affairs support; the civilians who helped set up the Emergency Operations Center – Mr. Brian Seglia, mentioned earlier; Mr. Paul Silverman, deputy chief of staff, personnel; Mr. Michael Scotto, deputy chief of staff, information management; Mr. Anthony Filosa, deputy chief of staff, logistics; and Mr. Peter Bianci, deputy chief of staff, comptroller.]

While all this was going on, we started getting word that one of our soldiers died. That became an emotional drain on all of us. . . . [We] confirmed six [of our] soldiers died at the World Trade Center. . . . We set up [an] Emergency Operations Center about three years ago, General [William] Collins [former 77th RSC commander] and myself. . . . We needed an Emergency Operations Center in case we mobilize. We put together the money. It took us three years to get it, but we got it. The first time we tested it [the EOC] was in the year 2000 [when] we had a skeleton crew. . . . It worked good. And then we had [the] USARC come in and train us [in the year 2000 and on 12 August 2001]. . . . The training and the redundancy of training paid off because we were able to react without thinking what to do. . . . We had a training group, . . . the Eagle Group [comprised of] . . . contractors. They tested our emergency operations procedures – the ability to call up units, test the computers and the redundancy, and the time paid off because soldiers and civilians reacted. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What kind of mission guidance was coming from the commander?

DILALLO: The commander’s intent was to take care of life and limb. . . . Whatever we needed to do and whatever the people in New York needed, he was going to do it because, as he quoted: “This is my community.” And he did fine. . . . He was the first . . . federal soldier on the news to tell them what people were going to do to provide support and whatever next came. Now, we’re in the next phase, and it’s providing soldiers for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and NOBLE EAGLE.
INTERVIEWER: What challenges were faced within the first three days of the incident?

DILALLO: Communications [and] cell phones [were] a major challenge. A lot of people were tired, worked three or four days without sleep, and we had to start getting people rotating. . . . Not knowing what was going to happen next was an unknown factor out there. And the rest was just providing the security on the gates, making sure our soldiers were cared for . . . and trying to recover what we could in New York. Then we came into . . . our mourning phase, as we then began to provide funerals for our fallen soldiers. . . .

[Mr. DiLallo explained that either Major Bernd Zoller or Colonel Al Kose, operations officers, coined the term, Liberty Crisis, to refer to the 77th’s quick response following 11 September. He also reiterated that the emergency training he and his staff received in the past three years was helpful and that every regional support command must have an emergency operations center.] When I went [to a conference] in December . . . of all the RSCs’ [command executive officers], I briefed them on 9-11. . . . One of my key points to them [was], “If you don’t have an emergency operations center, I strongly suggest you put one together.” And it really paid off for us. . . .

[Mr. DiLallo explained that the 77th Emergency Operations Center had all the equipment and trained personnel it needed to function well – televisions, telephones, secure faxes, lines, and maps. The staff used land-line telephones more so than cellular phones because they had heard that trapped people underneath the World Trade Center may be using their cell phones to call out, and the 77th did not want to tie up those lines. Mr. DiLallo remembered also speaking with the FBI who wanted to borrow some office furniture, so the 77th lent some. The 77th authorized the FBI, the Secret Service, the New Jersey State Police, and the Fire Department of New York to use Caven Point, New Jersey, and Fort Totten as a storage area.]

INTERVIEWER: Mr. DiLallo, what mission guidance was initiated by the commanding general?

DILALLO: General Colt, in conjunction with the [DCS]OPS . . . and advisors . . . came up with what type of mission statement we were going to use for this mission. . . . Everything was going to be directed by our higher headquarters, the United States Army Reserve Command, in conjunction with FEMA because it pretty much was a local operation. . . . We would prepare and provide all units and equipment to civilian and military agencies that required our support for the extent of this relief. . . . for an indefinite period of time until relieved. . . . The second part of that mission [was] that we were prepared to execute any follow-on missions that should be assigned to us by the United States Army Reserve Command . . . whether it be disaster relief, protection, defense of our borders, whatever. We would be prepared. . . . Here’s what the commander actually intends to do – that this regional support command headquartered in New York City would not turn away any requests for assistance without us knowing about it here in the
Command Group. We would provide twenty-four operations, provide any sort of legal, moral, or ethical needs in their area of operation[s]. We would analyze the requests and whatever support we could, we would get it out, . . . and we would do whatever we could to capture our funding, whatever we spent, so we’d safeguard our equipment, and see what funding we have so we could get reimbursed. . . .

[The 77th Regional Support Command's senior officers attended funerals and burials for the six fallen 77th soldiers.]

It was General Colt’s decision that a general officer would be at each funeral to represent the Army. . . . He was not always able to go to every funeral. . . . We got a hold of General Collins, who attended the funeral of our [legal] officer who died. . . . It’s important for the families to have a general officer there, to have that military representation, to let them know that we care about our soldiers that have died. . . . We still keep in contact with the families. . . . We’re still taking care of our own . . . . Most of the funerals [were] . . . conducted by firemen. . . . We were able to augment and supplement the fire department with our soldiers, provide the color guard, presentation of the flag, the rendering of honors to the gun salute, as well as Taps. So our honor guard performed their duties in a very honorable way.

INTERVIEWER: As time went on after 11 September, the command was faced with its normal course of business, as well as the response to the actual attack. What challenges did the command face? I know earlier you mentioned communications. Were there any other primary issues that the command had to address regarding long-term support of the response?

DILALLO: Well, besides the crisis that was going on, NOBLE EAGLE, and taking care of the recovery operations, . . . [we must start] refocusing . . . and . . . downsizing all the people we had here. . . . [Then] we had your normal day-to-day operation of this mega corporation. . . . There are people to be paid. There are union issues to contend with. There are normal events. . . . We had to start thinking of some other areas [such as] force protection. . . . You’ve got force protection evacuation procedures, alternate sites, intelligence. . . . We’re working longer hours. People are putting in a lot more time, and we’re still trying to maintain our sanity. . . .

INTERVIEWER: How is the use of soldiers for your front gate being accomplished?

DILALLO: We had military police out there rotating every two weeks. . . . We ran out of those because we had to save those for future possible deployments. . . . We used annual training for [military police] soldiers out there on the front gate. . . . We exhausted that means. . . . We’re just using soldiers [who] are not military police officers to maintain the security of our front gate. . . . We were going to ask for ADSW [active duty for special work] funds [for] the short tours, . . . 129 days, twenty people. . . . I believe that the 77th RSC . . . is a potential target. There are over 1,000 people here on a day-to-day basis. We can’t leave this up to the city. The city doesn’t
have the means to secure this facility. . . . It’s the [commanding general’s] decision, . . . but USARC [must] sign off.

**INTERVIEWER:** Has the use of personnel utilizing their AT [annual training] to fund their duties impacted any other areas within the command?

**DILALLO:** Yes, there have been several exercises that we had to cancel. . . . Gold Sword has been one exercise that I know has been cancelled because of that activity. I believe Rio [Bravo] has been cancelled. . . . So this has curtailed and cancelled exercises and annual training for some of the units. . . .

**INTERVIEWER:** Is practicing soldier skills with that particular detail [military police] being used?

**DILALLO:** Correct, so they’ve got their training really on the gate. . . . We’re preparing to meet the president’s request to mobilize our soldiers and continually telling people in the building that we’re at war and to be cognizant of that. . . . Over thirteen [77th] units have been mobilized [since 11 September]. Over 500 soldiers we have all over the country [are] in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.252

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252 Mr. Gary DiLallo, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 February 2002.
Chapter 3

Mr. Richard Cochrane, Supervisory Management Analyst for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. Cochrane was also an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel for the 77th. He was the acting provost marshal during the 11 September crises. His civilian job responsibilities included dealing with force structure issues, military table of organization and equipment, tables of distribution and allowances, and the activation and deactivation of units.]

INTERVIEWER: What were you doing on the morning of 11 September 2001?

COCHRANE: I was in my office in the DCSFOR [Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development] office of the 77th RSC. . . . I had just come back from the commanders’ conference. . . . About nine o’clock [a.m.], one of my people had come into work a little bit late and he told me that there was an accident at the World Trade Center. . . . I tried to get some information on the radio and couldn’t, so I went upstairs to [the Emergency Operations Center] . . . and the television was on there. . . . I hooked up with. . . Colonel [Alan] Ecke, . . . deputy commander of 800th MP Brigade. And we’re basically collaborating on this to find out what we needed to do to establish physical security here at Fort Totten. So we identified the areas of concern, and he really did all the work there. I was just tagging along with him to see what help we would have to provide. . . . Colonel Ecke works here as a civilian in the Engineer’s Office. . . . We identified [how many] personnel we needed to secure Fort Totten. [So we] reached out to the 800th to see what we could do about getting personnel to come on duty to take care of the physical security. We also needed weapons and ammunition. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was it that made you initiate this type of a response to the action that occurred at the World Trade Center? What made you feel that security was at risk?

COCHRANE: Well, based on what we determined was an attack on America, we needed to know what type of threat we were going to be up against. We didn’t have any real information that was coming in other than what was on television.

[The 77th soon established an Emergency Operations Center. Physical security became one of the first concerns, due in part because of the heavy traffic entering and leaving Fort Totten.]

INTERVIEWER: Are there any established operating procedures for security measures to be taken on this installation that you would implement right off the shelf?
COCHRANE: The provost marshal has responsibility for force protection. They do have procedures in place. . . . Periodically they go through a physical security inspection that encompasses what procedures . . . they have in place. . . . There are two full-time civilian personnel [who] work in the Provost Marshal’s Office . . . plus, you have the reservist, a lieutenant colonel, [Seth Gahr] that is the provost marshal. . . . On the civilian side we have Phil Haynie, [and] Colin Fraser. . . . At that point I didn’t have coordination with them because it was basically Colonel Ecke and myself . . . making phone calls, getting in contact with the 800th, [and] identifying the areas of concern, going back to the EOC to get additional information. . . . I did not actually hook up with the Provost Marshal’s Office until the following morning. . . . The problem that we faced was that the provost marshal has approved two people. They don’t have any additional MP assets. The 800th has . . . MP assets. . . .

[Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane and Colonel Ecke then worked together to address security issues throughout the command.]

INTERVIEWER: What is your prior experience with security?

COCHRANE: I’m an MP officer. . . . I was the commander of the port security detachments when we went through the physical security training. . . . In past years, I [worked at] the 340th Military Police Battalion . . . [and had responsibility] for manning one of the wings of [a] prison when we did our two weeks [of] annual training. . . . There was also the brigade S-3 [operations] of the 800th MP Brigade. . . . At that time we were responsible for attorney resettlement type activities. . . .

[He explained that because of his prior relationship with the 800th, it was easy for him to contact the commander and ask for assistance at Fort Totten. On the afternoon of 11 September, military police soldiers began arriving at the post. He also asked the commander of the 408th Personnel Services Battalion if he could use some soldiers for security inside the reserve center. He explained how he and Colonel Ecke determined the security needs at Fort Totten.]

We determined that we needed to guard the front gate. We needed building patrols to take care of the entire post because we’re now on alert and concerned with the enclave. . . . the entire post. . . . and we had also identified another entry point, which was the dock area for the Coast Guard. So those are the areas that we determined. . . . needed personnel immediately. . . . We wanted to have a minimum of two personnel per entry point. . . . We identified a number—twenty-two—[who] would be able to handle the building security. . . . and also identified that the roaming patrols and the fixed stations [docks and front gate] . . . [would] need another twelve to fourteen personnel from the MPs. . . . It was difficult getting in touch with everybody. . . . Phones were busy. . . . [The 800th and the 408th provided soldiers for security throughout the night.]

I don’t remember hearing the actual THREATCON level mentioned until the twelfth. But since our main concern was securing Fort Totten, what we were doing first was just
establishing some type of security. We identified that everybody [was] going to have to have 100 percent ID check, and we were going to be doing vehicle search, as well as locking the building here at the Ernie Pyle Center to make sure that people couldn’t just come in and go out as they please. . . . We wound up being at . . . THREATCON level Delta [the highest threat level condition]. . . . There’s approximately thirty-six, thirty-eight different areas that [Delta] is responsible for. . . . Our main concern was 100 percent check of all vehicles, 100 percent ID check, [and] armed guards. All guards were properly counseled on use of force, and we had certain restricted areas where either there was no access or extremely limited access. . . . On the first day we had guards with weapons and no ammunition because we did not have security [required to store] ammunition. . . . By the next day . . . we realized this was not the way to work it properly. The MPs were able to go down to Fort Dix and secure a limited number of secure rounds for us to have. That limited number stayed with us for about a week before we were able to get a more significant amount of ammunition to properly arm all the MPs at the gate and the roving patrols. . . . But the guards inside the building at Fort Totten, they did not have any weapons. . . . Toward the end of September, beginning of October . . . we identified the need to have secure ammunition at these places at the reserve center. . . . Ammunition . . . needed to be kept secure and in a separate location from the weapons. . . .

[ Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane explained that he became acting provost marshal informally when Mr. Gary DiLallo simply said he was going to appoint him. The regular provost marshal, Lieutenant Colonel Seth Gahr, was a New York City emergency services police officer who was called to duty in his civilian capacity.]

On the twelfth . . . we started formalizing the security details. We . . . also initiated the alert roster so . . . we could first tell everybody that we were here, be prepared in case we need you for something, as well as trying to get personnel to volunteer to come in to provide assistance. . . . We identified the NCOIC [noncommissioned officer in charge] for the personnel inside the building, and we started [briefing] the NCOIC on the missions that were going to be performed by the MPs outside. . . . One of the things we needed to do was make sure we had [the] appropriate number of vehicles [and conduct] . . . a physical security survey . . . identifying the areas that might be of big concern to us. . . .

[Units that provided security were the 408th, the 310th and 306th Military Police Battalions, and the 340th, 812th and 423rd Military Police Companies, which fall under the 800th.]

The Provost Marshal’s Office was in touch with the other reserve centers to ensure that they were adhering to THREATCON Delta. And basically, that meant that they were going to lock down the buildings. . . .

[Fort Totten received ammunition on 12 September, and within two weeks the guards had sufficient ammunition to protect the installation. Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane also explained that as acting provost marshal, his other duties included providing security for visiting dignitaries. He did this on 16 September when Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes visited Fort]
Totten, ground zero, FEMA's office at 26 Federal Plaza in Manhattan, and Jacobi Hospital. He also helped organize and provide security for Lieutenant General Plewes’ news interview with Hannity and Colmes – a cable news talk show. He mentioned the devastation was phenomenal and people worked well together at ground zero. He said he felt patriotic and proud to be in the Army at that time. He also provided security for Brigadier General Colt when he visited ground zero a few days earlier.

I did do other escort details with General Colt. He was interviewed by Channel 12 News, which was a Long Island all-news station. And we also provided security for him when he attended the funeral of Chief [Peter] Ganci [fire marshal, City of New York]. He went to the actual funeral ceremony and at the gravesite. . . . Chief Ganci was a well-known . . . fire official, and everybody wanted to show respect – not just to him but also to his brother, who was highly regarded here at the 77th.

INTERVIEWER: Were there any incidents that occurred with providing security at Fort Totten?

COCHRANE: We had an incident where . . . a vehicle was able to bypass the MPs at the gate. They had asked [him] for ID. They told him to stop. He kept on going [and] he went onto the post. . . . The MPs went onto the post [and] were able to contact some police personnel here at Fort Totten. [They] did a complete sweep of Fort Totten, but they never could find the vehicle, and unfortunately we still don’t have complete details . . . on that vehicle. . . .

Another incident that occurred on . . . the 19th of September . . . involved] an employee here at the headquarters of the 77th RSC. I came in contact with him as he was running past one of my guards on the third floor entrance to the Ernie Pyle Center. The guard was complaining that he was trying to tell him to stop and he refused and was walking out the door. I ran after the individual, caught up to him on the [walkway] bridge. . . . By that time, we had established certain entry and exit points [to the reserve center], and the third floor was not an authorized entry to exit point for just about every person in the building.

[Lieutenant Colonel Cochrane caught up to the employee and counseled him about not obeying the guards and using the wrong entrance. The individual said he had medical problems. He was barred from the post for an undetermined time. The 77th was now providing security for the entire Fort Totten, as well as storage space for the fire and police departments.]

We did have another incident where . . . we were providing storage . . . and there was a break-in. Certain equipment was stolen. . . . We contacted the police department [and they] did take down a report, but it still remains unsolved. . . . We established tighter security for that area with limited access, and we also put a guard outside the warehouse. . . . I believe [those] were the main three incidents. . . .

[The other agencies who share the Fort Totten post have expressed their gratitude over the security that the 77th soldiers provided.]
COCHRANE: Technically, I’m still the acting provost marshal. . . . I was on active duty for the remainder of September. . . . I’d performed periodic days in an active duty capacity during October, November and December. I was also asked by Mr. DiLallo to continue as acting provost marshal during the week in my civilian capacity so that I could be aware of any circumstances that might arise that might need some type of assistance. Although the amount of activity has decreased, and we have a pattern established, and the full-time provost marshal personnel are handling day-to-day activities, I’m still there in case they [have] certain circumstances.

The only area that I think has posed a problem for the 77th is the land. . . . It has been leased to the city, . . . but we have our own enclave. . . . We had a concern about the actual security because before Fort Totten was inactivated, it properly belonged to Fort Hamilton [Brooklyn, New York]. Fort Hamilton used to provide us security, MPs at the front gate, as well as roving patrols. [After the] . . . base realignment and closures [during the 1990s] – Fort Hamilton basically pulled away from Fort Totten. . . . When this issue came about, we were looking to get some assistance from Fort Hamilton . . . since they do have MPs and . . . Department of Defense police personnel. . . . [However], Fort Hamilton [officials felt] that there was no longer any requirement for them to provide any security. It’s an issue that really hasn’t been resolved yet, and it really does need to be resolved.

The general has been concerned about the physical security at Fort Totten. Obviously, we’re [close to] the World Trade Center, and plus, we have the fire department and police personnel, [and] emergency services who are constantly coming and going on Fort Totten. That in itself is a security issue. . . . There have been concerns about the effect of emergency service vehicles. . . . They could be used for whatever means – whether it be with a bomb, or to transport cells. . . . Since we have them coming and going on Fort Totten, the threat appears to be realistic. What we needed was to identify personnel [who] could have been mobilized to support Fort Totten for this physical security measure. Instead . . . we’re utilizing personnel, reservists in an [annual training] capacity. So, that’s draining personnel from all the different units. . . . We’re still waiting to see if we can get it approved to have approximately forty MPs mobilized to provide physical security for Fort Totten. But we still don’t have an answer yet. . . . There are certain personnel that need to be mobilized to provide appropriate assistance in case the request comes through to us. Yes, you’ve got full time civilian personnel and full time military here on post, but you also have the expertise from reservists that need to be utilized, as well. . . .
Chapter 4

Army Reserve Colonel Matthew Cacciatore, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Colonel Cacciatore has been in the Army since 1973. He had two years on active duty and has been an Army Reservist since 1975. He has held company and battalion command positions before joining the 77th staff in 2000.]

INTERVIEWER: Can you tell us how you began your day on September the 11th, 2001?

CACCIATORE: I remember vividly. In my civilian occupation, I’m an operations manager with Federal Express. Ironically, that day we were scheduled for an off-site meeting in New Jersey. . . . My personal plan that morning was to leave my office and drive through Manhattan, which would’ve taken me through lower Manhattan [near the World Trade Center]. . . . However, my schedule didn’t call for me to depart my office until about 10 o’clock. My office is in Maspeth, Queens. . . . From my office I can see Manhattan to include parts of the World Trade Center.

[At about 9 a.m., Colonel Cacciatore remembered an employee telling him to look at a TV set they kept at the office. The first tower of the World Trade Center had been hit, and the news was reporting it live.]

Since I’m in the air cargo industry, I know enough about aviation to say it was a perfectly clear day in New York. There was actually not a cloud in the sky. . . . First of all, besides wondering about the people and what could possibly be going on to help save them, . . . I keep saying to myself something’s not right. . . . I went to my office. . . . I called . . . Fort Totten [and] spoke to Major [Bernd] Zoller, . . . our mobilization officer here in the DCSOPS at the 77th Regional Support Command . . . I spoke to [Major] Ben [Zoller] to let him know that I was aware of what was happening [and] that I was accessible.

[The call lasted about a minute. Colonel Cacciatore went back to watching TV, when a second airplane hit the second tower. He called Major Zoller back and said he was coming into Fort Totten. He told his fellow managers that he was leaving for the post. He received verbal support later from his civilian supervisor to do what he needed to do with the Army Reserve. Colonel Cacciatore could see both World Trade Center towers ablaze as he was driving on the Long Island Expressway to Fort Totten. The little traffic on the highway at that point was emergency vehicles going into Manhattan. At some point, he heard that the Pentagon had been hit and about the crash in Pennsylvania. Once he arrived at Fort Totten, the first tower had collapsed. He went up to the Emergency Operations Center and met with Mr. Brian Seliga, full-time civilian operations chief; and Mr. Gary DiLallo. Several people were gathered in the center watching the events unfold on TV.]
As we progressed through . . . that first hour, . . . the initial thought was there would be a massive search and rescue operation underway . . . None of us . . . could’ve envisioned that there would really be no survivors. I think after the first twenty-four hours there was only one . . . As such, we being here in New York with the U.S. Army Reserve assets we had – the medical, the engineer – [we thought we] would be immediately called upon for anything and everything needed. The military police role started to unfold rather rapidly, as concerns for threats – not just here at Fort Totten, but [at] any military installation. It became apparent that something was out there, that we were actually under attack. So the military police, specifically the 800th MP Brigade[s] . . . assets were called upon almost immediately. Colonel Al Ecke, who’s the deputy [and] who is now deployed overseas as part of ENDURING FREEDOM, . . . was initially very instrumental in the calling in of the initial military police assets out of the 800th. The only [tasking] at that point in time was me turning around to Colonel Ecke and saying, “Hell, bring them in.” . . . Al also works here as a civilian in DCSENG [Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer.] There was eventually . . . a formal [tasking] . . .

INTERVIEWER: As the person who is not in a command position, but as a deputy chief, you did not receive any sort of guidance from the command executive officer or General [William] Turpeluk, or General [Richard] Colt pertaining to your conversation with Mr. Ecke?

CACCIATORE: That’s correct . . . because of the speed that it had to happen . . . It was my professional opinion that something was so horrible out there that we needed to take immediate and decisive action to protect against . . . any other threat. . . . So I [went] . . . as a DSCOPS [officer] to Colonel Ecke to bring in the MPs . . . In a very short period . . . [they were] reporting in to their headquarters in Uniondale, [Queens] and then . . . started providing force protection here at Fort Totten, which they continue to do through this day, as well as personnel security arrangements for General Colt. [Lieutenant] General Thomas Plewes . . . visited here. So they were immediate in their response . . . During the course of those first few hours, . . . anyone [who] was a critical full time or TPU [troop program unit] person of the command, dropped what they were doing and came into the Emergency Operations Center. . . . People literally put their lives on hold and just came in. . . . Besides myself, you had Colonel John Skoll, the DCSLOG [deputy chief of staff, logistics]; Colonel Philip Caccese, the DCSENG [deputy chief of staff, engineers]; Colonel Mike Scotto, the DCSIM [deputy chief of staff, information management]; Colonel Dick Tracey, the DCSPER [deputy chief of staff, personnel]. We had Colonel Tom Butler, who was the ADCSOPS [assistant deputy chief of staff, operations]. So you had new O-6s [full colonels] coming together for the first time in what was a crisis. This was not a practice run. We knew . . . there would be a pledge call with medical support from the . . . 8th Medical Brigade . . . from the MPs, and from the engineers. And we started to [deal with] . . . force protection concerns, as well as issues that started to arise . . .
We literally started canvassing the MSCs [major subordinate commands] . . . as to what they had on the ground. . . . Certain MSCs were almost immediately tasked and rendered immediate assistance. The 1179th DSB [Deployment Support Brigade] at Fort Hamilton, . . . Colonel [Daniel] Ganci’s command, . . . provided protective masks to . . . the New York City Police Department initially because of the concerns over the breathing of hazardous materials at the World Trade Center site. They provided cots and . . . sleeping bags. The 301st Area Support Group. . . provided the most immediate response, in terms of providing generators . . . to both the Fire Department of the City of New York. . . . [Colonel Ganci's brother, Peter, was a fire chief and perished at the World Trade Center.]

Initially, everything was a VOCO [or] verbal order of the commanding officer. . . . General Colt’s guidance was very specific – that we would not decline any offer or any request for assistance. . . . That gave us the green light that our [commanding general] was going to the wall on this thing, and he had a lot of guts. I give him a lot of credit. . . . There was no doctrine. The requests for the equipment [came from] . . . battalion chief Larry Connors, who was a former DCSOPS colonel U.S. Army Reserve, retired. He is . . . a senior officer of the Fire Department of the City of New York here at Fort Totten. . . . We moved equipment up to Jacobi Hospital in the Bronx, which . . . never was utilized because initially it was intended to be a site for a morgue. So it was never called upon. . . .

The 301st Area Support Command under the command then of Colonel Jack Wohrle, provided immediate assistance. He provided trucks [and soldiers] to move the equipment. . . . We had soldiers [who] probably worked fourteen, fifteen, sixteen hours to load equipment [and] move equipment [which consisted] . . . primarily [of] . . . generators, light sets, cots, [and] sleeping bags . . .

The 140th Quartermaster Company . . . were the soldiers making it happen with all of those requests. They were . . . providing mess support [and] . . . around-the-clock movement of the material that was requested . . . [also] the furnishing of vehicles, . . . drivers, [and] the loading of equipment going to Jacobi. . . . The request for mortuary support, as I recall, came as a VOCO without a formal FEMA [task]. . . . The 140th Quartermaster Company provides food service, shower, laundry, and bath as a U.S. Army Reserve unit. . . . They got up to Jacobi in record time. There was a police escort arranged to get them up there, through the New York City Police Department. . . . With rare instance, everything was done within the first twenty-four hours by VOCO. There was very little paper . . . all phone calls. . . . There were some soldiers who happened to be . . . from the 8th Medical Brigade [who] participated in the actual setting up of the equipment and moving all that equipment to Jacobi. . . . While that was going on, we had the 1179th giving masks and other support. . . .

We had the 800th rolling out with force protection and security. . . . We had engineers at that point on call . . . both in Newburg and New Windsor, New York, where the 411th Engineer Brigade is headquartered. . . . Also . . . the legal service organizations or JAG [judge advocate general] were on duty, as well as our chaplain. The JAG personnel intervened in terms of
interpreting the role of our military police in a civilian disaster. Our chaplain staff provided the
spiritual support and guidance that was anticipated that would be needed. . . . [The 8th Medical
Brigade also provided a certain type of tent to Jacobi.]

Continuing with the day of September the 11th, . . . the staff came together to do an
assessment [and] . . . General Colt did arrive on the scene. . . . He walked into the . . . Emergency
Operations Center sometime . . . late morning or early afternoon of the 11th. He issued . . . his
intent. . . . I’ll read [it] for the record, and I quote, “The 77th Regional Support Command will
not turn away any requests for assistance without acknowledgement from the Command Group.
The 77th RSC will continue twenty-four-hour operations and provide any assistance that is
commensurate with the commanding general’s guidance of legal, moral, and ethical operations.
The 77th RSC will continue to monitor all sources of information and analyze it to determine
what support the command can provide. The chain of command for the commanding general is:
the commanding general, the deputy commander, the chief of staff, and the deputy chief of staff
of operations.” And that intent allowed us as a staff to not turn away any requests. There was no
request that was turned away. . . . We wished to have more and . . . that there would have been
more life-saving [missions]. The staff, through the night of the 11th, continually assessed the
capabilities of the respective MSCs and their subordinates and [presented]. . . a staff estimate on
what we were capable of doing. We presented a briefing to General Colt. . . . During the day of
the 11th, [we] continually assessed the capabilities of the respective MSCs and their
subordinates. . . . What was of concern . . . were force protection issues [and] accountability of
our own soldiers. . . . We had USAR soldiers [who] were first responders to the attack. . . . Six of
our soldiers perished at the World Trade [Center]. . . .

[Colonel Cacciatore explained that each MSC had to conduct a “grazing herd” or
personnel status report on their soldiers by calling them on the phone. Many people could not
be contacted because of poor communication lines, or they were out of town, or because they
were first responders at the World Trade Center. By 14 September, the 77th command had
accounted for about eighty percent of its soldiers, including the MSC commanders. The 77th
and the Fire Department of the City of New York were working together to identify firefighters
who were also Army Reservists who may have been killed at the World Trade Center. The 77th
staff activated its Emergency Operations Center by around 10 a.m., and it began twenty-four-
hour-a-day operations. Immediate issues were soldier and equipment accountability. Could the
77th support the city, as well as being conscious of another terrorist threat? At first taskings
were informal, though the EOC began documenting these tasks. Soldiers began volunteering
their services to the 77th. Colonel Cacciatore explained USARC guidance.]

On 20 June of 2001 . . . the USARC [issued] immediate response guidance. And in the
first several hours of September the 11th, [when] . . . communications were very bad, . . . with
both General Colt’s guidance and the immediate response guidance, we used theirs as our
benchmark on what were we going to do in this attack on America. As the communications
evolved and got better, their guidance was very clear. . . . It was summarized by Lieutenant
General Plewes. . . . That guidance was [the same] as . . . General Colt’s: When there were serious conditions that exist as a result of a civil emergency and time does not permit prior approval from the higher headquarters, that USAR commanders are vested with the authority to take immediate action in response to requests to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. . . . As day one evolved into later, concerns were force protection. The force protection evolved. . . . We got clear and definitive guidance from them. . . . We were at THREATCON Delta. . . . Their guidance was very plain – that we would protect our soldiers. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned the protection of soldiers and that the general had a personal escort. I believe it was tasked to the lieutenant colonel at the time, Rich Cochrane. . . .

CACCIATORE: Right. . . . He’s also the GS-13 in the DCSFOR at the 77th RSC. And Ritchie has since joined [the staff] on his promotion to colonel as the ADCSOPS [assistant deputy chief of staff, operations]. Colonel Cochrane . . . provided the . . . armed escort for the commanding general, which . . . included his visits into the site early on. But as we evolved into day two – and this is where our support by and our relationship with the USARC headquarters really assisted us and where the intervention of Mr. DiLallo as the CXO [command executive officer] and Colonel Phil Spies in his role as the senior AGR [helped] – because they knew the people down there, and they knew the workings. There wasn’t anything we couldn’t get. Whatever we needed we got it. . . . There were no questions asked, provided they performed and provided they were accountable. . . . The DCSOPS . . . in the USARC. . . . [was] not just looking at what’s happening in the 77th RSC. . . . They were looking at all the RSCs and what the potential was for attack and all the assessments. . . . As the course of events took place, it turned out that became part of NOBLE EAGLE . . . [and] ENDURING FREEDOM. . . .

[Colonel Cacciatore explained that the primary staff at the 77th began giving classified intelligence and THREATCON briefings to the commanding general, sometimes three times a day. He spoke about using the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and the STU-III, which are secure internet and telephone communications. He talked about some 77th personnel having to perform both Army and civilian duties.]

INTERVIEWER: Did you find that it was a challenge for this command to have people who were filling important roles here performing their civilian job responsibilities and not being able to participate on the Army Reserve side of the house with their responsibilities?

CACCIATORE: It was a challenge. . . . One of the things from . . . basic training is that there is a chain of command. . . . If . . . a unit goes into combat and it loses key leaders, . . . a unit should still be able to function. It still should be able to carry on its wartime mission in the absence . . . of certain key people because that’s the way the system is supposed to work. There is supposed
to be some depth. And we found out that we had it. . . . For example, had the response been from the 8th Medical Brigade that they needed many registered nurses and many medical doctors, . . . those medical doctors and those nurses would’ve responded. . . . You would’ve had the absence of them on the TPU side. . . . Yet in their civilian capacity working in hospitals and medical professions, they would’ve been providing that service. . . . The DCSOPS . . . was providing a service . . . maybe under a different role, . . . but they were providing it. . . . We had to send nonessential people home . . . on the . . . 11th. I think it was prudent and . . . the right call that someone who’s deemed nonessential . . . be sent home for their safety and . . . protection. . . . I ordered that and directed that. . . .

[Colonel Cacciatore spoke a little about the importance of some Army Reservists who were also emergency or police-service personnel on the civilian side and how their skills on the outside helped the Army Reserve. He also spoke about the provost marshal’s job and how the regularly assigned soldier for that job, Lieutenant Colonel Seth Gahr, who worked for the New York City Police Department, could not perform his Army Reserve duties at the 77th, and therefore, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Cochrane became acting provost marshal. He said everyone performed admirably at the 77th. He also said his contact with the 77th’s Public Affairs Office was limited within the first seventy-two hours. He confirmed that Brigadier General Colt and Lieutenant General Plewes were interviewed by news programs in New York. He talked about Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Fink, 361st Press Camp Headquarters commander, performing much of the public affairs duties at the 77th for the first few weeks. He said the Public Affairs Office performed well. He then spoke of the days following 11 September.]

As we get into the following days, we got into the issues . . . of sustainment. We eventually did get a very good picture on soldier accountability on what the MSCs had done. We did brief Lieutenant General Plewes on Sunday . . . the 16th of September. . . .

[He explained that top 77th officials representing all staff sections attended the briefing. The command continued to hold briefings twice a day for the next several weeks. He spoke of costs associated with the 77th response, of THREATCON Delta, and of operations over the next few weeks.]

THREATCON Delta is very taxing in terms of sustainment. It requires that a lot be done, that you have . . . the right type of soldiers on the ground because they have to be trained in firearm use, . . . security issues. . . . Through the conclusion of General Plewes’ visit into the next week, we were also monitoring about how many soldiers remained on duty. . . . The EOC continued twenty-four-seven . . . beyond week three. . . . We were able to start to give people a little bit of a rest for those who remained on duty. We did an analysis on nonessential TPU soldiers. . . . We worked closely with the Command Group . . . and also in providing the USARC DCSCOMPT [Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller], through the 77th RSC’s DCSCOMPT, with a cost analysis of what we would do to maintain a twenty-four-seven EOC and . . . force protection here at Fort Totten. In concert with that, the Log started and continued to get a very thorough
line-by-line description of what had been lent out by each MSC . . . and it’s projected date of return. . . . By week three . . . some equipment start[ed] to be returned.

[The 77th began assessing mobilization capabilities of subordinate units and how that might impact training exercises.]

We have been impacted specifically in the military police community, which has and continues to provide force protection on a twenty-four-seven basis to Fort Totten here. The major training event for training in [year 2002] was Golden Sword ’02, the executive agent for that exercise being the 800th Military Police Brigade [and its subordinate units]. . . . Almost all those soldiers on the TPU side have . . . been utilized to provide force protection.

[The military police unit commanders cancelled Golden Sword as a result, but planned to conduct an exercise in the year 2003.]

Hopefully, [in years 2003 and 2004] and beyond, we can return . . . to a normal annual training event cycle. . . . That is currently the plan that both the MSC staffs and the RSC staff are working on. . . .

As it has been evident, the mobilizations that have taken place to date have not been exactly the ones that one might have forecasted back on September 11th, which is what we’re in the business of doing. . . . We’re in the business of meeting the demands of the National Command Authority and executing on order.

INTERVIEWER: Elaborate further on the financial aspect of how soldiers were put on active duty – you have the last month of the fiscal year, and then of course, the new fiscal year began – just a brief overview of how that occurred.

CACCIATORE: It was very forthright and very well executed by the 77th RSC DCSCOMPT in concert with the USARC DCSCOMPT. On the TPU side of the house – for those soldiers who had not completed their statutory AT, or at least fourteen days AT for [training year] ’01, which was the training year in which the September 11th attacks took place – those soldiers could and were placed on annual training funding status. That’s how they were funded. If their tour went beyond their fourteen-day statutory AT, but went up to and including 30 September, they were then placed on ADT, active duty for training. Case in point continuing – if a TPU soldier had already done his or her fourteen days of statutory AT but was activated in support of [Operation] LIBERTY CRISIS, . . . NOBLE EAGLE, and ENDURING FREEDOM, then they were initially put on ADT through . . . and including 30 September. . . . In addition to that, we certainly could use some RSTs [reserve secondary training] if people had not drilled for August or September. So we had that flexibility . . . getting to 1 October and beyond. . . . There were some uncertainties regarding the continuing resolution . . . being the new start of the fiscal year for the federal government. . . . It’s a temporary understanding that funds on a limited basis are available. . . .
He explained that money was available for the first three months of drills and fourteen days of annual training for soldiers, but the extra active duty funds may not be available at the beginning of the fiscal year. Colonel Cacciatore ended the interview by commending Colonel Gerard McEnerney, an Army Reservist and emergency preparedness liaison officer with FEMA; Lieutenant General Plewes; and some other soldiers of the 77th.  

Chapter 5

Mr. Brian Seliga, Staff Operations Officer,  
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, 77th Regional Support Command,  
Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. Seliga, a GS-12, was also a Army Reserve lieutenant colonel civil affairs officer for the 3rd Battalion, 385th Regiment, 1st Brigade, 98th Division, Fort Dix, New Jersey. He had over twenty-one years of military service.]

[Mr. Seliga began by explaining that his normal civilian job as a staff operations officer required him to be responsible for three primary sections – mobilization, readiness, and intelligence.]

SELIGA: Personnel-wise, we have a major that is in charge of each one of those cells. [In] intelligence, we have a GS-11. Within that section, they’re responsible for coordinating the policies and regulations both in the 77th RSC side and also the Army and USARC levels. For example, we have several units . . . and individuals being mobilized, so my mobilization cell is responsible for coordinating orders and making sure units are prepared for mobilization. . . . Ongoing are intelligence message traffic on the threat conditions, also security of people. . . . Before this position, I worked for [the] Drug Enforcement Administration in Philadelphia as the administrative officer.

[Mr. Seliga described his day on 11 September.] We were . . . attending a video teleconference [on] . . . how to handle substandard employees. . . . That session was interrupted by the chief executive officer here, Mr. [Gary] DiLallo, when he approached me and told me there was an incident in New York City.

INTERVIEWER: Why would he come to you with that information, and approximately what time did he do that?

SELIGA: I was the senior person in the DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations]. My boss, John Arnim, was away on military duty. And since I was in charge of the . . . Emergency Operations Center, he went to me to restart or activate . . . the EOC. . . . I proceeded to do just that. . . . I think it was about 8:35 [a.m.] because I remember watching the tower burning at about 8:45 on the 11th. . . . I went to the operations office and directed . . . my staff to begin calling units and then identifying the people in the staff sections of the 77th to man their stations in the EOC. . . . I went back to this classroom because many of the senior civilians were still there watching that video and not informed that there was an incident downtown. . . . I informed them, and they went to their sections to brief their employees.
INTERVIEWER: What is involved in establishing an EOC?

SELIGA: We have in the EOC about fifteen work stations that are staffed by specific sections. As an example, the DCSPER [Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel]... has a work station that tracks a database of where all the people are at in the unit or in the command. I... told them to come up with some key individuals [who] may be necessary for this mission, ... things like medical assets, MP assets, getting the strength of the units. We had the engineer specialists look at the different vehicles that could handle the rubble – large vehicles – so they were tasked to do that. That went throughout the staff sections here. So we... got people assigned to their work stations, ... started making phone calls, ... creating a log ... of all the different actions that we were taking for historical purposes and to brief the Command Group on a routine basis. ... 

INTERVIEWER: Who was the EOC communicating with from above as a higher headquarters?

SELIGA: With the USARC EOC. And we had other operations centers that we were talking to, which [included the] ... New York State Police, ... New York City Police Department, ... the FEMA. ... 

INTERVIEWER: How did you liaison with the New York City Police Department?

SELIGA: We had callers ... make calls from the office to us, and then through other military police soldiers’ contacts. ... The New York Fire Department, who resides at Fort Totten, was giving us information about the situation and requirements which we supported during the mission. ... We have an individual – Pete Garcia – who is in charge of our military and civilian activities, and he knew of some experts in that field. We made some contacts that way. We also have a provost marshal on our staff, and he was able to assist us. He’s an officer with the New York City Police Department, ... Lieutenant Colonel Seth Gahr. ... [He] was calling us and saying he couldn’t make it to reserve headquarters because he was actively involved in ground zero ... performing ... security missions downtown. ...

INTERVIEWER: How was the command prepared to facilitate the process of those requests? Under what authority?

SELIGA: We initially used General [Richard] Colt’s VO CO [verbal order of the commanding officer]. ... We later got USARC approval to use ... our federal resources. ... There’s a system established for payment of federal assets, so we finally got that system going about ... day three of the mission. ...
INTERVIEWER: So at this juncture point you made contact with Pete Garcia. Who initiated that communication?

SELIGA: I did. I asked Pete to make some contacts with the FEMA [representatives], and then any specific EPLOs [emergency preparedness liaison officers], which are emergency planners within the states of New Jersey and New York – and the state representatives in those two states. And he made those phone calls. . . . We have a group of about three individuals who are assigned to those duties, and most of them were scrambling to find a FEMA office because the FEMA office fell with the towers. . . . They were attempting to set up a site . . . in Edison, New Jersey. And they attempted to find space and move finally to the New York City area.

INTERVIEWER: Is there a particular term that you use for contacting the units to get a readiness level? Is there a standard operating procedure for that? Is it called anything?

SELIGA: The term is called “grazing herd,” but no one used that phrase. We . . . instructed the units to get accountability of their . . . soldiers. The reason for that was because we were concerned about reservists actually becoming casualties at ground zero, so that’s why it was important to make a hundred percent accountability of soldiers.

INTERVIEWER: When did you start receiving support requests, and from where did they come from?

SELIGA: I don’t remember which requests came in first. I know that by one o’clock that afternoon, we certainly didn’t receive any medical [requests.]. We did receive a request for tents for our temporary morgues. We requested cots for the fire department. . . . [There were] about thirty-five requests for logistics. . . . Jacobi Hospital asked for some tents for their morgue. . . . The FBI, the [National] Guard asked for some transportation support [and] generator support for their tents. They asked for some tactical radios. We provided some radios, and that was about it.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of support did you receive from your higher headquarters?

SELIGA: The USARC headquarters initially said for us to use annual training [funds] to support this mission. Never really gave us any financial guidance to execute this mission. Later on they asked us . . . what it would cost to continue the . . . EOC mission. . . . We provided a thirty day budget, and it turned out that budget would have to be funded internally, that we would not receive any extra dollars. We were not reimbursed for expenditures that we had already made with reservists on active duty. It . . . seemed like we were doing more with less.
INTERVIEWER: The whole idea of financing the activities of the EOC and its environments was under discussion?

SELIGA: After two weeks we sat down and said we need to have a long-term plan. . . . For the first two weeks [we used] . . . soldiers on annual training, and then after that period we used extended AT for primary security missions at Fort Totten and our subordinate units – Fort Totten being an interesting location because we have the New York City Fire Department here, DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], FBI, [and] other agencies. . . . General Colt decided that . . . the main gate would be a target. . . . We used several soldiers [for guard duty], up to forty for a typical shift. . . . It cost . . . for a thirty day period $200,000. . . . Each MSC . . . had [its] own EOC, which they were able to man for approximately thirty days, and then could not maintain that pace much longer, so they stood down, while we continued with an EOC here.

[Mr. Seliga said the 77th’s EOC operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week until November 2001. By December, the center had almost returned to normalcy.]

INTERVIEWER: Were there any other taskings that you received from higher headquarters, from the USARC?

SELIGA: One I specifically remember is supporting West Point during their football games. The OCAR [Office of the Chief, Army Reserve] – General [Thomas] Plewes thought there was a real need, real critical need to support the security mission at West Point during games. So we had sent . . . twenty military policemen to West Point for each of the four games following 9-11. We provided MP support . . . to the gates. . . . We were also asked by the USARC to prepare briefings, so the USARC senior commanders came down here. General Plewes came here and we briefed him. . . . Then Pete Garcia . . . was briefing FEMA representatives throughout the USARC on 9-11. . . .

INTERVIEWER: So what happened on day two, 12 September?

SELIGA: We’d get trickle-in requests from the agencies to support. We would provide briefings to the local Command Group here. We would provide information to the USARC headquarters in Atlanta, and we weren’t seeing much change at all. We were getting some reports that there were some terrorist activities in the area. So our heightened alert status kept us on our toes for the first . . . thirty days . . . for the first sixty days after 9-11 . . . day in, day out, same activities, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. So we didn’t really see anything different to speak of.

INTERVIEWER: Was the Emergency Operations Center prepared for something like this?
SELIGA: If there’s anything positive to speak about this event is that we were prepared. The EOC was well prepared. In fact, through the Y2K [Year 2000] exercise that we had, we merely fell in on that operation that we conducted . . . so everyone rehearsed it. . . . We had a mobilization exercise following the Y2K exercise. So [there are] two specific training events that the staff here went through so that when 9-11 happened, it was not something that we had to relearn.

INTERVIEWER: What about the challenges that you faced with 11 September?

SELIGA: We learned that we were a little bit short sighted on the intelligence side. We could’ve used . . . a staff member that could’ve assisted us with real-time intelligence information. . . . It would’ve been . . . helpful to have someone on the military police side that could’ve been looking forward on security missions. But our provost marshal, as we mentioned before, was deployed to ground zero in his civilian capacity. . . . I would also think that we could have captured the lessons learned a little bit better. We could’ve put together a written package, a particular format could’ve been used so that we could’ve captured this. . . .

INTERVIEWER: How about financially? How did the command pay for this extension of personnel man power in support of LIBERTY CRISIS?

SELIGA: Quite simply, it was taken out of hide. If the soldiers . . . happened to perform fourteen days of annual training during that period, that was it. That soldier is no longer able to support training missions throughout the year. So we were never given extra man days, nor an increased budget for this additional mission.

INTERVIEWER: Isn’t September pretty late in the fiscal year for anybody to have any additional AT days left over?

SELIGA: That’s right. It was a problem really after the fiscal year started on the first of October. So our real problem was what to do after 1 October. And we were told to pay for it within our current budget. And no one . . . was prepared for this. So we basically had to curtail some training events. And that does affect readiness in some cases because soldiers are no longer able to drive their trucks because those same soldiers were used for security missions. So, it does have a detrimental affect on readiness. . . . [Soldiers] don’t have time to qualify on the weapons; they don’t have time to go to school. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You’re saying there will probably be some sort of repercussion in 2002’s training year pertaining to the fact that soldiers were utilized for LIBERTY CRISIS utilizing AT dollars?
SELIGA: It also affects . . . units that are mobilized [for Operation NOBLE EAGLE]. We haven’t talked about those units. They’re now mobilized [and] they’re no longer available to us. And those soldiers weren’t given the opportunity to train on specific tasks before deploying, so they were . . . taken as is. It didn’t matter if they were not at the correct readiness level. They were just taken by headquarters, Army as they were. They were not given time to train up for this.

INTERVIEWER: How often did the EOC brief the command after 11 September?

SELIGA: We established [7 a.m.] and [7 p.m.] updates, and basically developed the format on our own. We didn’t have an EOC format, per se. And that’s typical for some operations, but I would’ve expected to have some standardized slides. But we basically covered all the bases for General Colt. . . . [He explained that typically, all senior leadership at the command, when possible, attended the briefings.]

INTERVIEWER: How many people did the 77th put on orders to support LIBERTY CRISIS?

SELIGA: I think there was somewhere between six- to eight-hundred soldiers on active duty for the first two weeks. . . . That number changed as civilians replaced the military and orders were ended. . . . I think we did quite well in responding to the needs of New York City, and that we should continue . . . participating in exercises of this nature in the future. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Did the EOC anticipate being tasked for either manpower or equipment, and if so, what did they do to anticipate that task?

SELIGA: What I remember doing is talking with each one of the unit representatives personally. I called them up and said there may be a need for medical specialties, [emergency medical technicians], psychologists. And on the engineer side, we were talking heavy equipment to move the rubble. So, we gave the RSC units a heads up that they may be what New York City’s looking for, so that if we did get a call, we’d be prepared. And they did that. The engineers made sure that all their vehicles were identified because they were ready to deploy. They weren’t broken. They were on good maintenance status. . . . We had a list of volunteers that were prepared to go, and we just never received any calls for people or equipment of that magnitude.

INTERVIEWER: What can you say about what supplies the 77th did provide?
SELIGA: Basically, logistical equipment that you would use in an operations center. There was . . . a request at the Jacobi Hospital for a temporary morgue. It was just tents and generators and lights. We had cot requests, basic household or hotel-kind of related equipment that would keep offices running, people warm, [and] trucks. For example, we had a couple of requests for transport of equipment from the Guard, nothing of real substantial ground zero effort. It was all centered around supporting the people directly involved in ground zero.255

255 Mr. Brian Selgia, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 10 January 2002.
Sergeant First Class Gregory Carpenter
(After 11 September, he became a commissioned officer.)
Chapter 6

Active Guard Reserve Sergeant First Class Gregory Carpenter, Operations Noncommissioned Officer, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Sergeant First Class Carpenter had sixteen years in the Army. Less than a year after 11 September he was commissioned as a second lieutenant.]

CARPENTER: [Sergeant First Class Carpenter described his duties as an operations NCO.] My specific duties here are to work in the classified realm. I work as the “GATASO,” which is the global command and control system terminal areas and security officer. I’m the manager for the SIPRNET – secure internet communication -- that provides classified information from Army Reserve headquarters, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Joint Forces Command, [and] to ourselves. I also manage the STU-III System – Secure Telephone Unit Generation Three – and the secure faxes along with that. We take in message trafficking, categorize, classify, and disseminate it to specific individuals. We also take in intelligence, create intelligence products, and do intelligence summaries – INSUMS – for the commanding general and command staff review. . . . Currently, we’re short staffed . . . for about three years now. . . . I have several bosses. My first and primary boss is the readiness officer, Major Virginia Rea. I primarily work in readiness when the EOC . . . is not stood up. We evaluate the units, their capabilities to stand up and go to war. I also function as the intelligence NCO. . . . I report to Mr. Kino [Joaquin] Rolon in that area. . . . Our supervisor for intelligence is Major Marcos Castro. He’s a part-time guy. He’s a reservist, and he works for the Department of the Treasury. . . . We can [contact] him real easy if we have intelligence questions. . . . [The] third boss I have is Chief [Warrant Officer 4 Mark] Getzin, who works down at the Northeast Army Reserve Intelligence Center at the SCIF – Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility - where we do all the top-secret [work].

INTERVIEWER: On 11 September 2001, where were you and what were you doing?

CARPENTER: I had come in that morning at about [5:30 a.m.] to get some work done so I could go home early that day. At the time the first plane hit the first World Trade Center tower, I was actually in this EOC working on security plans for the intelligence office. When the second plane hit, we saw it right on the screen of the television. At that point, Mr. Joaquin Rolon came over and said to me, “Did you see that?” I said, “Yeah, I sure did.” He said, “What do you think?” I told him that I didn’t think it was a fluke because it was a clear day. The plane obviously could completely see what was going on. And at that point, we agreed that there was a
problem, and we needed to lock down the EOC. We had about fifteen or twenty other people who just came walking into the EOC at the time. We had a very difficult time getting people out of there because most of them who were walking around thought it was just something that happened. But when the second plane hit, they thought differently. I would say by . . . 9:30 a.m., the EOC was . . . operational and we were doing the functions, establishing the communications with our subordinate units, identifying assets, and where they were located, doing telephonic alerts, having our subordinates doing their telephonic alerts down to their subordinate units to make sure we had a hundred percent connectivity with all of them. We were identifying secure capabilities because we knew we’d have to use the STU-IIIs between the MSCs and ourselves. We also sent a SITREP [situation report] up . . . to the USARC regarding the planes going into the buildings. That probably got to the USARC headquarters at about . . . 9:20 [a.m]. That’s what happened when we first kicked off. . . .

I stayed for the next . . . four days working here. We worked about twenty hours a day. As the EOC became more efficient in its function, we brought in some more of the reservists to augment some of our full time staff. We received several requests from FEMA regarding the need for cots, body bags, tents, things like that. We were getting these requests and we were processing them. We were evaluating the force protection level consistently, receiving [intelligence] to make sure we were making the right decisions regarding the force protection. We would sleep, alternating in a room across from the EOC. . . . At one point, the access roster listed about 120 people [working in the EOC]. I believe we had twenty-six people on the floor at one time. And it ran like that for about ten days to two weeks. Then we found out that we were running out of money since it was near the end of the fiscal year, so some people weren’t able to stay on tour. So we had to cut back. But [for] most of the . . . full time soldiers, we didn’t receive any compensation time or anything like that. We just worked straight through. The civilians, they were guaranteed to get overtime pay or compensation time. . . . Major Zoller just kind of stepped in. . . . He just took it and ran with it and made the whole thing run very smoothly until the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Colonel Cacciatore, was able to come in. . . .

The number one major problem was that people from all over this building came in and decided they wanted to watch our television to see what was going on. Now I understand public interest and things like that when it comes to disasters, . . . but it seemed that everyone forgot that we had a mission to do that day. Obviously, something terrible had happened, and the whole world just stopped for them, and they couldn’t follow through with what they needed to do. And we needed to do a lot. We gave a lot of support to the National Guard and to FEMA. . . . Some of the FEMA [employees] were our . . . [reservists]. They worked for our command. We had very few people interacting with our FEMA people down on the streets of lower Manhattan. So that was a major problem. People were sitting on my desk with the phone ringing, and I couldn’t answer the phone. It turned out that it was the CXO, Command Executive Officer Mr. Gary
DiLallo. He asked me what was happening and why it took me so long to answer my phone. And I told him that I had people sitting in the way, and I couldn’t get to my phone because this [one man] wouldn’t move. And that’s when Mr. DiLallo came down and made sure they got out of the EOC. That was the biggest challenge within the first couple of hours.

The full time staff that worked here knew what they were doing because we do it everyday. The [Deputy] Chief of Staff for Operations, Colonel Cacciatore, had just gotten that job. He had been a battalion commander at the 436th Transportation Battalion at Fort Wadsworth on Staten Island before. So he had never worked on the division-level staff, especially in the number four position as the DCSOPS. He had no assistant DCSOPS at all. As far as the leadership went, [they] had never done this before, never worked in an arena where they operated in an EOC. I had worked in an EOC for sixteen months before in the Philippines, Japan, and then Korea, so I knew how it functioned. Mr. Rolon had worked in the EOC at Fort Dix for eight months when it was fully operational, so he knew what was going on. Major Zoller worked in an EOC. Major Virginia Rea . . . was a training officer. She worked in an EOC in Korea. So the people who knew how to run an EOC were being told what to do by people who had never worked in an EOC before. So, it became very challenging for us to say in a diplomatic way, “Okay, this is how we’re really . . . supposed to do it. We have to setup rotating watches. We just can’t have people . . . working twenty hours a day for the first week.” We tried to explain, “You really can’t do that; people have to go and get sleep every once in awhile. Not everybody can run through all night like that.” So that was the challenge in the next couple of weeks.

The third part of it was the middle part, right around where the fiscal year ended up. We had no money at the end of the fiscal year, even though we were promised that people would be paid. Many people had a problem getting paid. They eventually got paid. And then when 1 October hit, we were promised that people would be . . . paid. General [Thomas] Plewes came up on 28 September and told us we had an open checkbook and do what we needed to do. Then a couple of weeks later we found out . . . there was just no money in it. So we had to figure out how we were going to pay our people. We had to rotate them in on AT pay . . . so they couldn’t go to annual training this year. So that’s going to affect readiness in the units. People could not be pulled in on ADSW [additional duty for special work] . . . because it wasn’t authorized. We couldn’t pay people for ADT [active duty for training]. . . . So in essence, we were told we could bring people in. We just couldn’t pay them.

Then the [next] major issue over the long run was force protection for our soldiers. We started out at force protection level Delta, and the measures we put in place were not even at the Charlie level. . . . We had armed guards walking around the base on rotating patrols for twenty-four hours. . . . We never made it to force protection level Delta at Fort Totten. . . . The only place that was . . . Delta was Fort Hamilton, which is run by the Military District of Washington. . . . We were just checking IDs at the gate, which was nothing. . . . The problem with that is we
can’t pay . . . all the MPs – military policeman – now. . . running through AT money again, all
the annual training money. So now we have a whole military police brigade that doesn’t have
any annual training time. That’s going to negatively affect their readiness, and we’ve deployed
several of the military police units already, which runs us even thinner. . .

INTERVIEWER: So, the pay issue is probably the most important one, and you’re saying it
still hasn’t been resolved yet?

CARPENTER: No, it hasn’t been resolved for several cases . . . People still haven’t been paid,
and . . . we’re running out of people. We put . . . administrative specialists on the front gate to
guard the gates for a time because we didn’t have any of the military police that were available.
There’s just nobody available because they’ve used their fourteen days of annual training time,
and we’re not allowed to give anymore money to anyone else.

INTERVIEWER: When military policemen pull guard duty, they’re actually training in their
MOS [military occupational specialty], correct?

CARPENTER: Some of the units are. Some of the units are law and order units; others are
EPW – enemy prisoner of war – units. And their METL [mission essential task list] tasks might
be supported by what they’re doing. But pretty much the [MPs] are sitting in their HUMVEEs at
the front gate just looking at ID cards. . . . They’re not even performing perimeter patrols. . . .
They have some weapons that they’re qualified on. I don’t think they are allowed to have
[ammunition] . . . right now. . . . You go to Fort Hamilton or you go to West Point. They’re
setup. They’re organized very well.

[Sergeant First Class Carpenter explained that the military police at Fort Totten were
not as well trained as they needed to be for the job.]

So they’re kind of a little bit of a deflection shield, but if anyone tried to drive through
and they had any identification at all, that would fly. Not too long ago, there were several cases
of dependent identification cards that were stolen out of Bethesda, Maryland that haven’t been
recovered. Well, the guys down at the gate, they don’t know the serial number on those cards.
They have no idea what the numbers on these cards are. How would they identify which one is a
good card or which one is a bad card? Now, that situation is the same at West Point or anywhere
else. No one [is] checking the numbers off against the roster. This is one example of where
they’re really lacking. . . .

The focus of the Command Group . . . has been very much staying in our lane by
identifying and reporting threats in the New York City area, suspicious activity. . . . We’ve kept
them [informed] of any situation. We’ve given them trend analysis. And they’ve focused on
everything that’s in our box, which I can say is very commendable because a lot of the command
structure out there – they’re not really focusing on what’s in their area. They’re looking
everywhere else. . . . If they don’t watch their area, that’s where we’re going to have more problems. We identified an elevated force protection level that’s been ongoing for the New York City area. But the people up at Reserve Command didn’t tell us that. We had to find that out from the state adjutant general for the National Guard in New York. . . . So in a situation like this, we’re at a lower force protection level. So we’re going to be the likely target if something happens, as opposed to one of the other bases that’s at an elevated level. And it goes back to where our people – our higher command – isn’t looking over here. The very first message we got from them . . . was civilians should go home. This was September 11, . . . but they should report back to work, regular time the next day. It was to be understood that USARC’s message is “business as usual.” . . . We queried USARC on that [email] traffic, and we identified that part of Manhattan was missing. We identified the fact that most of the trains that go through Manhattan, the buses that go through Manhattan, the vehicular traffic that goes through Manhattan, can’t go through Manhattan. And probably about sixty percent of our people can’t get to Fort Totten, not even to mention the other centers. How can it be business as usual? People were afraid to leave their house[s]. . . . They [USARC] still [does not] really understand what happened that day, or knew what was going on.256

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256 Sergeant First Class Gregory Carpenter, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 13 December 2001.
Mr. Michael Scotto
Chapter 7

Mr. Michael Scotto, Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management and the Information Management Officer, 77th Regional support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. Scotto was also an Army Reserve colonel and deputy chief of staff for information management at the 77th. He had twenty-eight years of military service.]

[On the morning of 11 September, Mr. Scotto and other chief civilians at the 77th were attending a conference on the second floor at the Ernie Pyle Building when the first attack on the World Trade Center occurred.]

SCOTTO: Someone walked in and handed Mr. [Gary] DiLallo, the command executive officer, a note. He got up and left . . . the room. A few moments later . . . Sergeant [First Class] Yvette Lee, who works in the command section, . . . says, “A plane has hit the World Trade Center. We are activating the Emergency Operations Center. Please, if you are required to be up there, please go up there immediately.” Well, I went back to my office to get another pad of paper or something and by the time I got up there, people turned to me when I walked into the EOC, and they said a second plane has hit the World Trade Center. And then we all knew that America was being attacked.

INTERVIEWER: What did you do next?

SCOTTO: The immediate crisis from the information management standpoint was the fact that people could not get out on the normal LAN [local area network-Intranet] lines and could not send or receive faxes. The reason for that is because – just like whenever there’s any kind of natural disaster – everybody picks up the phone at the same time to call family or friends or their employer. The telephone switches are only able to handle so many phones being off the hook at any one time. So . . . there were a lot of no dial-tone reports. There were a lot of people getting the recording saying that this call could not be completed. Same thing with faxes – they weren’t going through because there were just too many people trying to use the normal phone lines.

[Mr. Scotto digressed to explain his section’s primary responsibilities.] We are responsible for base operations information management, which includes printing, publications, and postage, and administrative dissemination of regulatory requirements. On the automation side, we’re responsible for telecommunications and other automation issues, like computers. . . . We are the technical providers of computer and telecommunications. . . . We do provide . . . the RLAS [Regional Level Application System] software and the RCAS [Regional Computer Application System] machinery for the unit to use. I encouraged people to send messages by
email and to . . . keep trying to get through on the telephone because the cellular phones . . . were clogged. . . . Everybody in the New York area – probably everybody all over the country – was trying to call somebody else. There were just too many phone calls flooding the line. I got with my automation officer, Captain Robert Smith, and I gave him a number of instructions, as far as making sure that the system did not take in any viruses, or if there were any virus attacks, to report them immediately. I had one person on leave – our information assurance or computer security person, Cordelia Cafferty – and I said, “Call her back. We may need her in here.” The main person in the section, Lieutenant Colonel Lee Cunningham, was at Fort Wadsworth that morning inspecting some new construction going on down there. He was unable to get back to Fort Totten till later that afternoon because, of course, the roads were closed off.

INTERVIEWER: What was taking place in the Emergency Operations Center here at Fort Totten on the morning of 11 September?

SCOTTO: Everyone was pretty shocked and pretty horrified, but they had an idea of how they had to function. They were opening up staff logs. They were coordinating with people they needed to coordinate with. There was a great deal of tension in the air, especially as we heard about the flight in Pennsylvania and the Pentagon. And we were looking at each other, wondering, “My God, what’s going to happen next?” But people were functioning, and the perception was, “Get ready, they’re going to need us. Everybody should be getting ready, too.”

INTERVIEWER: What happened throughout the day? What was going on?

SCOTTO: Throughout the day, I primarily stayed in the EOC. And the reason for that was in case somebody had some kind of an automation-related question involving telecommunications or the computers, I wanted to be the first line of defense before I had to bring in one of my technical experts. . . . Sometimes it would take forty-five minutes for somebody to get out and make a phone call to a selected unit. . . . The information management team functioned extremely well. . . . They made sure that the network operations were maintained. . . . The Administrative Services Division took extra precautions before anything erupted about anthrax to make sure that the mail was secure as best they could coming into the center. I was contacted by Mr. Richard Eckstein, who is the director of information management at Fort Dix, and he said that to give USARC a call, which I did. I found myself being on a conference call with a couple of people, and I keep an operational log. And from the 11th of September to 15 September, I was not able to make any entries because I was simply that busy. I wound up briefing the information management counterparts at USARC headquarters in Atlanta. . . . I gave them a situational report. They asked if I needed supplementation, as far as personnel, and I said, “I will let you know tomorrow. It’s a little early to judge.” . . . We began preparing for twenty-four-seven operations immediately. That’s pretty much what I did on September 11th.
INTERVIEWER: Could you elaborate a little bit further on that conference call with our higher headquarters at USARC? Was there anything else that was discussed, or some specifics with regarding to what kind of guidance they were providing, or level of service that they were going to give the 77th?

SCOTTO: They were asking us what we needed. I said that at this time we appeared to have it about ninety percent under control, but with twenty-four-seven operations in a high-stress environment, and not being able to anticipate what the next day or even the rest of the 11th of September would foist upon us, I was concerned about the endurance of the people. The people who work in the network operations center . . . here and the other automation people – they’re very dedicated, but it’s also an extremely demanding environment to work in, especially if we didn’t know how coordinated the attack would be. For example, would there be electronic viruses or anything like that going into our network? If there were, we didn’t know what the effect would be. So we were operating in the dark.

INTERVIEWER: What were the challenges that the DCSIM [Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management] faced over the next course of several weeks from 11 September?

SCOTTO: We had a number of TPU soldiers who were issued computers, either here at the office, or laptops to take with them. About a week prior to 9-11, there was a virus introduced called “As Per Your Request.” . . . On the fourth of September . . . when that virus was introduced, [the DCSIM section] put in a filter in our server [which] prevented the virus from spreading. . . . At any rate, on 9-11, everybody tried to get through – either computer, or email or phone – and when the people who were issued laptops, turned to their laptops, some of them opened up "As Per Your Request" virus. They didn’t know that it was a virus. It was a very cleverly designed attack on our network. The main thing is that it was stopped, and something that could’ve been crippling to telecommunications, was not. That was one issue. . . .

I was working eighteen-hour days primarily being a buffer between the many requirements that could’ve been handled and were handled at a relatively lower level. My goal was to minimize the interference with my technical people in order to keep them at the high end of expertise. If it was a question of something that I could answer, then I would do that. We had to make space in the warehouse building 118. We had about 400 boxes of monitors, of computers, servers, printers, and other automation equipment in there. Since the fire department needed to use that, we had to make a good deal of space for them.

[On 12 September, Mr. Scotto contacted the USARC to ask for a fourth contractor who specialized in telecommunications. The USARC complied and sent two personnel.]
I kept working about twelve to eighteen-hour days. . . . Everybody was holding up very well. They were under some stressful circumstances, but the troop morale was positive. People were determined to do what they could, and that was from the highest and the lowest.

The goal in the staff meetings was that we will support the needs of our citizens. Concurrent with that . . . was the need to secure our own facilities. Of course, there are other people who could tell you more about what the MPs did as far as securing the gate. For us, the main thing was getting an x-ray scanner for the mail. We were the first ones from USARC to be given that. It took awhile for it to get here. It’s just now going into operation because we had to construct a special room for it [in building 124]. That was another way that USARC did support us. . . . It is a warehouse. So that means that there is a certain amount of empty space available [and]. . . . that there’s a low density of people working there. Because it was a brand new building just standing up at roughly the time that this event occurred, we were able to do modifications without disrupting other things. Some of the modifications included a ventilation system that would pull the air toward the bottom. If you had a ventilation system pulling air out toward the top, you’d be getting potentially particles up your nose. We have two entrances to it. One entrance is normal, to be used on a routine basis, with double doors to take in packages so they can be put on the end of the scanner. The other door is your panic door. We’re hooking up an email there and a telephone. We’re going to be alarming it so that when someone has to go through that panic door, an alarm will sound throughout the entire building, so that everyone will get out of there. We’re also going to have an emergency flush shower there, so that somebody can wash out their eyes in case . . . something is emitted.

INTERVIEWER: What is the function of this special room?

SCOTTO: It’s to scan packages through the x-ray scanner, very much the same thing when you go through an airport. And it’s just to make sure nothing is in there that should not be in there.

INTERVIEWER: From my understanding, its construction is very special, with reinforced walls. Could you describe that for us?

SCOTTO: You’d be better off talking to the engineers, but the walls are designed to blow outward . . . instead of inward. . . . We . . . had another virus attack on the 18th of September. . . . One of our contractors had already updated the system, so that one was thwarted. It took about three or four days for a dial tone to resume as normal. There was an occasional wait, but nothing like the first two or three days.

[Lieutenant General Plewes visited and briefed the 77th command group and key staff on 16 September.]

I would prefer to consider it a classified briefing, although there are a couple of things I can mention. General Plewes had nothing but admiration for the hard work the 77th had done.
He addressed some issues of mobilization... I can’t go into here. But he was very positive and very supportive of us. He mentioned the initial phases of the mobilization that we were in, and he mentioned that we could certainly expect more. He said that because the situation was so fluid at that time, he wasn’t sure exactly who would be mobilized and where they would go, except for some of the things that we now know. For example, there are some MP units that have been mobilized. . . . Some of it was homeland defense . . . for the security for military installations. I believe the National Guard has the airports that they’re responsible for.

**INTERVIEWER:** Was there anything conveyed pertaining to USARC’s support for LIBERTY CRISIS?

**SCOTTO:** Other than what I already mentioned for our area – information management – there were two things. . . . USARC did pay for the scanner. . . . It’s very much like the large scanners that you go through at an airport when you go through security. And we did have the understanding – and you’d have to talk to the comptroller or the operations people on this – that USARC would be picking up the bill for the costs of LIBERTY CRISIS, which was our involvement in this, as far as putting soldiers on orders and that sort of thing. I can tell you that in the civilian world, I pulled a couple of strings with my former employer, Verizon, to get some support that we needed at one of our centers. And they came through. . . . We were able to get some additional support to [Fort] Wadsworth, as far as some of the engineering work. So between my Verizon experience, [the contractor’s] telecommunication experience, and the help we got from Verizon, we were then able to have a plan of action for the new lines for the units that were going to be moving into the Wadsworth Reserve Center – the 8th Medical Brigade and the 353rd Civil Affairs. The idea being is that we do not want to be defeated. We want our operations to continue, and if possible, to enhance and improve, despite the attack.

**INTERVIEWER:** You mentioned Fort Wadsworth. Was this in direct correlation with the 11 September attack, or was that facility going to be stood up anyway?

**SCOTTO:** That facility was going to be stood up in the future anyway. . . .

[Mr. Scotto explained that the DCSIM section was not directly involved in aiding New York City. It worked internally supporting the 77th’s information technology needs.]

**INTERVIEWER:** In prior experience with the section, were they trained for this contingency?

**SCOTTO:** We have a number of people who had seen combat, either in Vietnam or the Gulf War, and that kind of helped with the initial shock. The technical experts . . . had been through virus attacks before. Our Administrative Services Section . . . looks for [any] suspicious
package. That was a matter of routine before the attack on September 11th. And of course, that’s been significantly enhanced and emphasized since then.

**INTERVIEWER:** What about any sort of prior training with the establishment of the EOC with DCSIM’s involvement there?

**SCOTTO:** The EOC was first stood up for the Y2K rollover – December 31st, 1999 to January 1, 2000. I was not in the section at that time. I was the assistant deputy chief of staff for logistics. . . . I wound up . . . being the senior officer in the EOC that night, but the primary staff sections had representatives there. We rolled over without incident at any of our centers, and that was a good exercise for the EOC.

**INTERVIEWER:** Prior to your involvement here, your staff had been exposed to working in an EOC environment with the Y2K time period.

**SCOTTO:** That’s correct. They had, in a sense, a dress rehearsal for it, where they had the lines up and operating. They had phones on the desks. They had a fax and a copier. Both the fax and the copier were secure up there. They had the big screen television going so that we could monitor what was going on. . . . We were watching the time zones throughout the world.

[Mr. Scotto then elaborated on the sometimes twice-daily LIBERTY CRISIS senior staff meetings]

Each section would give an update on what had transpired. . . . I think we were up to three staff meetings at a time, but only the principle staff, which was in this case [personnel], [operations], and logistics, were in the midday meeting. . . . I wanted to make sure that my technical experts were doing technical expert things, and that if somebody had a problem with, for example, email, that I was there to act as the buffer first. If it was a lower-level technical problem or some kind of administrative issue, I would handle [it]. The administrative issue I could think of off the top of my head would be how do we handle anthrax? . . . At one point, there were about thirty different websites talking about how to handle anthrax . . . from various governmental entities. Now with that in mind, we had to go to the USARC. Reserve headquarters did come up with a protocol, as far as what to look for, how to handle things, and we, of course, passed it on to the units. Mr. Harry Rivera, the head of the Administrative Services Division of this section, was the one who was doing that. He worked with Mr. Marty Sullivan down at the USARC headquarters.

**INTERVIEWER:** Could you tell me how these new protocols affected the dissemination of incoming mail?
SCOTTO: We immediately stopped all incoming mail the next day. . . . Around 17 October or thereabouts, we resumed mail operations. We didn’t resume packages until the 19th or the 20th.

INTERVIEWER: When you say, “you resumed,” does that mean the packages were held in storage for an indefinite period of time before they were delivered?

SCOTTO: That’s correct. The U.S. mail went through. Anything that came through UPS [United Parcel Service], Federal Express, Airborne, or any of the other ones – that became something of a concern because a number of the AMSA [area maintenance support activity] shops were getting critical parts that they needed. I spoke with Major Douglas Gradwohl and Mr. Robert Neglia in the logistics shop . . . and I said, “If you can identify anything specific with a manufacturer and a designation, we will ask the delivery services to look for that specific package and we’ll get that one through.” . . . The criticality of the package itself was going to be the driving force. I don’t think we had more than one or two that came into that category. The shops were able to sustain themselves for that period of time without anything of that critical a nature. We also put out the word on handling mail with gloves. We reminded people that they should look for certain things, like misspelled words, excessive amounts of postage, grease spots on the envelope, heavy and bulky envelopes, and that kind of thing.

INTERVIEWER: Colonel, it’s been a little over four months now since the attacks on the United States. Now that you’re looking back on it, what could you have done differently starting from that date, 11 September?

SCOTTO: First thing that I would have done differently, would have involved myself. I think that if I were to walk into the EOC reliving the whole thing, seeing me sitting there and handling the occasional automation or telecommunications question, I think the first thing I would’ve said, “Scotto, where’s your staff log?” Because when somebody’s opening up a staff log, you’re focusing them away from the pictures on TV, and you’re getting them back to doing their job. And with all that, with the inertia of all the training that’s been done before, kicks into play. Most of the training had been done before. People knew what to look for in a suspicious package. The network operations people knew how to handle proactively a virus. That’s one thing I would’ve done differently. We’ve taken some corrective measures, for example, having extra batteries and chargers for the cell phones. Our staff coordination internally was well. . . . I believe we need to look at phonetics. The reason for this is because in the EOC, you’re going to have soldiers from private on up to general going in and out of there. Some of those soldiers, even if they’re officers or senior NCOs, are not necessarily familiar with how an RSC staff works. We experienced confusion between IM, EN and PM, in other words, information management, engineers, and provost marshal. There was confusion between IR and IG – internal review and inspector general. On at least one occasion, one of my IM soldiers was
called in because somebody said, “You know, we’d better talk to the PM and get some help up here.” They meant provost marshal. I would venture to say that’s a couple of things that we learned out of this.

**INTERVIEWER:** There was an issue pertaining to secure phone lines. Would you elaborate on that, Sir?

**SCOTTO:** The secure equipment that we used is called a STU-III – Secure Telephone Unit Generation-3. And this is designed so that each center has one, and I believe each general officer has one as well. It’s designed so that somebody could take it home with them if need be and conduct secure telecommunications over to the unit from their home. . . . It’s a regular unit that plugs into an ordinary phone jack. The scrambling is at each unit, at each end, not in the line itself. [*The 77th Regional Support Command has about forty STUs throughout thirty-eight Army Reserve centers.*]

**INTERVIEWER:** In cases of emergencies, national crisis, these phones are what’s to be utilized for the exchange of classified information?

**SCOTTO:** That’s correct. I know that during the immediate aftermath [of 11 September], there was a need or a perceived need by USARC to get in touch with some of the commands. All the commands experienced significant problems with getting these units to work. There were several reasons for that. Number one, the key [that] codes the STUs, had expired. This is a COMSEC [communications security] item. You’d have to talk to the [operations] folks who know more about that than I do. But if it’s not used and updated, it will expire. People did not know how to use the equipment. And just like any other piece of Army equipment, if you don’t know how to use it, it’s effectively useless. Some of them were being used as regular telephones, which they can be used as, because people didn’t really know. It’s not an item that has to be locked up because without the key, it’s just another telephone. We should consider using secure telephone equipment during our mobilization exercises, for example, or perhaps during AT preparation, and other things like that. It’s a way to keep people current with secure technology.

**INTERVIEWER:** Is our higher headquarters – Army Reserve Command – aware of the problem with these STU units? How far up the chain has this been acknowledged?
SCOTTO: I know it’s been acknowledged up to the USARC chief of staff level. I do know that at the 77th a number of secure telephone conversations were conducted. So I would like to believe that we’re better than most.257

257 Mr. Michael Scotto, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 1 February 2002
Chapter 8

Mr. Peter Garcia, Civil Military Project Officer,
77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. Garcia was also an Army Reserve operations master sergeant in the Third Brigade, 98th Division, Bronx. He had worked in his civilian job since 1996.]

INTERVIEWER: Can you please describe what your [civilian] position entails?

GARCIA: I manage the emergency preparedness liaison officer program for the 77th RSC Region 2. I work recruitment for counterdrug support to the United States government, and I work a program called innovative readiness training, which provides support to civilian communities using military resources.

INTERVIEWER: On September 11, 2001, can you describe what occurred that day and how your role here at the 77th was executed?

GARCIA: First of all, the emergency preparedness liaison officer program was developed in 1996 as a transition from the ARCOM to RSC. We have three colonels – one working for New York, one working for New Jersey state, and one regional colonel. These teams are attached to either a state or Federal Emergency Management Agency in order to support overall federal response to an emergency as a result of an emergency or a disaster. My job here at the RSC is to coordinate that support as requested from the FEMA . . . or DOD [Department of Defense] as the emergency runs its course. On 9-11, I was attending a class when the event happened. And as practiced and/or as executed in the past, the EOC immediately comes up as in response to any type of disaster or mobilization. So at approximately 9:30 [a.m.], myself, a member or representative of the EOC for military support to civil authorities, I assumed . . .[that] role . . . as the MSCA [military support to civil authorities] representative. . .in the EOC. My job is to advise the commander and coordinate any requests through or down from FEMA and coordinate the RSC providing that support to the community.

INTERVIEWER: The morning on September 11, what was taking place? Were you in the Emergency Operations Center here at the 77th? Did you man a station there, and what occurred?

GARCIA: . . . We were in a state of confusion. We really didn’t know what had taken place, the extent of what had happened. However, the first thing that I knew that needed to be done is I had to get my EPLO . . . teams to . . . FEMA to begin the coordination of their role . . . as the DOD agent. So Colonel [Gerald] McEnerney was at . . . work, and [because] New York City
was closed down, he couldn’t get into New York City. . . . I coordinated with the McDonald Reserve Center, 320th Chemical Company [Queens]. Two soldiers volunteered to escort McEnerney into Manhattan and report to FEMA. So the first thing that I did was I called the team to find out what their status was. I got McEnerney down to 26 Federal Plaza. And he happened to get down there within the first . . . hour of the event. . . .

There are three teams. The regional team, Region 2, Colonel McEnerney is the principal emergency preparedness liaison officer. The assistant principal is Lieutenant Colonel John Maul. The operation officer EPLO is Lieutenant Colonel Ronny Snyder. The communications EPLO is Major Jack Lomidico. The logistics EPLO is Major Carolyn Lott. The operations NCO . . . is Master Sergeant Dominick Cutaia. Now that’s the regional team.

For New York state, you have a Colonel Michael Santarcangelo. He’s the principal SEPLO, state EPLO. His assistant is a Major Nicholas Scopelletti. This is New York state. For New Jersey, you have a Colonel Walter Jankowski, and he’s the principal SEPLO, and he does not have an assistant. . . . The thing to do is to get the principal in place so he can . . . start his duties.

The next individual was Colonel Santarcangelo. He reports to the state emergency office in Albany. However, [he] was in Michigan at the time, and all airline traffic was shut down into New York City. So it took him one additional day to get in. His assistant lives in New York City. So rather than him going upstate to Albany . . . he reported to Colonel McEnerney in New York City. Walter Jankowski, who is the New Jersey state emergency preparedness officer, reported to Edison, New Jersey, where there was a temporary EOC set up for FEMA . . . Then a former liaison officer, Colonel David Rockefeller . . . a former EPLO for New York State, reported to Albany. . . . He took over Colonel Santarcangelo’s duties until Colonel Santarcangelo was able to get in from Michigan. So the team was notified within the first . . . eight hours, and within the first twenty-four hours everybody was in place. That was my first responsibility – to get everybody in place so they can start working their duties.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned that Colonel McEnerney was down at ground zero. By what time?

GARCIA: I would say by ten [a.m.] He had [a] military escort, and the highways were closed down, [but] he was able to get through . . . So we were able to get somebody over to his office [in Queens] within maybe fifteen minutes, and they got him down [to ground zero] within an hour or so.

INTERVIEWER: Who were you communicating with at your higher headquarters?

GARCIA: . . . The next thing is to open up the lines of communication between myself and the USARC and First Army. The next up in the chain . . . is David Claygamon. He’s the GS-12
military planner at the USARC. So I immediately opened the line of communication with him and then at First Army because the EPLOs are . . . attached to First Army. So the individual at First Army . . . is Jerome Loving. So my responsibility is to open up the lines of communication with these different levels of command in order to begin the coordination of support.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of coordination did occur?

GARCIA: . . . As operations were beginning to unfold . . . not so much federal, [but] a lot of city and state and local hospitals, agencies were unofficially coming to the command requesting different types of equipment [and] supplies. For example, the FBI was setting up operations in Floyd Bennett Field [U.S. Coast Guard station in Brooklyn]. They needed generators and cots and sleeping bags. The New York City Police Department . . . did not know the extent of the damage. They were just beginning to field their way through the early period, and they needed protective masks to go into [the] . . . ground zero area. So they came to us, and we gave them a number of protective masks using one of our units in Fort Hamilton. The U.S. Coast Guard had also needed tents and sleeping bags. The [New York] Fire Department . . . needed GP [general purpose] medium-size tents. The NYPD . . . and the fire department were looking for areas to store some of their equipment that they were using. They wanted to use Fort Totten as a staging ground so they needed to use some of our space. . . . In the early stages, people were coming to us just trying get some basic things in order to bring up their Emergency Operations Center wherever that may have been. So there was the EOC at Fort Hamilton. Then the NYPD was working out of Fort Hamilton. The FBI was working out of Floyd Bennett Field. The Coast Guard was working out of Floyd Bennett Field. . . . So those were the initial types of requests we were getting. . . . [The requests] were coming in . . . by cell phone. We were [also] getting emails. The telephones were down. The local LAN lines were down.

INTERVIEWER: Were these requests coming in through various authorities being channeled through the normal FEMA channel or were these unofficial types of requests coming in outside of the normal FEMA requests?

GARCIA: As we’re getting these requests, I’m supposed to evaluate them and try to route them through, without being bureaucratic [to] the right channels. The primary goal is to ensure that if we don’t get the stuff [equipment] back, that we get reimbursed for it. That’s my responsibility – to ensure that the request is a legitimate request coming from a legitimate entity, and that if we do give the equipment out that we are going to get reimbursed for it. . . . I contact my team to find out if this can be routed through their process or the FEMA process so we can get reimbursement for it. If it cannot be routed through [FEMA], [then] . . . the commander has to make a decision [on whether] to provide that support under the immediate response policy.
INTERVIEWER: Can you describe the FEMA process?

GARCIA: The process is that if an agency has a request for support, what they do is they go to FEMA. . . . FEMA is in charge of the overall operations and wherever their EOCs are at. . . . For instance, there may be a city hospital, and that hospital has a need for generators. What they do is they go to FEMA and . . . ask . . . for the generators. And FEMA will then determine what is the cheapest way to provide that support to that hospital. Now, there is a different level of support. They may decide to go to the Department of Transportation to provide those generators because they might have a storage area of generators just sitting there waiting to give to the hospital. But if those generators are not available, they may go to the Red Cross. If the Red Cross doesn’t have the generators, what they do then they will go to the DOD. It might not be in that order. However, they tend to go to the DOD last because the DOD is the most expensive. So the process is to come into FEMA. FEMA makes the determination where the request should go to. If the request comes to the DOD, what they do is then they come to me. The DOD comes to [me], and then I coordinate providing that support to the entity that is requesting it.

INTERVIEWER: Can you describe the process for those agencies which do not utilize the FEMA process?

GARCIA: The doctrine that we use to justify . . . support that is not being funneled through the FEMA process is called immediate response. But my job is to find out if we can first funnel the request through the FEMA. . . . If we can’t . . . then . . . we respond under immediate response. But first we have to decide, does this meet the immediate response policy in order to provide that support? So an agency [will] call us directly, and they’ll tell us what kind of agency they are [and] why they need the equipment. . . . I’ll . . . first try to get it processed through FEMA. If not, then what I’ll do is determine if this is a request that if we do not provide that support . . . somebody’s life could be lost, or there would be great damage to property. So we’re trying to save lives, and we’re trying to save property. And if it meets that criteria, then the commander can say, “Okay. They have a need. We can provide an immediate response. It is justified.” And then the commander makes his decision based on whatever I tell him. Usually, that’s the criteria I use - loss of life, loss of property. If it meets that criteria, I recommend that they support whatever the request is.

INTERVIEWER: You had illustrated to us earlier several different types of requests that did come through concerning gas masks, tents, and sleeping bags. . . .

GARCIA: . . . We had a request from the National Guard. They were setting up an area . . . either in Staten Island or the Bronx. It might have been a couple of areas to store the equipment – the stuff that was being taken out of ground zero. In that debris were probably body parts and
whatever chemicals that might have been part of that debris and that debris was toxic. So the National Guard came to us and asked for tents because they had used up all of their tents. The commander had agreed to give them tents. So we gave them ten tents, GP mediums. [We] got them out of one of our ECS [extended core storage], gave them to the National Guard . . . [who] destroyed the tents because the tents had exposure to chemicals, . . . and they were no longer useable. . . . [Since] the tents [were] not provided to them through the FEMA channels, there is no formal reimbursement through FEMA. However, it’s justified because we gave the tents to the National Guard under the immediate response, so we’ll be able to do a report of survey, and they’ll find no one liable for the uses of the tents. . . . That was one of the items . . . we did [loan] that came from the informal process that we provided, and that’s how we’re going to wind up writing it off or getting our money back. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was the pace like with these types of requests for those first three days?

GARCIA: Very quick. My job is not to make this a bureaucratic issue. . . . [You are] dealing with people’s lives. . . . People are in disarray. So you have a sense of urgency about supporting these people. I have to create a system which determines the validity of a request in order to get it in, get it out, and coordinate the equipment being provided to the entity. You . . . have to come up with a tracking system so you know as it comes in, you’re passing it to another person to. . . . determine where this equipment is. Then at the same [time] you’re talking to the general and providing a recommendation. Should you or should you not provide the equipment? . . . All of this . . . is a process that we use to coordinate mobilizations and coordinate disasters. . . . This is just a military process that is used to expedite things to the emergency operations center process.

INTERVIEWER: Where were you located when this was occurring and how did you facilitate that expeditious process of assisting with these tasks?

GARCIA: I was in the EOC. I was a member of the primary [staff]. The general had a primary staff, which provided him recommendations as the event was unfolding. And then there is a EOC staff who is actually managing the process. . . . I was there providing him guidance and information as far as FEMA was concerned and as far as what we should be doing from the FEMA standpoint. . . .

INTERVIEWER: You are giving him guidance on the FEMA side of it, but you’re also giving him guidance on the unofficial requests that are coming through?
GARCIA: Yes, because I have to make sure that he understands that he’s providing the support under immediate response. And immediate response . . . comes out of disaster management emergency preparedness. So anything . . . coming out of emergency preparedness, I’m his advisor from that perspective.

INTERVIEWER: So all of the requests that went through to the 77th are considered to be what?

GARCIA: Informal [tasks] that . . . we provided support under immediate response.

INTERVIEWER: Give us an estimate of the total amount of requests.

GARCIA: There were . . . numerous . . . types of requests [for equipment and space]. . . . Our soldiers were working . . . the issues. We had probably upwards of a thousand soldiers on duty at one point. We activated the 301st ASG [Area Support Group]. They had a couple of their units in and on duty. The 800th MPs had a few hundred soldiers on duty. We had to coordinate security of our facility. We had to . . . institute our force protection plans. As far as equipment is concerned, . . . I have a list of equipment that we gave out. . . . We gave out almost upwards of [$363,000] of equipment. We got most of it back, but we’re still short on a number of pieces. We allowed the New Jersey State Police [to] use Caven Point. The NYPD and the fire department used [the] Ernie Pyle Center. They used a lot of our space. Our EPLOs worked . . . essentially between 11 and 12 September . . . to 5 October. The whole team . . . rotated in and rotated out . . . for that twenty odd . . . days. The team was working down in Pier 90 [in Manhattan] supporting the DOD response cell.

INTERVIEWER: Now you’re also saying that soldiers were out there supporting in manpower, i.e., perhaps providing a transportation truck to get something from point A to point B. Any other types of missions like that?

GARCIA: . . . All of this equipment had to be delivered [and] set up sometimes. Tents had to be setup. . . . There was a certain level of security that each facility had to maintain. . . . Our security teams were responding as a result of THREATCON Charlie. The requests were coming in at the EOC within the first . . . forty-eight hours. We were getting requests for all types of supplies and equipment because I don’t think anybody was prepared for this type of operation. There was nothing pre-positioned, and I would say every federal and state agency in New York City . . . didn’t have pre-positioned EOC operations setup. . . .

As we were trying to set up our operations, we were trying to help the FBI and the New York City Police Department and the fire department establish EOC operations and staging areas so they can in turn begin operations. There is a sense of urgency of providing that support. . . . It
got [the] immediate attention of the staff that was involved. . . . If there’s a logistical request . . . from the fire department, I would immediately ask for tents. Our log[istical] representative would immediately identify . . . where the tents were at, and I would be talking to the commander explaining to him that we should provide this type of support. . . . He was not going to turn down any federal, city, state, or any entity that came to us for help. Under immediate response, we responded to all issues. . . . So I had to then respond by trying either . . . [to] get it through the FEMA channel or just identify where their equipment was so it can get to the entity.

It became a simple process. It wasn’t simple, but the process was. The Log would identify where the equipment was. . . . We would coordinate getting that equipment or providing that support to the entity. We had soldiers that were on standby . . . at various units . . . for security [and] to deliver the equipment. We had a whole team of soldiers in the Bronx at Jacobi Hospital that had a medical operation setup. We had a team of soldiers up there working, expecting to receive whatever from ground zero. . . . They had a whole . . . mortuary affairs system setup at Jacobi Hospital. . . . We had members from the 301st [who] helped deliver that equipment. We had members from the medical community . . . [who] were the ones up there helping, assisting, and operating that setup. We had to have soldiers take equipment out of our ECS [extended core storage] and have the equipment delivered to different sites throughout New York, especially the tents for the National Guard. Those were ten GP-medium tents. These are very large tents [that] require a lot of personnel to accumulate the wood, the pegs to tie them up, and put them on the trucks, and convoy them up to the sites, and take them down, put them up.

Everything that we gave out had to be either delivered, or if the entity came to us, we had to coordinate providing the equipment to the entity. We had the fire department and the police department . . . making deliveries almost like three or four times a day. . . . The police department was receiving equipment and supplies from . . . individuals . . . to support the 9-11 operation. . . . The equipment was being laid out on the streets of downtown Manhattan. The police department came to us and asked us if we could use space to store this equipment. . . . They would bring the equipment to Fort Totten. And then our soldiers would offload the equipment, store it in the cages . . . up to within the last thirty days. They’re starting to get that stuff out of here now. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Six, seven months later in hindsight now, what things or processes or standard operating procedures do you feel could be implemented today that would have made it a great help to you on 11 September?

GARCIA: To me there’s no doubt that the system worked. . . . The problem with the program is that it does not become a priority . . . until there’s a disaster. . . . We get lulled into this false sense of security over the years, and we just sit back because nothing’s happening. And then everybody just sort of thinks, “Well, I don’t need to attend this class. We don’t need to give this
briefing. We don’t because, you know, nothing’s going to happen.” But then something happens and nobody knows what they need to do. Fortunately, that’s my job. I’m paid to know. And because . . . I do know, the command was able to respond.

But what I think we need to do is we need to educate commanders about immediate response . . . or their role in these type of events because commanders get requests from communities, and they’re not supposed to just go out and provide support . . . blindly. . . . It has to meet the test of their liability issues. And if you’re going to give equipment, which a commander does have the authority to give, however, he must give it under the immediate response policy. And if he doesn’t understand what immediate response is, then he could possibly open up himself to a lawsuit. He gives out some equipment, somebody gets killed, somebody gets hurt, then the individual sues, and he’s going to be held responsible. So I think what we need is more education. The commanders need to be educated about the process. They need to know if somebody comes to them and requests [equipment] as a result of a disaster, the first thing you do is contact your higher headquarters to see if this can be legally done. Does it meet the immediate response, . . . the assistance that FEMA has in place, that the DOD has in place, that the role of the RSC [has] and how we interact with the federal agencies and what the emergency preparedness liaison officers do? [It] works. . . . It’s just that I have to educate the staff on those things a little bit more because they did not know. Colonel [Matthew] Cacciatore just came back from the FEMA course. John Arnim [civilian deputy chief of staff of operations] just came back from the FEMA course. . . .

Right now I have [about] four individuals on staff that have been to the course. Colonel [Thomas] Butler who is now the DCSENG [deputy chief of staff, engineer], he’s gone. Lieutenant Colonel [David] Van Cleve, he just came back from the course. . . . They are all operational . . . people [who] are in the EOC. . . . These are the individuals [who] need to know how the FEMA relationship works. So if I’m not here . . . they can do what I do . . . without me being here. But that’s what . . . we need to work on. We need to educate the staff.258

258 Mr. Peter Garcia, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 13 May 2002.
Mr. Thomas Kane  
(He is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve.)
Chapter 9

Mr. Thomas Kane, Military Personnel Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Mr. Kane had been in his civilian position for seven years and was also an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel in the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel section.]

[He explained his normal civilian duties: to manage personnel functions for 19,000 soldiers from Bangor, Maine, to Fort Bragg, North Carolina; senior enlisted and officer promotions; military occupational specialty reclassifications; Active Guard Reserve promotions; computer software responsibilities; military awards and decorations; the drug reduction and equal opportunity programs; and others.]

INTERVIEWER: Why don’t we begin with what was transpiring on 11 September 2001.

KANE: I was coming to work late . . . 8:45 a.m. I was on the Whitestone Bridge, and it was at that point I could see [smoke that resulted from] a plane going into the World Trade Center. . . . I was listening to 1010 AM [a local radio station] here in New York City, and they . . . started out with some reporter who was at home and had an apartment very close to the World Trade Center [who], saw a plane go in[to it]. . . . She was on the phone, and they were interviewing her. By the time I got in here to the office, . . . the second plane had hit the second tower. So at that point we were called into the conference room. . . . We were . . . watching the TV as . . . everything unfolded. I believe that at that point the CXO activated the EOC, and we started the ball rolling on trying to find out where all of our command and control soldiers were. . . . It seemed like forever to verify where everybody was . . . .

We got the first word that some of [our] . . . soldiers were missing. . . . We lost six . . . one lawyer . . . out of our 4th LSO [Legal Support Organization] and then five firemen from various units throughout the command. We contacted the units and put together all the information for the commanding general [Brigadier General Richard Colt] so he could make a call to the spouses and/or the parents. . . . I think that even at that point it was very hard to do because none of the families gave up hope. . . . The last family [that] gave up hope in November [was] the Bucca family [because] Mrs. Bucca was going to hang in there until they found his body. So they had to be very careful, because if there was no body there was still hope. I think the first one to give up was Mrs. Pohlmann, the [wife of the] lawyer. She was on the phone with her husband, who was on the 91st floor of the first tower . . . when the plane hit, and he was immediately gone. . . . She was the first to declare her husband dead, and so then we started the grieving process with the families. . . . Mrs. Pohlmann held the first funeral. She asked us to
provide military honors, which we did, in a very moving ceremony without a body. . . . So we went through [the funerals]. . . . It seemed like it never stopped. General Plewes was calling all the time to find out . . . when can we send notes. We did not want any notes, even from the CAR [Chief, Army Reserve] to go out until the wife accepted the death. . . . Once we found that out, we notified [Lieutenant General Plewes] and then [Brigadier] General Colt went to all the funerals. That was pretty much the end of the involvement of the Per[sonnel section]. At that point . . . in each case we secured the documents, forwarded them to AR-PERSCOM, [Army Reserve Personnel Command] so . . . the life insurance can be paid.

INTERVIEWER: Just to go back to the initial forty-eight hours around 11 September, you’re grazing herd. Could you describe a little bit more about how you reviewed the lists provided by the New York City Fire Department with a list you were compiling here? How did that work?

KANE: Well, we ran our grazing herd, and if a unit came back and said somebody was missing, we would check the fire department’s list. . . .

INTERVIEWER: When did you get the fire department’s list?

KANE: . . . I would say that we got that within forty-eight hours. It was quite extensive in the beginning, but it kept getting wheedled down as they found everybody because a lot of firemen just reported on their own. . . .When you [conduct] . . . a grazing herd you get a [poor] response from the units. . . . I got sixty-four percent [to] eighty percent. . . . Many [units] did not even call, so I think now that grazing herd has become one of the most important things we do in the Army Reserve if we are going to keep track of our people during a terrorist attack. They got to take it seriously, and I do know the CG [commanding general] is very tough on that right now. . . . We ran strength reports on a daily basis as to who was on active duty, AT, or whatever status they were in, and then we started very slowly calling up units. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Do you happen to know the names [of the deceased soldiers]?

KANE: Yes, their names were Lieutenant Colonel William Pohlmann from the 4th LSO; Captain Michael Mullen, 344th Combat Support Hospital; Captain Mark Whitford, 331st MI [Military Intelligence]; and that was an especially hard one because . . . his wife just had twins. Then we had Warrant Officer Ronald Bucca, 3413th Military Intelligence Detachment; and [Staff] Sergeant Fredrick Ill, 854th Engineering Battalion; and Sergeant Sean Powell, 4220th Hospital. Those were our six soldiers and we are still in contact with the families. We did a Christmas gift drive for them over Christmas for the young ones, and right now this week we are verifying that everybody got their SGLIs [Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance] and their annuities, making sure they are all taken care of.
He explained that many full time soldiers and civilians and Army Reservists in the Personnel Section volunteered for duty after 11 September. They worked on annual training or drill status. Some slept overnight in the reserve center. The Personnel Section was the largest in the command. It employed twenty-eight full time soldiers and civilians and around fifty Army Reservists.

INTERVIEWER: Are there any positive or negative lessons learned regarding how the Personnel Section dealt with this contingency, for instance, the grazing herd you had raised an issue about? Any other things that come to mind?

KANE: The need to have a second location for the headquarters is a must. . . . The command and control has to go to a senior subordinate one star or something [for a backup to the CG].

INTERVIEWER: So you raised the issue of having a back-up headquarters location. Why does that come to mind regarding this?

KANE: I think they are working on that. . . . I don’t know exactly which locations they have chosen or which subordinate general would get the command. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Any other operations lessons learned there?

KANE: Yes, I would say . . . the only other negative that we were totally unprepared for but I think we responded very quickly, [was that we] corrected the problems . . . with military honors. While most people would go right for the six we lost, by no means was that an indication of the amount of veterans who died in the World Trade Center. They were the larger amount.

INTERVIEWER: Does this command have what you referred to earlier as a burial detail?

KANE: Yes, for the state of New York and New Jersey.

INTERVIEWER: And how do those requests come in?

KANE: They go through what they call a CAC [Casualty Assistance Command] . . . at Fort Dix.

INTERVIEWER: Is there anything else you would like to add?
KANE: No, that is about all I can think of, [but] I am sure I will remember something afterwards. It is a terrible period in the history of the 77th, but we came out of it. As we send over our troops overseas, we will get a little bit of payback.259

259 Mr. Thomas Kane, interview by Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 March 2002.
Chapter 10

Active Guard Reserve Sergeant First Class Richard Perry, Operations Noncommissioned Officer for Retention and Transition Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Sergeant First Class Perry trained as an Army instructor and had twenty-nine years in the Army. He served twenty-one of those years on active duty. He had worked at the 77th for four years.]

INTERVIEWER: Sergeant Perry, please define what retention is.

PERRY: Our function is to ensure that the retention programs within the subordinate units are operating the way they’re supposed to be. We actually are the eyes and ears for the commanding general to ensure the commands are implementing the retention program to include the bonuses and all of the aspects of retaining quality soldiers. . . [in] our reserve units. The general retention transition NCO at the unit level is responsible to counsel soldiers, to provide them the information needed to make decisions to either reenlist and remain in the Army Reserve, to transfer to other units, or to transfer to an inactive status because they need a little time off. . . . In this office here we have . . . eight personnel. That includes the chief retention transition officer, the sergeant major, the deputy, as well as the retention NCOs.

INTERVIEWER: Do you recall what you were doing on 11 September 2001 at the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center?

PERRY: I was on my way in from my quarters in East Meadow on Long Island. And I heard it on the radio. . . . When I got here. . . . I went upstairs to the Operations Section because they have a big screen television up there. . . . I happened to be there watching it when the second plane hit. . . . We immediately went into a high level of security. Some of us full-timers were tasked to remain here in the building to set up a command post. . . . We started working twelve to sixteen to eighteen hours a day. . . . My family lives in Pennsylvania, and my wife actually was on the road, so I was desperately trying to [call] her [while] at the same time doing my duties here. So it was pretty traumatic for all of us. I think it was a period of four to six weeks before I got a chance to actually go home. We worked double shifts. We worked a shift in [the] Retention Office with about four hours off and then went upstairs and worked in command Operations to answer the phone, to field any questions and inquiries, or requests from FEMA . . . and other organizations who are directly involved at ground zero.
INTERVIEWER: So basically for about a four-week period, your normal job functions were put on hold?

PERRY: That is correct.

INTERVIEWER: When and how did you finally get back to doing your normal job? What was the situation then?

PERRY: It took probably about five or ten days for FEMA to actually take control of the site and start providing the support that was needed by the rescue personnel. The National Guard became involved as well, and things did not get better. They just became more in control. So our position here at the RSC was merely to be available to provide any additional support that was required by those at ground zero that were actually charged with the situation. . . . I had opportunities to go [to ground zero], but I’m a Vietnam veteran. I’ve seen enough of this. I didn’t want to go at that point in time. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Now as a result of 11 September, do you have statistics that you can tell us whether or not retention increased, decreased, or remained about the same?

PERRY: I can’t really provide you statistics. Trends I can. As far as trends are concerned, we did not have a mass exodus. Things are fairly normal here in the reserve units. The drills went on as usual. Some units were mobilized. Those units did not experience a lot of loss of soldiers leaving the reserves because of this [11 September]. . . . We received numerous phone calls from veterans who had been out of the service for . . . years who are . . . upset about what happened and were trying to figure out “How can I get back on active duty, or how can I get in the reserves and get mobilized with a mobilized unit.” [Veterans from the] fire department and police department, even though they were doing an awful lot with their own respective employment, wanted to actually get back into uniform. . . . We provided them the information to recruit them. We took down a lot of their information to pre-qualify them to see if in fact they were qualified. We have various programs and systems in place that can directly access their records to determine if they’re eligible. . . . If they have a break in service, we would provide them to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. If they were already in the service in an inactive status, we would provide them the necessary paperwork to transfer into units. . . . I think [retention] might have even gotten a little bit better because . . . of the shock of 9-11. Unlike Vietnam where everybody was turned off, I think it knitted the country together. And those already in [the service], were not afraid of being in. They wanted to stay in. As a matter of fact, . . . [retention] might have even had a slight improvement . . .

I understand how FEMA works, and I understand the levels of responsibility. Sometimes, however, being a member of the Army Reserve and having been directly involved in
the command post in the first hours, . . . it seemed . . . that we had all of this talent and assets in the 77th Regional Support Command Army Reserve, and yet we did not feel as though . . we were being utilized to our capacity when all around us they were bringing in National Guardsmen from all over the country. And this is our ground. This is our backyard. [These are] our people. I think that maybe the federal laws need to be changed a little bit so that when the situation stateside happens [again], that the Army Reserve has an important part in this whole scheme of things, not just the National Guard or FEMA. . . .

INTERVIEWER: That’s a good point because as you know the National Guard basically took over the perimeter security, and they posted soldiers at the tunnels and bridges.260

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260 Sergeant First Class Richard Perry, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, 27 March 2002.
Colonel John Skoll
Chapter 11

Army Reserve Colonel John Skoll, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics,
77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Colonel Skoll, an infantry officer, had twenty-eight years in the Army Reserve and two years active duty. As a civilian, he worked as an accountant.]

INTERVIEWER: Now on the day of the attack on the World Trade Center, 11 September, where were you and what were you doing?

SKOLL: I was on my way to my office here at the RSC headquarters from my home in New Jersey. I had gotten to the Outer Bridge Crossing, which connects New Jersey to Staten Island, New York, at just about the time the planes hit the World Trade Center. At that time, the police stopped everybody from crossing into New York across the bridges. . . . I was stuck . . . for approximately two hours. I checked in . . . with my office and told them that I did not think I was going to be able to get in, [that] I had heard what happened, [and that] the police were not letting anyone across the bridges. . . . I was directed to report to the 78th Division headquarters in Edison [New Jersey] as a liaison between the EPLOs, . . . the active duty, and the 78th Division. . . . I was the liaison there for the 77th RSC between the EPLO. In fact our EPLO, Colonel Walt Jankowski, was stuck there, also the active duty EPLO, Colonel [Kevin] Connors, and the 78th Division Commander [Major General James Helmly]. . . . I was at the 78th Division from Tuesday morning at [9:00 a.m.] until Friday morning when I was able to get back [to] . . . New York City. . . . I was attending meetings with FEMA, with the EPLOs, and with the organizing and coordinating of security . . . [and] providing daily information back and forth to . . . the RSC.

INTERVIEWER: Did FEMA request any equipment or storage space through you?

SKOLL: Not me directly. They were working through the active duty EPLO over there.

INTERVIEWER: When you reported here at Fort Totten, describe what your tasks were and what you did.

SKOLL: We provided manpower to the EOC, which was running seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. . . . All log[istical] and supply activities supported the World Trade Center crisis.
INTERVIEWER: All equipment requests came through your people. They received it, evaluated it, and if they could comply, they issued it out?

SKOLL: That is correct, yes.

INTERVIEWER: How would you evaluate how your mission went here at the 77th during this crisis period?

SKOLL: I thought it went very well considering that no one had ever participated in anything like this before, an event of such tragedy. I thought everybody was professional, well organized, prepared, coordinated, and executing properly. . . . I stayed here ten days. . . . It was my people doing all the work, the reservists and the full timers. . . . I was new to the 77th . . . . I have only been here for a year, and this is my first exposure to the 77th RSC and the New York people. . . . I was very impressed with the quality of the people and the caliber of their performance and activities.261

261 Colonel John Skoll, interview by Chief Warrant 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 2 February 2002.
Major Robert Henoch
Chapter 12

Army Reserve Major Robert Henoch, Commander, 142nd Transportation Detachment, 77th Regional Support Command, Fort Totten, New York

[Major Henoch had thirteen years of Army Reserve service and four years on active duty.]

INTERVIEWER: Sir, on 11 September 2001, where were you and what were you doing during the attack on the World Trade Center?

HENOCH: I work as an assistant district attorney in Manhattan. . . . That day I was going to a job interview . . . in New Jersey. I was on one of the last PATH [Port Authority Trans Hudson] trains that left the World Trade Center that morning. Another passenger on that train had been listening to a radio and informed the rest of us that airplanes had hit the World Trade Center. And I got to Newark, I could see what was happening, and I went to the job interview . . . at the U.S. Attorney’s Office. . . . They ended up closing the office. I left there about 10:30 a.m. and tried very hard to get back to the city, which was very difficult. I managed to talk a couple of police officers into driving me with their lights and sirens down to a dock where the ferry is. I took a ferry into the city, and then I took another ferry home to Brooklyn. I then ran home and changed into my uniform. Then I had my wife drop me off at the base of the Brooklyn Bridge. . . . There were buses. This was probably around two o’clock in the afternoon, maybe three, and there were buses that were taking emergency personnel into the city. I had my uniform on and my LCE [load carrying equipment] that I put on. I don’t even know why I bothered to put it on, but thought I might need it. The bus took me by myself, no questions asked, and I was dropped past most of the police barricades. Nobody was stopping anybody at that point because it was shortly enough after it happened. So that’s how I got downtown . . . I had a Kevlar on.

INTERVIEWER: When you got to the ground zero, what did you observe?

HENOCH: Basically, it was just catastrophe, people just sort of wandering around. . . . I started linking up with other people who were walking around in Army . . . and other uniforms. I actually met a couple of people from the RSC, nobody I knew at that time. . . . We started to organize ourselves into a work detail, and we took everybody’s names and numbers down. We organized ourselves into a couple of platoons and started to help set up . . . near Stuyvesant High School. After we had walked around right at ground zero for awhile, we started to help the police set up different areas. . . . Emergency services was setting up right across the street from the high school, and we started to get involved in every way we could. . . . Once we got ourselves organized, we started to scavenge around for equipment. . . . Supplies just started to sort of show up. It was everything we wanted. There were shovels . . . picks . . . tape . . .
flashlights. So we got ourselves all geared up and just started to work. It wasn’t a problem at all in the beginning, in terms of the police. We just started to work right on the site. . . . By the time we started, it was a little after dark, around eight or nine o’clock. . . . After we worked for several hours, our groups got split up. We slept that night across the street from Stuyvesant High School and . . . Borough of Manhattan Community College. . . . Someone had told us to set up a morgue. So we set up blankets and . . . body bags. . . . We just kept working all through that night in shifts. . . . [He remembered he may have only slept about half an hour that night.]

Every time people went out, someone would yell, “Who wants to go?” We would go out in six-ten-man teams and do what we could and help dig around. At that point, it was obvious that the fire department was taking control of the situation, and we were going wherever they told us to go. They were certainly happy to have anyone there who was willing to help. . . . I ended up staying for twelve or thirteen days. . . . The second night, the National Guard started to . . . take control of the situation. The second night we ended up staying . . . at one of his warehouses that Michael Bloomberg [who would become mayor of New York in January 2002] had given to us . . . on the West Side Highway. . . . He put us up in cots with sheets and everything and fed us. It was very nice of him. Then I would just go home at night and come back during the day. Eventually, the police required ID tags to get onto the site. A bunch of us just walked right up to the Guard people, told them that we were working, and they gave us ID cards. So we sort of came and went.

INTERVIEWER: You were working in an unofficial capacity then. Is that correct?

HENOCH: Yes, I was. On Friday [14 September], different people from the RSC were told that we could actually get put on orders to work. So I figured that would be a good way to stay down there and keep working. . . . The 1179th . . . Deployment Support Brigade . . . put me on orders . . . starting that Saturday. So, Tuesday to Friday [11 to 14 September], I was pretty much at the site the whole time. Then starting on that Saturday, I started to go to the unit during the day to help them organize because all the units were doing daily alerts. They had set up an EOC at Fort Hamilton, and I helped with that. At night, I and two other people from my unit, Captain Joe Mikalotta and Sergeant First Class Harry Bass. We would go down on our own, and we had the ID cards. So, we could come and go as we please, and then we would go down at night and work on the bucket brigades. . . . Literally all we were doing was working on the bucket brigade and whatever else needed to be done. . . . We were issued gloves, plastic helmets, and vests, and worked as long as we could. As the days went on, they’d start to move a lot of heavy equipment in. . . . The work of the bucket brigade sort of changed. We’d be working for an hour and then we would be pushed off the site for a couple of hours. We’d have to wait for the heavy equipment. Then we could go work for another hour or two. Then we’d be pushed off the site again. . . . During the first three or four days, you could have stayed at ground zero every minute
you wanted to because there weren’t a lot of people moving you off. But once they got the heavy equipment in there, the fire department started to regulate what we did.

INTERVIEWER: Were you with any other USAR soldiers at this time?

HENOCH: The Saturday [15 September] was when I probably started to work with two other reservists that I know . . . as well as many other police officers that I knew through the DA’s [District Attorney’s] office.

INTERVIEWER: What was your experience with the Army National Guard? Some soldiers told me that they were asked to leave. Did you experience this?

HENOCH: Yes, we were told on Thursday night that the Guard was in charge, and they didn’t want us around anymore. Basically . . . we just ignored them. . . . A bunch of us went right downtown and kept working. It was the next day, that Friday that we managed to get credentials so we could come and go as we pleased.

INTERVIEWER: On your last day, how did it come about? What made it the last day? Were you just tired? Did your orders expire? What happened on that last day?

HENOCH: No, I wasn’t tired. . . . There was less and less for us to do on the bucket brigade. It was also becoming much more of a fire department and construction-worker type scenario. The last couple of days we showed up, we would work for about fifteen minutes. And then we’d be told to move to the side for a few hours. Then we would work for a half hour. . . . It became clear that we just weren’t being used as much as we were in the past. . . . We felt like at that point the fire department wanted to be completely in charge of the site. OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] had started to show up, and they were requiring everybody to wear special boots and special uniforms and things like that. So there wasn’t much for us to do. And that was the only reason we stopped going. There just wasn’t much for us to do.

INTERVIEWER: Regarding safety, were you wearing safety goggles at any part of the time?

HENOCH: I wore goggles when I was on the bucket brigade because there was a lot of metal. . . . You didn’t want to get one of your eyes stabbed with a piece of metal. And they had respirators, which got progressively better. Every day, some new respirator would show up that they would insist on you wearing. After a few days, maybe it was a week, they started to actually fit you for the respirators. They wouldn’t let you onto the site unless you had . . . one of these new respirators.
INTERVIEWER: Sir, were there any problems that you experienced, and if so, how did you handle them?

HENOCH: . . . Most of the guys that I met were reservists, . . . Guard, . . . active duty people on leave. We just sort of formed into this big motley crew in those first three or four days. But as the Guard began to flex its muscles, that was a little bit irritating that they seemed to be more concerned with getting us out of there than getting the work done. Most of the Guardsmen weren’t from New York City, and we . . . really felt pissed off [sic] by that, and I lost a couple of people that I knew. . . . I didn’t know they were missing at the time. . . . We felt a deep connection to this place, since we live here. I live only two miles from the World Trade Center. . . . Other than that, I thought the city’s response was very impressive in terms of how quickly they organized for this thing, given that nobody had any sort of experience with this type of crisis. . . . We did see [Lieutenant] General Plewes and our general, [Brigadier] General Colt, commander, 77th Regional Support Command]. We thought we would be in trouble being down there, so we ran from them. A couple of drills ago, someone introduced me to General Colt because he knew I’d been down there. After telling him the story, he said he wished that we had come up to him and talked to him. He would have been happy to meet us down there. We just didn’t know if we would get in trouble, so that was just kind of amusing.²⁶²

²⁶² Major Robert Henoch, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 5 January 2002.
Sergeant Major Joanna Pittman
Chapter 13

Army Reserve Sergeant Major Joanna Pittman, Supply Supervisor, 353rd Civil Affairs Command, Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, New York

[Sergeant Major Pittman had twenty-four years in the Army.]

INTERVIEWER: On 11 September 2001, where were you and what were you doing at the time of the attack on the World Trade Center?

PITTMAN: I was at the new reserve center at 208 Drum Road on Fort Wadsworth... going through the new building, taking down room... jack... and telephone numbers so that we could set up the telephone architecture for the new system. My cell phone rang, and it was my sister calling from Oklahoma City. She was a little upset and wanted to know if I was okay. Well, I didn’t know at the time what was going on. She let me know that the first plane had crashed into the Trade Center. Then the phone... cut off. She called me back... ten or fifteen minutes later, again in a panic and said did I know that a second plane had hit the Trade Center? At that time... we didn’t because the building doesn’t have phones or radios. ...

INTERVIEWER: Did there come a time when you eventually went down to ground zero?

PITTMAN: Yes, it was several days later. What I did first was I went to the overlook on Fort Wadsworth. I could see Manhattan from there. I could see the devastation that occurred there. Once the Trade Center disaster happened, they kind of locked down Staten Island. It wasn’t until the next morning, then I was able to talk my way off of it using my [military] ID card and get across the Verrazano [Bridge] and get back out here to the Bronx.

INTERVIEWER: So you’re saying it took several days for you to get to your unit in the Bronx. How did it come about that you went down... to ground zero?

SGM PITTMAN: Captain [Brian] Goldstein had been working at ground zero, and at that time we were running a twenty-four operation here. And so, although we wanted to get faster down to ground zero, we were constrained by duty to have to stay here and run the operation center. But I think it was Friday night, which would have been the 14th. Captain Goldstein, myself, and Sergeant First Class [Rafael] Gomez geared up in BDUs [battle dress uniform] and kevlar and LBE [load bearing equipment], and went down to ground zero. We got all the way down to where the last barrier was, and we were directed into the school... [where]... they told us in there that we had to have special badges to get into ground zero to help. When they found out
that we were Army Reservists and Active Guard and Reservists [AGRs], and Sergeant Gomez is AC [active component], they told us we couldn’t go down. . . . They didn’t need our help because we weren’t National Guard. . . . So they kind of turned us around. We went out to the armory at 66th and Park [Avenue] and went upstairs and talked to . . . a chaplain . . . [and] got [on] their volunteer list. Sergeant Gomez knew one of the female NCOs working there, and she told us [to] come back in the morning, and she’ll . . . try to hook [us] . . . up with the crew that’s going out to work. So we came back Saturday morning. . . . She hooked us up with a steel worker who’s a president of a company who on the 11th, dropped everything he was doing, pulled all out his guys off of this job . . . and brought them all down to the disaster area and started working. Well, he had to go over to Park Avenue to get authorization for all of his guys to be down there. . . .

INTERVIEWER: So you used some connections to get down to ground zero. When you arrived there, what did you do and what did you observe?

PITTMAN: We were riding around with . . . an iron worker. And we get down to ground zero and . . . the first thing that you start seeing is the dust. It’s like a gradual change from nice, clean streets . . . to . . . it’s a little dirtier, . . . then it’s complete devastation. We walked . . . right at the base of the World Trade Center, and . . . we’re standing there with . . . the iron worker. . . . Sergeant Gomez and I are both supply sergeants by trade, and we’re looking at this huge mass of steel, and both of us are thinking, “I don’t know anything about steel working.” . . . We didn’t have any protective gear because the National Guard wouldn’t let us down there in uniform. So we had to leave our . . . military stuff behind. So I sent Sergeant Gomez out to go find us some hard hats. When he came back about five minutes later, [he] grabbed me by the arms and said, “Sergeant Major, you need to come here. You need to see this.” He drove me over to the corner . . . right at ground zero [where] they had a Burger King. . . . Inside was where all the volunteer relief supplies were coming in. . . . This place, it was a mad house. . . . There was one poor [man] in charge of it, and he had no clue as to what he had or what people needed, and everything was just in a huge pile. . . . He was so happy to see us. . . . We told him we were supply sergeants. . . . We organize things. We account for things. We can take care of him. He was just so ecstatic. That’s basically what Sergeant Gomez and I did for the next two or three days. . . . We helped coordinate the volunteer relief supplies. We got rid of the garbage that was up there and we organized . . . the boots and the shoes and the batteries and the flashlights and the respirators. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Do you feel that the National Guard treated you unfairly?

PITTMAN: Absolutely. I mean we’re not just . . . off of the street. We’re trained professional soldiers, and we have the self-discipline necessary to get the job done. . . . I understand their
position . . . to keep to a minimum the number of gawkers. . . . I just felt that they were throwing away a resource because I wasn’t wearing a National Guard patch.

**INTERVIEWER:** Were there any other problems you encountered?

**PITTMAN:** Again, it all centers on the fact that we weren’t National Guard. . . . We really had to sneak into ground zero. The first day the iron worker got us in. The second day I had to call this guy named Jay. . . . We just felt that [the] . . . relief center was so disorganized that we needed to . . . try to help.

[**Sergeant Major Pittman worked three days at ground zero and explained why she finally left.**] The fire department came in and cleared the entire ground zero. . . . The only people allowed back in were the people that had the authorized issued badge. And they were understanding. They knew that we wanted to help, but they were under orders, and there was just nothing that we could do.²⁶³

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²⁶³ Sergeant Major Joanna Pittman, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 7 December 2001.
First Lieutenant Matthew Goodman
Chapter 14

Army Reserve First Lieutenant Matthew Goodman, Executive Officer,
140th Quartermaster Company, Fort Totten, New York

[First Lieutenant Goodman was also the platoon leader of the clothing, exchange, and bath platoon. On the morning of 11 September, he and four members of his unit were at their Army Reserve center preparing to go to Fort Dix, New Jersey, for ten days for weapons qualifications and briefings.]

GOODMAN: On Sergeant Young’s radio . . . we heard that a plane had flown into the Twin Towers and then another plane flew into the Twin Towers. . . . Then we started receiving phone calls from the battalion commander to send everybody home and then go on a full alert.

[The battalion commander called the unit between 10 and 11 a.m. The unit also received phone calls from full-time staff and more calls from the battalion commander. Among the communications: to lock the reserve building and go home. They continued to listen to the radio. Sometime in the afternoon, they went home. Later, they were called back into the unit.]

INTERVIEWER: And who was there that day, that morning?


INTERVIEWER: So then what happened?

GOODMANN: [At home] I was watching the television about what was going on at the World Trade Center. I was very surprised and astonished watching the building collapse on TV. I stayed home for a few hours in the late afternoon. Approximately 15:00 [3:00 p.m.], I received a call that our unit has been mobilized. It was a verbal authorization to report to the unit. . . . I grabbed a few uniforms [and] took my vehicle and drove into Fort Totten. At that point, vehicles were being searched at the gate. There were MPs. So we were at the highest level of mobilization possible. Everything was very secure. I went to my reserve unit [and] helped organize the “grazing herd,” [accountability and alert roster] which we were trying to notify everybody in our unit to support. Everything was being handled through phone calls. It was very disorganized coming from the 695th Corps Support Battalion trying to get accountability from the 301st [Area] Support [Group] operations. . . . Missions were coming in that we were going to either Bronx Lebanon Hospital to set up an overflow site . . . for any casualties, for morgue operations, to set up a temporary mortuary affairs. At approximately 18:30 [6:30 p.m.], First Sergeant Allen and his crew had vehicles loaded with tents and equipment. And they were
going to one of the sites. I didn’t know which site, and neither did anybody due to the confusing
information that was coming in. I went to the 301st Area Support Group. They said to me that
they were going to Jacobi Hospital, and I was going to be the second wave. I was trying to
secure transportation. The 301st Area Support Group has a Blue Bird bus that can hold . . . sixty
[or] seventy passengers. . . . I was in constant communication with Sergeant Allen telling us that
we needed certain equipment that he forgot to bring. . . . I brought him down what we needed.

INTERVIEWER: What was taking place during those four hours while waiting at Fort
Totten?

GOODMANN: The five-ton [trucks] that brought the equipment down came back, [and] we
loaded them up again with bath units and generators and a forklift. . . . We needed more heavy
type equipment to move around the pumps and generators in order to set up the bath operation.
More troops started arriving. . . . The police escort . . . took us down to Jacobi Hospital Medical
Center site where we had approximately twenty-eight people to work on setting up all these
tents. My mission guidance was to set up four . . . tents to use as mortuary affairs tents, . . . one
TOC [tactical operations center] as my command center, . . . one . . . clothing and exchange bath
operations tent, and one mess tent for food service. . . . I went back to Fort Totten, and I left a
contingent . . . with First Sergeant Allen. . . . They set up everything to be operational. . . .

[The 140th staff worked at Jacobi Hospital about six weeks.] My directives were coming
pretty much from the . . . 695th Corps Support Battalion. All the managers at the Jacobi Medical
Center were there just to support us. . . . We were on standby . . . on alert, and the site [was] . . .
ever used because the mortuary in Manhattan . . . was . . . [handling] all the parts and bodies
that were coming in. . . . They didn’t have a lot of actual bodies. It was mostly parts. In the
borough of Manhattan . . . there is where they do the DNA testing. So Jacobi actually would
have been a site more for decontamination and temporary storage of excess body parts that
Manhattan mortuary couldn’t handle. . . . The expectation that we originally had was to set up the
site as a nuclear, biological, chemical [NBC] decontamination site in case there was any residual
. . . attacks. Jacobi Medical Center is a designated site for the city that can respond and treat
[NBC] attacks. . . . They have all the antidotes, and they have trained medical personnel that
know how to treat these types of injuries. . . . We can treat, provide decontamination showers . . .
whether it be body parts or personnel or casualties. . . .

[He described other activities at Jacobi.] There were many roadblocks and check points
to get into the hospital. Roads . . . were closed, . . . and there really was just military traffic on
the roads. There were many missions that the 140th were doing – driving missions going down
to ground zero and bringing equipment to us, whether it be generators, heaters. . . . So there were
daily missions coming down to our support office, as well as other units that were down at
ground zero using our equipment: tents for the FBI, generators, . . . food service personnel to
cook for the FBI, . . . cots, blankets, medical supplies that we were transporting that came from 
the 344th General Hospital [and] . . . also to get equipment we had at other locations – at Fort 
Dix and Fort Drum, ECS [extended core storage]. . . . Morale was very good. We had our 
chaplain coming down daily to spend time with us. We had morale welfare recreation setup in 
my TOC. Jacobi Hospital personnel . . . were visiting all the time. They were very curious [at] 
what was going on, and they were very impressed and thanking us everyday for being there.

There were many visitors coming around – Fernando Ferrerer [Bronx Borough president] 
down to the site, and the deputy commanding general, Colonel [William] Terpeluk. . . . Three 
days after we setup [16 September], General [Thomas] Plewes . . . came down with the staff 
from the 77th RSC to inspect the site. . . . He was curious how the building exchange bath 
operation actually worked. [He] wanted to see the showers run, which we showed him. . . . We 
had . . . mortuary affairs tents setup with tables and lights and had canvas bags and all the 
equipment necessary. . . . He interviewed a lot of enlisted personnel that setup the site as well as 
myself. . . . He congratulated us that we did an excellent job and was very impressed. And then 
he went down to inspect the site at ground zero. . . . We had a staff of five on the day shift plus 
myself, so that’s six, and then five on the evening shift. We went twelve-hour shifts. . . . I 
believe it was [from] six in the morning to six at night – six at night to six in the morning.

INTERVIEWER: Did you face any challenges with setting up your operation in that first two 
or three days?

GOODMANN: Yes. [It was] very difficult to setup tents at the sites. We needed two different 
types of tents, . . . frame tents that would fit on concrete . . . and the other tents that needed 
wooden pegs . . . [to] set up on the grassy areas around the cement site. . . . The hospital provided 
us security. . . . Also the clothing-exchange bath . . . needed electricity so we had electricians 
come down from Jacobi to run us lines for light in the tents.

INTERVIEWER: How did the operation end?

GOODMANN: Our battalion commander called me and said he wants to break down the site 
slowly, that it’s not official but when the official word comes down, we’d be ready. . . . We were 
on active duty special orders.

INTERVIEWER: Can you evaluate your current training or past training and the relevance of 
that training to this operation and maybe indicate any positive or any negative lessons that can be 
learned in preparing for this mission?
GOODMANN: Two years ago we went to the National Training Center out in Fort Irwin, California, which is a desert environment where we actually setup and conducted clothing exchange/bath operations and laundry operations. And we were in a wartime environment where we had to setup a perimeter and actually man the perimeter with foxholes and weapons. . . . We had to setup tents and equipment in a certain amount of time and get it operational. . . . As for the horrors that we . . . faced, I don’t think the unit was prepared emotionally for that, especially from the lower enlisted and even myself.

INTERVIEWER: Are you referring to the anticipated casualties that were expected to come to your area?

GOODMANN: Correct. What we expected was body parts coming in. We were going to act as pallbearers along with the mortuary affairs personnel that were going to be in the tents.

INTERVIEWER: What were the concerns in dealing with body parts?

GOODMANN: . . . A lot of them [the troops] haven’t seen any dead bodies. It’s a laundry and clothing exchange bath unit. We really don’t deal with mortuary affairs type work, which we were being tasked to do. It was nothing this unit personnel couldn’t handle. But in order to mentally prepare us for these challenges, we underwent counseling by the 695th Corps Support Battalion chaplain, . . . Captain [William] Heisterman. . . . He came down twice daily . . . to visit us. . . . He counseled us and talked and held services for us on the weekends when we had counseling sessions about our feelings. . . . He also brought his TV . . . and Play Station [game center].

INTERVIEWER: Is there anything else that you would like to say?

GOODMANN: Both the 77th RSC chaplain, Major Sosa, came down and conducted counseling sessions with us along with [our] chaplain. . . . We had as part of our equipment a forklift, and on a daily basis we provided the fire department with forklift support because trailers were coming down to the Jacobi operations site for our donated goods. So we needed to offload the trailers so the trailers could go back to where they came from because they had limited space. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Are there any lessons learned from this experience for perhaps the next time, if the next time was to happen, Lieutenant?

GOODMANN: The lesson learned is that you don’t have to be prepared for a specific type mission. . . . We’re a laundry and bath unit operation, and yet we curtailed the unit to perform mortuary affairs operations. . . . That if you’re in the Army, [you can] be tasked to do anything.
You don’t have to actually do something that’s in your specialty in case of a big emergency like this... As a soldier in the unit, you can be told to do anything."^{264}

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^{264} First Lieutenant Matthew Goodman, interview with Major Robert Bensburg, tape recording with transcript, 14 February 2002.
Sergeant First Class Harry Bass
Chapter 15

Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Harry Bass, Traffic Management Coordinator, 1179th Deployment Support Brigade, Fort Hamilton, New York

[Sergeant First Class Bass had twenty years in the Army. His unit’s mission was to help deploy active duty units to their duty station. On 22 October 2001, he was called to active duty for Operation NOBLE EAGLE.]

INTERVIEWER: On September 11, 2001, where were you and what were you doing at the time of the attack on the World Trade Center?

BASS: I was driving in my car on the Van Wyck Expressway in Queens . . . when I heard about the attacks. I immediately called my reserve unit on my cell phone and asked them if we needed to report to the unit for further instructions. We were told to stay in a stand-by status. . . .

[On the evening of 11 September, he went to ground zero.] Volunteers started to go down there on their own to help in any way they could, whether it be on the bucket brigade or whatever they needed. . . . I went with Major [Robert] Henoch, with another unit within the reserves, and with a Captain [Joe] Michalotta, who is also in the 1179th. . . . We took a civilian car. There were check points, but actually it was very fast because there weren’t many vehicles on the road. We assisted on the bucket brigades in taking out the debris, bucket by bucket. We did that for many hours. . . . We were trying to help in the rescue effort to find survivors. . . . We only found dead bodies. . . . By the time I [had] gotten there, the towers had already come down.

[He worked on the bucket brigades in civilian clothes as an unpaid volunteer for six to twelve hours a day for about a week. He saw other workers in military uniforms.]

Most of them were in the National Guard, . . . but there were many reservists who . . . were volunteers on their own. They weren’t paid; they just showed up on their own time and did whatever they could. . . . It got to the point where they were doing less of a rescue operation and more of a recovery. So they really didn’t need the amount of people that were there at the beginning.

INTERVIEWER: Did you come to that conclusion or did some city official perhaps down at ground zero ask you to leave?
BASS: Well, they never actually asked us to leave. It’s just that they were doing less of pulling debris out by hand and more of a machinery operation at that time. Eventually it got to be a safety hazard.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁵ Sergeant First Class Harry Bass, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 12 December 2002.
Sergeant First Class James Farran
Chapter 16

Army Reserve Sergeant First Class James Farran, First Sergeant, 1179th Deployment Support Brigade, Fort Hamilton, New York

[First Sergeant Farran had thirty-one years of service.]

INTERVIEWER: On September 11, 2001, at the time of the attack on the World Trade Center, where were you and what were you doing?

FARRAN: [In] my civilian occupation I work for the New York Board of Trade at 4 World Trade Center. It’s one of the . . . shorter buildings at the foot of both towers — nine stories tall.
. . . I was in the cafeteria getting a bagel at that particular moment . . . when the building was struck with the airplane. Not knowing it was an airplane, I immediately looked out the window and saw the explosion, saw all of the debris falling down to the courtyard in the middle of the two towers where people would normally walk to the Trade Center. [I was] watching the people scatter . . . holding their hands over their heads to shelter their heads as debris started to fall down. . . . I stood there for about five to ten minutes watching the fire and making phone calls to people from that location letting them know what was going on, not realizing that it was a plane that hit the Trade Center, just thinking it was an explosion and watching the fire. . . . I had noticed everybody . . . running down the hallway. . . . I walked up the steps and stood at the foot of 4 World Trade Center adjacent to Tower Two — the southern tower of the Trade Center making sure that we have all our employees out. . . .

The second plane hit right above our heads. . . . And then [there was] another explosion, and all the debris started to fall on our heads. That was a little more frightening because we were a little closer. I was outside the building watching the explosion. It sounded like you were at an airport hearing the plane roar its engines as it hit the building. . . . Everybody knew it was a plane. It just penetrated the building and came out the other side. Myself and everyone else who was standing at the foot of the building, all ran to the little park that’s adjacent across from Church Street. . . . The debris in the air . . . and dust . . . was something that you couldn’t believe

[He saw people get hit by falling debris, though at the time he didn’t know if anyone was killed.]

I . . . just started to move as quickly as possible. . . . We all think that we’re trained and we know what we’re going to do but you never really know until it happens. You see the best of people running for their own lives and you have to pretty much save yourselves so you can save someone else. . . . Right now you’re just protecting your head from debris running. . . . We eventually stopped right on Broadway watching both buildings on fire burning. . . . We started to
collect some of our people that we know to make sure that everyone that we worked with was
out of the building and safe. And as we were standing there, all of a sudden [there was] the
sound of slapping. . . . The floors started to collapse. . . . Every time we’d hear a slap, it was a
floor caving in . . . where the plane hit. . . . Tower Two just stayed almost erect and just cocked a
little to the left and came down almost in slow motion. . . . The people I was standing with . . .
stood there . . . frozen to the ground.

When the building eventually [fell] . . . to the ground and the cloud started to engulf us,
we started to run thinking the debris was going to start hitting us. . . . I may have taken maybe
five or six steps, realizing that I would never make it down the block without something hitting
me in the back. So I made a 180 [degree turn] back to where I was standing and ducked behind
this monument that was part of the decoration of a building outside the front of the building.
And we just crouched down behind it and held our breaths. . . . I believe what saved me from
dying . . . was some other fellow workers . . . gave me a bottle of water. . . . I was able to put that
in my mouth and try to breathe through it and breathe through the drinking water and spit out till
the cloud eventually dissipated. . . . The plane never came out of the building. The plane went
inside the building, never came out. . . . It went in one end, the other end . . . [and] just a fireball
came out the other side of the Trade Center. . . . From there . . . we were being engulfed as it
went from daylight to pitch black. . . . There were two girls with me. . . . As the debris started, as
the sky turned black, she made a cellular phone call, . . . screaming on the phone to whoever had
called her, “We’re going to die, we’re going to die.” . . . The other young lady I was standing
with was saying, “Are we buried alive? We’re buried alive.”

The two things that went through my head were that I never thought I would die
suffocating. I thought I would die of old age. . . . I just called my father earlier to inform him
that I was okay and I was out of the building. . . . When the cloud dissipated somewhat, . . . there
was a side door of the building we were standing next to. The door opened up [and] some people
came out. . . . I couldn’t see much because of the debris in my eyes and the burning from the air
[which] had gasoline in it. We were all choking. One of the custodians . . . had gotten a five-
gallon bottle of water. . . to try to flush our eyes and our mouths. . . . Everybody [who] came in
that doorway looked like they just went through a ringer. We were all trying to help each other,
. . . taking dirt out of our eyes. . . . We stayed there a while and then we went back up to the
lobby level. . . . Somebody was walking around [who] had a cell phone that was working. My
cell phone stopped working . . . probably because the antennae was on top of the building . . . He
had called my father letting him know again that I was okay. . . . We went out the back door, . . .
[and] we started to the East River where the air was . . . a little better. The wind was blowing
toward . . . Brooklyn and that’s the way we were going, toward the east side. . . . Some of the
people [who] had sandwich stores and storefronts were giving us water. . . . A truck driver let his
doors open. [We were] listening to the radio telling us that the Pentagon was just struck. And I
just said, “What the hell is going on?” I said, “Gee, I can’t believe this is happening.”
You know I worked in the Trade Center since they built the building practically and watched all the improvements in the courtyard [and] the shows they used to put on in the summer. Just imagining [if] they [had] hit it later in the day or a month or two sooner, they would have killed thousands of people watching shows... The building opened up just like a banana. The floors fell right through the middle of it, and the outer skin just fell apart—just peeled away... From my vantage point there was a building obstructing me looking between the two towers. Anybody who was standing watching the two buildings burn [who] was able to look between the buildings... were seeing people fall. [From] my vantage point, I didn’t see it. There were people standing next to me saying they just came from that side... They were saying people were jumping out of the building right in front of them.

Well after the building fell down... I had walked to the East Side and then eventually walked to the Brooklyn Bridge and crossed over... Everybody was walking across the bridge like zombies... [These were] people who were buried with the dust like I was or people who were fortunate enough to be in the building and outran it or stayed away from it, the dust. I guess it’s sort of insulation or fire retardant [from the World Trade Center]. From there... I got [on] a bus to [ride to]... my father... He picked me up and drove me home...

INTERVIEWER: Did you go back to ground zero any other days after you left there or was that your only time there?

FARRAN: ... [Since] I was in the reserve, a few days later I was called to [duty for] sixteen days... When I was off duty, some of our soldiers... went down there a couple of days later to help out with the buckets [brigade]... to do whatever we possibly could... We were there approximately three days... I saw them carry three garbage black bags – I don’t think [they were] body bags... I know body bags. I’ve been in Vietnam, and I’ve seen body bags. They have handles on them. These bags looked like garbage bags and [it] took three people to carry one of them... I could only assume the person was a heavy person... The whole package couldn’t have been more than two and a-half feet long. I guess it didn’t have the extremities of the person... When I wasn’t there, I was working here [in the Army Reserve unit]. Either I slept here or I went to my father’s house.

INTERVIEWER: So basically during those three days that you came to ground zero, you were a volunteer manning the bucket brigade, meaning that these buckets or pails would be filled with debris and passed along a chain like in the old days when they manned a water brigade by putting out fires. Is that correct?

FARRAN: That’s correct... The buckets were emptied in a pile... You couldn’t bring in heavy equipment because you never know what you can grab with the heavy equipment. You can grab a person... As they were emptied, someone would carry twenty buckets inside one
another and they would be brought back to the starting line, [and] the firemen would fill them up again . . .

**INTERVIEWER:** Did you have any problems getting into the ground zero site or passing the check points? How did that work out?

**FARRAN:** We had someone who had a little [authority]. . . . Some people were civilian policemen and that helped. . .

**INTERVIEWER:** Did you run into any other military people such as the National Guard?

**FARRAN:** Yes, we had seen some National Guard people there. They were pretty much pulling security.

**INTERVIEWER:** We have reports that some of them did not welcome Army Reserve soldiers. Did you have that experience?

**FARRAN:** Personally, I didn’t have it myself. . . . I heard stories, but I did not see it for myself.

**INTERVIEWER:** So on the third day, how and why did your volunteering come to an end? How did that occur?

**FARRAN:** After awhile, I think we had enough because I work there and never could realize that I won’t be going back there again. But the whole area where I used to sit and have lunch, talk to people, watch the shows in the summer, just can’t imagine that it’s not there . . . everything from the ground sub basements all the way to the 107th floor. . . . I got called to active duty on October 21. The 1179th Deployment Support Brigade was activated, . . . and we were under [the] MTMC, Military Traffic Management Command, and that’s who we report to in Virginia. . . . I couldn’t really say so much [about the mission] because some of it’s classified, but we move people . . . and equipment . . .

**INTERVIEWER:** And you’re stationed in Virginia at this time?

**FARRAN:** My home station is right here, [Fort Hamilton] but our duty station is Fort Eustis, Virginia. That’s where MTMC is.

**INTERVIEWER:** Now on your civilian job, when you go back to it, what’s there? Describe those circumstances. Have those people been relocated?
FARRAN: Fortunately, the company had the foresight to have a disaster recovery site in Long Island City [Queens]. It was a building they had rented for years just sitting dormant with equipment and booths – trading booths with people who work [with] phones and trading pits . . . . We trade commodities at the New York Board of Trade. Unbeknownst to us, this building was really designed for a power outage or a shortage or something minor only . . . for a day or two, at most, a week. . . . There were quite a few trading pits that trade at the Trade Center. When we got to this building, fortunately it didn’t need too much to get it going. . . .

It is a crying shame what had happened . . . how someone can go after civilians. I guess that’s the way that part of the world fights their wars. . . . It could’ve been worse. I mean they could’ve hit the building at 12:00 [p.m.]. They could’ve hit 42nd Street at New Year’s Eve. They did take out a lot of people, and they destroyed a lot of real estate – probably the most prime real estate. And I don’t think anything will ever be the same again. Just traveling in traffic – just going one place to another – nothing’s the same any more.266

266 Sergeant First Class James Farran, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2, tape recording with transcript, 6 January 2002.
First Lieutenant Kurt Godbey
Chapter 17

Army Reserve First Lieutenant Kurt Godbey, Logistics Officer,
344th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Totten, New York

[First Lieutenant Godbey had three years in the active duty Army and three years Army Reserve
time. At the time of this interview, he was an Active Guard Reserve soldier and had two years in
his current unit.]

GODBEY: My job is to manage equipment and supplies. I requisition the supplies needed for
the hospital and manage moving equipment and hospital medical equipment that needs to be
calibrated and maintained to run the hospital.

INTERVIEWER: Do you recall what you were doing on September 11, 2001, at the time of
the attack on the World Trade Center?

GODBEY: Yes, . . . I had an alternate AT. . . . I have . . . hospital equipment . . . to train our
people here at the unit. We were [taking inventory of] equipment at the time. We could see the
smoke from the towers after it happened. We heard the commotion. We could even smell the
scent of the smoke from it blowing this way. So after the 11th, there was a big change on how
things were going on. That day was probably the most memorable for me because after that it’s
never been the same here in the unit. . . . We had the opportunity to bring more people on to plan
for being mobilized. . . . [We began by] calling our staff to make sure [our reservists were ] okay.
It was a real wakeup call for the unit and some people [answered] the call. I’ve seen a great deal
of patriotism during that time.

INTERVIEWER: Describe how it changed your work day. What did you do that was
different?

GODBEY: I was on alert twenty-four hours a day. We went on work shifts. It [was] probably
the hardest two weeks after 9-11 that I had since I’ve been here at Fort Totten. . . . We were on a
high alert status waiting on whatever was going to happen. Tensions were high, and it was a sit
and wait kind of standstill. It kind of helped me as the logistics officer here with the extra staff
that came in. We got ready for our . . . inspection. We managed more inventories. We really
got things done while we were waiting on everything to take place. So it was a stand and wait
kind of posture. . . . I mean my work day was probably fourteen to sixteen hours a day for two
weeks. [They] were the hardest two weeks in my life.

[He explained other unit activities.] We loaned cots to the police department here at Fort
Totten. . . . We loaned six to the canine unit here. . . . We loaned more cots down at Fort
Hamilton to a [National] Guard unit. I think it was over fifty cots we loaned down there. We gave up our body bags to the [Jacobi] Bronx hospital. . . . We also took our trucks and moved the 140th [Quartermaster Company] to Jacobi . . . [and] helped them move their equipment. . . . As we went into the Bronx, it was the first time I’d seen people cheer people in uniform. . . . It was a very patriotic day. . . . We got out [of] the convoy. We lined up our vehicles. We unloaded tents. We unloaded generators. We talked to the hospital personnel [about] where they wanted their equipment, where they wanted the water buffaloes. . . . We helped move the stuff into place. . . . We worked with the 140th. They had their first sergeant down there running the show for them. He knew what was going on and we worked closely with him. . . . His crew . . . set up the tents for the makeshift morgue hoping if they needed it that would be the overflow from whatever happened down in the city. . . . That was the only trip I had made to Jacobi. The rest of the time I managed on getting my staff there. We gave food service personnel to cook soup and hot coffee for the people who were working there . . . .

[He was not at Jacobi Hospital when Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes visited on 16 September. The three people who made the trip with him that day were: Sergeants Leanne Gouveia, Carroll Jefferson, and Lisa Hammonds.]

We also loaned out a refrigerator . . . here at Totten to use to refrigerate food for the extra soldiers that were on Totten. . . . For about two weeks we had breakfast, lunch, and dinner here at Fort Totten, which was like . . . an active duty unit here. I mean we were running full steam there for two weeks. So it was a very . . . exciting time to be here . . . .

We never went to ground zero. We were told not to go to ground zero unless we were directed to. We were not part of that support. There were many people who went to ground zero, but our staff was not directed to do so. . . . Jacobi was the only time I went out to do anything for this event, other [than] manning my personnel at Jacobi. . . . We loaned [equipment] to the Guard, we loaned to the canine unit, and we also loaned to the fire department. . . . We collected everything back. We even loaned M-9s to the MPs. . . . We were here at Totten and the MPs were just getting activated, and they didn’t have all of their equipment accessible at the time. So the first week here we loaned M-9s to the MP unit here at Totten. We loaned rounds [ammunition] to the MPs because I had enough rounds to securely move my weapons from one location to another. . . . Everything that we loaned out we received back other than the body bags, which we didn’t want back. . . . It was a very vivid experience, the 9-11. I was surprised at the patriotism I saw in the people of this country and the soldiers and staff here at Fort Totten. It was a very learning experience.267

267 First Lieutenant Kurt Godbey, interview by Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 1 April 2002.
Sergeant Harold Ross
Chapter 18

Army Reserve Sergeant Harold Ross, 344th Combat Support Hospital, Fort Totten, New York

[As a civilian, Sergeant Ross worked for the Jersey City [New Jersey] Police Department as safe haven director for an after-school program.]

ROSS: On 11 September I had planned to go to my office early and get a head start on some work. When I awoke that morning my fiancée, Angie, told me that our daughter, Natori, was not feeling well. . . . This meant that I would have to stay home or bring Natori to work with me. . . . I decided to work from home instead of going in early. Still, Natori and I had to bring Angie to work and then return home where I would begin my work for the day. . . . After bringing Angie to work, Natori and I started on our way back to Woodbridge. We were on the New Jersey Turnpike very close to exit 12 when I heard the DJ [disc jockey] for the morning radio show that I listen to [WBLS] announce that an airplane had just hit the World Trade Center [also referred to as WTC]. My initial thought was that some idiot in a Cessna flew off course and hit one of the towers, but that wasn't the case. I got to my exit and paid the toll collector who was watching a small television. He told me that a passenger plane flew into one of the towers. I paid the toll and raced home to turn on the television. When I got home and turned on the TV . . . I picked up the phone and called my fiancée to see if she knew what was going on since her office is directly across the river from the WTC. She knew what was happening and so did everyone in her office. In fact, some of her coworkers, including her supervisor, went to the roof or a higher floor to get a better look. While on the phone with Angie, I heard screams in the background, and Angie herself began to scream and cry out loud saying that another plane had hit the other tower. . . . She told me that people were running for the doors and that she was going to join them. I told her to go to my mother's house, and I would call her there. We ended our call and my phone rang. When I picked up and said, “Hello,” I was surprised to hear my sister, Carolyn, on the other line crying. She said, “Are we being attacked?” I said, “It looks like we are.” While talking on the phone with Carolyn and watching the news, I read a message that flashed across the screen. The message said, "The Pentagon has been hit by a plane and is on fire." I told my sister that I couldn't talk anymore, that I had to get to my unit.

I hung up the phone, went to my bedroom, and started packing my duffle bag. I grabbed a couple of uniforms, my boots, and [a] few other essentials. I told my daughter to come with me, and we loaded the stuff into the car and headed back to Jersey City. I had a hunch that the NJ [New Jersey] turnpike would be backed up, and I thought that my chances of making it into Jersey City would be better if I drove through the towns taking Route 1 North. I made it as far as the outskirts of Newark International Airport before Route 1 became too congested. I took an on
ramp to Interstate-78 East which I knew would give me access to the NJ Turnpike extension that led to Bayonne and Jersey City. After less than 1/4 mile, I ran into another traffic back-up. Looking ahead I could see a New Jersey state trooper car close to the shoulder of the road. I made my way to the shoulder, drove up to the state trooper, and told him that I had to go into Jersey City. As it turned out, traffic was backed up because he and other troopers were not allowing anyone access to the extension. This particular extension leads to Liberty State Park in Jersey City and the Holland Tunnel. The trooper asked why I had to go, and I told him that I am a soldier in the Army, and I had to get by. He asked for my ID card, and I showed it to him and also showed my uniform in the car. He told to me to go back to my car and wait for his signal. When I got back to my car I looked at the trooper, and he signaled me forward while making other drivers move out of my way. I gave him a thumbs up as I passed him and raced across the extension to Exit 14B and then to my mother’s house.

At my mother’s house, I found my older sister, Cherry, my friend and a former Marine, William, who had an appointment in New York that morning and had taken the path train from Jersey City to the World Trade Center. As it turned out, the planes hit the towers before his train made it to the WTC, and he and the other passengers were rerouted to 34th Street in New York and then back to Jersey City. Needless to say he was quite upset, and I was glad to see him at the house. . . . The TV was on and everyone was watching in shock at what was going on. I took my uniform upstairs, changed, and asked my friend, Kelly, to drive me to Exchange Place. Exchange Place is Jersey City’s business hub and is located on the city’s eastside waterfront directly across from the WTC. I suspected Exchange Place would be a jump point for response activity and thought I could find a ride across the river to ground zero.

The JCPD [Jersey City Police Department] had road blocks set up on the main street leading to Exchange Place. At each check point I showed my ID and told the police officers that I was going to ground zero. Each one of them let me pass. Some of them knew me from the job. At the waterfront, I walked up to a police officer and asked who was in charge. I was pointed to a man I recognized . . . from OEM [Office of Emergency Management] and police HQ [Headquarters]. I told [him] that my unit may be over at ground zero providing medical assistance and that I had to get over there. [He] sent me to the dock where I could take a tug boat returning from ground zero with dust-covered civilians. I jumped on the tug. It turned around and back we went. In my mind, as we crossed the [Hudson] River, I had images of scenes from [the film] Saving Private Ryan and any other movie I've seen where soldiers are preparing to land on the shores during some amphibious assault. My personal equipment was limited to [a multi-purpose tool and a small flashlight], a small first aid pouch, and two camouflage bandannas. I wet one of the bandannas in the boat’s kitchen and used it as a mask/filter for the dust and smoke which was already starting to get thick. I looked at the smoke cloud and all the dust and wondered if this would be my last day on earth. I had no idea of what I would see or do. I just had to get over there and hopefully link up with some Army folks.
The tug boat landed at or near Battery Park, southwest of the WTC. The streets were empty with the exception of a few lost civilians looking for a way out of the city. They asked me for help, and I walked with them back toward the park and the tug boat. Some time had gone by, and I was anxious to get to ground zero and link up with some soldiers. Helping people made me feel good, but I didn't feel safe being the only military person around. I would only feel safe in the presence of my Army brothers.

So I began my trek toward ground zero. The smoke and dust were so thick I could barely see in front of me at times. And there must have been at least three or four inches of soot and papers on the ground. I came to several streets that looked liked a black hole. I felt an element of fear but knew I had to continue. I made [it] to BMCC [Borough of Manhattan Community College] and finally found my Army brothers, as well as a few other military members, one [from the] Air Force, . . . and one [from the ] Marine [Corps], as I recall.

I saw a major standing near or under a raised connection between two buildings, one of which may have been BMCC. He was facing south toward the towers and was trying to get a signal on his cell phone. I approached him from the east passing BMCC on my right. I saluted, and after he returned my salute I asked him if he had an NCO with him. He said no, and I said that I would be his NCO until he found another or until I found members of my unit. To my surprise the major . . . was a National Guard officer, but he recognized the patch on my shoulder as the 8th Medical Brigade. He told me that he had a mission for me – "Go to Federal Plaza and find [a colonel] and bring him back to me.”

I started running towards Federal Plaza. After about five blocks, I realized that motorized transportation would be easier on me. I saw a man driving a pick-up truck and I yelled out . . . that I had to get to Federal Plaza, could he take me? He said yes and I got in the truck. He dropped me off at Federal Plaza, and I walked around looking for an officer in uniform. A young private came up to me and said, “Sergeant, I just got home from basic training. Can I stay with you?” He was in uniform BDU’s [battle dress uniform] and standing at parade rest while he spoke. I said, “Yes, help me find the colonel.” Unfortunately the private and I got separated, and I found the colonel first.

The colonel was in civilian clothes standing next to a [HUMVEE]. . . For the first time in my military life and otherwise, I saw soldiers completely armed, locked, and loaded here in the city that I could practically call home. I rushed up to a colonel who stood about six feet tall and was strategically placed between the two armed guards, one in front and one to the rear. The colonel was talking on the radio mounted inside the hummer. My first contact was a sergeant [E-5] male type, who although seemed very determined, was nonetheless respectful and accepted me as [a] comrade. The atmosphere was more than serious. It was thick with mission-oriented attitudes. The military feeling of the day was more real than any words could express, and the more uniforms I saw – Army especially – the better I began to feel about my decision to cross the river. Looking back I almost believe the others felt the same way.
I told the sergeant that I had a message for the colonel. The sergeant let me pass and when the colonel finished his conversation I reported to him as I was trained and told him that the major was waiting for him at the EMS [Emergency Medical Service] rally point down near BMCC. We loaded ourselves into the [HUMVEE], minus the private who I never saw again. Losing him makes me feel like I failed in part as an NCO. He was looking to me for direction and guidance, and I sent him on a search mission that separated us and ultimately left him on his own in a hot zone. I hope he made it through the day okay.

When the colonel's group and I arrived at the rally point, I spotted the major close to where I left him, and the sergeant parked the [HUMVEE] between an office building and what I think was a high school across the street. The colonel and the major had a meeting to go to and instructed us to stay together. They went into the building, and now I was with the sergeant and specialist, and they proceeded to show me the stock pile of equipment and goods they had in the [HUMVEE]: MOPP [Mission Oriented Protective Posture – designed to protect against chemical and biological weapons] gear, Kevlars [helmets], MREs [meals, ready-to-eat], chem[ical] sticks, magazines, rounds, flares, water, and a medics bag is about all I can remember. We agreed that one of us would stay near the vehicle at all times to protect the gear from theft. The specialist pulled first guard while the sergeant and I walked around to try to find out what was happening. We walked back to the EMS rally point where I first found the major. We moved southbound toward the WTC and the Bell Phone Company building. We were able to find out that the rescue and recovery effort was being held up by the condition of Building Seven near the World Trade Center Plaza.

Building Seven was located somewhere near the phone company's building and was burning badly. The fire seemed to be on the upper floors. We were told that it was empty, and the fire department engineer was certain the building would fall soon. I remember hoping that no one was trapped in the building, and I remember preparing myself for a call for volunteers to help evacuate the building if someone was found to be inside. It was a stupid thought, but it was generated by a desire to do something and by the frustration of being an American soldier in a crisis environment but being locked out because I wasn't a fireman. All at once, I realized that it seemed no one was in charge and that everyone was in charge. I just wanted the people whose authority I recognized to be in charge because then I would get an order to do something.

Anyway we headed back to the [HUMVEE] so I could relieve the specialist, and he could get a closer look at the situation. The specialist and the sergeant didn't walk on FDR [Franklin Delano Roosevelt Drive] like the sergeant and I did. They took a parallel street one or two blocks east of FDR but in the same direction [towards the WTC]. I stayed back to guard the [HUMVEE] but had to do it without a weapon. The situation didn't exactly call for the sergeant to break protocol and give me one of his. It was okay. I felt like we were the safest people down there. I watched them walk off, and after a while they turned a corner, and I couldn't see them anymore.
I started to get bored and ventured a short distance away from the hummer to where I could see Building Seven. More than a few hours had gone by now, and the building was still burning. A few civilians had passed my way and expressed their happiness with the presence of the military. I was about fifty feet away from the hummer when I saw the sergeant and specialist coming toward me. I moved in their direction, and suddenly the people behind them started running. Then they started running in my direction, and before I did an about-face the ground shook, the air roared, and Building Seven came down. The collapsing building caused another wall of dust, paper, and other debris to fly around us, and I remember getting [angry] at two guys who began to cheer in amazement at the whole thing. I tend to have a low tolerance for that sort of youthful ignorance, but . . . I guess folks were coping anyway they could.

Reunited with the sergeant and specialist, and with Building Seven down, we wanted to do something. We wanted to go in. The sergeant tried to get to the colonel for instructions but had no luck. Someone on the FDR Drive [an army officer] called for a formation, and soldiers from all branches reported. He told us that the time to go was close at hand, and he wanted to know if anyone was search and rescue qualified. He got a few, and he had them stand to the side of the formation. He passed out a sheet of paper and asked us to list our information to include our units, rank, name, SSN [social security number], the usual. It was around then that the FDNY [Fire Department of New York] started moving in, and someone told the officer that only his qualified people could go in closer to the site.

Now determined to do something other than just stand around and watch, we [the sergeant, specialist, and I] moved back toward the high school and separated from the group of military personnel in the formation. The lobby of the high school was being converted into a trauma center, and we decided to give a hand. On the inside though, it seemed that things were just about done. . . . The EMS group inside was beginning to triage victims. As I recall, there was a lot of eye injuries and lung or coughing related treatments going on. We left the building, and once outside we ran into the colonel and the major. They said something about going . . . somewhere in Jersey or Delaware. I can't really recall. . . . At any rate I didn't want to leave ground zero just yet, and I didn't want to chance spending the night in the tunnel. The sergeant gave me an MRE and the medics’ bag. He said don't leave, he'll be back, and he would look for me. I told him that I was there for the duration, and he would find me at ground zero or very close to it. They got into the [HUMVEE] and drove off. I picked up a sandwich out of a box of sandwiches. There was food and water everywhere, and I thought I'd hold on to the MRE and ate it with some water.

It was dark outside at that point, and I really wanted to do some work at the collapsed WTC. The FDNY was beginning to tape off the FDR Drive area, and I thought that I better get as close as possible before I get blocked out completely. I went around the corner to the street the sergeant and specialist took which ran parallel to the FDR Drive and moved quickly down that street toward the WTC. To my surprise I made it to a building on the southwest corner
across the street (diagonally) from the phone company building in spite of the many police officers stopping photographers and others trying to get close.

I walked into the lobby of the building and saw one soldier in uniform helping a group of medical folks set up a trauma treatment center. I told a nurse . . . that I was a medic and could help. We converted a private room into a morgue [that] didn't involve much by the time I got there except moving furniture out . . . [of] the way to clear the floor for bodies. I off-loaded a bunch of saline solution in cases, helped set up tables, and then sat down for awhile and waited for some more work. I walked around the lobby of the building we were in and moved to where I could get an up close and personal look at the WTC. At this point the building I was in was west directly across the street. . . . I could see the WTC about twenty to thirty feet in front of me, maybe closer. I was amazed at what the most obvious force the collapsed building created. In front of me was what used to be a fire truck, crushed under the debris. . . . I stood looking at the truck and its background for quite awhile when I realized that I might look to someone else as though I was in shock or something, and I snapped out of it and went back to the main treatment area of the lobby. . . . I was the only soldier in that area. A cop came in and asked for some help off-loading cases of body bags. I thought – that sounds like my call.

I went outside and found the truck with the cases of body bags and started taking them two cases at a time. Needless to say that after a few trips two cases became one. When the truck was empty I went back to the lobby and looked at the wall of cases of body bags we off-loaded. All in all they were stacked about six cases high, about five or six deep, and ran from left to right about twenty or more. That's a lot of body bags. Someone yelled out, "I got one!" Suddenly there was a frenzy of activity. It was not a survivor . . . It may not have even been a whole body. I don't know because I wasn't able to get close enough to see. I know that about thirty or forty minutes after that at approximately 01:30 [1:30 a.m.], I started making my way to the waterfront where boats were still making runs between Jersey City and Manhattan. Along the way I ran into a fireman who asked me if I had anything to eat. His group was far removed from where the streets overflowed with food. I told him no and took a few steps before remembering that I still had my MRE. I called to him, and as we walked toward each other I pulled the MRE out of my pocket and handed it to him. You would have thought I just fed his kids or something. He was so happy. As for me, I had to leave [Manhattan] and get back to family. The look on their faces as I walked out the door had finally caught up to me, and [I] realized how dramatic a moment it must have been for them.

When I got to the docks, a boat from Jersey City was tying on and preparing to unload more food and water. I was tired. . . . by that time, but for a ride home would gladly help off-load the goods. I did just that, got a ride back across the river, made a collect phone call to my mother's house, and asked my sister to come to Exchange Place and get me. I told her that she would find me standing in front of the federal building at 30 Montgomery Street. She drove down, picked me up, and that was the end of day one. The next day I went back to ground zero, using the route as I did on 11 September to see if the colonel and his crew [the major, the
sergeant, and the specialist] could be found. I spent less than two hours there when the feelings being given off by the cops and FDNY irritated me. Back to Jersey I went, back to the house, and to my car. I took the car to my unit at Fort Totten where my arrival was more than welcome.

I was put on orders and given a number of assignments. I had to check the unit’s alert roster by making actual calls to unit members and asking them to confirm all information listed on the roster. I drove a five-ton truck over to [Jacobi] Hospital in the Bronx. [It] was loaded with equipment [tents, phone lines, food service, etc.] all of which was needed at the hospital where one of the morgues for the body parts was being set up. I was available as a driver for the company commander, the hospital commander, the executive officer [XO], the chief nurse, and ended up taking the chief nurse . . . to the home of Captain Michael Mullan, . . . a unit member and a New York fire fighter. [He died at the World Trade Center on 11 September.]

[A colonel] received information that the captain was missing in action at ground zero and presumed killed in action. She wanted to visit his family to assure them that they could count on the unit for support or anything else they thought we could do. Captain Mullan lived in Queens not too far from Fort Totten. His family was pleased that a representative from the unit came by. . . . I spent the next two weeks living at the unit and working with my company commander, First Lieutenant Matthew Aiken.

Of the many lessons learned from the whole experience, the one thing that stays with me the most is that . . . the Army's system and training does . . . work. What I mean is that I entered the hot zone alone, found a colonel and a major and a unit, (I can’t recall the unit, but they came from an armory in Manhattan not too far from Federal Plaza.), watched a pseudo chain of command form, and although the group was made up of a variety of specialties the immediate situation didn't call for much more than some basic military knowledge (i.e., CTT [common task training]). Our system does and will work, even if it is forced together in a hap-hazard fashion. I've always had confidence in my own ability as a soldier, but now I have more confidence in the Army. I'm not saying it's perfect. I'm just saying it works.268

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268 Sergeant Harold Ross, email correspondence with Sergeant William Miller, 12 August 2002. The 90th Military History Detachment, in conjunction with the 311th Military History Detachment, conducted this interview through email.
Major Paul Guilot
Active Guard Reserve Major Paul Guilot, Mobilization Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

[On the morning of 11 September, Major Guilot was working mobilization issues concerning Bosnia and Kosovo. It was a normal day.]

GUILLOT: The planes impacting on the World Trade Center thrust us into NOBLE EAGLE sometime within twenty minutes of the second plane impacting. . . . We assumed our positions down here in the EOC and began tracking the different operations as far as what was going on in the world and what our requirements were going to be, . . . establishing our communications with our higher headquarters, which is FORSCOM, and also reaching out to our reserve RSCs, . . . and establishing contact with them, making sure that they are up and running, and we have good [communications] with them. . . . I would say after six or seven hours we had contacted all of our subordinates that we needed to speak to and established that they were manning their emergency operations centers. . . . At first there weren’t any [communications]. The first . . . units that we had that were requested were mortuary affairs units from down in Puerto Rico. That’s when the mobilization section of the EOC started tracking the MOS [military occupational specialty] qualifications of the people. . . to make sure they were deployable status and ready to go. . . . I believe it was within forty-eight hours we had them tracked and ready to go.

INTERVIEWER: Who was asking for those assets within the USAR?

GUILLOT: It didn’t come from the USAR. It came from our higher headquarters, which was FORSCOM that requested mortuary affairs units. . . . We started to determine that we had units located down in Puerto Rico, and we started assessing their readiness with FORSCOM. . . . Right now I don’t remember how many [passengers], . . . but they went in two different increments. I do know that a new unit just standing up wasn’t ready to go, so we worked to plus-up [to borrow people and equipment from another unit] that first unit that went. . . .

INTERVIEWER: So within hours of the planes hitting the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, FORSCOM was looking for, in particular, the occupational specialty of mortuary affairs?

GUILLOT: Absolutely, because there’s only one active component unit located out of Fort Lee [Virginia] . . . that does mortuary affairs. We have the remainder in the reserves, and that’s only two other units. . . . The process that takes place is that FORSCOM requests a derivative UIC
– a derivative unit identification code – that identifies a specific unit that they want to go into specific pieces. We in turn look at our structure, pull out the structure that FORSCOM has directed us to look at, derivatize [sic] the unit, send the derivative to FORSCOM who requests activation of that derivative up the chain of command to the Department of Army . . . [which] . . . cuts a notification for training, which comes back to us, and at that point we notify the RSC that they . . . need to start looking at spinning out four possible mobilizations. . . . It can [also] be the double A unit, which is the whole unit. Every [tasking] that we get, every unit that we mobilize, originates from FORSCOM. . . . We have about 482 units [mobilized]. . . . FORSCOM has generated those [units]. I’m not sure as to what the other types of units that they were looking for early on in the operation. . . . The other units that we activated were a lot of our GSUs [garrison support units], [and] the military police [MP] . . . to protect certain areas, . . . other vital interests. . . .

The MPs out of the 99th RSC were required to report to “SITE-R” immediately. SITE-R is . . . the Pentagon’s Emergency Operations Center. Things go on there, and they need to move to a secure facility. [The unit’s mission] . . . is to provide security for the exterior outside Site-R, the perimeter. . . . The unit . . . wasn’t [called up] through formal channels. It was the RSC commander saying we need to provide the support to SITE-R, and placed . . . the MPs on extended ADT [active duty for training], AT until we could get the mobilization formalized. . . . The RSC commander, General [Karol] Kennedy, responded to . . . the threat [on] the Pentagon and that SITE-R was going to be activated. I don’t know where they got the word. It didn’t come through the mobilization cell here. . . . The unit was . . . [deactivated] shortly after when they didn’t think they were going to need it. . . . Then they were recalled to SITE-R by a formal FORSCOM [task]. . . . I believe they had an advance party that made it to SITE-R . . . within . . . twenty-four hours of the 9-11 incidents. Then they were recalled a day or so later. . . . The rest of the unit was getting there. They were filling in. They were getting [ready] . . . at SITE-R. . . . [Then they] were sent back . . . within twenty-four hours of them being told not to go, that they had to turn around and head back to SITE-R.

INTERVIEWER: Were you aware of . . . any communications occurring from the 77th up in New York with the World Trade Center attack?

GUILOT: Now we did monitor the security of their buildings. That would be the Provost Marshal who would be able to answer this better than me, but there were many calls here from the units themselves asking, “Are we going to be mobilized? Do we need to go? Do we need to get ready?” And our answers to them were to, “Hold. Our security posture is up. There is a possibility of mobilizations, but we don’t have any information. When we get it we will pass it on to you.”
**INTERVIEWER:** Major, what were some of the challenges that were faced those first few days here within the Emergency Operations Center?

**GUILOT:** Establishing something that was real life that was not a planned exercise with MESLs [pronounced “measles”] – [mission event synchronization list or master events scenario list – used interchangeably] that we knew were coming, that we could plan for.

**INTERVIEWER:** “MESLs,” define that please.

**GUILOT:** The . . . contractors [Eagle Group] who would run our exercises for mobilization, would come up with some scenarios, which are called MESLs that we have to react to and process the paperwork that we needed to do to make sure that what needed to happen, happens. . . . Some of the big challenges that we faced were the USAR was not built to send individuals to be mobilized. It was built to send units. And our requirements were coming in for pieces and parts of units which required us to break units [in order] to bring other . . . units . . . up to strength so they could deploy and be mission capable for the mission that FORSCOM directed them to do.

**INTERVIEWER:** You’re speaking of NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM activations?

**GUILOT:** I’m talking . . . 9-11. They didn’t want . . . the . . . cooks, the maintenance. They wanted mortuary affairs specialists with specific MOSs. . . . We had to go in and look by those specific MOSs and build derivative UICs to mobilize. So it was . . . something that we haven’t done in any of our exercises, and we came to realize that that was going to be an issue for us. . . . That was something that we had not trained for.

**INTERVIEWER:** What about the prior training that you did receive concerning the Emergency Operations Center?

**GUILOT:** Eagle Group training that they did provide us utilized FORMDEPS, which is FORSCOM Mobilization Planning and Deployment System. . . . This deployment right after 9-11 did not conform to what FORMDEPS was written for, and our training had not included individual mobilizations. So we were, and as we still are, . . . just making it up as we went along, trying to perform best to the Army regulations that were there. As a result, we’re talking about re-writing FORMDEPS or putting another volume in for domestic emergencies that we have to respond to.

**INTERVIEWER:** When was the last time that [you] . . . conducted a training exercise?
GUILOT: August [2001] we did a four-day exercise. . . . It was built on the scenarios of a full-scale deployment basically. So we’re using the TPFDDs that are out there . . . time phase force development data. What that tells us is . . . line units . . . that are anticipated to deploy by certain times, will have to be in theater. So . . . you have a ranking. We need this type of unit first, second, third, and all of our units are located somewhere . . . right now. I know there are three TPFDDs, . . . and those are the ones that we exercise off of when we use Eagle Group mobilization exercises. . . . [Eagle Group is comprised of] either six or seven contractors [who are] former military [with] . . . the rank of O-5 [lieutenant colonel] or above. They work . . . in the DCSOPS. They have offices in the DCSOPS and they create exercises for us, . . . usually . . . two a year. . . . They supposedly train us . . . for exactly this type of contingency, . . . what the reserve was built for. . . .

The emergency operation – much like the rest of the Army – was probably running around trying to figure out what they were supposed to do. . . . We immediately realized that our prior training . . . was not going to address the issues that we had to deal with . . . individual deployment, pieces and parts, the different techniques that we were going to have to use to get people to a mobilization station. Examples are . . . the quartermaster unit that responded to the Pentagon, the mortuary affairs guys. . . . FORSCOM asked for the entire unit. . . . However, they placed a restriction on us by putting a number of soldiers [who] could deploy to . . . respond to this. . . . By doing that, they disable our ability to support any future requirements because the active component assumes the entire structure of the double A element that took it out of the reserve hands. So we couldn’t send soldiers forward. I hope I’m explaining it right and clear to you. . . . A good example of that is the [people] coming back from [Army] school[s] who are non deployable cannot join the unit that was up there once they got back because we had no structure to mobilize. . . . The [active component] at FORSCOM took the full double A unit with all its structure and left the guys in school to come back. . . . What had to happen was the 63rd RSC [Los Alamitos, California] had to pull those soldiers into the RSC structure and assign them positions.

INTERVIEWER: So they are on the unit manning report, that particular unit. All of those positions went with the unit to the Pentagon. When these soldiers come back from school, the actual paragraph-line number on their unit manning report for that unit is no longer there because they’re on active duty?

GUILOT: Correct.

INTERVIEWER: So they in essence needed to be absorbed by another reserve unit?

GUILOT: Right. . . . There was an additional requirement for those people who came back from school. . . . I believe what we did was create a mobilization support det[achment] [that]
transferred those soldiers into this support [detachment], which was managed here by the USARC. . . . [This detachment] cut individual mobilization orders on [the soldiers who came back from school], and sent them to join the mortuary affairs unit. . . . [The] mobilization support [detachment] that’s created off our NAAD, which is the National AMEDD [Army Medical Department], – we [create] that here at the USARC.

INTERVIEWER: Any other challenges, issues?

GUILOT: The issue [is] that we are not set up for extended manning of more than three or four days. There are four mobilization officers, and if you’re running a twenty-four-seven [twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week] operation, burnout sets in pretty quick. With the way the Army rotates its people, . . . we have some weak people who didn’t know [who] had just transferred in and have no way of knowing the mobilization process or what had to happen. So they were relying heavily on the more senior people that had some mobilization knowledge. . . . It’s a big learning curve, and that’s something you can’t just fall in and know all this stuff right up front. So that was an issue for us.

INTERVIEWER: What about training being validated by the Eagle Group? What were you going to say about that?

GUILOT: . . . The Eagle Group in our training exercises functioned as our higher headquarters or as FORSCOM. . . . I don’t think they were totally aware of what the mobilization cell did because often times we were excluded from a lot of the information. . . . We’re the hub or planning cell for Eagle Group, and if a [personnel] issue comes down, it comes down through us, whereas Eagle Group would just flow that information right to [personnel], [and] leave the [mobilization] cell out of it. . . . Since we had no real play in the mobilization exercises, they didn’t require us to go out and look at units. A good example is . . . the mortuary affairs unit. If they needed them, they would go directly to readiness and say, “Give us a recommendation for which unit is the best qualified to do this job.” Readiness would . . . process this information and give it directly to Eagle Group, leaving the mobilization cell out of it. . . . We know that FORSCOM will . . . make a recommendation to the mobilization cell itself, and we will disseminate the information of who we need, . . . combine it all, and tie all the pieces together before we come back to FORSCOM and Eagle Group and say, "Hey, this is the best unit, and we’ve already conducted our personnel [review].” We’ll tie all that. . . . We’re the hub for the information. . . . The bridge [another term for the emergency operations people] . . . will disseminate the information to mobilization and then we will make coordination with all the different entities. . . . In our exercises, Eagle Group was acting . . . as the mobilization cell – and not realizing that FORSCOM was going to come directly to us and not through the bridge. . . . But they left us out of a lot of the critical operations that we found out that we were in charge of.
There’s a lot more to mobilization. We have to look at personnel, structure, readiness, training, as well as cutting mobilization orders and recommending derivative UICs to FORSCOM. We were ill equipped for that prior to 9-11, and our exercises never addressed anything like that.

INTERVIEWER: So in essence with this particular contingency that occurred, because of the nature of these Eagle Group exercises that were being conducted, they didn’t really train the mobilization cell, the EOC?

GUILOT: That’s correct. They also were stuck on FORMDEPs, and that was the only way we could do business. FORMDEPs went right off the bat. FORMDEPs is based on more traditional [exercises] over in Germany. This was an emergency response. And you couldn’t take what we learned from the mobilization exercises and transform that into this quick response. A good example is the Army decision-making process. [It was] pretty much out the window when we had to come up with a unit within a day. There was no time for the staff to do that.

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Master Sergeant Fred Buyarski
Chapter 20

Active Guard Reserve Master Sergeant Fred Buyarski,
Noncommissioned Officer in Charge, Emergency Operations Center,
U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

[Master Sergeant Buyarski had thirty-two years in the Army, four of which was spent on active duty and seventeen years as an Active Guard Reserve soldier.]

INTERVIEWER: Where were you and what were you doing at the time of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?

BUYARSKI: When the first plane hit the first tower, I was actually driving to work . . . little later than normal because I worked the third shift, which would take me to about 17:30 [5:30] hours. I heard the plane had hit the first tower and I said to myself, "Wow, that doesn't sound too good." I was thinking [a] light plane, . . . serious but not too serious. So I got to work, and we had the TV on because we had to monitor CNN [Cable News Network]. When I saw the tower burning I said, . . . “This looks bad . . . real bad . . . .” We still had no idea where this thing was going to go, and then as we were watching it, we saw the second plane, and it looked like it was just flying by beyond the buildings. And when it hit the second tower, we all looked at each other and said this was no accident. That's basically where it started. . . . Major Phillips turned to either Sergeant Polk or me and said, "Get on that computer and send an email to all the crisis action team members. . . . Send a message for all of them to get . . . here and note that this is the real thing. This is not an exercise." And that's where we started with it. We sent messages to all of our major subordinate commands that this is the real thing and for them to stand by for further orders.

INTERVIEWER: Please explain to us an email you sent on 11 September where the subject was "No weapons or ammo." Can you tell us about that?

BUYARSKI: Many of our subordinate units had called us, and they were asking about security for their buildings. At that point, there was a decision made that there would be . . . no weapons, firearms, or ammunition issued. I guess what they were concerned with at that point was that we didn't want armed people running around the outside of the various reserve centers further alarming citizens. We didn't want any accidents to happen. At that point, something had to be put down in writing: "This is how we're going to secure those buildings.” So basically while security was being provided and people were guarding doors and gates, the commanding general had decided that there would be no weapons or ammo issued.
**INTERVIEWER:** Did this rule apply to MPs [military police], or were they excluded from this rule?

**BUYARSKI:** Well, as a rule, the military police, because of their unique job as [the] military's police officers, they're authorized to be issued and to carry weapons and live ammunition. This message was more directed at everyone else other than the military police. . . . As a rule, there is no ammunition stored at those reserve centers.

**INTERVIEWER:** The next subject is regarding public affairs guidance. Could you please tell us what type of guidance was issued by the Public Affairs Office on 11 September?

**BUYARSKI:** . . . The civilian population wanted to get some information. They turned to military installations such as recruiting stations or the local reserve center or a National Guard center, and we needed to have guidance to be able to give these folks without causing any further alarm. In other words, we weren't going to say we're standing by with rifle in hand ready to repel . . . a border invasion. We told them that we were definitely on alert, and they should be getting their information as to what was going on from their local radio stations and the national news at this point. We weren't going to make any bold statements as to where we were going to go with this.

**INTERVIEWER:** This next subject is called "Armed Guard Guidance," where you refer to Army Regulation 190-143, Chapter 3 [Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties]. Did you receive this or did one of the officers ask you to put that out?

**BUYARSKI:** This message had come from our Provost Marshal's Office here. . . . I was the avenue by which it was sent out to all our subordinate units. . . . The Provost Marshal's Office had sent that and this was, at that moment, how this was referenced [regarding the use of force].

**INTERVIEWER:** I see there's a memo referring to the THREATCON level, and it was put on Delta. Now was this put on Delta nationwide? Perhaps you can tell us what THREATCON is and the different levels?

**BUYARSKI:** Well, the THREATCON is a threat condition, and THREATCON Delta is the highest or next to highest level, whereas the imminent problem, the danger of something happening very soon and very seriously, is very possible. And this was THREATCON Delta [which] was established countrywide, actually world wide. All military were put on THREATCON Delta initially. This message was sent out so that folks would let us know that they have taken the necessary measures. For each one of the THREATCON levels (there's
Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta), . . . there are certain measures according to the regulation that concerns THREATCON that tells us what you're supposed to do for each one, for example, secure all doors and start checking ID cards and these kinds of things. At THREATCON Delta no one comes into the building without having an ID card. . . . In this building you have to have a badge or a visitor's badge. So the level of security went way up. All of the doors were secured. Guards were posted. You had roving guards on the base. So, yes, it was very serious, very, very serious.

**INTERVIEWER:** Nothing ever happened at the post, did it? For instance, all of the action being at Washington and New York, you didn't catch, for instance terrorists or anybody else down in this area?

**BUYARSKI:** No, it was pretty safe here. And of course, the MPs immediately secured the two gates that we have here. Within a short period of time concrete barriers were placed and that's the way it's been ever since. . . .

**INTERVIEWER:** What THREATCON are we in right now [19 March 2002]?

**BUYARSKI:** We are at what's called Bravo Plus . . . a little higher than a regular Bravo. Most places across the United States are at Bravo Plus now, but there are some areas that are still at Charlie, which is the next highest one. And basically [there is]100 percent ID checks for coming in the base. If a person doesn't have a badge, ID cards are checked, and you have to sign in when you come in the building.

**INTERVIEWER:** How did you receive the directive stating the half staffing of the American flag? How did that come about?

**BUYARSKI:** We received it from the watch team at Forces Command, which is our higher headquarters. This item had gone to all the major units in this country. When it came in on my email system, I sent it to all our subordinate units. It was referring to what happened on September 11. It was directing all the units to place their national flag at half staff in front of their installations.

**INTERVIEWER:** So this kind of memo had started with the president from the White House and worked its way down, correct?

**BUYARSKI:** Yes, sir. That's a very high level, and it was of importance that this be put out to all of our subordinate commands.
INTERVIEWER: Tell us about the memo referring to military personnel on leave or in transit.

BUYARSKI: It was for anyone who was on leave. They were to call their parent unit, wherever they were assigned to get directions and instructions. Folks who were in a transit status between assignments were still supposed to go to wherever they were going and they would be told what the next [assignment] was going to be once they got there.

INTERVIEWER: Does this include soldiers who were . . . on vacation with their families in another part of the country and had a hard time getting back because of the grounding of planes? Did that affect them?

BUYARSKI: . . . We had some people who were in California, and they ended up having to drive back here because they couldn't get a plane back. So, yes, it even affected us here. As long as the person called their unit, let them know where they were, then they wouldn't get in any sort of trouble.

INTERVIEWER: Did you have any disruption in telephone communication like we had in New York?

BUYARSKI: No, sir. In fact New York was one of the very first places that we were placing calls to because we had the 77th Regional Support Command at Fort Totten in New York City and we were able to talk to them continuously. We were on the phone with them a lot in those first weeks of the operation after the disaster.

INTERVIEWER: Explain to us some of the guidance USARC provided to the field regarding the SITREP report. Define SITREP and tell us the guidance you provided.

BUYARSKI: The SITREP is a situation report . . . that all the major subordinate commands – and there's nearly thirty – some of them were required to send us a situation report everyday. What it would [say] are things like how many personnel they have assigned, how many were supporting what turned out to be Operation NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM later. Just to let us know on a day-by-day basis this is what we're doing. And it would include things like points of contact, phone numbers that could be reached at twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, types of problems with equipment, personnel, and any issues that deal with soldiers would be sent to us. This would be looked at and passed along to the appropriate folks to deal with those problems and issues that they had. And we still get those every day from every unit.

INTERVIEWER: Tell us the difference between THREATCON and TFPCON condition?
BUYARSKI: Well the THREATCON or the threat condition was changed to terrorist force protection condition [TFPCON]. And this was a part of Army Regulation 525-13, Anti-Terrorist Force Protection. What they did was it changed the name, and it was changed to terrorism force protection condition because that seemed to be the main driving force for the operations that we're doing right now. That's about the only reason that I can think of why it was changed. We had never before dealt with a terrorism threat issue in this country. . . . It was a common thing overseas at different assignments but not here.

INTERVIEWER: Tell us about this memo dated 14 September regarding the partial mobilization of the National Guard and the Army Reserve.

BUYARSKI: That was a pretty important one. . . . Before we could give our subordinate units any direction, we had to have this order about mobilization of the National Guard and the Army Reserve. It had to be authorized. It was released by the United States Department of Defense on September 14, 2001. . . . After we received it by fax, it was immediately given to the folks in our Command Group, and we sent it out to all of our subordinate units. . . .

INTERVIEWER: What was your relationship with the public affairs officers here, Lieutenant Colonel Boyd Collins and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Phillips?

BUYARSKI: Oh, yes, we were working very closely with them. Basically they had passed to us this item we're looking at, White House Executive Order dated 14 September 01, and it was from the White House Office of [the] Press Secretary. It was the actual executive order that the Public Affairs [Office] sent to us so that we could send to everybody. This is the one that orders the Ready Reserve of the armed forces to active duty.

INTERVIEWER: Did the PAO have a lot of reporters coming up here during that time of crisis period?

BUYARSKI: Well, they weren't allowed here on the fort, but they were definitely doing a lot of telephoning and emailing.

INTERVIEWER: I noticed that you sent out on September 15 a situation report. . . . Was that because you were getting reports from the field in different formats, and you had to provide guidance? How did this come about?

BUYARSKI: Yes, sir, that's absolutely correct. What we did was we came up with a standardized format so that our subordinate units would be giving us the information that we absolutely needed, in that we were receiving it from everyone the same [way].
INTERVIEWER: Tell us what were some of the manning requirements for the Emergency Operations Centers. Do you recall that?

BUYARSKI: Yes, sir. . . We had a requirement for all our reserve centers to be on twenty-four hours manning of their Emergency Operations Center. Some of our subordinate commands were authorized to stand down twenty-four-hour operations, for they were physically there. But they still had to provide . . . our [Emergency] Operations Center with a point of contact and phone number that was available twenty-four hours.

INTERVIEWER: I assume these were twelve-hour shifts in the beginning?

BUYARSKI: Well, yes, sir, . . . from the very beginning we started twelve-hour shifts in the operations center, and we have continued that to this time. Not everyone, but there's about four or five of us a day. We do twelve-hour shifts – twelve on twelve off. We cover all twenty-four hours in the day. And we work a three days on and three days off schedule.

INTERVIEWER: Sergeant, what about force protection antiterrorism funding? Can you explain that to us?

BUYARSKI: Because the units had to man their reserve centers twenty-four hours a day . . . money was being involved because many of the reserve centers don't necessarily have people . . . assigned. . . . They're not active duty people so they were going to have to call in some of their reservists to help out with this. So a USARC directive told them not to reprogram any of their fiscal year zero-two [2002] fiscal security and counter-terrorism funding without written approval from us here at the USARC's DCSOPS.

INTERVIEWER: Can I assume that many soldiers were using their two week active duty training during this crisis period?

BUYARSKI: Yes, sir, that is my assumption and that did happen because at the very least, they were able to call in someone who hadn't done annual training for two weeks.

INTERVIEWER: Sergeant Buyarski, explain to us what the SIPRNET [Secure Internet Protocol Router Network] type of communication is?

BUYARSKI: Well, the SIPRNET is very closely part of the Global Command and Control System. It's a secure information processing network, and we can send emails back and forth, and we don't have to worry about them being intercepted by anyone.
INTERVIEWER: Sergeant Buyarski, is there anything else you want to add?

BUYARSKI: In our building about a month and a half ago we had an anthrax scare. . . . Something was discovered here, and we were put on 100 percent alert. We were evacuated. The building was sealed. Major Phillips and I were present in the [Emergency] Operations Center that evening when that happened. It was absolutely very serious. It turned out to be not anthrax, fortunately, but it was pretty scary. Other than that we just march along with our day-to-day, and it seems like a way of life now. We don't know when it will change.\(^{270}\)

\(^{270}\) Master Sergeant Fred Buyarski, interview with Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner, tape recording with transcript, 18 March 2002.
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons
Chapter 21

Active Guard Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons,
Chief of the Operations and Plans Division, U.S. Army Reserve Command,
Fort McPherson, Georgia

[Lieutenant Colonel Koons was responsible for mobilization, plans and current operations since 1 September 2001. He had twenty-two-and-a-half years in the Army with twelve years in the Active Guard Reserve.]

INTERVIEWER: You just started your current position on 1 September 2001, so you were getting to know your job. How did September 11th affect all of that?

KOONS: I’ve been in training and operations the majority of my career, so this was pretty much a natural stepping stone. But on 1 September I’d already done a couple of TTXs [table-top exercises] with the RSCs, so I understood where I was going. . . . This brought it to light much more. We had scheduled a TTX for the USARC in November, and we were gearing up for that, so it kind of led us up to September 11th in that we were starting to get ready and looking at those things that we needed to accomplish for our CPX [command post exercise]. . . . It’s where we go out to the RSCs and we run through a CPX for them that is very structured. We have events that we put in that will cause them to go through the mission planning process and see how they handle each one of the events as they come forward.

INTERVIEWER: Now on September 11th, how did the events of that day and the subsequent days cause you to have to change your plans?

KOONS: . . . I was sitting down doing a leave form, and I’ve got a little TV here in the office, and I keep it on CNN, when I heard the first airplane hit the first tower. At first, I thought I had it on a movie channel, so I turned around and looked and realized that it was CNN, and I went down to Mr. [Anthony] Guisti’s [assistant deputy chief of staff, operations] office and said, “Look, we probably need to start getting things geared up.” And I called the EOC and said, “Start calling people in.” And I would say within the first two hours we had things fully functional downstairs, even though we didn’t know to what extent we were going to be involved. We had everybody in the EOC. We were starting to work through the process of getting things into a shift scenario, so that people could plan on what they were going to be doing for at least the next forty-eight, seventy-two hours. . . . We had three shifts . . . ninety-seven people.

INTERVIEWER: How long did you continue that tempo?
KOONS: Until about the end of October. And then we started paring back on those who were sitting in the EOC but weren’t really contributing. So, we’ve gone through probably four scale downs and revisions on the EOC schedule. Originally we had two shifts going twenty-four hours, two twelve-hour shifts. And what that was causing was a lot of burnout. So, we started picking out those folks who could go to eight-hour shifts, and we still have some folks who are twelve-hour shifts. We just modified it as we went on.

INTERVIEWER: What type of training does an individual need to go through in order to work in an Emergency Operations Center?

KOONS: Basically, a good grounding in basic tactical operations. We run two or three CPXs a year normally to [train] people up enough so they can work down there. The [soldiers] we have on the bridge are very tactically oriented, and we tend to select those [soldiers] who are very well grounded in those S-3-type [operations] functions. We’ve got representatives from personnel, logistics, DCSENG [engineer], the chaplain, IG [inspector general]. Each one of those has specific requirements as far as being familiar with their specific areas. And then we take them in, train them on the overall operation of the EOC to make sure that they understand who they go to when they get a problem, or how they go about coordinating stuff.

INTERVIEWER: So each representative of the other sections still needs to know something about operations?

KOONS: Yes.

INTERVIEWER: During the time of September and afterward, what sort of interaction did you have with the Pentagon?

KOONS: We had very limited communications with the Pentagon, other than OCAR when they have their requirement. We send them our daily SITREP, our update slides, [and] specific information on personnel. And when they are working on a contingency, then they’ll ask for information on specific units.

INTERVIEWER: During September and October, what types of challenges or problems did you face in the EOC?

KOONS: Information flow. That was the biggest one. It was information on what the requirements were from FORSCOM, what the RSCs needed to know from us, [or] where we would need to go to get the information. In [the] September-October time frame, unlike a normal mobilization process, we were in a hasty mob[ilization]. Normally, you would have a
theater of operation that had a requirement. They’d send the request for forces to JFCOM [Joint Forces Command], who would go to DA [Department of the Army]. Then they’d determine who sourced it, and FORSCOM would – if it was an Army requirement, . . . determine whether it’s USAR, National Guard or an AC [active component] sourcing. And then if it was ours [USAR], then we’d determine [which were] the best units . . . from that perspective. But in this case, we were getting requests from locations all over the United States. We were getting requests from outside the United States, and nobody knew where to input the requests to get it into the right chain.

INTERVIEWER: What sort of requests?

KOONS: For units. We had the RSCs that would come to us requesting the mobilization of MP units to support their force protection requirements. We had installations that would go to FORSCOM requesting mobilization of MPs for force protection. . . . Now, nobody knew exactly where in the system they had to input the requests. . . . So that probably was the biggest stress factor that we had was getting the requests into the right channel to make sure it was approved all the way up and down the line.

INTERVIEWER: When an RSC or any other unit requests to have soldiers mobilized at their installation or wherever, it does have to go higher than you, doesn’t it?

KOONS: Yes. . . . You get a conflict, [which] creates a requirement. They send the requirement to the commander in chief of the theater, [who] sends a request for forces to DA. DA sends the request for forces to FORSCOM. FORSCOM determines which of the three components is going to source it. If it’s us, then they send the request for forces to us. We look at the units that we have out there that fill those requirements [and] send out any requests for information to the RSCs. They look at it and say, “Okay. We’ve got these units and this is probably the best one.” We send that back out. It goes to FORSCOM. FORSCOM then sends a request for a work mode to DA. DA sends the alert mobilization order down to the CONUS [continental United States] at FORSCOM and out to the RSC, and then the unit moves. That’s how it actually happened.

INTERVIEWER: But during this conflict, it didn’t quite happen like that, right? They were coming to you?

KOONS: Right, they were going everywhere. They had requests going directly to the unit to be mobbed [mobilized]. They had requests going to DA, to FORSCOM, to us, [and] to other agencies.
INTERVIEWER: How was this able to finally get resolved?

KOONS: Finally, every time we got a request or we were made aware of a request that was outside the normal process, we, at FORSCOM and finally DA would tell them where they had to start with the request.

INTERVIEWER: You mentioned one of the challenges you faced during a couple of months after September 11th was communication. And is this what you’re referring to? Did you have any other sort of communication problems?

KOONS: Communication problems in the respect that FORSCOM was working off one classified system that we [and the RSCs] didn’t have access to on a regular basis. . . . We’re in the process of working that out so that we can fund it and get the communications in a classified means worked out.

INTERVIEWER: Is that something that they call the “GCCS [pronounced “geeks” – Global Command and Control System] or STU-III?

KOONS: SIPRNET [Secure Internet Protocol Router Network].

INTERVIEWER: Speaking about the Emergency Operations Center, what’s going on down there right now?

KOONS: Currently, we’re working rotation policies. Right now the policy is while you’re in the AOR [area of responsibility], you’re going to be in the AOR for about six months. So we’ve got a lot of units that have been over there since the October time frame, and they’re getting ready to hit that six month window. So we’re looking at what units we can replace, what units we can’t replace, and how we go about doing that. . . . I’m talking over in the CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. . . . Right now we’ve got two eight-hour shifts going on and then we have an on-call shift. We’ve got the bridge and the watch officers on for two twelve-hour shifts. And I’m on from about 5:30 [a.m.] to about 19:00 [7:00 p.m.]

INTERVIEWER: Is this going to continue on indefinitely?

KOONS: Till they tell us to stop.

INTERVIEWER: You’re also a mobilization officer. You mentioned just a moment ago about your six month rotations with the units that are in various places. Can you tell me what is going
on with that, mobilizing troops for say Operation NOBLE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM?

KOONS: Well, as far as the rotation policy, there’s actually three [or four] of them out there. . . . For medical units, you get a ninety day . . . rotation policy for . . . doctors and clinical nurses, [etc.]. For the non professional medical folks, then it’s a six month in theater rotation policy. . . . In [all other] theaters . . . it’s a six-month rotation policy. For CONUS units NOBLE EAGLE, it’s a one year rotation policy unless you’re in an austere site, and then it’s a six month rotation policy. So first of all we’ve got to determine what type of situation they’re in, whether their CONUS, OCONUS [outside continental United States]. If it’s CONUS, is it austere or non austere? If it’s OCONUS, then it’s six months. . . . It makes it very complicated to say [to the] . . . reservist [that you are] . . . going to be on duty for this period of time. You may be one of those units that are one-of-a-kind, and therefore you’re going to be mobilized until you’re no longer needed. The guy sitting next to you may be there for six months.

INTERVIEWER: What is an austere site in the United States?

KOONS: If you’re on a force protection mission in one of the classified sites that has no significant life support capabilities, other than a place to eat and sleep, that’s considered austere. No MWR-type [morale, welfare, recreation] activities, no gym, that type of stuff.

INTERVIEWER: So those soldiers will only be on duty about six months?

KOONS: Well, they’ll be mobilized for a year, but they’ll be at those sites only six months.

INTERVIEWER: When did you find out that reservists were going to be mobilized for either NOBLE EAGLE or ENDURING FREEDOM?

KOONS: I think it was about three or four days after . . . September 11th, when the president signed the order to mobilize under a partial mob. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Can you tell me how many soldiers are mobilized to date, a rough estimate?

KOONS: . . . We have a total of 8,820, as of today. . . .

INTERVIEWER: How is this mobilization different than prior mobilizations?

KOONS: It goes like this. Prior mobilizations we followed FORMDEPS. It’s been very systematic because you’re following a war plan that you’re mobilizing people against. In this
one, the first priority was NOBLE EAGLE, which was crisis management and force protection and protection of the CONUS assets. . . . [NOBLE EAGLE] was [not] a true war plan that we could take off the shelf and say, “These are the forces I need.”

INTERVIEWER: Are there any changes in how you’re going to mobilize troops in the future?

KOONS: We are looking at a different version with FORSCOM with FORMDEPS for hasty mob[ilization]scenarios.

INTERVIEWER: In getting back to your Emergency Operations Center, what types of lessons learned have come out of all this?

KOONS: Probably the key thing to the whole thing is flexibility.

INTERVIEWER: Sir, can you think of anything else that you might like to add concerning 11 September and the aftermath of that?

KOONS: In a CPX scenario, a lot of people have balked at the idea of participating, and a lot of folks have said, “Well, it’s the Emergency Operations Center. It’s an operations function, and therefore, we’re not going to put a lot of emphasis on it.” The fact that the chief of staff and the DCG [deputy commanding general] put a lot of emphasis on participation in making sure that we were all doing the same thing has paid off big dividends. Our last CPX before September was in July, so going into . . . 11 September . . . wasn’t new to us. We were able to step in, pick up the books, and say, “This is what we’re doing. This is how we do it. This is why we do it, and this should be the result.” And it’s paid off big dividends. As far as on the personal side, it’s caused a lot of people to either prove or disprove their abilities. So it’s amazing who the heroes turn out to be. It’s not necessarily at the star [general] level or the O-6 level, or the GS-15-type levels. It’s the [soldiers] you don’t see on a day-to-day basis that just keep things going and making sure that things continue to happen. And it’s been a learning experience.271

271 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Koons, interview by Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 19 March 2002.
Major Kent Jennings
JENNINGS: [Major Jennings described his normal job duties.] Basically, we’re in charge of mobilization and logistics for all Army Reserve units that fall under USARC’s command for exercises, deployments, mobilizations. We’ve worked with the RSCs and with subordinate commands to ensure that we’re logistically ready.

INTERVIEWER: What sorts of things does logistics entail?

JENNINGS: Readiness of units, equipment readiness . . . equipment on hand, equipment that units are supposed to have that they’re authorized. Make sure that they have the right type of equipment to perform the mission that they’re going to be called upon to do . . . also the actual maintenance, the readiness posture of units. [Six people work in the Plans and Operations Branch.]

INTERVIEWER: And were all of you involved instrumentally in the events of 11 September at the USARC?

JENNINGS: Yes, we were. However, . . . myself and Captain [Ronald] Frame . . . were actually in Germany . . . working issues for Kosovo and Bosnia, some equipment issues for our units – K-4 and S-4 [Kosovo and stabilization] rotations – when 9-11 occurred. We were sitting in Heidleberg when it happened.

INTERVIEWER: So, when 11 September occurred, what then happened with the Kosovo and Bosnia operations?

JENNINGS: . . . We still support that, however, we were called to come back in as soon as possible. It took two or three days . . . before they allowed the flight back out.

INTERVIEWER: What were you actually doing when you heard of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?
JENNINGS: We were working some equipment issues with the 7th ARCOM, OCAR, subordinate units, major subordinate commands under OCAR. We were working – in fact, I think that day we were working postal conveyor-belt issues for some of our units, postal units that are in Bosnia and Kosovo. And we had just heard…. So, that’s how we found out. Then, of course, we went up to the operations center at our headquarters over there, and we saw the pictures. . . .

[Major Jennings kept in contact with the USARC until he was able to board a flight there on 14 September.]

The first night, of course, we came in here. And then we had a lot of units nominated to go different places, so we had to look at the readiness posture of all those units. So, it was a lot of going into the unit status reports looking at on-hand equipment. We call it “scrubbing” the units. There was a lot of work there. The first few weeks, there was a lot of effort and a lot of time. . . . NOBLE EAGLE was a different scenario than ENDURING FREEDOM. For NOBLE EAGLE, the basic guide we got was that the units come as they are. Whatever readiness posture they’re at in that point in time is what they’re going to go in. Of course, we’re not going to send a unit that’s completely broken. We’ve got to make sure that what they have to perform their mission they have, and it works and it runs. But, it’s just a matter of going through again and making sure that . . . their primary pieces of equipment, their mission-essential pieces of equipment are operational, and that they actually have them on hand.

INTERVIEWER: Now, we can talk about ENDURING FREEDOM in a moment. First, I’d like to talk a little about NOBLE EAGLE.

JENNINGS: You’ve got to understand, when it first happened, too, the guidance was sketchy. And FORSCOM was . . . trying to figure out what to do. . . . We were getting so many messages coming in and out of the ops that it was so confusing. So, we were looking at how do we fix the units so that they can perform the mission no matter where they go, at the very beginning.

INTERVIEWER: How many days after 11 September did you realize that some units were going to be mobilized in some capacity?

JENNINGS: We knew immediately. Particularly the MP [military police] units . . . were called upon pretty early in that scenario.

INTERVIEWER: What were some of the challenges that you discovered with those mobilizing units? I know we’ve talked about equipment.

JENNINGS: . . . We have a mortuary affairs unit that’s mobilized out of Puerto Rico. And you’ve got to get the equipment from Puerto Rico to the United States, so that’s one scenario. . . .
INTERVIEWER: I know that a lot of units didn’t have everything on hand that they needed. I only happen to know because I was in a mobilizing unit, and I saw that, for example, some MP units that came through the same installation as we did, didn’t have some of the major things like trucks.

JENNINGS: What we do in that instance, particularly for ENDURING FREEDOM, [is] to meet whatever the deployment criteria that’s set. We’ve got to look at cross leveling units, but we don’t want to break other units to fix them. So, you’ve got to look at different units to see how they’re resourced and where you can pull different equipment, so you don’t hurt the other unit. So . . . when we say scrubbing, that’s where we really get into the detail work, because you have to make sure you’re not breaking other units.

INTERVIEWER: How did that work out getting the mobilizing units the equipment that they needed? How did you basically do that?

JENNINGS: Again, we go through readiness reports. We look at units that are . . . either not on some of the [operational plans], or different scenarios, or they’re later deploying units, or possibly deploying. And then you’ve also got to look at the per[sonnel] side of the house. If there’s a unit that you know you’re not going to be able to fix … for personnel, you may want to get another unit in that case. . . . Why fix them for equipment if you can’t fix them for personnel?

INTERVIEWER: Why did it appear that quite a lot of mobilizing units – at least for the CONUS [continental United States] – were broken, in terms of not having equipment?

JENNINGS: I wouldn’t say they were broken. I can tell you some of the other issues. A lot of the units, making sure that they’re doing their inspections of their personnel clothing and OCIE [organizational clothing and equipment] and things like that. That’s a big issue. You’ve got to identify shortages in that arena, too. . . . We didn’t have huge, major issues with a lot of equipment shortages. And that was a result of getting feedback from FORSCOM that you come as you are in NOBLE EAGLE. And we didn’t get that until three or four weeks into the operations. . . . We had, but nothing to the point that we couldn’t perform our missions.

INTERVIEWER: Once units go overseas, then, what happens if they run into other equipment issues?

JENNINGS: If it’s overseas, then normally they’re under active Army auspices. Then they would request through those channels. . . . One of the things that General [Thomas] Plewes
wanted was . . . make sure that our soldiers were being taken care of, particularly for NOBLE EAGLE, and that our units have adequate billeting, that they’re being fed properly, that they’re being supported properly at their deployment sites and installations. Our Transportation Services Division . . . [does] weekly slides on that. It’s not like we had a hands-off approach once they’re at the deployment sites with the active Army. But, really, as far as getting support they’re emphasizing, according to FORMDEPS, all the phase one activity. When you're planning, when you’re making sure you have all equipment on hand as far as personnel clothing, as far as OCIE [was concerned], that was a real challenge because a lot of these units were . . . hastily mobilized. They didn’t have time to do a lot of the stuff that they would normally do in an alert phase. So, that was a real challenge, to identify shortages within a three or four day time period, and get them to their deployment site. . . . Sometimes the equipment was trailing the soldiers because we didn’t have enough time to get the stuff GBLed to [government bill of lading] the location, wherever they were going stateside. . . . There was just a lot of coordination between the CONUSAs, [continental United States Army], the installations, the direct reporting units, to the USARC.

INTERVIEWER: What were some of the lessons learned?

JENNINGS: We had to determine in a lot of instances what units needed to bring because we had little or no logistics guidance as a result of hasty mobilization. . . . We had undefined missions in a lot of instances. So we were calling the CONUSAs. I say “we” and our Mobilizations Branch, here in the USARC – mob DCSOPS. . . . We had some of the units that were being mobilized [that] went straight to deployment sites early on because they had to be [at a duty location]. They didn’t go through mob station. That creates other things. [There was] more emphasis on the RSCs to make sure everything’s squared away because, of course, at the mobilization stations they do a validation process to make sure that the people have all their equipment. . . . Our RSCs had to do a little bit more work to make sure the units were prepared – the ones that were going straight to their deployment sites.

Again, I talked about reduced time to complete phase two and three tasks according to FORMDEPS. In some instances, phase two was completely the alert phase – was completely taken out of the equation because they had to get to their mob site or their deployment site. . . . It’s evident we need to place more emphasis on phase one tasks prior to being alerted for mob. Just in peacet time, it’s important that we do showdown inspections of personal clothing, of OCIE, because with hasty mobilization, you don’t know what’s coming. . . . It’s important that we do a lot of the SRP [soldier readiness processing] checks. . . during phase one. We’re not going to have the time in some instances to do that. I saw in some instances some inventories were not conducted or were incomplete. [There was] the lack of having real good mission statements in the mob orders or in the FORSCOM deployment orders. And equipment guidance,
again, has been limited or not provided in some instances. So we’re having to try and track that
down. . . . When you don’t have mission statements, particularly when you have the scenario
come as you are, it’s sort of difficult to determine do we have the right equipment sometimes.
We try to do the best we can do in light of not having that, calling the CONUSAs, calling
FORSCOM. That’s where we’re beating up our mob folks upstairs. We’re calling the
CONUSAs, and we’re calling FORSCOM trying to get their guidance. That’s a lot of work, and
that takes a lot of time, dealing with the installations – a lot of installation issues [such as]
DODACs. [Department of Defense activity codes]. Once they hit the installation, their
DODACs should be changed to wherever they’re deployment site is going to be at. And that’s a
mob station responsibility. We found a lot of the DOCAC’s haven’t been changed. It’s a real
issue. . . . It has been a major problem for us.

And if DODACs aren’t being changed, that means that you send a unit overseas, and they
still could be using their peacetime requisitioning process. The funds are coming out of our
pocket – the reserve pocket – when they actually should be billed to [the] active component.
And again, if the . . . addresses aren’t changed when they order stuff, it’s coming to home station
rather than where it needs to be going. So, that’s been a real issue.

INTERVIEWER: So, then you still have some deployed units that are using their peacetime
DODACs?

JENNINGS: Yes . . . Not just the reserves – the National Guard, everybody’s having this issue.
And we’ve raised this to FORSCOM, so they’re aware of the problems that are happening. I
don’t know, but I think a lot of the installations were cut off from the process too. . . . They
haven’t done this in awhile. So, I don’t know if it’s part of re-instituting the set procedures that
are on FORMDEPs again and making sure people abide by those.

INTERVIEWER: What were some other issues that you faced in dealing with the installations?

JENNINGS: . . . Depending on the area of operations that we’re sending folks to, there’s a
different set of clothing plus-up that the installation has to provide and just making sure things
are standardized across the board with different mobilization stations. That’s [varying standards]
been sort of an issue we’ve had to work with FORSCOM on.

INTERVIEWER: When a unit needs equipment or clothing, and it’s unable to be cross leveled
or borrowed from some other unit, I know that in some cases the installation will purchase what
they need.

JENNINGS: Yeah, according to FORMDEPS it’s their responsibility to do that.
INTERVIEWER: So, then, do you know who gives them the money?

JENNINGS: FORSCOM. Or they take it out of their pockets and request for reimbursement. Fort Dix is a good example -- our installations having to plus up. That’s another thing, too. Not only do we sort of have an oversight of working these issues, but Dix, as being an installation to us, we work hand in hand with . . . Fort Dix, as a power-projection platform. In fact, we’re running into those issues right now because they have to do all the plus ups for all the units that are falling through Fort Dix – OCIE plus ups. And if a unit’s coming in and is not fully prepared, they’re having – their maintenance is getting involved to fix the vehicles. Then they request reimbursement from FORSCOM. . . . There's probably somebody you can address in the Comp[troller] shop. But, it's a little confusing because there’s different pots of money out there – all the different operations. So it gets a little confusing for the installations and what they should charge.

Fort Dix is a good example. They’ve got folks flowing there for S-4 rotations, for folks deploying for an S-4 rotation. They’ve got folks returning. [The] 29th Division [is] returning right now from a Balkans rotation. And then they’ve got people going out for NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. So they’ve got different groups coming in, and it’s really tough to manage a CIF [central issue facility] there to issue out all this clothing. . . .

One of the things we’ve noticed, it’s tough for RSCs to be able to look at all their units. . . . We’ve raised this in our after action review comments [and that] is getting mob orders that say both NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. There’s different deployment criteria. . . . On the mob orders it’s saying both NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM. There are different deployment criteria for it. There’s different funding channels for both of those. So that’s an issue that we have raised, and we have raised [it] at FORSCOM, too. It’s tough for us to distinguish. It’s tough for our folks . . . to determine if you’re getting mixed messages.

INTERVIEWER: So, why are these orders coming through saying both?

JENNINGS: One of the issues is not having a defined TPFDD [time phase force development data] . . . . Without having a defined TPFDD, it’s tough. Doing these hasty mobs . . . you don’t have good mission statements. You’re not getting a lot of guidance . . . whereas, with maybe Southwest Asia or Korea we have defined [operation plans] that are a little easier to follow.

INTERVIEWER: So, these units that are stating both operations on their orders, how are they being handled right now? What’s happening with them?

JENNINGS: If it says both, we’re trying to get them to the deployment criterion that’s worse case.
INTERVIEWER: Which is ENDURING FREEDOM, right?

JENNINGS: Yes, which would be ENDURING FREEDOM. . . . Let me digress for just a moment. . . . For RSCs being able to look at all their mobilizing units, it’s real tough because they’re limited on staff there. One of the things that . . . we’re suggesting out of log[istics] is . . . looking at TDA [table of distribution and allowances] force structure for RSCs to have maybe a mob[ilization] support team that would be similar to what you see at FORSCOM with their augmentation unit. But maybe we could have an augmentation unit at RSCs that, upon a war like we’re in right now, they’d have a mob TDA for these mob support teams, and they would bring them on and then they could go out and look at units that have been alerted and assist these units. So, that’s one of the things we’re suggesting and one of the things that we’re suggesting in this homeland defense, homeland security practical exercise that our O-6 [colonel] attended with the chief of staff on Monday. So I don’t know where that’ll go, but we’re suggesting that we like that idea.

One of the other issues we’ve had . . . that’s a challenge for us is when they call a “double A” unit up – mobilized double A unit up without equipment. . . . A double A means it’s the entire unit mobilizing. According to FORMDEPs, when you mobilize a double A, everything goes – the equipment, everything. But early on in the scenario, we’ve mobilized units, and we were told don’t bring the equipment, or if you don’t bring the equipment, who actually owns that equipment? It should be the active component, if you’re mobilizing that unit. But then they say, “Keep the equipment at home.” Well, who maintains it, who reports it?

We’re breaking new ground. The way we’ve done business with FORMDEPS, a lot of it was changed as a result of this. That was a big challenge for us . . . . Basically with the units we mobed [mobilized] without equipment, we’d find a caretaker in the RSC for that, and they’d basically monitor the equipment report for the unit and make sure the maintenance would get done on the vehicles. So, they’re basically a caretaker . . . within their peacetime chain of command . . . which is not really the way we should be doing business. . . . We had one unit that we mobilized like that, and then, three months later they said, “Oh, well, now we need the equipment.” This was that unit out of Puerto Rico I was telling you about earlier. We mobed the mortuary affairs unit. We mobed that unit to begin with early on. They said, “Oh, no, no equipment,” and then three months later, they say, “Oh, now we need the equipment.” . . . We get ready. We make all the arrangements, but the peacetime chain of command made all those arrangements. So, that’s a real issue.

Should there maybe have been a CONUS movement order or something like that? . . . It was something so new that we’ve never done that. We’ve never done that. Normally, you have a TPFDD and everything flows as part of that TPFDD, to include equipment. So, it’s just a different way of doing business. So, it’s a big paradigm shift for us. And I don’t know if it’s going to continue that way, or if it’s just a result of 9-11 happening. So, that was a direct result of 9-11, just having to get units at some of these sites that we never mobilized soldiers to before.
Have we ever mobilized a mortuary affairs unit to go to the military district of Washington? That’s new. . . . We got the equipment from Puerto Rico to Fort Lee [Virginia.] We made all those shipping arrangements, so when I say “we” I mean the RSC. So, that’s a big job. . . . The unit’s already gone, so that’s just an additional burden that the peacetime chain of command had to do. . . .

One of the things we’d like to see [is in logistics guidance]. We’ve addressed this. . . because you’re getting log guidance, and you’re getting guidance in a lot of different formats and with ENDURING FREEDOM you may get some log guidance in the deployment orders. You may get some guidance in the mob orders. But we would like to see the log guidance – clearly defined logistics guidance and a clearly defined mission statement in the CONUS mob orders. And the reason we say mob orders is because everybody gets that mob order. The installations get that mob order. The unit gets that mob order. We get that mob order. And that’s another issue we’ve raised is we’d like to see that happen. That’s a real challenge. If you’re trying to go to four or five different places to try to figure out what your mission’s going to be and what equipment you’re going to bring, that’s a huge burden. . . . When they come to us to try to get the information, if we don’t have it, it’s tough.

INTERVIEWER: You talked earlier about some units not having mission statements or guidance. How is that rectified? What happens then in a case like that?

JENNINGS: Well, normally what we’ll do is if we get calls from our log counterparts, we’ll go to our mobilization branch and [ask for help.] The . . . DCSOPS . . . they define the requirements. . . . We as logisticians . . . fill that requirement. We make sure that they have the equipment to be able to perform that function. But if no one’s defining the requirement, then we’ve got to go through our ops [operations] counterparts and say, “What is the requirement?” So, that’s been a big issue. . . .

Under a well-defined Oplan [operational plan], you’re going to get your mob order thirty days out. So, that would force them to at least have mission guidance and log guidance thirty days out to help our units prepare . . . . They [have] called upon to mobilize TDA units that aren’t authorized equipment. Facility engineer teams -- these units were never intended to go OCONUS. So that’s been a real challenge with us working with mob stations at FORSCOM. How do you get these people equipment?

INTERVIEWER: And what kind of units are those?

JENNINGS: Facility engineer teams. They just go out and look at facilities. They don’t have equipment. They’re just people who go out and do site surveys at facilities.

INTERVIEWER: Why would they be mobilized? What’s their play in all of this?
JENNINGS: I don’t know what their mission is. I would assume to go to these different locations and determine what type of structures. . . . It’s a unique thing. We’re mobilizing units that were meant to stay stateside. So that’s a different mission for us now. . . .

Property accountability -- there’s another issue. When we mobilize soldiers, if it’s a derivative UIC, you’re not taking the whole unit. You’ve made a derivative UIC, and they take equipment with them. What they’ll do is what we call a “task force download disk” and offer them as PBSRs, which is the automated property book system. When they take that disk, which has that portion of equipment off of the whole unit’s equipment, . . . it’s supposed to be downloaded on some active component property book system for accountability purposes. We’re finding it’s not being downloaded. Thus, we have equipment that’s floating out there. So, that’s been another issue. It needs to get put on somebody’s property book system so you can manage it, so you know where the equipment is.

That’s been another issue we’ve been working with FORSCOM. Within twenty-four hours all that’s supposed to happen at the mob station. DODACs are supposed to be changed. The task force download disk should be put on somebody’s property book, active component property book for visibility purposes. And we’re finding that’s not current. . . . That’s why we’ve highlighted a lot of these issues to FORSCOM because we’re finding that happening. I don’t know if that’s part of the validation process at the installation. That’s why we raised these issues. . . . We’d like to see more added emphasis being placed on the logistical aspects of that validation [process] at that installation. We’re thinking the CONUS is making sure the people are trained, making them perform their mission, but we’d also . . . like to see [that] those CONUSA . . . validation teams have a standardized log checklist that they’d check off at mob station prior to letting a unit leave that mob station, i.e., that they have their new DODACs, have their TAC [tactical command post] addresses. . . . Somebody’s taking control of their property.

So, those are some of the issues we’re looking at. . . . A lot of times, it can’t be done until they get to the mob station. . . . They’ll have to have their peacetime DODAC until they get to their mob station. So, it’s really clearly the mob station’s responsibility right before they deploy to give them the new DODACs, the new TAC addresses to wherever they’re going. . . . Mobilization stations didn’t request or modify DODAC and TAC addresses for mobilization. We continue to pay the bill. . . . [The] USAR has different pots of money.

One of the other things, too, from the mob station, we’re still getting a lot of calls back from the RSCs under USARC. Once a unit’s mobilized at the mob station or their deployment site, they’re calling us back and saying, “Well, you need to send this. . . .” No, we sent them according to the deployment criteria, and now they’re active component, whoever their caretaker is. So, that’s still been an issue.

One of the issues I think we had . . . [was that] one of the unit’s that mobilized . . . [was] supposed to mobilize with their weapons. Well, they get to their deployment site CONUS and whoever they’re supporting says, “Well, you don’t need weapons.” So they say, “We’ll send
your weapons home.” So . . . they tell a unit, “Well, you use your own fund site to send it home.” “No, you need to provide a fund site to send it home. They work for you now.” So, they were calling back to the RSC asking for a fund site. So, those are some of the issues. It’s just a challenge that we have to educate people in. The process is out there. It’s well known that they should be taken care of, and I think that’s part of the reason that General Plewes had the quality of life stuff. He wants us raising those issues to FORSCOM when we see them. . . .

INTERVIEWER: Are units that are mobilized provided an installation as a caretaker if they’re in the states?

JENNINGS: No. See, the installation is the caretaker while they’re processing through the installation, but no. Some of these sites, I don’t know if they’re not equipped . . . to be able to take care of them, as well as an installation is equipped to take care of them. Once they get to their actual deployment site, we send an MI [military intelligence] guy to the National Security Administration or team, for instance.

INTERVIEWER: So their caretaker is supposed to be the site where they’re ultimately deploying to?

JENNINGS: Their ultimate deployment site, right. That’s our understanding. . . . Somebody should be taking care of them. . . . For the most part they are.

[Major Jennings spoke about Fort Dix, New Jersey, as a mobilization installation being among the busiest for in processing soldiers for active duty.]

[Another issue is] mobilizing some units that may perform different missions, other than what their SRC [source code] states . . . If we get good mission statements, it can also avoid selecting the wrong unit for a mission. That’s really important. . . .

We mentioned personal clothing. Again, there’s going to have to be a heightened concentration on phase one activity. . . . You should’ve gotten all the plus-ups of the other stuff, too, at the mob station. . . . One of the issues that was raised is [whether or not we] should . . . be [at] the same standard as [the] active component? . . . Should we be at the [active] standard?

Harry [Rote], anything else that we need to add? I think . . . [of] some of the challenges we’ve faced right off the bat.

ROTE: . . . Pretty much everything we’ve done we’ve reinvented the wheel. Forces Command has doctrine, FORMDEPS. It talks about everything.

JENNINGS: Yeah, we really haven’t followed FORMDEPS.
ROTE: It’s talks about the whole spectrum of mobilization, the whole nine yards. And we’re not doing it. We’re not following that.

JENNINGS: Well, nobody’s enforcing that, and that’s when we get back to talking about the power projection platforms and the different standards.

ROTE: FORMDEPS tells everybody what their responsibilities are. FORSCOM doesn’t. FORSCOM has no control over the installation. Every installation will see their own thing. There’s no standard. . . . We have all these CPXs and all these other things, and table-top training exercises, the whole nine yards. We train one way, but when it comes time to fight, we’re broken. And higher echelon doesn’t want to hear that.

JENNINGS: And they are – to FORSCOM’s credit. That’s what this is all about. I don’t know if this’ll mean another volume to FORMDEPS.

ROTE: But see, what’s that going to resolve? If you can’t follow the current, simple things in FORMDEPS, you’re rewriting [policy]. . . . We don’t need to rewrite policy. . . . This isn’t the first mobilization we’ve been through. What’s irritating me is you can’t take the lessons learned from DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and apply them. Supposedly that’s what the new versions of FORMDEPs and all that’s all about. But the bottom line is . . . we are not fighting the way we trained. And even here in USARC, our emergency operations didn’t work the way it was supposed to. Our DCSOPS seems to change step every time we turn around. It’s like they’re changing it to modify – like they’re the only directorate that matters. . . . We have our own problems. . . . When we look at unit status reports . . . we . . . validate that data. . . . So we’ll go on, and we’ll actually look at their . . . data, . . . and we’ll find out exactly what they look like, . . . and we’ll bounce that off of the USRs [unit status reports]. . . .

One of the other things we do . . . is we look at . . . what they may be substituting items for or in lieu of items. We want to make sure that they have the right items to perform their mission. So, they may have a CUCV [commercial utility cargo vehicle] instead of a HUMVEE [high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle] that they’re using. . . . Or they may have another type of radio that’s not a SINCGARS [single channel ground to air radio system]. . . . We’ll look at subjective upgrades because commanders can do subjective upgrades on their USRs . . . . You’ve got a lot of other equipment in the units that may not be reported on the USRs but may be broken. . . .

Another item that we had to do is that we pulled MTOES [modified table of organization and equipment]. We bounced MTOES off the USRs, off our on-hand data, because again, not everything’s being reported on the USRs. . . . It would be nice if [FORSCOM] had mission statements there [and] . . . then let us determine what meets that capability. . . . We’re not sending leadership in a lot of these rotations, which I see as an issue personally.
ROTE: See we used to with K-4 and S-4 stuff. We used to get really good mission guidance. . . . They’d even give us equipment guidance. Then, if we can do it for S-4/K-4 stuff, why is it we’re having so much trouble now?

JENNINGS: Again, I think it’s [a] paradigm shift. In a lot of these, particularly for homeland defense, we’ve never done this before.

ROTE: But the issue is the things we’re struggling with are the simplest things, like what do you do with your equipment? If you take the double A, if you want the whole unit, you get the whole unit.

ROTE: See, once again it’s that same thing with the USR. You’re saying that they’re available, so you report them, but they’re not really available. . . . For the sake of readiness, we’re just going to make up stuff as we go along. . . . One of the problems is that if you’re showing them as available – these guys have been mobed for up to two years – well, the calendar’s already started on them, and here’s the rest of the unit, and they haven’t been mobed. So what happens when they mob the rest of these guys to go do a mission, and this derivative UIC, if you will, that’s already been mobed a year or a year-and-a-half. See there’s a big disconnect. You’re heading for disaster.

JENNINGS: Another reason for having good mission statements and making sure that we get that . . . is so we don’t mobilize soldiers that we don’t need to mobilize, that don’t have a true mission. And I know there’s been some instances of that, for instance, DIVITS [division institutional training units] – mobilizing some folks out of DIVITS. . . .

ROTE: . . . Division institutional training, for the training base expansion. If you mob these guys and they don’t have any soldiers to train, they just mob them in anticipation. I don’t know if that’s necessarily a good thing either. I don’t know what that does to your recruiting and to your retention. . . .

[Information technology] was a huge issue right after 9-11. . . . We’re operating downstairs [Emergency Operations Center] and all of a sudden the word comes down that everything has to be classified. Everything has to be over secured voice. We didn’t have all the
STU-IIIIs. We didn’t have SIPRNET [Secret Internet Protocol Router Network] on every terminal downstairs. We do now. But that was a huge lesson learned from all this.

The same with the RSCs. I know the CIO [Chief Information Office] [is] working to get more capability out to the field. . . . A lot of [correspondence from the regional support commands] was coming by secure fax or by the limited number of STU-IIIIs that we did have. . . . We’re still very limited on STU-IIIIs, but we’ve made a lot of progress. I think every terminal downstairs in the ops center has an SIPRNET drop, so we can talk with classified email, which is nice. One of the issues that we have raised – I think almost each main directorate here to include us, personnel and ops readiness – we have our own secure area like this. We’re requesting to have SIPRNET put in here too, . . . so that we can communicate classified between this cell and the cell that’s downstairs. . . .

Not only were we activated downstairs, but here. We call this the logistics ops center. We activated this. We brought people in here to work actions. . . . When we first started, we were working twenty-four hours. . . . We were working twelve-hour shifts – a day shift, a night shift. So, we’d have the CAT [crisis assistance team] chief, the DCSLOG [Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics] CAT chief downstairs, which was myself and Captain Frame. And then we’d have a cell up here to work actions because you’re trying to coordinate a lot of stuff downstairs between the other directorates. So, in doing a lot of scrubbing, we’re sending the stuff upstairs. And then we have the team up here that does that scrubbing. . . . We kept twenty-four hour [operations] till the end of January.

[Major Jennings gave some background information on his section and other duties.]

We are, as the DCSLOG representative. . . .the conduit between operations, between DCSOPS [Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations], and DCSLOG. We’re the Plans and [Operations] Branch. . . . We are the primary CAT representatives to the EOC, which is the tie between us and DCSOPS. But we were already pre-designated to fill that slot. For all of the mobilization exercises, we’re always the ones who do that for the DCSLOG. We provide the training for the DCSLOG for any command post exercise and things of that nature. So we already knew. We had a procedure set in place. We have a big SOP [standard operating procedures], standard SOP with continuity books ready to take off the shelf when something like this happens.

[At the time of this interview, Major Jennings was still working in his CAT position, though fewer hours than in the months immediately after 11 September.]

[Who are] . . . the primary people who are going to be in charge of mobilizations? If you think about it, we and the National Guard Bureau. Yet FORSCOM has an augmentation TDA for that purpose. The CONUSAs have an augmentation TDA for that purpose. So, we’ve learned a lot out of this. And now, I don’t know if anybody commented to you, we have developed an augmented TDA. I think it’s like 44 people, or something like that. I don’t know when that’ll come into effect. I know that’s gone on TDA. So, that’s one of the lessons learned, a valuable lesson learned. But I think we need something similar to that at the RSCs – mob support teams . . . and look at all units.
ROTE: Right now we’re hung up on just focusing on the one-A units, the tier one A units.

JENNINGS: . . . In this scenario, particularly in homeland defense, . . . we pulled . . . all the non one-A units.

ROTE: Right now the resources go to the one As. They get everything. Whatever’s left over everybody else gets. But you have to look at all of the units. Maybe that every two years – we’ve got to do something. . . . We’ve got to get out here and see what’s actually out in the units, and we’re not doing it. Right now, the priorities are retention, . . . but it’s consuming all your resources. . . .

JENNINGS: . . . Our installations have done exceptionally well. . . . We’ve blurred the lines of responsibility between us and the mob station – who takes control, who does what. . . . For NOBLE EAGLE they’re being told to capture the costs and ask for reimbursement. For ENDURING FREEDOM they have to give budget estimates straight to FORSCOM from different pots of money. So it’s really sort of confusing. And then K-4/S-4 is a different pot of contingency. It’s really confusing. And they’ve got to manage all this together in one little CIF [central issuing facility]. . . . [Fort] Dix is busier than it’s ever been, even when it was an active component installation. We’re mobing more people through it, and yet, you’ve got to understand when it was bracked, [under base realignment and closure]. . . a lot of the manning . . . went away from them, to run a CIF – central issuing facility. So, these are some of the issues that we’ve readdressed with CONUS, with FORSCOM, and with our leadership here. . . .

I think it’s just we need to develop new processes, or refine the way we’re doing business, maybe make some changes to FORMDEPS and determine who’s going to be responsible for what, and maybe your idea of having the mob station responsible for certain areas. If you know that you’re going to have somebody who is in charge of units, they can make sure that they’re getting what they need to get. And I don’t know who that’s going to be. I’ve heard rumors that they may have a CINC [commander in chief, combatant commander] that’s going to be in charge of homeland defense. But I think that would resolve a lot of the issues . . . because then you’d have oversight of those units upon mobilization. . . . Overall our installations are doing a great job, and I think our subordinate commands have done an exceptional job with not having a whole lot of good mission guidance.²⁷²

²⁷² Major Kent Jennings, interview with Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner, tape recording with transcript, 20 March 2002.
About the Authors

Major Robert Bensburg of Mahopac, New York, joined the Army Reserve in 1984. His branch is Adjutant General. In 1998 he took command of the 311th Military History Detachment. In October 2001, he and the unit mobilized for Operation NOBLE EAGLE to document the Army Reserve response to the 9-11 terrorist attacks. In April 2003, Major Bensburg took an assignment to Kuwait and Iraq to document the Army Reserve role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a bachelor’s degree in business administration from Iona College, New Rochelle, New York. As a civilian he is an individual consultant for Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund in New York City.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Michael Werner of Yardley, Pennsylvania began his military career with the New Jersey Air National Guard in 1985. In 1993 he joined the Army Reserve as a warrant officer candidate. He obtained the military occupational specialties of motor transport operator and supply systems technician. He also holds an Army skill identifier of military historian. In 2000, he joined the 311th Military History Detachment and in October 2001 mobilized under Operation NOBLE EAGLE orders. He holds a bachelor’s degree in liberal arts from the City College of New York, a master’s degree in education from the City College of New York, and a master’s degree in military history from American Military University. As a civilian, Chief Werner is a manager for the Transportation and Networks Division in Delaware for the U.S. Postal Service.

Sergeant First Class Christina Steiner of New York City joined the Army Reserve in 1988. Her primary military occupational specialty is photojournalism, though she holds a secondary specialty in preventive medicine. She joined the 311th Military History Detachment in 1998, and in October 2001 she mobilized for Operation NOBLE EAGLE where she worked in New York, Washington, and Atlanta over two years. She holds a bachelor’s degree in journalism from Wichita State University. As a civilian she is an administrative assistant and freelance writer in Manhattan. She has written newspaper and magazine articles for various publications and online web sites around the country, including: The Wichita Eagle, USA Today, the Miami Herald, Army Reserve, and Soldiers Magazine.