

THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

**741ST ADJUTANT GENERAL COMPANY (POSTAL)
(Orlando, Florida)
February 2003 - May 2004**



**Office of Army Reserve History
United States Army Reserve Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia**

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Dennis Hatcher

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Introduction/Lessons Learned

Editor



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2009**



DESCRIPTION: On a dark blue disk the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

SYMBOLISM: The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

BACKGROUND: The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (US Army Institute of Heraldry.)

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Foreword

The Global War on Terrorism-Operation Iraqi Freedom: 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal) is one in a series of histories of Army Reserve units deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This includes Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The histories are based on primary sources collected by the Office of Army Reserve History's GWOT Military History Task Force. The task force provides program management, central collection, and archiving of unit histories. The former Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General James Helmly, stated the importance of this collection effort:

The Army Reserve is experiencing a time of great transition to meet present and future challenges to our national security. The events of this transition, while still fresh, must be captured and documented to preserve the story of the Army Reserve's contribution to this unprecedented war. The result will be a unique archive of the wartime accomplishments of all mobilized Army Reserve units, not only of this war, but for all future defense commitments. Nowhere else within the United States Government does an official archive of the Army Reserve exist.

The records collected include narratives with a mission statement, after action reviews or lessons learned, personnel rosters, mobilization orders, demobilization orders, unit briefing slides, photographs, and autobiographical sketches. This information is used to record and to preserve the Army Reserve's contributions to GWOT. This volume and other unit histories included in the series, as compiled from these records, provide an invaluable resource for the Army Reserve and its Soldiers to

learn from their own experiences and retain lessons learned for future operations.

Fort McPherson
Atlanta, Georgia
September 2008

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Introduction

"Through their service, Reserve personnel play an important role in our efforts to advance democracy, peace and freedom across the Nation and around the world. These dedicated men and women train vigorously and work closely with our active duty forces, serving as equal partners in our integrated Armed Forces." President George W. Bush (11 August 2002)¹

11 September 2001 was a watershed in the history of the United States. The terrorist attacks had a profound affect on the country. In his address to the nation that night, President George W. Bush said the attacks had moved "a great people . . . to defend a great nation." Bush set the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the US "will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." On 20 September 2001 in a joint session of Congress, Bush further defined his policy by stating, "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime."²

On 15 September, Bush ordered a partial mobilization of reserve forces with the first call-ups starting on 22 September. The Army Reserve quickly reacted to the largest deployment since Operation Desert Storm. Even before the official call-ups, eighty-five Soldiers from one Army Reserve unit, the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs), were on the scene at the Pentagon by 17 September 2001.³

In New York after the attack on the World Trade Center, Army Reserve Soldiers aided in the recovery efforts. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers were quick to answer the call for assistance. Army Reserve Soldiers provided equipment, reserve center space, and other logistical support. Like the Pentagon recovery effort the actions of Army Reserve Soldiers at the World Trade Center preceded official mobilization.⁴

Military intelligence determined that Osama bin Laden's Islamic al Qaeda was responsible for the 11 September attacks. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan where the fundamentalist Taliban regime

controlled the country and harbored al Qaeda. A loose coalition, the Northern Alliance, opposed the Taliban. On 7 October 2001, less than a month after the 11 September attacks, the US, with support from Great Britain, launched an air and naval attack as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The campaign pinpointed airfields and air defenses along with command and control centers. In a national address Bush said the military action was aimed to "cut the military capability of the Taliban regime." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that the assault was intended to "make it increasingly difficult for terrorists to use Afghanistan as a base of operations."⁵

The ground war or "boots on the ground" began on 19 October 2001 with a number of twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment A teams who joined the Northern Alliance in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda. By November 2001 over 50,000 American forces involving ground, sea, and air operations were in the theater. "The fighting in Afghanistan," wrote Brigadier General John Brown, director of the US Army Center of Military History, "fractured into several miniature campaigns as each allied Afghan warlord advanced on his own objectives, carefully protecting the tiny contingent of Americans who gave him . . . awesome firepower."⁶ The fall of Kabul and Kandahar and the "destruction of organized resistance in Tora Bora" spelled doom for the terrorists. By late 2001, American Soldiers working with Afghan forces were successful in "decisive[l]y defeating the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies and in liberating Afghanistan."⁷ Operation Enduring Freedom "marked the first commitment of American forces in what would become simultaneous combat operations across multiple theaters of war since World War II."⁸

In his state of the union address on 29 January 2002, President Bush told the American people "in four short months," the country had "rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested, and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression."⁹

But, as seen later the terrorists rallied, albeit in a weakened state. By January 2002, the US and its allies began to set the stage for Operation

Anaconda which lasted from 2 March through 19 March 2002. Its mission was to destroy remaining al Qaeda forces. Although the operation was successful, a number of al Qaeda fled into the nearby mountains and into Pakistan. While the terrorists suffered substantial losses, fighting still persists in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Operation Enduring Freedom continues as does the mobilization of Army Reserve Soldiers.

The Army Reserve played and is playing a vital role in these operations. According to Lieutenant General James Helmly, then Chief, Army Reserve, "What was once a force in reserve has become a full partner across the spectrum of operations to satisfy the demand and need for Army Reserve Soldiers and units around the world. Wherever the Army committed forces in the world . . . Army Reserve Soldiers are an integral part, providing critical specialized capabilities and augmentation."¹¹ Army Reserve Soldiers were there in Afghanistan serving alongside active component Soldiers. For example, the 911th Forward Surgical Team supported the 10th Mountain Division during medical assistance missions in Afghanistan. The 310th Psychological Operations Battalion served in the isolated mountain regions of Afghanistan determining the needs of the people and organizing the delivery of non-perishable food, bottled water, and medical aid.¹² The 345th Military Intelligence Detachment assisted the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in intelligence operations leading to the identification, location and targeting of the Taliban and al Qaeda. What Army Reserve Soldiers accomplished proved "vital to the war on terrorism." "We," said one Soldier, "helped out the active duty forces that were there and needed the augmentation." Some civil affairs units, known for their distribution of humanitarian aid and assisting in rebuilding projects, found themselves on the front lines working on combat operations with the infantrymen.¹³ In fighting terrorists there often was no clearly defined front line.

The concept for what later became Operation Iraqi Freedom was long in the making dating back some viewed to 1 March 1991, the day after Desert Storm. Based on intelligence that Saddam Hussein had developed weapons of mass destruction President Bush decided that a regime change

in Iraq was warranted. He also based his decision on Iraq's probable connection with terrorists and the belief that Iraq posed a danger to the stability of the Middle East. As some of America's allies questioned the threat of Saddam, Bush was prepared to act alone to crush what he included in his "axis of evil." Others wanted to wait on the results of recently readmitted UN weapons inspectors. Britain sided with Bush as his determination for a regime change in Iraq increased.¹⁴ In a statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 2002, Bush said:

My nation will work with the UN Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraq's regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We will work with the UN Security Council for the necessary resolutions. But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced -- the just demands of peace and security will be met -- or action will be unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will also lose its power.¹⁵

Seven days later on 17 September 2002, Bush released his administration's National Security Strategy which, in short, set forth the reformulation and posture of America's foreign policy. It was a major shift from a "shape, respond, prepare" posture to the new posture of "assure, dissuade, deter forward, and decisively defeat." It affected how the Army was to reshape itself and went hand in hand with the Army's ongoing transformation. The new posture included preemption to handle rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. As Bush said, this was "a matter of common sense and self defense."¹⁶ It would set the stage in 2003 for the invasion of Iraq.

When Bush made this address to the UN plans were already in the making for a campaign against Iraq. In fact on 4 December 2001 General Tommy Franks, commander of the US Central Command (CENTCOM),

briefed the secretary of defense on the first draft war plan. By 1 February 2002, Franks had plans for a four-phased war involving deployment of troops into theater, air strikes, a ground war, and reconstruction.¹⁷

On the eve of the campaign, the Turkish parliament decided not to allow the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division to pass through the country and thereby set up a front in northern Iraq. "This obviated a major feature of the preferred war plan, left the division's equipment out of play as it hastily transshipped from standing offshore from Turkey to Kuwait, and perturbed deployment schedules because the ships carrying the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division equipment were not available for other purposes for a prolonged period of time."

Franks and the ground forces commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, had to reassess their strategy in the light of the impending conflict. Franks had several contingency plans. One called for a "rolling start." According to this plan, the campaign would begin by using forces already in theater and supplementing them as needed with "reinforcements as they arrived. Iraqi dispositions and circumstances," wrote Brown, "did not suggest significant resistance much south of Baghdad, so why not sweep up relatively uncontested terrain with a lesser force and feed in further forces as they arrived?"¹⁸ The plan was tactically driven given a twelve-year air campaign dating from Desert Storm with the no fly zones, American ground forces "acclimatized for operations in Iraq" with experienced defensive operations protecting Kuwait, and intelligence reportedly pinpointing Saddam's location.¹⁹

Operation Iraqi Freedom began with an air assault on 19 March 2003 in the "shock and awe" phase. Within twenty-four hours the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, 1st Marine Division, and the British 7th Armored Division were on the move. They quickly traversed the theater without much opposition, moving along the west side of the Euphrates River toward Baghdad, reaching the vicinity of Al Najaf with minimal resistance, overrunning the Rumaila oil fields and securing the facilities "virtually unscathed," capturing Umm Qasr and mounting other offensive operations. Western and northern Iraq had virtually been neutralized.²⁰

However, "the campaign did not stay easy." The Fedayeen, special Republican Guards, and other forces mounted a counterattack "with a vengeance." They proved to be "wily and ruthless opponents," ambushing US forces, sniping, attacking the extended supply lines, firing shoulder air defense weapons, and using suicidal tactics. "They knew the American rules of engagement and exploited them to their advantage." An Nasiriyah was one of the most "hotly contested" areas. The expected moral support from the Iraqi Shiites did not materialize as they "seemed to present an overall attitude of sullen indifference." Lieutenant General William Wallace, the V Corps commander, responded to the "troubling surprises" when he remarked that the Iraqis were "'not the enemy we war-gamed against.'" Strategy and tactics had to change to combat the "dynamic battlefield."

The Army Reserve responded by mobilizing primarily combat service and combat service support units. Army Reserve Soldiers were involved in providing military police protection, operating ports and ammunition facilities, repairing equipment, building bridges, hauling fuel, and supporting the theater on a broad-spectrum.²¹ Army Reserve units like the 741st Adjutant General (Postal) received mobilization orders and deployed to Kuwait and then to Iraq.

By the end of 2003, the Army Reserve had mobilized a total of 2,322 units (AA UIC's and derivative UIC's).²² The total number of Army Reserve Soldiers serving on active duty for the Global War on Terrorism was 71,587 incorporating Operations Noble Eagle (home front), Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.²³ Helmly described the mobilization as "for percentage wise the largest mobilization we've had since World War II."²⁴ In a message to Army Reserve Soldiers and their families, Helmly told them: "Today the nation is asking Army Reserve Soldiers to be prepared to serve on active duty when called. Just as the generation of World War II answered the call to service, we are being called upon to sacrifice in defense of our Nation in the Global War on Terrorism."²⁵ "The nation has called," said Lieutenant General Jack Stultz, the current Chief, Army Reserve, "so we've answered the call, and we're going to continue to answer the call."²⁶

Major combat operations in Iraq officially ended on 1 May 2003 when President Bush declared "mission accomplished."²⁷ However, as with Operation Enduring Freedom, the insurgents were relentless. The Global War on Terrorism continued with the nonstop mobilization and deployment of Army Reserve Soldiers. The Army Reserve remained committed to the warfight and to the warrior ethos. For the 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal) that meant providing postal services to military units in Kuwait and Iraq through the establishment and operation of Army post offices.

Lineage and Honors

To date, no official lineage and honors is certified for the 741st AG Company by the Center of Military History. The following information is from public sources, official orders and from unit members.

Date unknown: Unit constituted as the 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal), unit identification code (UIC) WS24AA, in Orlando, Florida.

Date unknown: Unit is assigned as subordinate organization under command and control of the 81st Regional Support Command, Birmingham, Alabama.

14 May 2003: Unit is assigned to United States Army Central Command, Kuwait.

June 2003: Unit is authorized wear of the 3rd Army right shoulder sleeve insignia in recognition of service in a combat zone of operations.

May 2004: Unit is reassigned to the 81st Regional Readiness Command.²⁸

Heraldry

81st Regional Readiness Command



Distinctive Unit Insignia

Description: A gold color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches (2.86 cm) in height overall consisting of a blue octagon bearing a vertical gold stripe throughout the center charged with a blue star at the top and overall in base a black wildcat and extending over the left side of the octagon a gold eight-rayed sun and over the right side a gold fleur-de-lis; arched across the top on a gold scroll the inscription "TRAIN" and convexly arched in base, terminating on each side in back of the sun and fleur-de-lis, a gold scroll inscribed "MAINTAIN" on the left and "SUSTAIN" on the right, all in black letters.

Symbolism: The black wildcat is from the shoulder sleeve insignia of the 81st Division and also refers to that unit's nickname. The sun from the flag of the President of the Philippines commemorates the division's World War II Philippine Presidential Unit Citation, and the fleur-de-lis is for the World War

I Campaigns. The star denotes Command activities. The octagon and vertical stripe allude to the numerical designation of the organization.

Background: The distinctive unit insignia was originally authorized for the 81st US Army Reserve Command on 12 June 1970. It was reassigned to the 81st Regional Support Command on 16 April 1996. The insignia was redesignated for the 81st Regional Readiness Command effective 16 July 2003.²⁹



Traditional Shoulder Insignia



Desert Insignia

Left Shoulder Sleeve Insignia

Description: On an olive drab disc edged with a 1/8 inch (.32 cm) black border a black wildcat passant. The overall dimension is 2 1/4 inches (5.72 cm) in diameter.

Background: The shoulder sleeve insignia was originally approved by telegram on 19 October 1918 for the 81st Division. On 29 June 1922 it was officially announced. The insignia was redesignated for the 81st Infantry Division on 11 May 1964, retroactive to 1 August 1942. On 22 April 1968 it was authorized for the 81st US Army Reserve Command. The sleeve insignia was reassigned to the 81st Regional Support Command on 16 April 1996. The insignia was redesignated for the 81st Regional Readiness Command effective 16 July 2003. The 81st Division is credited as being the first unit to have a shoulder sleeve insignia.³⁰

3rd Army



Shoulder Sleeve Insignia

Description: On a blue disc 2 -1/4 inches in diameter, a white letter “A” with members 1/8 inch wide within a red circle 2 inches in diameter and 3/16 inch in width.

Symbolism: The disc with two borders alludes to the designation of the unit, and the white letter “A” signifies “army.” The “A” inside an “O” also stands for Army of Occupation, World War I.³¹

Command Organization

Operation Iraqi Freedom

3rd Personnel Command Postal Operations Directorate,
Camp Arifjan, Kuwait (until January 2004)

Commander LTC Robert Howard

348th Personnel Group (from January 2004)
(Commander Unknown)

678th Postal Service Battalion, Kuwait

Commander	Major Geiger
CSM	CSM William Johnson

408th Postal Support Battalion (from January 2004)
(Commander Unknown)

741st Adjutant General Company (Postal)

Headquarters

Commander	CPT Michael D. Martinez
First Sergeant	Donald J. Betts

1st Postal Platoon

Platoon Leader	CPT Cletus Smith
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2nd Postal Platoon

Platoon Leader	CPT Harold Anderson
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3rd Postal Platoon

Platoon Leader	1LT Maria D. Bonham
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Chronology

January 2003	Unit headquarters (UIC WS24AA) is alerted for possible mobilization.
6 February 2003	2nd Platoon mobilized as derivative unit (WS24B0), effective 10 February 2003.
13 February 2003	2nd Platoon departs home station at Orlando, Florida.
15 February 2003	2nd Platoon arrives at mobilization station, Fort Stewart, Georgia.
15 March 2003	Headquarters (WS24T0), 1st Platoon (WS24A0) and 3rd Platoon (WS24C0) mobilize as derivative units.
18 March 2003	Headquarters, 1st and 3rd platoons report to mobilization station at Fort Rucker, Alabama.
20 April 2003	2nd Platoon departs Fort Stewart, Georgia, en route to Kuwait.
21 April 2003	2nd Platoon arrives in Kuwait, assigned to Camp Virginia under the auspices of the Headquarters, 351st Adjutant General Company.
14 May 2003	Headquarters, 1st and 3rd platoons are reassigned to Fort Stewart, Georgia.
15 May 2003	First ship containing equipment for 2nd Platoon arrives in Kuwait.

19 May 2003	Headquarters, 1st and 3rd platoons deploy to Kuwait from Fort Stewart, Georgia.
21 May 2003	Headquarters, 1st and 3rd platoons arrive at Camp Wolf, Kuwait.
24 May 2003	Headquarters and all three platoons transfer to Camp Pennsylvania under the command of the 678th Postal Service Battalion.
5 June 2003	Cargo ship <i>USS Brittin</i> arrives in Kuwait with equipment for 3rd Platoon.
6 June 2003	Cargo ship <i>USS Cape Rise</i> arrives in Kuwait with equipment for Headquarters and 1st Platoon.
10 June 2003	APO AE 09328 officially opens at Camp Pennsylvania, Kuwait for free and MPS mail only. Staff Sergeant Clay receives first piece of mail from the US.
19 June 2003	Finance services commence at APO AE 09328.
20 June 2003	1st Platoon transfers to Camp New York to establish an APO.
8 August 2003	Headquarters and 1st Platoon transfer to Camp Doha.
August 2003	2nd Platoon transfers to Camp New York, later to Victory Base, Baghdad.
August 2003	Headquarters and 3rd Platoon remnants transfer to Victory Base and establish an APO.

August 2003	Unit notified of theater-wide service extensions.
3 April 2004	2nd Platoon departs Kuwait en route to Fort Stewart, Georgia.
1 May 2004	1st and 3rd platoons depart Kuwait en route to Fort Benning, Georgia.
3 May 2004	1st and 3rd platoons arrive at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Operations

Preparation and Mobilization

The 741st Adjutant General Company (Postal), hereafter cited by its common nomenclature, the 741st Postal Company, or simply the 741st, is home stationed in Orlando Florida. Its stated mission is to provide postal services to military units overseas through the establishment and operation of Army post offices (APO). Postal services include, but are not limited to, finance operations consisting of the sale of postage stamps, money orders, shipping supplies, etc.; postal customs service; assistance to Soldier patrons using the military postal system (MPS); and mail distribution for United States armed forces stationed in the combat theater. The company mobilized in Operation Iraqi Freedom to perform a postal mission in support of several different camps within the Kingdom of Kuwait and Iraq.³²

The 741st was organized as four separate elements: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Platoons, and a headquarters section, all of which were flexible in their organization to be deployed as a single unit or as separate entities, capable of operations in several different locations as necessary. Such diversification was needed to support a diversified combat environment.

As early as January, 2003, the unit leadership was aware of and alerted for possible mobilization. On 6 February, that possibility became fact for the 2nd Platoon, consisting of seventeen personnel, when it was ordered³³ to mobilize as a derivative unit³⁴ effective 10 February and report to Fort Stewart, Georgia, no later than 13 February. Commanded by Captain Harold Anderson and Sergeant First Class Glen Kearse, the platoon members undertook mobilization training consisting of basic Soldier skills to ensure the men and women of this platoon were proficient in the ways and means to survive on the battlefield. This training included basic rifle marksmanship; nuclear, biological and chemical defense; combat first aid and lifesaving techniques; and the omnipresent physical fitness training, to name but a few of the subjects to be found at the

mobilization training site. This was also the place where urinalysis testing and immunizations were administered.

Something else to be found at the mobilization site was the old World War II-style, wooden barracks in which the unit was obliged to stay. These barracks, most of them last updated in the 1960s and early 1970s, were in poor condition and lacked the creature comforts found on the opposite side of the fort, where the permanently stationed personnel lived and worked in modern homes and facilities. This was not unusual accommodations for Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers. Meals were usually eaten in the dining facility, also located on the other side, to where Soldiers were bussed back and forth at specified times.

After more than two weeks of training and validation for overseas deployment, Captain Anderson and his Soldiers settled in for a lengthy wait before actually boarding an airplane; they watched in frustration as regular Army units with higher transport priorities traveled to nearby Hunter Army Airfield and deployed ahead of them.

Meanwhile, the remaining elements of the 741st still in Orlando received mobilization orders and prepared to deploy to Fort Stewart where they would join their brother platoon. But in a change of orders, perhaps due to overcrowding at Fort Stewart and a logjam of Soldiers ready to depart from there, the mobilization station to which they were to report was changed to the United States Army Aviation Center and School, Fort Rucker, Alabama. The 741st boarded chartered busses for the long trip from Orlando in the south central part of Florida to south Alabama.

Immediately upon arrival at Fort Rucker there was a change from the norm experienced by most Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers: facilities were clean, modern and comfortable. In an extremely rare positive comment about mobilization training of Army Reserve Soldiers anywhere, Sergeant Richard Hester, a postal specialist from Daytona Beach, Florida, assigned to the 1st Platoon wrote, "We mobilized out of Fort Rucker, very nice facilities, good training and preparation."³⁵

On 14 May, the 741st received its deployment orders to United States Army Central Command, Kuwait. Three of its members, a captain, staff sergeant and specialist, were determined to be nondeployable for medical

reasons and remained at the mobilization station. By 19 May, the unit was once more placed aboard busses for transport to Hunter Army Airfield, near Savannah, Georgia. Halfway through the trip, one of the unit's Soldiers, Private First Class Joshua Champion, received word of a medical emergency in his family that required his immediate presence. At Fort Stewart, authorization to release this Soldier was quickly given. No one could have guessed at the time, that this emergency, combined with the three nondeployables, would be the harbinger of many more calamities that would plague the 741st in the coming year and rob it of sorely needed personnel.

On 20 May, 2003, the remaining platoons of the 741st departed Hunter Airfield without delay, exactly one month behind the unit's 2nd Platoon which had finally departed after spending five dismal and boring weeks at Fort Stewart.

Kuwait

Setting Up Operations at Camp Pennsylvania

The main portion of the 741st arrived in Kuwait in the early morning hours of 21 May 2003, landing at Kuwait International Airport, after having made stops in Newfoundland; Shannon, Ireland; and Lanarca on the island of Cyprus. The Soldiers were tired and glad to be on the ground. Immediately after deplaning and unloading their baggage, the Soldiers traveled by bus a short distance to Camp Wolf, an in-and out-processing station located between the main runways of the airport. Sometime during the flight, it became apparent that another Soldier, Private First Class Amber Sanders, was developing a medical problem. While at Fort Stewart, waiting to board the chartered DC-10 jet airliner to Kuwait, she was stung or bitten by an insect above her right eye. During the course of the long flight, the eye had swelled completely shut by the time they arrived in Kuwait. After being processed and assigned billeting space, Sanders was escorted to the medical treatment facility run by the 47th Combat Support Hospital out of Fort Lewis, Washington. Sanders was immediately treated and released back to 3rd Platoon after receiving

antibiotics and medication to relieve the swelling. On 24 May, the third day at Camp Wolf, the two postal service platoons were finally assigned to Camp Pennsylvania, just across the southern Iraqi border leaving behind their headquarters element and two Soldiers who suffered heat injuries.

Upon arrival, the unit discovered that postal operations at Camp Pennsylvania were completely stopped as a result of the previous postal unit being ordered forward into Iraq with the 1st Armored Division. The Soldiers also learned their own 2nd Platoon was now tending postal operations at Camp Virginia, Kuwait, having been assigned there a full month earlier. The following evening, the headquarters element arrived at Camp Pennsylvania, along with the now-recovered heat casualties. Four days later, on 29 May, Private First Class Champion rejoined 1st Platoon, having returned from emergency leave. The 741st Postal Company was, that same day, assigned to the higher command and control of the 678th Postal Support Battalion. The following day, in a show of camaraderie, the unit accepted an invitation by the dining facility chief mess sergeant to a Memorial Day dinner of barbecued ribs, steaks and grilled chicken, complete with fancy deserts.

It was not long before problems arose as the 741st began settling into its new routine of providing Soldiers to perform guard duty within the camp. It was not but a very short time until serious concerns about sexual harassment of female Soldiers by TCNs (third country nationals, hired to perform routine tasks) came to the attention of First Sergeant Donald Betts. Specifically, female Soldiers were uncomfortable when escorting foreign visitors into the camp who, when in the company of females, seemed to disobey the orders of their own military and culture by their unwanted behavior. The same was true of the TCN guards with whom they worked. Personal safety and rules of engagement were also subjects of concern if and when females searched people entering the compound. Eventually, these problems were resolved and the 741st settled into a routine, punctuated by sandstorms and sand fleas. All that was missing was an assigned APO (Army Post Office) code number to begin full service postal operations at Camp Pennsylvania, and their equipment from the United States.

The cargo ship *USS Brittin* arrived in port with the 3rd Platoon's equipment on 5 June and began discharging its cargo that same evening. Instead of the estimated thirty to thirty-six hours it would take to unload its 1,700 pieces of cargo, the operation lasted nearly five days. Another cargo ship, the *USS Cape Rise*, containing equipment for Headquarters Section and 1st Platoon and originally scheduled to arrive on 9 June, arrived early, a day after *Brittin*'s arrival. With only 700 pieces of cargo, the *Cape Rise* could be unloaded within twenty-four hours. With this development, 3rd Platoon, which was already at the port and ready to tackle the *Brittin*, offloaded the *Cape Rise* instead, thereby getting desperately needed unit equipment to begin postal operations. A shortage of Soldiers for offloading both ships and transporting the equipment created a logistical nightmare for the 3rd Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Maria Bonham, who struggled to find a way to do the job without compromising security and safety. To her credit, Bonham relayed the problem to 3rd PERSCOM (Personnel Command) and arranged to have the company's equipment offloaded and transported directly at the location it was needed rather than interim storage at Camp Pennsylvania.

While all this was going on, the unit suffered another loss when 3rd Platoon's Sergeant Erika Sosa, required medical treatment that could not be performed at the hospital in Doha, Kuwait. After being evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Hospital in Germany, and further evacuated to the United States, Sergeant Sosa was eventually stationed at a mobilization site where she remained for the duration of her mobilization. With this latest loss to the unit's overall personnel strength, First Sergeant Betts was able to exempt his remaining Soldiers from guard duty. If being exempt from guard duty was not enough to brighten everyone's day, the 741st constructed another morale booster in the form of a softball field, with which Soldiers could escape some of the tedium associated with camp life. The ball field provided a focal point for relaxation and physical activity that just happened to be lots of fun, too.

By 10 June, all the necessary equipment needed to operate an APO arrived, all of it in pretty good condition. On that day, APO AE 09328 officially opened for business, accepting at first only free mail – mail sent

from overseas not needing a postage stamp--and official mail sent through the Military Postal Service. Staff Sergeant Cheryl Clay had the honor of being the first unit member to receive mail from the United States. Nine days later, finance services commenced. The first day sales of money orders and stamps totaled \$331.97.

Mail for all the military branches in theater came through the Joint Military Mail Terminal located near Camp Doha. Mail came into this terminal mostly by air, but local mail, or that mail sent from within theater, usually arrived via ground transportation. Virtually all in-country mail left the terminal by ground transportation to the various APOs. As the theater mission grew, the volume of mail expanded exponentially, and subsequently the need to quickly process the mail through APOs grew as well. Therefore, it came as no surprise to Captain Cletus Smith that his 1st Platoon would leave Camp Pennsylvania on 20 June 2003 to set up another APO in support of 3rd Infantry Division units at Camp New York, also located just inside the southern Iraqi border. Just a few days later Specialist Melody Jones of 3rd Platoon became ill from recurring migraine headaches and was eventually evacuated to Eisenhower Army Medical Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia, for long term care. She did not return to her unit.

It was indeed unfortunate that Specialist Jones could not have remained until 29 June, for on that day a gala farewell party took place at Camp Doha for the outgoing commander of the 678th Postal Service Battalion, to which the 741st was happily invited. At a place known locally as The Marble Palace, Soldiers were treated to a sumptuous meal, spa treatments, swimming, games and much more. But not all was fun and games, as Captain Smith and his Soldiers would come to find at Camp New York.

Operations at Camps New York and Virginia

2nd Platoon Soldiers arrived at their assigned station, Camp Virginia, on 21 April and were well into their mail service operations by the time the main elements of the 741st arrived in Kuwait. Members of 1st Platoon, accompanied by other Soldiers from the 678th, arrived at Camp

New York on 5 July to assist 3rd Infantry Division APO operations being handled by the 129th Postal Company. The 129th's postal officer informed the Soldiers from the 741st that no assistance was needed. This came as a surprise to the newcomers who duly noted that of the eleven military container vans (milvans) at that APO, six were still loaded with mail needing sorting and forwarding to other locations, mail that should have been in the hands of recipients days ago. As a result of this unnecessary delay, a subsequent military investigation took place, the results of which were not made known to the public. Days after this incident, the 741st operations were split between the two camps to ensure adequate cross-training at both APOs to prevent future delay problems.

At about this same time, early July, the headquarters section and elements of 1st Platoon at Camp New York, were alerted of their participation in Exercise Bright Star 2004, an annual deployment of US Soldiers to Egypt, with a projected arrival date in that country of 10 September. The selected elements immediately began preparation for this "deployment within a deployment" in earnest. Vehicles and milvans were prepped and washed, equipment checked, packed and stored for shipment. Operations were well under way, when just as quick as it was announced they would go, it was announced their mission was cancelled, much to the irritation and disgust of the Soldiers involved because they learned of the cancellation from a television news network before hearing it from their own command.

In the meantime, operations at camps New York and Virginia were becoming increasingly difficult. In the summertime heat, the tents in which they operated became like ovens, literally cooking the people and equipment inside them to the point of breakdown. Without some sort of cooling apparatus, there was no hope of continuing to deliver mail. All IRTs (Integrated Routing Terminals used to track and forward mail) failed and milvans of unprocessed mail remained untouched as more mail accumulated everyday. First Sergeant Betts was able to acquire several swamp coolers, a primitive form of air-conditioning that cools air by passing it through a water-soaked filtration box with a blower fan for circulation. While incapable of producing refrigerated air, the swamp

coolers, none-the-less, provided some measure of much-needed relief.

On 11 July, 2nd Platoon suffered critical personnel losses. Postal sergeant Staff Sergeant Arthur Bynes, and maintenance Specialist Derek Snevel, who was recently accepted into the Army's Warrant Officer Flight School, received emergency Red Cross messages and returned to the United States. At this same time, Sergeant Wesley Wright, a postal specialist with 3rd Platoon, also left because of emergencies at home, bringing thus far, a total of five personnel losses across the entire unit.

3rd Infantry Division Returns

With all the events befalling the unit's platoons and elements at all locations, the 741st prepared for the onslaught into Camp Pennsylvania of 3rd Infantry Division Soldiers coming back from northern Iraq to redeploy 28 July through 25 August 2003. In an extraordinary act of forethought, an artillery battery's first sergeant asked Sergeant First Class Diane James, a trained equal opportunity advisor with the 741st's 3rd Platoon, to conduct a sexual harassment training class for Soldiers returning to the mainstream of Army society after having been deployed in combat conditions. What was at first expected and intended to be a quick thirty minute briefing turned into a marathon session that had to be curtailed so that the Soldiers could eat their evening meal. The resistance and discomfort of this all male group of battled-hardened Soldiers to a class such as James was teaching disappeared thanks to the outstanding quality of her presentation. Participants lauded her class, many stating never before had they enjoyed or learned so much in a class like this.

On 9 August, Specialist Bernice Newton, a postal specialist with 2nd Platoon, left the unit and was discharged for family hardship. A week later, Specialist Tim Strayer and Master Sergeant Rosendo Ayala, were stricken with a medical emergency at home and in theater, respectively, and were transferred to the United States bringing the unit's losses to eight, or 14 percent of its deployed strength. That month, 2nd Platoon joined 1st Platoon at Camp New York.

The month of August saw some positive results: 1st Platoon's Christopher Ford, also a postal specialist, earned the Soldier of the Month

award by the 678th, which further earned him a promotion to the rank of specialist.

About this time, a major reorganization of postal operations started to take place as redeployments and replacements proceeded throughout the theater. Several camps began closing and ceasing mail operations, while at others mail processing was backlogged. The 741st commander, Captain Michael Martinez, and James were reassigned to Camp Arifjan to assist in 3rd PERSCOM's Postal Operations Directorate, and Lieutenant Maria Bonham became personnel officer at 3rd Army's Combined Forces Land Component Command. The rest of the 741st transferred to Victory Base in Baghdad, Iraq, to set up and operate the APO at that location. Because of personnel losses, 2nd and 3rd Platoons combined.

The command granted rest and recreation leave in September to all Soldiers whose deployments were extended to meet the twelve months "boots on the ground" policy recently enacted by Department of the Army. Between October 2003 and January 2004, three more 741st Soldiers would return to the United States for emergencies and medical conditions, making a total of eleven losses, or a staggering nineteen percent of the unit's deployed strength in the course of its overseas mission. This did not include those Soldiers still in country with illnesses or injuries that were not sufficient to warrant evacuation, but adversely affected the unit's capabilities none-the-less.

Going Home

In January, the 348th Personnel Group replaced 3rd PERSCOM. Subsequently, the 408th Postal Support Battalion replaced the 678th Postal Support Battalion, which took charge of all APOs throughout Kuwait. Change came rapidly. Navy and Air Force personnel began to replace and supplement the tired and depleted Army postal units in February 2004. APOs became joint forces operations and placed the postal operations inside modern, comfortable structures at camps Udari and Victory. By the end of March, all necessary cross-training was completed. Bonham transferred back to her 3rd Platoon. Even though fierce fighting erupted in Fallujah at the start of April and many Soldiers were now being held in

place, the unit prepared a homecoming gala for themselves, scheduled for 4 April. As luck would have it, 2nd Platoon unexpectedly received orders to fly home. Because it had been the first element of the 741st to arrive the previous year, on 3 April it became the first to redeploy. 2nd Platoon's Soldiers said farewell the day before the big party, but none complained of missing the party; they were happy to be going home. The headquarters section followed on 18 April, and finally, on 2 May 2004, 1st and 3rd Platoons boarded the DC-10 jet airliner for home in the United States.

The first stop in the United States was Fort Dix, New Jersey, where the unit received a welcome home from units there. From Fort Dix, the Soldiers were bussed a short distance to Philadelphia International Airport for a flight to Atlanta, Georgia. From there, the Soldiers were bussed to Fort Benning, Georgia, the newly-designated redeployment and out-processing station, arriving well after midnight on the morning of 3 May. There was no time to relax or take stock of their new surroundings: their first out-brief was scheduled for 0430 hours. After several more days of classes and briefings, the 741st was finally released to go back to its home station. On the evening of 7 May 2004, the Soldiers boarded a bus for the long trek to Orlando, arriving at 0800 hours on the morning of 8 May. They were home at last.

In all, losses to the 3rd Platoon caused its members to operate a platoon-sized mission with only seven personnel. For that, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Shoomaker, personally presented them with award coins. Finance operations from the entire company amounted to \$385,000 by tour's end, and it moved over eight tons of mail during its deployment.

While no 741st Soldier was killed or wounded in action, it never forgot those families who suffered death, illness or injury. But most of all, it will never forget those who served the cause of Iraqi freedom.³⁶

From a Soldier's Perspective

“Being told you are being mobilized is never something anyone wants to hear . . . [When] we finally left to go home on April 3, 2004, that was the happiest day I had in a really, really long time.”³⁷

“It was interesting working with the Air Force.”

“All our soldiers got good training [at Camp New York].”

“Performing our tasks, it was difficult. We had a hard time getting anything need[ed] to [do] our job.”

“We broke our backs and sweated gallons of hard work sweat . . . then we went to Camp Virginia where we worked ourselves depressed.”

“We would perform every task/mission to the utmost of our ability. And we were more than successful.”

“After almost killing each other they split up the platoons and sent my platoon to Camp New York for 6 weeks. That sucked donkey crap.”

“Captain Smith told us that the heat would strengthen our minds.”

“We were supposed to go to [Exercise] Bright Star and they lied through their teeth. . .we watched CNN and found out it was cancelled.”

“At times it was a bad experience for all the stuff we went through. But overall it was a lot of fun and a great experience. I love the Army.”

“I enjoyed being deployed with this unit and I consider it a privilege to have serve[d] with such honorable people.”³⁸

Lessons Learned

Captain Martinez identified a number of lessons learned in his after action report. One issue concerned the mobilization process. Since the platoon was the operational unit of a postal company, each section of the company mobilized under its derivative UIC. However, when the 741st received the mobilization alert one platoon mobilized separately from the rest of the company and went to a different mobilization station. The rest of the company went to another mobilization station. Upon arrival in country, the separately mobilized platoon was not in the same chain of command as the other sections of the company. It was later assigned back to the company. In the event the entire company is scheduled to mobilize, Martinez advised that the entire company should mobilize and move at the same time to the same place, even if each section is mobilized under its derivative UIC. This would allow the unit to continue training together and maintain better communication within the unit and chain of command. This is particularly critical for cross-leveled personnel. Once in theater, the mission and higher headquarters determine the best location for each section.

Another problem the commander singled out related to the initial mobilization. The 2nd Platoon had only three days from the mobilization date to arrive at the Fort Stewart mobilization station. The short notice did not afford time to spend with families before the deployment. Soldiers had to work twelve to fourteen hour days. Nonetheless the Soldiers were able to complete all tasks and meet mission requirements. Martinez thought units should be allowed at least two weeks initial mobilization time, thereby ensuring effective transition from the home station.

Actions at the mobilization station were an issue. The 741st was held at the mobilization station for two months but completed the validation process in two weeks. Many of the activities conducted at the mobilization station were previously completed at home station. There was no information available on when the unit was expected to depart the mobilization station. As a result, the company had to develop impromptu training. Many Soldiers lost motivation and focus on the mission. The

time spent at the mobilization station did help the new leadership become acquainted with the Soldiers better. Martinez recommended that the mobilization station and the unit know the deployment dates so that each can use the time at the station more effectively and thereby reduce the time spent there. Consequently the 741st could deploy swiftly from the station. Training validated at the home station should not be repeated at the mobilization station.

According to Martinez, identification of the correct mobilization station was challenging. The site on record alternated between Fort Rucker and Fort Stewart. The written and revalidated mobilization plan was for Fort Stewart. Thinking this was the final decision, an advance team traveled to Fort Stewart to conduct initial coordination. Upon the unit's mobilization, the plan had to be changed to Fort Rucker. As a result, all reports and documentation had to be revamped to mirror Fort Rucker's requirements. Consequently the unit was split. Part of the unit went to Fort Stewart while the remainder went to Fort Rucker. This meant the 741st would not be reconstituted in its entirety until being deployed in country for several months. To correct this situation one plan should be followed.

Martinez believed cross-training at the mobilization station was a plus. Deploying units with different military occupational specialties cross-trained other units. This effectively used deploying units and helped the training unit perfect its technical and tactical skills. He believed cross-training other units at the mobilization station for a few weeks should become a standard operating procedure.

Martinez pointed out some personnel concerns. Junior enlisted personnel were cross-leveled from the company in order to round out another unit. This was "a shortsighted fix and not an appropriate solution to the problem." It created a deficiency within the company. This had to be filled when the company received the mobilization alert several weeks later. Further cross-leveling requirements resulted, which could be detrimental to another unit or units. Martinez thought cross-leveling should occur from units that were not mission capable, such as tier-4 units.

Another personnel concern was the scarcity of lieutenants throughout the Army Reserve. The company had no qualified lieutenants for deployment. Cross-leveling of lieutenants was not the answer since there was no pool of lieutenants. This necessitated the cross-leveling of two captains into the company. Captains, Martinez opined, have a major impact on the company's operations, such as in their management styles which may be at odds with the company's. It also creates disparity with the time in grade between the commander and platoon leaders. Only one of the three platoon leaders cross-leveled had any postal training and experience. Cross-leveled senior personnel should know about postal operations. Their rank should be above the senior NCO grade of E-7.

Martinez also addressed the lack of an infrastructure to supply replacement Soldiers for those who are REFRAD or redeploy for sundry reasons. The mobilization station should send weekly status reports on Soldiers and attempt to find replacements.

Company leadership was divided. The 741st was the only postal company to retain all its platoons, yet the company leadership (commander and 1SG) and support personnel in the headquarters section were separated and tasked out during the deployment. The headquarters is the focal point of a unit; losing any part of it disrupts the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. Martinez wrote that this had an extreme impact on communication and command and control together with placing additional duties on the 1SG, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. These Soldiers demonstrated their professionalism and leadership when tasked with this workload. Platoon operations suffered by not having a headquarters section to track common Soldier tasks of records, awards, PT, weight control, and noncommissioned officer and officer evaluations. In spite of not having a true headquarters during the operation, the platoons were able to execute all operational requirements. Martinez recommended that key headquarters personnel (commanders and 1SG) should never be separated from the company in order to use their experiences to bring the company together. In the event this does happen, then the commander should be able to visit at any time he considers necessary. In the end he is

responsible for the Soldiers' welfare. This means he should have access to reliable transportation and communications at all times.

There were chain of command challenges. 2nd Platoon was under the operational control of a different postal support battalion. The higher headquarters did not make contact with 2nd Platoon until several months after arriving in theater. The reason was that each battalion had an order assigning the platoon as a down trace unit. De-conflicting the situation took several weeks due to the impact it would have on the operation to which the platoon was assigned. During that time, there was no clear guidance on the chain of command and direct responsibilities. Consequently, the platoon leader was pulled from the postal operation upon arrival of the platoon at the camp. There was an immediate affect on the platoon chain of command and operational effectiveness. The platoon worked within these constraints to meet several requirements of postal inspections and supply requirements. Martinez recommended that the chain of command be clearly identified as soon as a component enters theater. The indecision associated with the command and control adversely affected the platoon and operations.

Martinez opined that communications while traveling were deficient. Within Kuwait the theater command ordered that all vehicles traveling off any camp were to carry a cellular phone for use in the event of an emergency. But, the 741st was not equipped with these phones. Requests for cellular phones were repeatedly declined. The reason given was the lack of funds, yet this was a mission requirement. The postal mission required Soldiers to leave the camp at least once a week. The company had only one SINCGARS (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System). Each of the four company sections was in a different location. It was impossible to share the equipment or even monitor radio channels in the event of an emergency. While traveling in Kuwait with thousands of dollars in cash and postal assets, the platoons had no communication assets. In the event a vehicle broke down and/or the unit made contact with the enemy, there was no way to contact the headquarters. After being deployed for five months, two platoons received two cellular phones. The Soldiers used personal cellular phones although all transportation was for

official purposes. Soldiers should not have to use their own resources when performing Army missions. As a result, the platoons increased planning and coordination with each other when traveling and paid attention to preventive maintenance checks and services prior to departure. Upon entering the theater, Martinez recommended that each unit receive long-range radio communication equipment or a cellular phone. Ensure units receive communication devices (i.e., cellular phones, PRC-127). Install SINCGARS in tactical vehicles. Although funds within theater are limited, communication equipment is required while traveling and must be provided.

Information, wrote Martinez, was not always disseminated through proper channels. There were several occasions when information did not flow from top to bottom and bottom to top. One example was the Bright Star mission. Family members learned about the mission's cancellation from the news and told Soldiers before the chain of command received notification of the cancellation. Once confirmed, the chain of command told the Soldiers; but they already knew. There were other times when information was not passed through the chain of command causing one or more levels of the command to be uninformed of a pending action or mission requirement. Martinez stated that information should not only be passed down in a timely manner but also through the proper channels.

The uncertainty of redeployment was a problem given release of the twelve months boots on the ground policy. On two occasions a platoon was prepared to redeploy but then received another mission. While the Soldiers were prepared to execute the mission, they were led to believe that redeployment was on the horizon. Martinez thought that mission requirements should be analyzed more carefully before Soldiers believe redeployment is imminent.

Martinez had operational concerns. 2nd Platoon was under the operational control of another battalion whose focus was not on postal operations. As a result, the priority of support was low for basic requirements, such as air conditioning and generators, in the operations tents of the post office. During the peak of operations, temperatures reached 130-degrees in those tents. The lack of support affected Soldier

morale and caused some heat casualties in addition to lowering the overall effectiveness of the command at the company and battalion level. It caused leaders to concentrate daily on common Soldier skills and guaranteed no one was seriously injured. Leaders worked smarter and not faster. Martinez recommended that postal units should be treated as permanent party at each camp. The operation should receive all the resources required to do the mission since postal operations deeply impact Soldier morale.

Yet another issue was vehicle deficiencies identified at the mobilization station. At the mobilization station, vehicles were visually inspected for serviceability. If the vehicles passed the inspection, then they were validated for the mission. But then they could not be used; preventing the unit from performing preventive maintenance, more driver training, and mechanical review. Visible inspection was not appropriate for a mobilizing unit. Martinez believed that the vehicles should have been driven. This would have identified faulty equipment which could have been repaired with available parts and facilities.

The unavailability of non-tactical vehicles was problematic. Maintenance on vehicles was an issue. The company's mission demanded moving with postal assets to various locations. In the commander's view, postal units should be equipped with non-tactical vehicles as needed.

Desert camouflage uniforms (DCUs) were a problem for the company in that uniforms and equipment could only be ordered through the mobilization station. Martinez advised that units should be authorized to order DCU items at the home station. Two sets of DCUs should be part of the standard clothing issue. Since the unit was highly deployable, it should be authorized to keep some of these items on hand at all times.

The unavailability of sizes and mismatched uniforms were related problems with DCUs. The issuing facility should be able to furnish all deploying Soldiers with properly fitting uniforms in ample amounts.

The delivery date of chemical defense equipment (CDE) was always changing. JSLIST (Joint Lightweight Suit Technology)³⁹ was ordered at the home station once the request was authenticated against the mobilization order. Due to the lead-time required to receive the JSLIST

and other CDE, it was impossible to receive those items at home station before being sent to the mobilization station. Once the order was submitted, the delivery date kept being pushed back causing further delays at the mobilization station. In the commander's judgment, with good planning and mobilization dates the unit could have ordered these items earlier than waiting just days before mobilization.

Supplies posed a problem in that conexes were shipped before receipt of the supplies. Pallets were used later to ship the supplies. These pallets were lost or stolen in transit. There was no accountability for the pallets. Martinez recommended that deployment dates should be known so that coordination and planning could be done regarding supplies.

Running out of supplies which could not be easily obtained, hampered operations. The 741st coordinated with other channels to secure needed items. Martinez believed the pre-pack should include more of the quickly spent items.

The suspense for awards was another issue. Awards were requested too early into the deployment. Martinez stated that the suspense for awards should occur later in the deployment.⁴⁰

Photographs



Headquarters, 1st and 3d Platoons at Fort Rucker, Alabama, April 2003.



Training at Fort Rucker, Alabama, April 2003.



Camp Pennsylvania living quarters, June 2003.



Building the Camp Pennsylvania Army Post Office (APO).



Camp Pennsylvania Army Post Office.




The 741st constructed another morale booster in the form of a softball field, with which Soldiers could escape some of the tedium associated with camp life.



Camp New York living quarters.



Camp New York Army Post Office.



The 741st had several heat casualties. Here the temperature is 148 degrees Fahrenheit.



Sandstorm at Camp Pennsylvania.



Preparing for Exercise Bright Star 2004, Camp Doha, Kuwait.



Installing a volleyball net at Camp Pennsylvania.



Specialist Amber Sanders celebrates her birthday at the Camp Victory APO, Baghdad, Iraq, 29 July 2003.

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⁵ Coordinating Draft, Brigadier General John S. Brown, *American Military History* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 26 Nov 03), chapter 29, p. 8; Pamphlet, Dr. Richard Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2002* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, no date), p. 7; Article, author unknown, "Afghanistan wakes after night of intense bombings," 7 Oct

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⁷ Pamphlet, Stewart, *The United States Army in Afghanistan*, pp. 27, 45.

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¹¹ Testimony, Statement of Lieutenant General James Helmly Before the Subcommittee On Defense, Committee on Appropriations, US Senate, National Guard and Reserve Programs, 7 May 03.

¹² News Release, Lieutenant General James Helmly, "The Army Reserve Engaged in the Global War on Terrorism," Apr 04,

<http://ww4.army.mil/USAR/news/word-01.php>; Photo caption, "Cpl. Dominic M. Pileri, *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 27; and Article, no author, "Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, p. 18.

¹³Article, no author, "The Units That Serve," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, 03, pp. 19-20 and Photograph, *New York Newsday*, 8 Feb 02, <http://www.neynesday.com>.

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¹⁵Address, President George Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, 10 Sep 02,

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²² Email, Sergeant First Class Charron Jones, USARC G-3 to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, subject: Mobilizations Stats, 8 Feb 05.

²³Battle Update Brief, USARC G-3, subject: Mobilization of Army Reserve Units and Soldiers, 30 Dec 03. This is the total Headquarters, Department of the Army mobilized Army Reserve Soldiers. There are discrepancies in the number of mobilized soldiers according to different sources. Email, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Davidson to Dr. Coker, USARC G-1, subject: Data for Historian, 27 Apr 05. According to the USARC's G-1 there were 53,555 Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized. This is the number of Soldiers who were actually being paid. Email, Colonel James Shoenhard to Dr. Coker, subject: Noble

Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom RC Daily Update, 2 Mar 05. According to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, which obtains its statistics from the G-3, the number was 89,629. That figure represents mobilization authorization -- how many members a unit is authorized to be mobilized for a given event. It does not represent people directly.

²⁴ Interview with Lieutenant General James Helmly by Dr. Coker, 11 Mar 04.

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²⁶ Article, Michelle Tan, "'Warrior citizen', New Reserve chief thrives on 'intensity' of Army Life," *Army Times*, 26 Jun 06, p.23.

²⁷ Article, Kathleen Rhem, "President Bush proclaims end to major combat operations in Iraq," 2 May 03.

<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123004771>.

²⁸ Previously 81st Regional Support Command, redesignated 16 July 2003. As of 17 October 2006, the company was no longer assigned to the 81st Regional Readiness Command. See email, Mr. James Hudson to Dr. Kathryn Coker, subject: 741st AG CO (Postal) Information, 11 Apr 07.

²⁹ US Army Institute of Heraldry, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Heraldric Items, 3rd Army, <http://www.arcent.army.mil/history/heraldry.asp>.

³² History Narrative, Captain Michael D. Martinez, subject: Mission, no date, unit history file, Global War on Terrorism Collection (GWOTC), US Army Reserve Historical Research Collection (USARHRC), Office of Army Reserve History (OARH), US Army Reserve Command (USARC). Unless otherwise stated, all information is from the unit history file, GWOTC, USARHRC, OARH, USARC.

³³ Department of the Army, Headquarters, First United States Army, Permanent Orders 037-9, dated 6 Feb 2003.

³⁴ The term derivative unit refers to a platoon, detachment or other element of a larger organization that is mobilized as a separate entity and assigned its own unit identification code (UIC) designation derived from its parent unit's UIC.

³⁵ Autobiographical Sketch, Sergeant Richard J. Hester, subject: Personal Reflections, no date.

³⁶ *Operations Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom Deployment—741st AG Co Postal (DS)*, author unknown, no date.

³⁷ Autobiographical Sketches, subject: Personal Reflections, no dates. The quotations are taken from each Soldier's autobiographical sketch.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ 741st Commander to Commander, 678th PSB, subject: After Action Review, 12 Dec 03 and Email, CW4 James Hudson to Dr. Kathryn Roe Coker, subject: 741st OIF Unit

History, 4 Apr 07. According to Hudson, JSLIST is the “acronym for the new Chemical Defense Suits that soldiers were issued during and before our soldiers entered Iraq [in] March 2003.” Much of this account uses the language of the after action review.

⁴⁰ Memorandum, 741st Commander to Commander, 678th PSB, subject: After Action Review, 12 Dec 03.