

**THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM  
OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE**

**DETACHMENT 1  
719TH TRANSPORTATION BATTALION  
(MOVEMENT CONTROL)  
(Boston, Massachusetts)  
August 2002 – August 2003**



**Office of Army Reserve History  
United States Army Reserve Command  
Fort McPherson, Georgia**



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**Dennis M. Hatcher**

**Kathryn Roe Coker  
Introduction/Lessons Learned  
Editor**



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2009**



**DESCRIPTION:** On a dark blue disk the bust of a Minuteman (Captain John Parker) in cocked hat on a pedestal, between two branches of olive or within a dark blue designation band with gold inner and outer borders inscribed UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE in gold.

**SYMBOLISM:** The minuteman has traditionally been used to represent the citizen soldier. The wreath signifies achievement and accomplishment. Gold is symbolic of honor and excellence and dark blue signifies loyalty.

**BACKGROUND:** The emblem was approved for use as a plaque in 1972 and is used as an unofficial identification device of the United States Army Reserve. (US Army Institute of Heraldry.)

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# Foreword

*The Global War on Terrorism-Operation Noble Eagle: Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control)* is one in a series of histories of Army Reserve units deployed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This includes Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The histories are based on primary sources collected by the Office of Army Reserve History's GWOT Military History Task Force. The task force provides program management, central collection, and archiving of unit histories. The former Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General James Helmly, stated the importance of this collection effort:

The Army Reserve is experiencing a time of great transition to meet present and future challenges to our national security. The events of this transition, while still fresh, must be captured and documented to preserve the story of the Army Reserve's contribution to this unprecedented war. The result will be a unique archive of the wartime accomplishments of all mobilized Army Reserve units, not only of this war, but for all future defense commitments. Nowhere else within the United States Government does an official archive of the Army Reserve exist.

The records collected include narratives with a mission statement, after action reviews or lessons learned, personnel rosters, mobilization orders, demobilization orders, unit briefing slides, photographs, and autobiographical sketches. This information is used to record and to preserve the Army Reserve's contributions to GWOT. This volume and other unit histories included in the series, as compiled from these records, provide an invaluable resource for the Army Reserve and its Soldiers to

learn from their own experiences and retain lessons learned for future operations.

Fort McPherson  
Atlanta, Georgia  
July 2009

LEE S. HARFORD, JR., Ph.D.  
Army Reserve Historian  
United States Army Reserve

## Introduction

*“America will always remember who responded first on September 11th. In the thick of action from the very beginning were our nation’s Reservists.”* Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (20 January 2003)<sup>1</sup>

On 11 September 2001, nineteen Islamist terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda attacked America by flying two planes into the World Trade Center twin towers in New York City and thirty minutes later into the Pentagon. Over 2,000 (2,823) people died at the World Trade Center. Another 189 died at the Pentagon.<sup>2</sup> A fourth plane, headed for the capital, was averted from its target by the heroic actions of the thirty-three passengers and seven crew members on board, crashing into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania: *“A common field one day. A field of honor forever.”*<sup>3</sup>

In his address to the nation that night, President George W. Bush said the attacks had moved “a great people . . . to defend a great nation.” Bush set the tone for his evolving doctrine by stating the US “will make no distinction between terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”<sup>4</sup> “. . . Bush . . . advised the American people to go to ‘work’ with a heightened sense of awareness,” an awareness that, unlike America’s past wars, the war against terrorism will not be fought exclusively ‘over there.’”<sup>5</sup>

According to then Chief, Army Reserve Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, “Among the great heroes of that day were Army Reservists. They displayed the highest qualities of courage and selflessness, whether that meant rushing into the World Trade Center, helping injured comrades out of the burning Pentagon or organizing rescue and recovery activities regardless of personal safety concerns.”<sup>6</sup>

One example of numerous reserve heroes that day was Colonel Edgar Wakayama, a Medical Service Corps officer attached for a one-year tour of duty to the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Director for Operational Test and Evaluation. He received the Soldier’s Medal, the Army’s highest decoration for non-combat valor, for his actions that day at the Pentagon. The Soldier’s Medal citation read: He entered the Pentagon three times to search for injured people, leading three to safety on the first

trip and several more on the second attempt, before being repulsed by smoke and heat on the third entry.” Wakayama then turned his efforts toward helping to treat the wounded. “‘Medics don’t leave wounded behind on the battlefield,’ he said.” “‘For years I’ve taught that to my students. When the Pentagon was attacked, I had to put my money where my mouth was.’”

He remained there that day and for the next nine days at the recovery site known as Camp Unity, working twelve-hour shifts. “‘For nine days, I worked alongside the great soldiers of the 3rd Infantry, the Old Guard,’ Wakayama said. ‘They kept going into the Pentagon, braving the dangers of further collapse to try to rescue survivors and then to bring out remains.’” One thing on his mind when he received the medal on 6 March 2001 “was what was taking place that week in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan on Operation ANACONDA and how this related to what he did on Sept.11.”<sup>7</sup>

Three days after the attacks, on 14 September Bush issued a proclamation declaring “a national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of future attacks on the United States.” The national emergency had existed since 11 September.<sup>8</sup>

In an executive order, Bush authorized the call up of the Ready Reserve for up to twenty-four months of active duty.<sup>9</sup> The partial mobilization legally allowed then Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld to call up a million reservists. The service chiefs, however, stated they only needed about 35,000 reservists for what was designated Operation Noble Eagle, homeland defense and civil support operations. Among those were 10,000 Army Reserve and National Guard Soldiers. Most of the reserve Soldiers “were volunteers as thousands had called in to say they are ready to report for duty wherever needed.”<sup>10</sup> Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs Craig Duehring stated, “‘Many Americans have asked how they can help. Now some of our citizens will begin to help by trading their work clothes for uniforms (like) their parents and grandparents did in the past and answer the call.’”<sup>11</sup>



In four short days there were almost 2,500 reserve Soldiers on duty.<sup>12</sup> There was no time for 60, 90 or 180 days to mobilize. Hasty mobilizations from twenty-four hours to ten days became the norm. A case in point was the 311th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. On 13 September, the call went out to the 65th Regional Support Command (RSC). The next day, eighty-five Soldiers volunteered and mobilized the same day. By the morning of 17 September, they were at work in the Pentagon's north parking lot. There was only seventy-two hours between the time they were called up and the time they were operational. On 26 September, another 105 Soldiers were on the scene. "By this time," said Plewes, "they were all under partial mobilization orders. The orders had caught up with a unit that had been 'at war' for more than a week." Other units followed the same example, "conducting hasty mobilizations or mobilizing after they deployed."<sup>13</sup> "The soldiers who have answered the Nation's call so promptly," Plewes stated, "are heroes, plain and simple. We must continue to support them in this time of great sacrifice. We must apply the lessons learned from units now serving so as to streamline our procedures and facilitate mobilization of those called up in the future."<sup>14</sup>

Six months after the attacks the Army Reserve had more than 450 units and some 15,000 Soldiers supporting operations around the world. As Plewes told Soldiers in the spring of 2002, "We continue to be what we have been since September 11 – fully and decisively engaged in countless ways. . . . Much has been accomplished in the six months since 9-11. Much more remains to be done. Our resolve remains constant: we are as committed for this struggle today as we were on the evening of September 11, when the flames and smoke still rose from the Pentagon, the World Trade Center and a quiet field in Pennsylvania."<sup>15</sup>

By the end of 2001, over 11,000 Army Reserve Soldiers had answered the call and were on duty in the Global War on Terrorism.<sup>16</sup> As of 14 July 2009, eight years since the terrorists attacks of that fateful day, 306,306 Army Reserve Soldiers have been activated in the Global War on Terrorism, thousands of whom are serving at home as part of Operation Noble Eagle<sup>17</sup>

For the Army Reserve Operation Noble Eagle is the mobilization of Soldiers and units for the specific purpose of replacing regular Army units deployed overseas, or augmenting continental United States (CONUS) based installations or units. The Army Reserve has supported and continues to support Operation Noble Eagle in a number of ways including, for example, force protection and security at installations and facilities across the country, intelligence and investigations support, training and training validation, headquarters augmentation garrison support, communications, postal and personnel support, engineer support, military history, logistics and transportation operations, legal support and medical support.. One of the units providing transportation services was Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control).



Army Reserve's 311th Quartermaster Company Mortuary Affairs) from Aguadilla, Puerto Rico – set up operations in the north parking lot of the Pentagon on the morning of 17 September 2001. The men and women of the 311th had the grim task of searching through tons of debris from the Pentagon attack, searching for remains of victims and personal effects. They deployed and were operational within seventy-two hours of the call for volunteers reaching them. *(Photo by Lieutenant Colonel Randy Pullen, OCAR Public Affairs Office)*



New York, 16 September 2001 – Brigadier General Richard Colt (center), commanding general of the Army Reserve’s 77th Regional Support Command, commends New York City firefighters and volunteers on their work following the 9-11 terrorist attacks. – *(Photo by 311th Military History Detachment.*

**Detachment 1**  
**719th Transportation Battalion**  
**(Movement Control)**

**Lineage and Honors**

9 April 1918: Constituted at Is-sur-Tille, France in the American Expeditionary Force as the Provisional Depot Battalion, Railway Operating troops.

27 May 1918: Redesignated as the 58th Standard Gauge Operating Battalion. Later that year, the unit was redesignated as the 58th Regiment, Transportation Corps.

24 September 1936: The battalion reconstituted in the Regular Army and consolidated with the 58th Engineer Battalion, Railway Operating.

21 February 1941: The 58th Engineer Battalion redesignated as the 719th Engineer Battalion, Railway Operating thus beginning its lineage as the 719th.

16 November 1942: The unit is activated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, and redesignated as the 719th Railway Operating Battalion.

20 November 1945: The 719th Railway Operating Battalion is deactivated at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

9 November 1947: Unit is withdrawn from the Regular Army and allotted to the Organized Reserves.

18 December 1947: Unit is redesignated and activated in Houston, Texas, as the 719th Transportation Railway Operating Battalion, in the Organized Reserves.

20 December 1950: Unit is deactivated in Houston, Texas.

1 November 1951: Unit is reactivated.

20 October 1952: Unit is redesignated the 719th Transportation Battalion.

31 December 1965: Unit is deactivated in the Army Reserve in Houston, Texas.

16 September 2000: Unit is reactivated in Boston, Massachusetts as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control) (Echelon Above Corps).

Campaign Participation Credit: World War I battle streamer without inscription and World War II-EAME Rome-Arneo and North Appennines.<sup>18</sup>

# Heraldry

## 94th Regional Readiness Command



### Distinctive Unit Insignia

**Description:** A gold color metal and enamel device 1 1/8 inches (2.86 cm) in height overall consisting of a nonagon divided diagonally from lower left to upper right, the upper area light gray and the lower area black, bearing overall a blue oblong with long axis vertical, charged with a gold silhouette of the bust of a Puritan with a flintlock blunderbuss on his shoulder.

**Symbolism:** The diagonally divided gray and black background refers to the shoulder sleeve insignia worn by the 94th Infantry Division during World War II. The geometric four-sided figure commemorates the four European campaign honors. Blue is the color used for Infantry. The bust of the Puritan is from the shoulder sleeve insignia worn during the period 1923-1942 and 1956-1991. It represents the history and traditions of the area with which past and present organizations have always identified. The nine sides of the device and the four sides of the oblong also allude to the numerical designation of the unit.

**Background:** The distinctive unit insignia originally authorized for the 94th US Army Reserve Command on 4 Jun 1970; reassigned and authorized for 94th US Army Reserve Regional Support Command on 16 April 1996. The insignia redesignated effective 16 July 2003 for the US Army Reserve 94th Regional Readiness Command.<sup>19</sup>



## Chronology

- 27 March 2002 Parent unit (unit identification code (UIC) WSY4AA) alerted of possible mobilization in support of Operation Noble Eagle.<sup>20</sup>
- 9 August 2002 Thirty-seven unit personnel mobilized at home station: designated as Detachment 1 (UIC WSY4Y1); ordered to report to Fort Eustis, Virginia, mobilization station.<sup>21</sup>
- 10 August 2002 94th Regional Support Command hosts farewell ceremony for unit at Castle Island, Massachusetts.
- 12 August 2002 Unit arrives at Fort Eustis, Virginia.
- 10 September 2002 Unit assumes command and control of Task Force Nobel Escort.
- 16 November 2002 Task Force Nobel Eagle operations terminated at midnight.
- 17 November 2002 Unit begins new mission of starting a new operations cell within the Movement Control Center.
- June 2003 Twenty-three unit members extend their mobilization for an additional year of active duty; reorganized under a new derivative UIC, WYS4Y2.
- 20 June 2003 Thirteen unit members process for demobilization at Fort Eustis.

8 August 2003

Derivative UIC WSY4Y1 is officially demobilized.<sup>22</sup>



Arlington, VA, 11 September 2001. Command Sergeant Major Alex Lackey, Command Sergeant Major of the Army Reserve, communicates on a cell phone outside the Pentagon on 11 September. Smoke is still coming from the Pentagon. Inside the building when the plane hit, he exited the Pentagon, then formed a litter team and tried to rescue survivors. Prevented from re-entering the building because of the fire and the threat of an additional attack, he supported the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Regiment (“the Old Guard”) who rushed from Fort Myer to the Pentagon. (*Photo by Master Sergeant Jacqueline Gopie*)

# Operations


## Preparation and Mobilization

Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control), a subordinate unit of the 94th Regional Readiness Command and home stationed in Boston, Massachusetts, mobilized on 9 August 2003 in support of Operation Noble Eagle. The mission of the 719th was to relieve in place the 257th Transportation Battalion at Fort Eustis, Virginia.<sup>23</sup>

Mobilization for a Continental United States (CONUS) mission came as a surprise to the unit's leaders. According to Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, Sr., "The unit was war-traced (i.e., attached to a higher command) to the 3rd Transportation Agency Movement Control and we planned for an OCONUS (outside CONUS) mission, but to our surprise we were ordered to support the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) at Fort Eustis, Virginia. A CONUS mission was not in our war plans and the news of a stateside mission was greeted with mixed emotions. Some Soldiers wanted to show their support for the war effort and had looked forward to an OCONUS mission. Others felt unsure; some who had deployed in support of previous wars were somewhat relieved. One thing was for sure: everyone was going to give his/her best effort and was proud to be a Soldier supporting the war on terrorism."<sup>24</sup>

The 719th's total mobilization authorization was forty-seven Soldiers, but actually mobilized with thirty-seven Soldiers, more than twenty percent below what was considered adequate for their mission. The unit arrived at Fort Eustis on 12 August, just three days after receiving official mobilization notice, a feat made possible by its five month advance alert notification, and its relatively sparse mission essential equipment requirements. After ensuring their personal combat equipment was complete and ready, the 719th Soldiers loaded their privately owned vehicles and drove to Fort Eustis, Virginia, located on the eastern shore of

the James River, near the huge US Navy complex at Hampton Roads (Norfolk).



Map showing location of Fort Eustis, Virginia, and surrounding vicinity. ([www.eustis.army.mil](http://www.eustis.army.mil)).

## **Task Force Noble Eagle, Fort Eustis**

After a cursory mobilization validation training and subsequent assignment to the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the 719th immediately began training with the 257th to assume command and control of Task Force Noble Escort, a Department of the Army directive implemented as a result of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The task force provided armed security escort services to Security Risk Category I and II<sup>25</sup> sensitive arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E).<sup>26</sup> The unit's mission was an important one. "Our mission," explained Captain Susan E. Henderson, officer-in-charge of battalion operations, "was to plan, implement, and oversee the Military Security Escort Vehicle

(MSEV) teams that were escorting trucks [laden with] ammunition throughout the country. The MSEV mission began as a force protection solution for the safe delivery of . . . ammunition following the attacks on 9/11.” The scope of this mission turned out to be a far greater task than anyone at first expected, according to Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, the 719th’s top enlisted Soldier. “Our battalion was co-located in the operations center of MTMC,” he said, “and was tasked with command and control of three companies and eleven detachments, with a complement of 450 personnel located at twenty-two sites across the country.”<sup>27</sup> For a unit of only thirty-seven personnel, controlling that many Soldiers was a formidable task which entailed many essential details, as evidenced by the extensive logistical requirements. “The mission logistical support [for security personnel] was accomplished via contracting for needed services [including] billeting, rental car and cell phones,” explained the unit executive officer, Major William MacKinnon, Jr. “Several installation support agreements were established with the National Guard and the Air Force to provide billeting on military installations. Each Soldier was required to have a valid security clearance and a Bank of America [government credit] card. Because of the requirements, BOA [Bank of America] limits were set at \$5,000.”<sup>28</sup> Obtaining security clearances for the escort personnel and staff was not always possible and that created a large potential for impacting the mission. “Only a few of us had valid security clearances, which limited the number of personnel with access to the operations center,” wrote Owens. “Although we worked hard at getting most of our Soldiers the required clearance, some Soldiers weren’t U.S. citizens and that became a staffing problem. We encouraged Soldiers, who wished to do so, to apply for and take advantage of, the expedited citizenship program.”<sup>29</sup>

In addition to commanding and controlling such a large organization of drivers and security escorts, the 719th was also responsible for training new Soldiers from other units in escort missions. Staff Sergeant Grace Washburn-Neal, a Force Protection Team member recalled: “I was part of an inspection team that went to various locations in the United States to inspect our escort teams . . . We gave classes here at Fort Eustis on self-

defense [in] different scenario enactments to challenge each Soldier to see how they would handle an ambush [during] missions. We gave classes on the rules of engagement.”<sup>30</sup>

Just when it seemed the unit was reaching its best efficiency, Task Force Noble Eagle came to an end at midnight, 16 November 2002 after escort services were privatized and the transport of ammunition was handed over to commercial carriers.<sup>31</sup>

## **Movement Control Center**

The morning of 17 November 2002, dawned with a new mission for the Soldiers of the 719th. “Det 1, 719th Transportation battalion stood up the Movement Control Center, Military Traffic Management Command,<sup>32</sup> Fort Eustis, Virginia,” MacKinnon wrote in his unit’s historical narrative. “The primary mission of the Movement Control Center was to provide positive total asset visibility (TAV) and in-transit visibility (ITV) to combatant commanders in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.” In layman’s terms, that meant his unit would track cargo shipments in and out of the combat theater and keep commanders advised of their cargo’s status, anywhere in the world. This was done through a variety of technologically advanced electronic data storage, retrieval and tracking systems including Radio Frequency Identification<sup>33</sup> of cargo shipping containers on air, rail, highway or sea borne carriers. The 719th and approximately twenty government civilian personnel manned the Movement Control Center, commonly known as the MCC.<sup>34</sup>

A secondary mission of Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion, was to train and provide command and control of several other movement control units: the 625th Movement Control Team; and the 456th, 528th, and 977th Movement Control Detachments.

In March 2003, Henderson became a designated MTMC liaison officer and traveled to Scott Air Force base as a member of the newly-formed MTMC Surface Cell; its name indicating it dealt primarily with the tracking and movement of cargo by surface transportation as opposed to air transport. Her role in the twelve-Soldier team was to provide surface transportation expertise to the command.

In the meantime, the US offensive in Iraq began in earnest. Several detachments, then under the command of the 719th, deployed to ports in Kuwait. “There was much concern about the detachments getting caught up in the 365 days of ‘boots on ground’ (BOG) deployment policy as they had already completed five months of active duty in the states and were not looking forward to additional active duty time,” wrote Owens. “Morale was very low but as time went on things got better and the detachments were able to REFRAD (released from active duty) after one year of total active duty time.”<sup>35</sup>

## **Demobilization**

By June 2003, the 719th’s demobilization was close at hand and the detachment members began preparing to return to home station for release from active duty. The unit had done a good job and was well-liked in the MCC. Everyone in the 719th had the opportunity to extend their mobilization an extra year. A little more than half of the unit’s Soldiers accepted that offer and stayed on until August 2004. The thirteen Soldiers who did not extend reported for demobilization processing at Fort Eustis on 20 June 2003. They were released that Friday at 1600 hours (4:00 pm.) and returned to home station on 28 June to begin home station activities related to the end of mobilization. On 8 July, those Soldiers began thirty days terminal leave, and were finally released from active duty, effective 8 August 2003.<sup>36</sup>

Those Soldiers of Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion, who extended reorganized under a new derivative UIC (WSY4Y2) as Detachment 2, 719th Transportation Battalion, and continued the missions begun the past twelve months. Many of them deployed to Kuwaiti ports in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. They would eventually follow their friends and team mates who demobilized a year earlier, suffering no casualties for all they experienced.<sup>37</sup>

## **Lessons Learned/Observations**

The unit's operational issues became part of the Military Traffic Management's after action review. There were several lessons learned and observations included in the 719th's own after action review. For example, the force structure the unit used did not completely support the mission. Being short of three crucial military occupational specialties (MOSs) endangered the 719th's ability to complete its mission. At the time the mobilization process did not authorize cross-leveling. The plan to fill the unit at the power projection platform did not happen. The authorization for units to cross-level mission critical skills at the alert stage remedied the problem.<sup>38</sup>

The fact that several of the unit's Soldiers had reserved Non-Commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and Officer Education System (OES) schoolhouse seats was another issue. MTMC's agreement to release those Soldiers to attend NCOES/OES depended on the operational tempo (OPTEMPO). Whose responsibility, the active Army or the reserve, it was to pay for the Soldier's travel to the school (TDY) became troublesome. The problem has since been resolved.

The fact that there was no formal command and control plan for the 719th's subordinate units at home station was another issue. Upon mobilization the 719th deployed with five AGR (active guard/reserve) and five active component Soldiers. The unit administrator (UA) deployed in her TPU (troop program unit) position. Seventy-five percent of full time unit support (FTUS) was deployed leaving two FTUS to support seven units. The entire FTUS logistics and training structure was deployed. As a result, the unit developed a makeshift structure, minus any formalization. Making matters worse was the fact that the gaining unit was also employed in support of Operation Noble Eagle. A formalized rear command and control plan was reduced to a memorandum of understanding.



The Soldier readiness process (SRP) became an issue when the stations were closed before it was completed. The given demobilizing unit's chain of command was then responsible for ensuring that all Soldiers were cleared properly. The Mobilization Unit Processing Center (MUIC) failed to identify issues promptly. The unit administrator had too many assigned units. The recommendation called for a daily IPR with the MUIC. Units then could be proactive in completing the SRP.

Correct completion of DD 214s was a problem. One requirement was for Soldiers to submit DD 214 worksheets ninety days before demobilization. The Soldiers reviewed working copies of the DD 214 forty-eight hours before leaving home station. They were told that making corrections to their DD 214 would delay movement to home station. Soldiers were advised to submit corrections through channels at home station. The recommended solution called for better prior coordination with the MUIC to identify DD 214 documentation requirements.

A related problem concerned awards. Awards were submitted through the chain of command in March 2003 for the demobilizing Soldiers. All awards were not received until January 2005. The awards were not on the DD 214s. There was no award higher than a Meritorious Service Medal. As stated in the after action review, the awards process should be simplified and placed on a "time sensitive tracking system."

Late officer evaluation reports (OERs) and non-commissioned office evaluation reports (NCOERs) posed a problem. Close out OERs and NCOERs were submitted forty-five days before demobilization. Their finalization was delayed. According to the after action review, their timely submission and processing required a "time sensitive tracking system."<sup>39</sup>

## **From Soldier's Perspective**

“I have been in the Army since 1996. The Army has changed so much. The discipline seems to be lacking in a lot of ways. I would just like to conclude that my heart goes out to those soldiers and their families who lost loved ones in this War on Terrorism. I was not one of the soldiers who went downrange.”

“It is hard to run a unit one specific way when you have 3 or 4 Commanders who do things another way.”

“This mission was a different experience for me – perhaps one of the best years of my life.”

“If there was something that I could change while I was on this mobilization it would be to make sure that all soldiers are taken care of regardless of Rank. I feel that at times when units get mobilized as [a] whole the higher echelon only looks out for themselves.”

“The personnel of the 719th Bn [battalion] who had worked in the COC [command operations center] had the unique experience of being involved in supporting fighting soldiers at the strategic level during war. The knowledge gained by them is invaluable.”<sup>40</sup>

## Photographs



Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control) Soldiers conduct nuclear, biological and chemical common task training at Fort Eustis, Virginia. 2002.



Lieutenant Colonel Joe McParland, commander of the 719th, exits the gas chamber during nuclear, biological and chemical training at Fort Eustis, Virginia. 2003.



A rough terrain cargo handler (RTCH) maneuvers a container into position for the 719th. 2002.



Here, a forklift transports an ISU-90 (internal airlift/helicopter slingable container unit). 2002.



Major William MacKinnon, Jr., poses in front of the Military Traffic Management Command's operations center. 2003.



Members of the 719th stand at attention during their farewell ceremony, Fort Eustis, Virginia. 2003.

# NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Article, “Notable Quotables,” *Army Reserve Magazine*, Volume 49, Number 1, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Article, “September 11 attacks,” [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September\\_11\\_attacks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11_attacks), no date; 311th Military History Detachment (MHD), *The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New Your City*, p. xv; 90th Military History Detachment, *The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon*, p. xvii; and Article, “The September 11 Attack on the Pentagon,” <http://pentagon.spacelist.org/>, no date. The 189 killed at the Pentagon included 58 passengers, 4 flight attendants, both pilots, and 125 in the Pentagon.

<sup>3</sup> Article, “Flight 93 National Memorial,” <http://www.nps.gov/flni/parkmgmt/missionstatement.htm>, no date,

<sup>4</sup> Statement, President George W. Bush, Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html>, 11 Sep 01.

<sup>5</sup> Article, “Operation Noble Eagle- Details, Reservists to provide homeland defense,” <http://usagovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa091601a.htm>, 16 Sep 01.

<sup>6</sup>Testimony, Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement before the Subcommittee Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, , <https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/AROverview.htm>, p.2, 13 Feb 02. The 90th Military History Detachment (MHD) published *The Role of the Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: The Pentagon*, which included a number of interviews detailing the actions of Soldiers and other personnel at the Pentagon following the attack. The 311th produced a complimentary volume on the attacks at the World Trade Center, *The Role of te Army Reserve in the 11 September Attacks: New York City*.

<sup>7</sup> Article, Lt. Col. Randy Pullen, “Honors For Hero of Pentagon Attack,” *Army Reserve Magazine*, Summer 2002, pp. 44-45.

<sup>8</sup> President George Bush, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason Of Certain Terrorists Attacks, 14 Sep 01, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-14.4.html>.

<sup>9</sup> Executive Order-Call to Active Duty, Complete text of Executive Order authorizing call-up of reserves,” <http://usagovinfo.about.com/library/bills/bleonoble.htm>, 14 Sep 01,

<sup>10</sup> Article, “Operation Noble Eagle,” <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/noble-eagle.htm>, no date.

<sup>11</sup> Article, “Operation Noble Eagle- Details, Reservists to provide homeland defense,” <http://usagovinfo.about.com/library/weekly/aa091601a.htm>, 16 Sep 01.

<sup>12</sup> Historical Summary, Kathryn Roe Coker, *The 2002 Army Reserve Historical Summary*, p. xxix.

<sup>13</sup> Testimony, Lieutenant General Thomas Plewes, “Army Reserve Overview,” Statement before the Subcommittee Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 13 Feb

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02, <https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/AROverview>, htm, p.2 and Article, Linda Kozaryn, "Army Reserve Duty Has 'Changed Forever,'"

<https://usarcintra/cioweb/CdrsCorner/ArmyResDutycgmsg.htm>; 22 Jan 02.

<sup>14</sup> Article, Lt. Gen. Thomas Plewes, "From the Commander: 9-11 Plus Six Months," *Army Reserve Magazine*, Spring 2002, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Briefing Card Update, Major Dahms, Public Affairs and Liaison Directorate, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), 20 Dec 01.

<sup>17</sup> Chart, Reserve Components: Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom, Contingency Tracking System Daily Processing Files, Defense Manpower Data Center, 7 Oct 08.

<sup>18</sup> *719th Transportation Battalion (MC) Unit History*, Farewell Ceremony Program, 10 Aug 02, unit history file, Global War on Terrorism Collection, US Army Reserve Historical Research Collection, Office of Army Reserve History, US Army Reserve Command. Unless otherwise stated, all information is from this source.

<sup>19</sup> Heraldry, US Army Institute of Heraldry, subject: 94th Regional Readiness Command, 16 Jul 03.

<sup>20</sup> Memorandum, Colonel Gary R. Engel, Military Traffic Management Command, subject: Request for Alert of United States Army Reserve Units for Possible Mobilization for Operation Noble Eagle, 27 Mar 02.

<sup>21</sup> Permanent Orders 199-1 (Change 1), Headquarters, First United States Army, subject: Mobilization of Army Reserve Units, 18 Jul 02.

<sup>22</sup> Demobilization Order 127-04, Department of the Army, subject: Demobilization Order 127-04 ONE/OEF/OIF, 140044Z Jul 04.

<sup>23</sup> Historical narrative, Major William MacKinnon, Jr., subject: 719th mobilization, no date.

<sup>24</sup> Personal narrative, Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, Sr., subject: 719th Transportation Battalion mobilization history, 3 May 04.

<sup>25</sup> Army Regulation 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, Appendix B, Sensitive Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) Security Risk Categorization, defines Category I AA&E items as missiles and rockets and Category II AA&E items as light automatic weapons.

<sup>26</sup> Historical narrative, Major William MacKinnon, Jr., subject: 719th mobilization, no date.

<sup>27</sup> Personal narrative, Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, Sr., subject: 719th Transportation Battalion mobilization history, 3 May 04.

<sup>28</sup> Historical narrative, Major William MacKinnon, Jr., subject: 719th mobilization, no date.

<sup>29</sup> Personal narrative, Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, Sr., subject: 719th Transportation Battalion mobilization history, 3 May 04.



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<sup>30</sup>Personal narrative, Staff Sergeant Grace Marie Washburn-Neal, 719th Transportation Battalion, subject: personal experiences, no date.

<sup>31</sup> Personal narrative, Captain Susan E. Henderson, subject: Autobiographical sketch for Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), no date.

<sup>32</sup>The Military Traffic Management Command changed its name on 1 Jan 04 to the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command. This change was made to reflect its role in deploying the forces.

<sup>33</sup>Radio frequency Identification (RFID) is an electronic identification method, relying on stored and remotely retrieved data using RFID tags or transponders. An RFID tag can be attached to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves. Chip-based RFID tags contain silicon chips and antennae. Passive tags require no internal power source, whereas active tags require a power source

<sup>34</sup>Personal narrative, Captain Susan E. Henderson, subject: Autobiographical sketch for Army Reserve Soldiers mobilized for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), no date.

<sup>35</sup>Personal narrative, Command Sergeant Major Bernard M. Owens, Sr., subject: 719th Transportation Battalion mobilization history, 3 May 04.

<sup>36</sup>Historical narrative, Major William MacKinnon, Jr., subject: 719th mobilization, no date.

<sup>37</sup>Telephone interview, Major MacKinnon with Mr. Dennis Hatcher, subject: personal experiences, 13 Feb 07.

<sup>38</sup> After Action Review, subject: Detachment 1, 719th Transportation Battalion (Movement Control), mobilization and deployment, no date. Much of the text is verbatim from the report.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> These quotations are from Soldier autobiographies.